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INTRODUCTION.
It should be mentioned from the outset that this study 
is only indirectly concerned with Indonesian History proper, 
as it deals solely with the activities of the Dutch in the 
Central West- and East-Coast area of Sumatra during the 
period 1816-1871• The objective of this investigation is to 
provide an account - and if possible a reasonable explanation - 
of the extension of Dutch political and economic control in 
that part of Sumatra, However, in order to provide a reason­
able explanation I have found it necessary to examine the 
subject not only in terms of local issues but also in the 
wider context of European history, especially the history of 
nineteenth century Anglo-Dutch relations. Therefore this 
thesis purports to be an integrated account of Dutch expansion 
in Central Sumatra, which to my knowledge has not been attempted 
so far either in 7 lish or in Dutch, In fact it has primarily
been Dr. Tarling*s recent work on British policy in the 
Malacca Straits and the Peninsula which has given me the idea 
for this thesis, i,e. to add to his work by investigating the 
actions of the other contender in the area: Holland,
(1) Tarling Nicholas British Policy in the Malay Peninsula and 
Archipelago, 1824-1071* (Journal of the Malayan Branch of 
the Royal Asiatic Society, Volume XXX, part 3» No,179*) 
October, 1957*
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But I wish to point out immediately that my work cannot 
claim the same degree of exhaustiveness and finesse as Dr« 
Tarling,s for the reason that I have not been able to draw 
directly on archival material in Holland and Indonesia,
Although I do not wish to underestimate the dangers posed to 
historical research by selections and compilations of documents, 
I hope to show in the following precis of the story that the 
printed sources which I was able to use are a good enough 
sample on which to base valid conclusions.
Immediately on the return of the Dutch to the East-Indies 
in 1816 Sumatra figured prominently in the disputes which arose 
with the British authorities about the restitution of the 
colonies. An Anglo-Dutch Convention of August, 1814 restoring 
to Holland some of its former colonial empire was particularly 
vague as to what territories exactly were to be returned to 
the Dutch; and moreover the Convention did not settle any of 
the outstanding pre-war disputes which had been caused by 
British demands for a greater share of the East-Indian trade 
and a post at the Southern entrance to the Malacca Straits, 
Finally in March, 1824 a new treaty was concluded in which 
Holland was given dominion over the whole of Sumatra with the 
exception of Achin, Considering that any territorial expansion 
at this time by a non-British nation would be dependant on the 
fiat of Britain, the most important power in South East Asia,
iv.
I found it of great importance to the story to investigate 
why and how Sumatra came to he recognized as a Dutch dominion* 
The published source material at my disposal provided 
a practically full coverage of the period 1814-1824; and I 
did not feel handicapped by any gaps; at least not in regard 
to the more important issues* I have made extensive use of 
the compilations of documentary material by van der Kemp and 
van Deventer; the papers and correspondence of Elout who was 
Commissioner-General, plenipotentiary at the London talks in 
1820, and Minister for Colonies, successively; the papers and 
correspondence of the Minister of State Falck; correspondence 
of the Commissioners-General and Governor-General van der 
Capellen; papers and correspondence of high officials such 
as Muntinghe and de Graaff; reports and minutes of the London 
negotiations of 1820 and 1824; and correspondence and papers of 
Canning, Castlereagh and Raffles*
Suspicion of British intentions to retain a political and 
commercial hold on the Archipelago - which Holland considered 
as its sphere of influence - was aroused almost immediately on 
the arrival of the Dutch in Batavia in 1816, when Fendall, the 
British Lieutenant-Governor of Java, retarded the handing over 
of the colonies and i.a* stipulated that Holland was to recog­
nize treaties concluded with Indonesian princes during the 
English interregnum* This initial suspicion was raised to a
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high pitch when in 1817 it became known that Raffles had 
been appointed as Lieutenant-Governor of Bencoolen, a 
British colony in Western Sumatra* Though Raffles* anti- 
Dutch sentiments were well known, I have been able to estab­
lish that the Batavian authorities knew already before 
Raffles* arrival about his plans for establishing a new 
British empire in the Bast-Indies, which was to include the 
whole of Sumatra* Consequently in order to anticipate 
Raffles the Dutch colonial authorities — despite their limited 
military and financial resources - tried to occupy as many 
points in the Archipelago as possible*
Raffles denied the Dutch claim to the whole of the 
Archipelago and soon after his return to the Indies in 1818 
attempted to establish British influence in Sumatra, Borneo 
and Riouw. The actions of Raffles, however, added considerably 
to two major difficulties which confronted the Dutch on their 
return to the East-Indies in 1816* Firstly how to re-establish 
their political prestige which had been non-existent in most 
of the Archipelago for nearly twenty years; and secondly how 
to regain a footing in the East-Indies trade which by then 
had practically become a British monopoly*
The Batavian government feared that if it did not react 
strongly to Raffles* challenge the little prestige which it 
enjoyed among the Indonesian princes would decrease even
vi*
further* Therefore Raffles had to he stopped and all traces 
of previous British influence in the Archipelago had to he 
obliterated*
Furthermore Batavia realized that a British colony in 
South Sumatra or anywhere else close to Java would he a 
serious threat to its grandiose plans for making that island 
into the most important entrepot in the whole of Asia* It 
should he noted that Holland or for that matter any other 
nation at that time was not in a position to compete with the 
British on equal terms for the East-Indian trade. The British 
merchant in Java virtually enjoyed a monopoly for two reasons* 
Firstly owing to superior production techniques in the home 
country he was able to undersell any other competitor. Secondly 
the fact that British ships traded directly between England 
and the colonies, while Dutch ships mostly had to come out in 
ballast, as Holland had little to sell, caused British shipping 
rates to he lower, enabling the English trader to pay higher 
prices for colonial produce.
Under those circumstances Dutch colonial trade could 
hardly he expected to prosper; and in 1818 a moderate tariff 
was introduced in order to give Dutch shipping and trade a 
reasonable amount of protection.
However, the Batavian government feared that any measure 
to protect Dutch shipping and trade would he in vain if the
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British succeeded in setting up a free-trade port close to 
Java*
It was mainly Raffles who drew the attention of the Dutch 
to the potential importance of Sumatra, where at Semanka Bay 
(Sunda Straits) he intended to establish a British free-trade 
port, which he was convinced would soon surpass Batavia in 
importance* Consequently in order to stop this threat by the 
British to the prosperity of Java, the Dutch stronghold in the 
Archipelago, the colonial authorities repeatedly suggested to 
The Hague that a new convention should be concluded with 
Britain, which would leave the whole of Sumatra in the Dutch 
sphere of influence in return for the surrender of the remnants 
of Holland’s previous empire on the Indian continent.
In the meantime vigorous Dutch protests in Calcutta and 
London had resulted in a disavowal of Raffles’ actions by the 
British government. But the disputes between Raffles and 
Batavia had brought to the fore again the pre-war demands by 
Britain for a larger share of the East-Indian trade and a 
settlement South of Pulu Penang*
Although British trade had not suffered any ill effects 
so far the Calcutta government had become suspicious of the 
expansionary moves of the Dutch and their attempts at protec­
tion* Subsequently at the end of 1818 Calcutta ordered 
Raffles to conclude a treaty with Achin in Northern Sumatra
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and to occupy Riouw or another suitable position at the 
Southern end of the Straits of Malacca in order to safeguard 
the sea route to China and to protect British trade in the 
Archipelago. Raffles, who found Riouw already occupied by 
Dutch forces, planted the British flag on the island of Singa­
pore in January, 1819*
Batavia protested vigorously to what it termed a violation 
of Dutch territory, but refrained from talcing any direct action 
as it expected that also this last move by Raffles would be 
disapproved of in London. But the Dutch clearly misjudged the 
intent of British policy in the Straits of Malacca, which since 
pre-war days had been to secure control of this vital seaway to 
China. To the dismay of Holland - which considered it as another 
example of Albion*s perfidy - the English government in 1820 
made the recognition of Singapore a condition sine qua non 
before commencing negotiations for the settlement of the 
disputes in the East-Indies. Moreover England made it clear 
that it would not stand for a mere permissive toleration of 
British trade, but that it wanted positive concessions.
The Dutch negotiators readily agreed to trade concessions 
but refused to give in on Singapore. The negotiations broke 
down and were not taken up again till 1824, when finally on 
17th March a new treaty was signed.
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The treaty emphasized the principles of non-interference 
in trade, most favoured nation treatment, and stipulated that 
in the respective colonies duties were not to he higher than 
100% above those levied on national ships and subjects. 
Furthermore Britain obtained the Dutch colonies in India, 
Malacca, Singapore and a guarantee of non-interference in the 
Malayan Peninsula, while in exchange the Dutch obtained Riouw, 
the Carrimons and Billiton. Holland was also given dominion 
over Sumatra - with the exception of Achin - and obtained the 
British possessions in that island with a guarantee of non­
interference.
Although the Dutch had been successful in removing 
British influence from Sumatra their main purpose in doing so - 
i.e. to protect the prosperity of Java - was defeated by the 
recognition of Singapore as a British port, which was in an 
even better position to trade with the Archipelago than 
Southern Sumatra.
In fact the interest shown by the Dutch in Sumatra during 
the period 1816-1821+ was largely of a strategic nature and it 
was only the port of Padang at the V/est-Coast, which because of 
its coffee exports, was considered to be of some economic 
importance.
Although the direct political influence of the Dutch East 
India Company at the West—Coast of Sumatra had never extended 
any further than the narrow strip of territory between the
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C e n tra l Sum atran m ountain range (B uk it B a risan )  and th e  c o a s t ,  
th e  Dutch soon a f t e r  t h e i r  r e tu r n  to  W est-Sumatra in  1819 t r i e d  
to  ex tend  t h e i r  c o n tro l in to  th e  h in te r la n d  o f Padang, i*e* 
Minangkabau# In  th e  second s e c t io n  I  have a ttem pted  to  e s ta b ­
l i s h  why th e  B a tav ian  government -  d e s p ite  i t s  in c re a s in g  
f in a n c ia l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  Java  -  decided  on p o l i t i c a l  expansion  
in  West Sum atra and to  d e sc r ib e  to  what e x te n t th e  Dutch had 
reached  t h e i r  o b je c t iv e s  by 1830*
The Dutch would p robab ly  have been  co n ten t -  a t  l e a s t  f o r  
some tim e to  come -  to  con tinue  th e  p r a c t ic e  of th e  Company in  
c o n c e n tra t in g  on t r a d in g  a c t i v i t i e s  a t  th e  co ast and le a v in g  th e  
i n t e r i o r  u n touched , i f  no t a c i v i l  war in  Minangkabau, which 
a d v e rse ly  a f f e c te d  th e  p ro s p e r i ty  o f Padang, had caused them to  
in te r f e r e *
S ince  th e  beg inn ing  o f th e  cen tu ry  a f a n a t ic  Muslim s e c t ,  
c a l le d  th e  P a d r is ,  had t r i e d  to  convert the  M inangkabaus, whose 
Muslim f a i t h  was r a th e r  unorthodox , to  t h e i r  views and way o f 
l i f e #  The P a d r i movement, however, was more th a n  an a ttem p t a t  
r e l ig io u s  refo rm  and c u t deep ly  in to  th e  t r a d i t io n a l  p a t te r n s  
o f Minangkabau s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  l i f e ,  as i t  t r i e d  to  a b o lis h  
such s p e c i f i e i a l l y  Minangkabau i n s t i t u t i o n s  as th e  m a tr i l in e a l  
system  on th e  grounds th a t  i t  c o n f l ic te d  w ith  th e  Muslim law* 
Minangkabau s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  was based on a compromise 
betw een custom ary law (a d a t)  and th e  Muslim law and n e i th e r  one
nor th e  o th e r  dominated# T herefo re  the th e o c ra t ic  id e a s  ox the
xi«
Padris, who as strict Mohammedans did not differentiate 
between Church and State, caused a great deal of opposition 
from the strongly tradition conscious Minangkabau people«
When finally some of the Padri leaders resorted to violence 
and tried to terrorize the peoi>le into accepting their doctrines 
and leadership, a civil war broke out in which thousands of 
people were killed and agricultural production and trade were 
nearly brought to a standstill«
The most important motive for Dutch intervention in 
Minangkabau was to protect the trade of Padang which was 
suffering considerably from the ravages of the Padris« The 
Batavian government - plagued by financial difficulties in 
Java and disappointed at the unprofitability of most of its 
other possessions - was particularly sensitive about the pros­
perity of Padang which was considered as a potential source of 
profit owing to its increasing coffee exports«
In addition to the concern for the prosperity of Padang, 
the Dutch feared that if they did not take action in Minangkabau, 
the British might stir up trouble and try to draw the trade from 
the interior to Bencoolen and their other West-Coast settlements« 
The suspicion of Raffles was still very real and the Dutch had 
become rather sceptical about the assurances of the British 
government, especially after it steadily refused to abandon 
Raffles* settlement at Singapore*
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Furthermore the available sources give the impression 
that Batavia was eager to take the opportunity of taking 
control of a rich and fertile country at comparatively little 
cost, as it was expected that the Minangkabaus would rise 
against the hated Padris immediately on the arrival of Dutch 
troops in the country.
However, when the Dutch forces clashed repeatedly with the 
Padris and the population in general showed a great deal of 
apathy, it soon became obvious that the Resident of Padang 
whose reports had been based mainly on information from anti- 
Padri sources had led himself and the Batavian government astray 
in the assessment of the situation in Minangkabau. Contrary 
to expectation the whole of the country was practically under 
Padri rule and the Dutch, who had envisaged only a short cam­
paign, in fact had blundered into a ma^or conflict, which they 
could ill afford at a time when the financial situation in 
Java was very precarious and their available resources were 
already severely strained by costly expeditions to other parts 
of the Archipelago where rebellion had broken out.
But a withdrawal from Minangkabau was not feasible because 
it would damage even more the already low prestige of the Dutch 
government in the Archipelago. Moreover, attempts to come to 
terms with the Padris, who were at the top of their strength 
and who were waging a holy war against the European unbelievers
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were doomed to failure. Consequently the only way open to the 
Dutch was to take the offensive. But the military strength of 
the Padris was far greater than had been expected and after 
two years of hard fightlng( 1822/23) the Dutch forces had only 
managed to establish a strong foothold in Minangkabau.
However, by the end of 1823 Batavia, which was forced to 
cut down its expenditure in order to avoid a complete financial 
collapse, ordered a temporary halt to the Dutch offensive in 
Minangkabau. But this temporary measure became permanent when 
in 1826 a special Commissioner-General, who was sent from Holl­
and to deal with the financial crisis in the colonies, ordered 
stringent economy measures and prohibited any military expansion 
or intervention in the islands outside Java.
Consequently the Dutch were not able to push any further 
into Minangkabau, but instead tried to consolidate their position 
by building a defence line and by concluding treaties with the 
various Padri regions. Initially the West-Coast authorities 
managed to maintain the status quo, but when after 1826 a 
considerable number of troops had to be withdrawn in order to 
deal with the rebellion of Diponegara in Java (1823-1830) the 
military situation gradually deteriorated.
In the meantime the Batavian government which initially had 
been uncertain about keeping Minangkabau occupied after the 
Padris were exterminated had apparently become impressed by the
revenue potential of the rich and populous valleys of the
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Sumatran interior, and at the beginning of 1823 decided to 
remain at least in part of the country# The system of admin— 
istration which the Dutch subsequently tried to introduce was 
based on Javanese conditions. Especially the fact that 
indigenous leaders and officials were to be appointed by the 
Dutch authorities was resented by the Minangkabaus, who unlike 
the Javanese were used to more democratic procedures of govern­
ment# Also attempts to introduce the Javanese land rent system 
and indirect taxes on opium and salt in a country where taxation 
in any form had hitherto been unknown, and the continuous 
demands for unpaid forced labour for roads and fortifications, 
together with the general disappointment at the apparent 
inability of the Dutch to defeat the Padris, caused a great 
deal of dissension in the government districts#
By 1829 the military position of the Dutch had greatly 
deteriorated and a complete collapse was only prevented by the 
dissension among the Padris themselves# The authority of the 
government hardly reached further than the guns of its forts, 
while its prestige was discredited by both Padris and anti- 
Padris alike#
The failure of the West-Coast authorities to reach the 
original objective of establishing peace and order in Minangkabau 
should be seen in the wider context of general Dutch policy in 
this period or rather the lack of it# The Batavian government 
since 1816 had been concerned to break with the earlier practices
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of the Dutch East India Company and had tried to introduce 
a more liberal system of administration and government* However, 
owing to the unassailable position of British trade and commerce 
in the Indies and also because of a great deal of financial 
bungling the colonial government in 1824 found itself at the 
verge of bankruptcy. During the subsequent dispute about the 
best system to make the colonies a profitable proposition — 
the sole raison d*etre of overseas possessions at this time — 
administration had to be carried on without the aid of a 
clearly defined line of policy, which resulted in haphazard 
government.
The sources used for this period do not show any significant 
gaps, at least not in regard to the Dutch point of view. Al­
though I was able to use some accounts by Padri leaders those 
sources were lacking in detail and on many points Dutch accounts 
of the Padri movement had to be taken for granted.
The most important source used was the work of E.B. Kielstra, 
who wrote a detailed story of the Dutch in West Sumatra during 
the period 1819-1880. Kielstra*s essays are actually detailed 
compilations of documents - often reproduced in full - inter­
spersed with a narrative; and they contain a wide cover ranging 
from correspondence of village officials to Cabinet minutes in 
The Hague. Another important source used was the work of De 
Stuers who was Resident of the West—Coast from 1825 to 1829*
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In addition a great deal of information was gathered from the 
sources mentioned for the first section#
A major change in Dutch colonial policy occurred during 
the years 1829-1830# Proposals for the development of colonial 
agriculture by means of encouraging private investment and the 
settlement of European planters were set aside, mainly because 
the results of such a policy were considered to be too slow in 
forthcoming. Instead the King accepted a plan submitted by 
General van den Bosch for an extension of the East-India Com­
pany* s system of forced deliveries of export produce# This 
produce was to be consigned to the Nerderlandsehe Handelsmaats- 
chappij (N#H#M#)9 a privileged trading body set up in 1824 
largely on the initiative of the King for the purpose of 
combatting more successfully foreign competition in the Java 
trade#
Van den Bosch considered the colonies purely as a business 
venture and consequently his objective was to obtain large 
profits with the smallest possible overheads# This principle 
is clearly reflected in his policy concerning the islands 
outside Java, i#e# the so-called Outer—Possessions# Van den 
Bosch severely criticized the hitherto haphazard attempts of 
the Batavian authorities to extend Dutch influence throughout 
the whole of the Archipelago, and he laid down the definite 
mile that the effectiveness of Dutch control in those islands
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should be proportionate to the profitability of the territory 
concerned. Furthermore, van den Bosch argued, the rather 
limited resources of the Dutch should not be dissipated over 
the whole of the East-Indies, but they were to be concentrated 
in areas which showed promise of immediate profit. In this 
category he included first of all Java and then the spice islands 
of Banda, tin producing Banka; and also Sumatra:
M,,an island that accounts for at least 40 shiploads 
of products annually and that can be an outlet for 
much industrial produce,••••• .............
The rest of the Archipelago was to be left alone for the time
being.
In respect of Sumatra van den Bosch argued that to base 
Dutch influence in that island on military conquest would be 
futile, Dutch control of Sumatra would only remain unchallenged 
and stable if the Sumatrans were made to realize that their own 
interests were closely tied up with those of Holland, Therefore 
administrative officials should try to encourage the known 
inclination and capacity of the Sumatrans for trade and commerce, 
but they were to refrain from compulsion in order not to upset 
the strongly democratic susceptibilities of the indigenous 
people, which would only result in resentment and ill feeling 
towards the Dutch government.
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Although initially unwilling to extend Dutch influence 
into the interior of the island, van den Bosch soon realized 
that merely occupying the important trading centres at the 
coast would not be sufficient to obtain the greatest possible 
benefit from Sumatra. As productive capacity was kept below 
par by the continuous ravages of the Padris, and in addition 
much of the coffee crop found its way to Singapore instead of 
the Dutch controlled ports at the Western seaboard, van den 
Bosch decided that the whole of Minangkabau was to be occupied.
Consequently in June, 1832 the Dutch forces started an all 
out drive and by the end of October they had wiped out Padri 
resistance in the whole of Minangkabau.
However, in January, 1833 Minangkabau was in full rebellion 
and the Dutch forces which were thinly spread over the whole of 
the country were forced to withdraw to their original positions.
By June, 1833 most of the country, with the exception of the 
Padri stronghold of Bondjol, had been brought under control again.
In October, 1833 van den Bosch, who attributed the wide­
spread anti Dutch sentiment to the irresponsible actions of the 
military and oppressive administrative measures such as taxation 
and unpaid compulsory labour, devised a system of administration 
which was designed to make the presence of the Dutch less
resented.
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The main task assigned to the administration was to 
convince the Minangkabaus that the benefits of Dutch rule far 
outweighed its burdens* Therefore indigenous autonomous rights 
could not be interfered with unless this was absolutely necessary 
for the preservation of peace and order* Taxation and unpaid 
forced labour were abolished forthwith and in order to compensate 
for the loss in government revenue customs duties would be 
increased, a move which hardly would be noticed by the Minang— 
kabaus* Furthermore the production of export crops was to be 
encouraged not by compulsory methods but by a system of monetary 
incentives and improved communications* The Minangkabaus were 
to be offered a sufficiently high minimum price for their coffee, 
which firstly would ensure higher production and secondly would 
cut out trade with Singapore as all coffee would be at the 
government’s disposal* In addition roads were to be improved 
in order to enable horse cart transport between the highlands 
and the coast; and the N.H.M. would be induced to set up depots 
at various points in Minangkabau where coffee could be exchanged 
for such commodities as textiles, salt and opium*
Subsequently the West-Coast authorities informed the popul­
ation of the government’s intentions in the so-called Plakaat— 
Pandjang (lit. Long Decree) in which a pledge was given of non­
interference with autonomous rights and the Minangkabaus were 
exhorted to co-operate with the plan to increase production and
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trade which was not only designed to increase the government1 s 
prosperity but also that of their own.
But it took a number of years before any serious attempts 
could be made to put van den Bosch’s policy directives into 
practice, because between 1833 and 1838 the Dutch were forced 
to spend most of their energy and resources in attempting to 
conquer the Padri fortress of Bondjol« One of the main causes 
of this military setback was apart from the valour and skill of 
the defenders and the incapability of the Dutch officers, the 
dissension among the Dutch themselves« Effective military action 
against Bondjol was greatly hampered by the sharp difference of 
opinion which existed between the Resident and the military 
commander as to how Bondjol was to be brought into line«
Finally in August, 1837 Bondjol fell; and during the next 
three years the Dutch continued their drive Northwards in order 
to exterminate the remnants of Padri resistance« During the 
course of those operations a detachment of troops which after 
the fall of Dalu-Dalu - the last Padri stronghold - was sent 
in pursuit of a number of Padri leaders, reached the East-Coast 
of Sumatra at the confluence of the Panel and Bila rivers where 
a small post was established«
After the last pockets of Padri resistance had been wiped 
out the Dutch forces established firm control in the Northern 
part of the West-Coast, where during 1839/40 the ports of 
Baros, Tapus and Singkel were occupied after fierce resistance
by the Achinese,
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Thus, by 181+0 van den Bosch*s objective of bringing the 
whole of Sumatra - with the exception of Achin - under Dutch 
control was nearing its completion* The remainder of the 
island to be occupied were the Batta-lands Proper and the East- 
Coast sultanate of Siak and dependencies*
The source material for this section did not present any 
great problems, as a great deal of archival material dealing 
with this period has been published* In addition to Kielstra 
most important were the published papers of van den Bosch and 
his published correspondence with Baud, the Colonial Minister, 
and Governor-General de Eerens. I have also made extensive use 
of an official history - edited by Colijn - of Dutch policy in 
the Outer-Possessions during the nineteenth century, which 
contains many valuable documents* Furthermore the memoirs of 
Lange and van der Hart - two high ranking army officers - and of 
Francis - a high official - proved to contain a great deal of 
valuable information*
By the time the Padris - the first obstacle to van den 
Bosch’s Sumatra policy — had been exterminated, another and 
more formidable barrier to Dutch expansion in Sumatra was 
raised by Britain*
The Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824 had failed from its incep­
tion to fulfil its purported objective of finally settling both 
commercial and territorial disputes between the two countries
in the Archipelago*
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Attempts by the Batavian authorities to provide effective 
protection to Dutch trade and industry caused a deterioration 
of relations with Britain, especially after 1830, when the 
international position of Holland - owing to the Belgian 
question - had weakened a great deal.
During the ^Thirties Holland had great difficulty in staying 
afloat financially largely because of the difficulties with 
Belgium, and therefore the Dutch were opposed even more than 
previously to grant trade concessions to the British, The Home 
country needed all the financial help it could obtain from the 
colonies in order to pay for the large standing army it was 
forced to keep during the years 1830-1839 and in order to cope 
with the ever increasing debt.
In addition the Belgian revolution and the subsequent 
dissolution of the union with Holland resulted in a major prob­
lem in regard to colonial trade. The separation of Belgium 
meant to Dutch traders the loss of a regular supply of manufac­
tured goods for export, because Holland itself had hardly any 
secondary industry of its own. Both the King and van den Bosch 
realized that Holland would not be able to compete with Britain 
in the East-Indian trade unless a Dutch secondary industry was 
built up, especially cotton mills.
The N.H.M, played an important role in the scheme which 
was devised to encourage the manufacture of Dutch cottons.
This company granted low interest loans to industrialists — many
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of whom were Belgian emigres - and set up weaving schools 
in conjunction with the government. More important the N.H.M. 
concluded contracts - which included guarantees against losses - 
with the Dutch government for the delivery of cottons to the 
East-Indies and became the chief exporter to the colonies.
Moreover, the government’s growing need for funds forced 
the King into borrowing from the N.H.M., which in return was 
given the disposal of the whole Java crop. So, the N,H,M, came 
to hold a practical monopoly of the Java import and export trade. 
The subsequent numerous British protests demanding tariff 
concessions were steadily sidestepped by the Dutch government.
But finally at the end of 1835 The Hague - fearing direct 
British action against Dutch shipping - was forced to give in 
and lowered the tariff differential by half.
When it became clear that further British requests for the 
restitution of excess duty paid since 1824 and the admission of 
consuls in the colonies would not be met, the British Foreign 
Office in 1838 decided to oppose any further expansion of Dutch 
influence in the Archipelago,
Subsequently, allegations made by the Straits Settlements 
about Dutch Mencroachmentsn and attempts at monopolizing the 
trade and commerce of Sumatra were taken up by the Foreigi Off ice 
in order to force Holland to adopt a more liberal trade policy 
in the whole of the Archipelago,
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While the efforts of British merchants and manufacturers 
to find new outlets for their produce were accentuated by the 
severe world depression of the late ’Thirties and early ’Forties, 
Holland was equally hard hit by this world crisis* The slump in 
prices of colonial produce had brought the N.H.M* - and with it 
the Dutch government - to the verge of bankruptcy, because the 
company was unable to extend any further loans to the government 
as it was unable to balance previous loans with the proceeds 
of the sale of Java produce. Obviously under those circumstances 
concessions to British trade were out of the question.
On the other hand the Dutch government feared that if it 
provoked Britain any further it would run the risk of losing 
Java, the mainstay of Holland’s economy. Therefore The Hague - 
without giving in on pricniple - tried to do everything possible 
to avoid any causes of complaint; and it informed the British 
government that it had postponed the occupation of Siak, a 
sultanate on the East-Coast of Sumatra, which the English insis­
ted that should remain independent.
But when the Foreign Office insisted that in any case 
Holland had no right to occupy Siak or any other independent 
Indonesian state, J*C. Baud, the Dutch minister for Colonies, 
tried to play safe by giving Britain conclusive proof that 
Holland had no intention of monopolizing the Sumatra trade. 
According to Baud a Dutch occupation of the East—Coast of
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Sumatra would be an unprofitable proposition, because 
England would only assent if Holland guaranteed equal 
treatment of British trade. Baud who was unwilling to 
give up Dutch territorial rights in the East-Indies, tried 
to avoid a discussion of those rights by taking away the 
cause of dispute. Thus, on 1st September, 1841, he ordered 
the Batavian authorities — without notifying the British 
government - to withdraw their forces not only from the 
neighbourhood of Siak but from the whole of the East-Coast 
area.
When early in 1842 Britain proposed to replace the 1824 
treaty with a new agreement Baud played his trump card about 
the Dutch withdrawal from the East-Coast of Sumatra and pointed 
out that there was no reason for discussions as no disputes 
existed any more.
But when England insisted Baud tried to stall negotiations 
as long as possible on the grounds that Holland owing to its 
financial difficulties was not in a position to grant concess­
ions.
However, Baud grasped the opportunity to regain the 
diplomatic initiative when in the middle of 1842 Britain used 
another approach and suggested a new commercial — but no terri­
torial agreement - on the basis of reciprocal concessions. The 
Dutch Colonial Minister feigned a certain amount of interest in
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the British proposals granting access of Java sugar on the 
English Home market in return for concessions to British trade 
in Java# But when in the beginning of 1843 Baud was pressed 
by London for an answer his counter proposals - which included 
a demand for the admission of Dutch colonial produce into 
England on Dutch ships and a reduced tariff for dairy produce - 
were obviously designed to wreck any chance of agreement# 
Consequently the negotiations — as Baud had hoped — ended in 
failure*
Van den Bosch*s plan to take control of Sumatran trade and 
commerce by occupying the wealthy interior and sealing off the 
West- and East-Coasts, could still be reached without the 
occupation of the East-Coast, Baud argued. The East-Coast 
itself had little economic value and was only important because 
of the transit trade between the Sumatran interior and the 
Straits Settlements. Although the Dutch had been prevented by 
Britain to seal off the East-Coast they, according to Baud, 
could still control this transit trade at its source by closing 
the borders of their territories in the interior#
The subsequent policy of the authorities in Minangkebau to 
revert the direction of trade - which was naturally inclined 
towards the East - to the Dutch controlled ports of the West- 
Coast caused the tribes living along the Eastward flowing rivers
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to become hostile to the Dutch government and resulted in 
repeated invasions and pillaging of the Dutch border districts.
According to Michiels, the governor of the West-Coast, 
the only effective way to stop those hostile actions was to 
occupy the territories concerned. But Baud objected to any 
military expansion and pointed out that all that would happen 
was to remove the cause of hostility - i.e. the trade barrier - 
further Eastwards. The Colonial Minister, however, had no 
objections to remove the trade barrier altogether providing 
other measures could be found to make the occupation of Minang­
kabau worthwhile to the Dutch government. Whatever course of 
action the Batavian government decided to take, Baud emphasized 
that military expansion was out of the question and that in no 
case Sumatra should be allowed to become a financial burden.
The revenue system which in 1847 was finally adopted in 
Minangkabau was based on increased customs revenue, which was to 
be obtained by raising the output of export produce. Accordingly 
the Minangkabau growers were ordered to deliver their coffee to 
the government at a guaranteed minimum price. Moreover, the 
government was to bear the burden of the high transport cost of 
coffee from the highlands to the coast. Roads were to be 
improved in order to tal© horsecart transport and government 
depots where coffee could be delivered were to be built 
throughout the country»
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Though Michielä1 economic policy found ready acceptance 
in The Hague, his persistent demands for expansion into the 
East-Coast region were steadily refused. Similarly Governor- 
General Rochussen who was of the opinion that owing to the 
repeated attempts by the British to penetrate into the Dutch 
sphere of influence, i.e. in Borneo, Celebes and the Lesser 
Sunda Islands, the established policy of non-expansion and 
non-intervention had become obsolete, was frustrated by The 
Hague in his plans for extending effective Dutch control 
throughout the whole of the Archipelago.
Although Baud had become anxious to establish Dutch 
sovereign rights in the whole of the East Indies, especially 
after the British moves in Borneo and the occupation of the 
island of Labuan in 1846, he only agreed to effective occupa­
tion and administration of those islands which showed promise 
of immediate profit. Otherwise outward signs such as the 
issuing of Dutch flags to local rulers would have to suffice as 
an indication of Holland’s sovereignty»
In Sumatra, according to Baud, no more profit was to be 
obtained from extension of control into the East-Coast area. 
Instead any further expansion in that direction would certainly 
provoke Britain and could result in the loss to Holland of what 
it had gained so far.
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The Dutch government considered the colonies only as a 
business proposition; and therefore the main principle of 
colonial policy and administration was to obtain the largest 
possible profits with the smallest possible overheads. In 
regard to Sumatra this objective had been reached and consequent­
ly no further military expansion was considered worthwhile.
For my study of Anglo-Dutch relations between 1824 and 
1841 I am particularly indebted to two works.
For the understanding of the Dutch point of view the study 
of Goedemans was indispensable. The author has gone very 
deeply into the subject matter and has reproduced many documents 
in part or in full.
In regard to the British point of view I have mainly 
relied on the exhaustive treatment of the subject by Tarling; 
and generally I have taken his well documented conclusions for 
granted.
In addition I was able to gather further information from 
a variety of sources of which the more important ones were 
Kielstra, Posthuraus1 documents on economic history, and Colijn’s 
official history,
, A major change in public thinking in regard to 
colonial policy occurred after 1848, when - as a result of the 
bloody political upheavals in the rest of Europe - a parliament-
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a ry  re v o lu t io n  took p la ce  in  The Hague, which brought a 
l i b e r a l  f a c t io n  to  pov/er, A new C o n s ti tu t io n  t r a n s f e r r e d  
a g r e a t  d ea l o f the form er power o f th e  King over th e  c o lo n ie s  
to  P a r lia m e n t, in c lu d in g  th e  c o n tro l o f finance«
The l i b e r a l s  were v ery  c r i t i c a l  o f th e  c o lo n ia l  monopoly 
system  of van den Bosch and th ey  demanded i t s  a b o l i t io n  in  
o rd e r  to  p ro v id e  more scope f o r  p r iv a te  e n te r p r is e  in  c o lo n ia l  
t r a d e  and a g r ic u l tu r e .  In  a d d i t io n  th e  compulsory and o p p ress­
iv e  f e a tu r e s  o f the  “c u l tu re  system “ were condemned on hum anit­
a r ia n  grounds«
However, i n i t i a l l y  the  l i b e r a l  programme demanded a g ra d u a l 
a b o l i t io n  of th e  e x is t in g  system , because most p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s  -  
r e a l i z in g  t h e i r  u n f a m il ia r i ty  w ith  th e  a c tu a l  s i t u a t io n  in  th e  
In d ie s  -  were u n w illin g  to  p re s s  f o r  too  d r a s t i c  changes in  
c o lo n ia l  a d m in is tra tio n  ou t o f  f e a r  th a t  th e  flow  o f p r o f i t s  
m ight d im in ish .
Though m easures were tak en  to  s to p  th e  o p p ressio n  and i l l  
tre a tm e n t o f  th e  Jav an ese , no immediate a b o l i t io n  o f th e  c u l tu re  
system  -  which was c o n c en tra ted  in  Java and had proved to  be 
a f in a n c ia l  su ccess  -  was advoca ted . But in s te a d  the  id ea  o f a 
d iv is io n  o f la b o u r  between th e  government and p r iv a te  e n te r p r i s e  
took  sh ap e , i« e .  p r iv a te  c a p i t a l  was to  s p e c ia l iz e  on the  
economic developm ent o f  th e  O u te r-P o sse ss io n s , which so f a r  
had been la r g e ly  n e g le c te d . P r iv a te  c a p i ta l  in v es tm en t, i t  was
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considered, would increase the revenue earning capacity of 
the more valuable Outer-Possessions and would therefore ease 
the governments task of occupying those territories effect­
ively, the need for which was growing more urgent with the 
increasing danger of foreign infiltration.
Emphasis was placed on the development of mining, especially 
of coal and iron, two commodities which with the development of 
steam ships, railways and the mechanization of the sugar indus­
try, had become of great economic and strategic importance.
But no great upsurge occurred in mining mainly because the 
abolition of the culture system during the ’Sixties opened up 
opportunities for investment in agriculture in Java - a less 
risky venture than mining in the Outer-Possessions. The initial 
plan for a division of labour between the government and private 
enterprise failed, because Dutch public opinion - which in the 
meantime had become better informed about the situation in 
Indonesia - demanded an immediate withdrawal of the government 
from the economic sector.
At the same time however continuous pressure was put on the 
government by the liberals to abandon the policy of non—expansion 
and non-intervention in the Outer-Possessions. Apart from 
purely economic motives, the liberals stressed the duty of the 
Dutch government to protect the Indonesians from misrule, 
extortion and such evils as slavery and piracy.
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In addition the colonial government pointed out repeatedly 
that the costly expeditions which were needed to suppress rebe­
llion, piracy and slavery were useless if they were not followed 
up by effective occupation and administration.
But The Hague, which still insisted on large profits from 
the Indies and was unwilling to increase the colonial budget, 
remained opposed to any expansion of political control.
However, the colonial government between 1850-1870 in order 
to stop foreign infiltration took matters into its own hands and 
on various occasions put the Home government before a fait . 
accompli.
The effect of the new liberal colonial policy on the 
administration of the West-Coast of Sumatra in the period 
1850-1870 was very limited.
A proposal in 1857 to abolish the adat pusaka (i.e. matri- 
lineal inheritance law) and the suku government on the grounds 
that those institutions were detrimental to the material and 
moral development of the people, was put aside. The government 
argued that such radical interference with the indigenous 
social and political structure was bound to create unrest and 
instability, and pointed out that the Dutch cause would be 
better served by keeping the traditional social and political 
order intact. This unwillingness to introduce European ideas 
of government and administration, apart from serving as another
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illustration of the traditional Dutch policy of divide and 
rule, is further explained by the fact that peace and order 
in Minangkabau had been soundly established since the 
beginning of the ’Forties after twenty-five years of war and 
that this territory had finally started to pay off* Indeed, 
the coffee policy of Michiels had worked well, especially as 
his successors had tried to make this industry as attractive 
as possible to the people from a financial point of view and 
had attempted to abolish any of its oppressive features*
The government therefore was reluctant - as it had been 
in Java - to change its economic policy in Minangkabau while 
that territory was already a profitable proposition; and it 
was not till 1908 that the coffee monopoly on the West—Coast 
of Sumatra was abolished.
On the East-Coast of Sumatra the Dutch since 1841 had 
strictly abstained from intervention, but during the ’Fifties 
the danger of foreign intervention forced Batavia to extend 
its influence into that area; and in 1858 treaties were 
concluded with Siak, Djambi and Indragiri*
The treaty with Siak did not only cause renewed disputes 
with the Straits Settlements, as was to be expected, but also 
with Achin, which claimed sovereignty over some of the Siak 
dependencies.
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Although this Dutch-Achinese dispute was one of* many 
that had occurred since 1819, it had far more drastic conse­
quences than any of the previous ones, as it resulted in a full 
scale war which lasted for more than thirty years*
Van den Bosch had felt hampered in his plans for Sumatra 
by the fact that Holland - according to the treaty of 1824 — 
could not infringe the sovereignty of Achin. But owing to the 
strained relations with the British during the ’Thirties and 
’Forties any Dutch overtures to have this restrictive clause 
removed would have been rejected out of hand.
However, between 1850 and 1870 an Anglo-Dutch rapproche­
ment is discernible because the main cause of friction between 
the two countries was gradually disappearing with the abolition 
of the culture system and the introduction of a more liberal 
trade policy by Holland also in its colonies. Another major 
reason which drew the English and Dutch closer together in 
South East Asia was the fear of settlements in that area by 
other European powers*
When in 1862 the Dutch decided to extend their influence 
over the pepper ports to the north of Siak Proper, Britain 
was willing to acquiesce providing Holland would treat British 
trade on an equal footing.
Finally a new Anglo-Dutch treaty was concluded in 1870 
which gave Holland a free hand in Sumatra including Achin*
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There were various reasons which made it desirable that 
Achin should be incorporated into the Netherlands East Indies*
The Achinese claim of sovereignty over the East-Coast pepper 
ports was seen as a constant source of instability in those 
territories, which soon after Dutch occupation had proved to 
be of great economic value owing to the successful experiments 
in the growing of high grade tobacco* Moreover the continuous 
acts of slavery and piracy by the Achinese could not be condoned 
any longer by a liberal and humanitarian government, especially 
not when after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 the Straits 
of Malacca became one of the major thoroughfares for Internationr- 
al shipping* In addition it was feared that the attempts of 
the Achinese to obtain overseas support against the ever 
increasing power of the Dutch in Sumatra might result in the 
permanent settlement of a third European Power in the Malacca 
Straits area*
Holland declared war on Achin in 1873» but it took more 
than thirty years before this country was finally subdued*
While for the period 1816-1848 I was able to find a good 
sample of source material, I was less fortunate in regard to 
the years 1848-1873*
I felt especially handicapped when trying to establish the 
main motives of the Dutch in renewing their expansion on the 
East-Coast of Sumatra* I was forced to piece together the
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story mainly from various secondary works, such as Somer, 
de Klerck and Colijn, Although I was able to obtain some 
additional information from the records and proceedings of 
the Dutch Parliament, the documentary coverage at my disposal 
was insufficient to make a detailed analysis possible. There­
fore my treatment of this particular aspect cannot claim to be 
exhaustive; and it was especially at this point that I felt the 
consultation of the Dutch and Indonesian archives would have 
been extremely useful. The same remark is true for my 
discussion of administrative policy on the West-Coast and its 
effect on indigenous society.
1.
SECTION I.
DIVISION OF THE SPOILS:SUMATRA:1816-182U.
i. The Background;1750-181U»
Britain’s attitude in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century towards the greatly weakened Dutch colonial empire 
should be seen mainly in terms of European foreign policy 
considerations. While since the seventeenth century the 
British and the Dutch had been closely allied in their attempts 
to keep their common enemy:France, at bay, by the middle of the 
eighteenth century the ties of friendship between Britain and 
Holland had been considerably weakened. The merchants of 
Rotterdam and Amsterdam had become increasingly perturbed 
about the rising power and prosperity of Britain, which by then 
had far surpassed the Dutch Republic in world importance,
Dutch trading interests generally strongly supported the anti- 
Orangist party: The Patriots, who under the influence of the 
French "philosophes" strove for a more democratic regime and 
for closer ties with Prance, The British government however 
attempted to reinforce the Orangist regime in the Netherlands 
and this policy is also reflected in the British attitude 
towards the Dutch in the colonies.
Prom about the middle of the eighteenth century the China 
tea trade had become of the greatest importance to the British 
East India Company, which as a consequence desired to extend
2its influence to the East Indian archipelago in order to 
protect the important sea route to China and to buy East 
Indian produce, which could be sold in China for tea. The 
British government, however, tried to restrain the East India 
Company from pressing too far South in order to avoid a clash 
with the Dutch, who claimed a trading monopoly over the whole 
of the archipelago, although by that time the Dutch East India 
Company was too weak to enforce such a monopoly.
This British policy of appeasement, however, did not succeed, 
and during the American War of Independence Anglo-Dutch relations 
rapidly deteriorated, because the Dutch did not want to give 
up their lucrative trade with the American colonists. The war 
(1780-1784) which subsequently broke out between Holland and 
England, was disastrous for Dutch trade and international 
prestige, while it brought the Dutch East India Company to the 
verge of bankruptcy. During the war the Orangist regime in the 
Netherlands had been overthrown by the anti-British Patriots 
and therefore at the peace negotiations in 1784 Britain pursued 
a tougher line in regard to the East Indian archipelago, where 
it obtained the right of free navigation and trade. Furthermore 
in 1786 England occupied Pulu Penang at the Northern end of 
the Straits of Malacca, partly in order to protect the Southern 
entrance to the Bay of Bengal and partly to set up an entrepot
for the China trade.
3It was not till 1788, after the ’’ancien regime” of the 
Orangists had been restored in Holland with the help of 
Prussian arms and after defensive treaties had been concluded 
with England and Prussia, that the British government reverted 
again to its previous policy of appeasement in South East Asia, 
where it tried to find a solution which would be acceptable to 
both countries. But a British proposal to leave the spice 
monopoly in the Moluccas to Holland in return for a British 
station at Riouw, at the Southern end of the Straits of 
Malacca, encountered a great deal of opposition from the Dutch. 
No agreement however had yet been reached on the British demand 
for a share of the East Indian trade, when in 1793 Holland was 
occupied by a French revolutionary army and the Prince of 
Orange and his entourage were forced to flee to England.
Soon after, the British under the terms of the defensive 
treaty of 1788'occupied most of the Dutch colonies, with the 
exception of Java and a few smaller posts. At the peace of 
Amiens (1802) most of the colonies were restored to Holland 
again, but with the important exception of Ceylon and part of 
Guyana in the 7/est-Indies. But after the renewal of the war 
with Napoleon in 1803 the Dutch colonies were again occupied 
by the British and this time also Java fell into English 
hands (1811).
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After the defeat of Napoleon the British government 
resumed its traditional policy of seeking friendly relations 
with Holland; and it was mainly on the insistence of Britain 
that in 1815 the United Kingdom of the Netherlands (i.e.
Holland and Belgium) was set up as a strong hufferstate against 
any future aggression by Prance towards the North, Furthermore 
Britain in order to cement the ties of friendship between the 
two countries, declared itself willing to restore to Holland 
some of its previous colonial empire. A Convention of 13th 
August, 1814 restored to the Dutch:
11 ..the colonies, factories and establishments which
were possessed by Holland at the commencement of the . * 
late war, viz.: on the first of January 1803 ......
The Convention further stipulated that Britain would retain the 
Cape of Good Hope and some of the Dutch colonies in the West- 
Indies, while the island of Banka would be ceded to the Nether­
lands in exchange for the old Dutch possession of Cochin and its 
dependencies in Southern India. But the pre-war disputes 
between England and Holland in the Est-Indies, especially those 
concerning the Straits of Malacca, were not settled by the 
Convention,
(1) Pull text of the Convention of 13th August, 1814 is in
"Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis met Engeland betreffende de 
Overzeesche Bezittingen, 1820-1824, getrokken uit de Nagelaten papieren van wijlen den Minister van Staat, Elout.” 
s*Gravenhage, Nijhoff, 1863« pp.255-258.
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ii. The Dutch quest for Sumatra :18l6-182lu
Although the financial and military weakness of the 
Dutch on their return to the Indies in 1816, precluded them 
from re-establishing their previous political and commercial 
supremacy, a growing suspicion and fear of English plans in 
territories neighbouring to Java, the Dutch stronghold, was 
largely responsible for the Dutch moves to extend at least 
their nominal authority as far as possible throughout the 
whole of the East Indies. The Dutch considered the possession 
of Sumatra and the smaller islands bordering the Malayan 
Peninsula as a pre-requisite to their prosperity, because those 
islands would act as a barrier against the English attempts to 
establish an entrepot port closer to the centre of trade in the 
archipelago:Java, where the Dutch were trying to build Batavia 
into the commercial and trading centre of the whole of the 
Indies.
Suspicion of British motives and plans in the archi­
pelago was aroused soon after the arrival of the Dutch 
Commissioners-General^2) in Java. Commissioners-General
(2) The Commissioners-General were sent to the Indies as the 
representatives of the King, who under the Constitution 
had absolute power over the colonies. Their functions were: 
to take over the colonies from the British; to re-establish 
Dutch power there; and to devise a suitable system of 
administration. Although their instructions were rather 
wide, because the actual situation in the Indies was hardly 
known in the Hague, they specifically stated that the 
administration should be based on such liberal principles 
as the protection of the indigenous population and the 
increase of their welfare and happiness.
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Eloutv ' and Buyskens who reached Batavia on 26th April,
1816, were very perturbed about the refusal of Fendall, the 
Lieutenant-Governor of Java,^^ to hand over the colonies 
immediately, on the grounds that he had received no orders 
to do so. Especially Elout, the head of the mission, became 
very suspicious of Fendall*s motives, although in fact without 
reason*
The point was that when Major Nahuys, who had been sent 
to prepare the way for the Commissioners-General, arrived in 
Batavia on 5th March, 1816, Fendall was greatly surprised to 
hear about the impending return of the Dutch, especially as 
he had been told in Calcutta only the previous December, when 
he had received his appointment to Java, that the Dutch were
(3)
(3) Elout. Cornells Theodorus (1767-1841); lawyer; appointed to the Commission on the Civil and Criminal Code (1799); In 
April 1814 appointed Commissioner-General for the Nether­
lands East-Indies (1816-1819); Plenipotentiary at Anglo- 
Dutch talks in London in 1820; Minister of Finance, 1821- 
1824; Minister for Colonies, 1824-1829«
(4) The East Indies during the British regime were divided into 
three administrative areas: Java and dependencies (i.e.
Madura, Palembang, Banka, Celebes); Bencoolen and dependencies 
the Moluccas. Each of those divisions was directly respons­
ible to Calcutta, the seat of government of the British East 
India Company. Fendall therefore could only act on the 
orders from his superiors in Calcutta, where any instructions 
from the British government for the surrender of the colonies 
to the Dutch would have arrived in the first place.
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(5}not expected to return for at least another two years. '
He wrote to Calcutta on 15th March to ask for instructions 
expressing his surprise at the unexpected tidings; and he 
explained the delicate position he would be in if the Dutch 
did not have with them on their arrival any positive (6)instructions from London for the surrender of the colonies.
In fact Fendall’s apprehension proved to be right, as the 
Dutch arrived without any proper warrants from the British 
government. The Commissioners-General before their departure 
had asked the Dutch government to inquire in London if the 
necessary orders for the return of the colonies had been 
despatched to the authorities concerned and although the Dutch 
ambassador reported on 8th October, 1815 that those documents 
were about to be signed this did not actually happen till
(5) Elout to Goldberg. Secretary-General, Dept, of Colonies, 
30th May, l8l6. in Deventer M.L. van "Het Nederlandsche 
Gezag over Java en Onderhorigheden sedert 1811." Deel 
I,s*Gravenhage,Niöhoff, 1891. p.65. Note: The British 
authorities in Calcutta were under the impression that 
the defeat of Napoleon after his escape from Elba would take far longer than it in fact did (Hundred Days). In 
the meantime the British government (1815) had sent orders 
to Calcutta counteracting the earlier instructions to 
return the colonies to the Dutch.
(6) Fendall to Moira (Francis, Earl of Moira, K.G. Governor- 
General.), 15th March, 1816. in Kemp P.H. van der 
"Fendall’s and Raffles* Opvattingen in het algemeen omtrent 
het Londens Tractaat van 13 Augustus, 1814” (Bijdragenvoor 
de Taal-Land-en-Volkenkunde van Nederlands Indie. 1897*
pp.479-489.
8.
(7)
21st December. The warrants arrived in Calcutta on
2nd June, 1816 and Fendall received them on 4th July.
Despite the initially civil attitude of Fendall,
practically every action by the British authorities was
decried by the Dutch as harming their interests, which in
turn incited the British to become really obstructive. When(8)Commissioner-General Van der Capellen arrived on 10th May, 
1816, Fendall withdrew the earlier permission for the Dutch 
troops to land unless a declaration was signed that this did 
not signify a surrender of British sovereignty. This forma­
lity had to be repeated with the arrival of each troopship
and when the ship "De Ruyter" arrived on 21st May and Fendall
(9)happened to be on an inland tour it became very odious.
Elout complained that now their days in Java were numbered, 
the English were trying to take as much wealth out of the 
island as possible. Timber was being cut indiscriminantly, 
leases were being withdrawn before their expiry date and resold.
(7) Fagel. Dutch ambassador in London, to the Hague. 8th 
October, 1815* IbldT“p. 355.
(8) Capellen. Godert Alexander Gerard Philip, Baron van der 
(1778-1848); doctor of law (Utrecht. 1803); in 1814 Secret­
ary for Commerce and Colonies; in 1813 Commissioner for the 
Prince of Orange of the provisional government of Belgium: 
Commissioner-General for the Netherlands East Indies (1816- 
1819); Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, 1819- 
1825.
(9) Kemp P.H. van der "Teruggave der Oost-Indische Kolonien, 
I8I4-I8I&, naar oorsprongkelijke stukken." s*Gravenhage, 
Nijhoff, 1910. pp. 353-361.
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It was quite clear, he concluded, that the British were
trying to harm the interests of the Dutch government to the(10)greatest possible extent.
At the end of June, however, Fendall, having received
information from London about the departure of the Dutch to
the Indies, declared himself willing to commence negotiations
about the cession of the colonies, although he stressed that
the actual surrender could not take place till he was ordered
to do so by Calcutta. Fendall proposed a number of conditions,
mainly of a financial nature, but also including a request that
the Dutch should recognize treaties made with indigenous princes
(11)during the British administration. Especially the last 
proposal was badly received by the Commissioners, who pointed 
out that the question under consideration was a convention 
between two sovereign states not a capitulation. The 
convention of 1814 stipulated an unconditional return of the
(10) Elout to Goldberg, 30th May, 1816. in Deventer "Gezag” 
op.cit. p.70
(11) Kemp P.H. van der "Oost-Indie*s Herstel in 1816 near 
oorspronkelijke stukken." s’Gravenhage, Nijhoff, 1911*P*64» 
Note; In fact Raffles before his departure from Java (25-th March, 1816) had tried to soften the blow to his 
personal ambitions, caused by the English decision to 
restore the colonies to the Dutch, by intimating to the 
indigenous princes that Holland in the Convention of 1814 
had promised to respect and confirm the measures taken
by the British administration. This was a pure invention. 
Source: Deventer "Nederlandsch Gezag ....‘, op.cit.pp.346-7.•  •
colonies and subsidiary questions therefore should be 
settled after the restitution had actually been made. Early 
in July, however, Pendall was finally able to act after having 
received a reply from Calcutta to his earlier request for 
instructions in March. He was ordered not to postpone the 
cession of the colonies even if the Dutch did not have proper 
warrants, because:
’’....The notoriety of the cession, the departure of the 
Dutch armament with the full knowledge of the British 
government....render it morally impossible that any one 
cause can exist for suspending the arrangements........
Although the British government, so the instruction continued, 
had no right to force the Dutch to guarantee the treaties made 
with native rulers during the British administration, it had the 
’’strongest moral and political obligations” to try to preserve 
for those princes the benefits which the treaties had promised 
them. If the Dutch would not agree to an unconditional 
guarantee, they should be asked to refrain from making politi­
cal alterations in the territories concerned till the question 
had been settled by the European governments. If this request 
was also refused then the cession of the colonies should not be 
protracted any longer but should be effected under protest.
The negotiations which followed were long and difficult owing
10.
(12) Calcutta to Batavia. 18th May, 1816. in Kemp ”..Opvattingen 
op.cit. pp. U89-9V.
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to the obstinacy of both Fendall and the Commissioners- 
General and it was not till 23rd July that a convention was 
signed regulating the cession of Java and its dependencies, 
although Banka and Palembang which caused special difficulties 
were excluded. Java was officially handed over to Holland on 
19th August, 1816, but Fendall was not able to leave till the 
beginning of 1817 owing to the difficulties which arose about 
the handing over of Palembang and Banka.
The geographical description in the Convention of 1814 of 
what exactly was to be returned to Holland was very vague, and 
only the island of Banka which was to be exchanged for the 
Dutch possession of Cochin and its dependencies in Southern 
India, was specifically mentioned. Ironically it was Banka 
which caused the greatest trouble between the Dutch and 
British authorities in Java. The omission of both Palembang 
and Banka from the convention of 23rd July was caused by the 
Dutch refusal to guarantee a treaty concluded in 1812 with the 
Sultan of Palembang, in which he surrendered his sovereign 
rights over the island of Banka, with its large tin deposits, 
to Britain. Before the Dutch forces in Java had capitulated 
to the British in 1811, Sultan Badrudin of Palembang had rid 
himself of the Dutch garrison by killing them, soldiers, 
officials, wives and children, and throwing their bodies in
12
the river. The Sultan then declared himself independant both
of the Dutch and of the new masters of the archipelago: the
English. Although the sultan's claim for independance might
have been technically right this did not deter Raffles,
Lieutenant-Governor of Java, from sending an expedition in
1812 under Gillespey to punish the murderers, and to obtain
the valuable tin deposits of Banka and Billiton, dependencies
of Palembang. Raffles wished to keep Banka and Billiton
(13)permanently within the British empire and Lord Minto, the
governor-general at Calcutta, agreed that, although Palembang
in itself had only little commercial value, Banka and Billiton
were important and in order to make their eventual return to
the Dutch more difficult the islands should be politically
separated from Palembang and brought under the direct control
(14)of the British Crown. Consequently Gillespey, after Sultan 
Badrudin had fled, conducted negotiations with the Sultan's 
brother Ratu Achmad Najm al Din, whom he placed on the throne.
On 17th May, 1812 a contract was signed in which the Sultan 
ceded the full sovereignty over Banka, Billiton and dependencies
(13) Raffles to Lord Minto. 7th March, 1812. in ’’Memoir of the 
Life and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles.” 
by his Widow. Lond., Duncan, 1835* Vol.l. p. 156.
(14) Minto to Raffles. 15th December, 1812. in ’’Memoir.... .of 
Raffles” op. cit. p. 347*
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to the British Crown and the British East India Company.
Pendall therefore insisted that if the Dutch did not
recognize the treaty of 1812 with Palembang, they implicitly
refused to recognize British sovereignty over Banka, which
the Convention of 1814 transferred to Holland in exchange for(16)Cochin and its dependencies. The Commissioners-General
however refused to guarantee the treaty of 1812, nor would
they give an undertalcing not to interfere politically in
Palembang until the dispute was settled by the European
governments. The British then ceded Palembang and Banka to
the Dutch in February, 1817, but refused to cede the island
of Billiton on the grounds that the Convention of 1814 made
(17)mention only of Banka and not of its dependencies. Although
the Commissioners-General agreed to the British suggestion
that the question of Billiton should be referred to the
governments in Europe for a decision, they added that they
would occupy the island for the common interest of all, as
it was infested with pirates and smugglers, but owing to the
lack of military resources the Dutch were not able to do so 
(18)till 1821.
(13) quot. Kemp "Opvattingen.•.** op.cit.pp.367-368.
(16) Fendall to Commissioners-General. 15th July, 1816. quot. 
ibid, p p.439-440«
(17) Fendall to Commissioners-General. 21st January, 1817, 
quot. ibid, p.376.
(18) Commissioners-General to Fendall. 28th January, 1817« 
quot. ibid, p.376.
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Clearly, the first post-war relations between the English
and Dutch colonial authorities had been strained and unfriendly;
and Pendall and his staff returned to Calcutta disgusted with
the behaviour of the Dutch, especially of that of Elout.
Apparently Van der Capellen*s moderation was favourably
commented upon by those who had returned to Calcutta from
Java but in regard to the rest of the Dutch:
"...The impression is general and strong as to an 
unfriendly bias in the majority of those to whom the . .
island of Java has been delivered.•••••••••••••••••,wvl9y
The Commissioners-General, however, insisted that Pendall had
been deliberately delaying the return of the colonies, and
their suspicion of British motives is well illustrated by the 
following extract from one of their despatches to the govern­
ment in The Hague:
"...The English authorities as well as private English­
men in those regions are very discontent about the 
restitution of all the Indian possessions to the Nether­
lands, but especially of that of Banka; and they ascribe 
this cession in general to the lack of knowledge of the 
British government in Europe about the importance of 
those possessions; and they are still hoping all the 
time that once a good opportunity will arise to regain 
those possessions; this is especially true in regard to 
Palembang and Banka................ .................." (2C )
(19) Lord Moira to Van der Capellen. 27th November, 1816. in 
Colenbrander H.T. ed. "Gedenkschriften van Anton Reinhard 
Falck” (Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicaties Klein Serie,13)> 
s’Gravenhage, Nijhoff, 1913. p.465.
(20) Commissioners-General to the Hague. 19th October, 1816 
quot, Kemp *f. .Opvattingenu op. cit.p.361.
15.
This feeling of suspicion was raised to a high pitch when
rumours spread throughout the Indies in 1817 that Raffles
was about to return to the Archipelago as Lieutenant-
Governor of Bencoolen. Raffles, who had been recalled to
England in 1815 to answer charges of mismanagement brought
against him by General Gillespey, had been able to clear his
name and had regained the confidence of the Directors, who
appointed him to Bencoolen, and although this establishment
did not warrant the title, he was given the designation of
Lieutenant-Governor in recognition of his previous services
in Java. Prom the instructions to Raffles by the Court of
Directors it is clear that he did not have any authority to
act politically i.e. to expand British political control in
the East Indian archipelago without the foreknowledge of the(21)Company’s government in London. But while still in England
(21) The instructions to Raffles were as follows:
"It is highly desirable that the Court of Directors 
should receive early and constant information of the 
proceedings of the Dutch and other European nations, 
as well as of the Americans, in the Eastern Archi­
pelago. The Court, therefore, desire that you will 
direct your attention to the object of regularly 
obtaining such information, and that you will trans­
mit the same to them by every convenient opportunity, 
accompanied by such observations as may occur to you, 
whether of a political or commercial nature. You will 
furnish the Supreme Government with copies of these 
communications. In the event of any such communica­
tions appearing to you to be of a nature to require 
secrecy, you will address your letter to the Secret 
Committee."
Source; quot. Boulger D.C. "The life of Sir Stamford 
Raffles", Lond., Marshall, 1897. p.267.
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Raffles was considering action which went far beyond the 
terras of his official instructions. The Dutch, so Raffles 
claimed, would try to exclude the British from a fair share 
of the East Indian trade, because they had done so before, 
and because of their language and behaviour since their 
return. Even if the Dutch were well disposed towards British 
trade, it would be imprudent not to take measures in case 
they changed their minds in the future. Therefore the British 
government should insist that Holland would recognize the 
treaties made by the British during their term of government 
with the indigenous princes. In contrast to the Dutch,
Raffles interpreted the Convention of 1814 literally; and 
consequently he held that Holland should only be restored 
to those points in the archipelago which has actually been 
in its possession on 1st January, 1803. Raffles claimed that 
apart from Java, Banka and the Moluccas, there was at least 
one sixth of the East-Indies, where the former exclusive 
rights of the Dutch could well be challenged, because treaties 
with those territories such as Riouw had been concluded before 
1803 and had not been renewed since then, while in another 
sixth of the archipelago such as the interior of Sumatra and 
part of Borneo the Dutch had never exercised any exclusive 
rights. The British therefore could rightfully conclude 
treaties with native princes in at least one third of the
17
archipelago and in order to facilitate communications with 
those princes and to establish a entrepot for British trade 
a more strategic point should be occupied in the archi­
pelago in addition to the existing establishments at 
Bencoolen and Pulu Penang# Raffles favoured the island of
Banka for such an establishment and pointed to Pulu Bintang in(22)the Riouw archipelago as a second choice.
How far the ideas of Raffles about the establishment of
British influence in the East Indies were publicly known is
difficult to ascertain, but already in 1816, nearly two years
before his arrival in Bencoolen, the Commissioners-General
wrote to the government in The Hague, that Raffles, while he
was in Europe, would undoubtedly use his special knov/ledge of
the area to emphasize to the British cabinet and the Directors
of the Company which parts of the Indies would be important
from the point of view of British interests. The Commissioners
also mentioned that they had been sufficiently informed about
Raffles great plans for Sumatra, which on his return they
expected he would undoubtedly try to put into practice, while
he would use anything as a pretext for interfering between the
(23)indigenous princes and the Dutch authorities. A number
(22) Raffles T.S. "Our interests in the Eastern Archipelago” 
1Ö17. Paper for the information of George Canning, 
quot. Boulger op.cit.pp.268-273«
(23) Commissioners-General to the Hague. 9th October, 1816, 
quot. Kemp ”Opvattingen.” op.cit.pp.381-382.
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of reasons can be ascertained for the Dutch suspicion of
(24)Raffles: e.g. his well-known anti-Dutch sentiments, his
attempts to revert the decision of the British government
(25)to restore the colonies to the Dutch, and the presence in the
(24) The following extract from Raffles* History of Java (pub: 
1817,vol. I, p.65) is an example of his thinking on Dutch 
colonial policy. Commenting on a population decrease in the East Indies he writes:
"..Bad government was the principal cause; a system of 
policy v/hich secured neither person nor property- 
selfish, jealous, vexatious and tyrannical. It is no 
less true than remarkable, that wherever the Dutch 
influence had prevailed in the Eastern Seas, depopula­
tion has followed. The Moluccas particularly have 
suffered at least as much as any part of Java, and the 
population of those islands, reduced as it is, has 
been equally appressed and degraded................. M
That the History of Java was known to the Commissioners- 
General very soon after its publication, is clear from a 
reference made to it by Elout in a despatch to the 
government in the Hague on 21st December, 1817. (Falck* s 
Gedenkschriften, op.cit. p.450.)
(25) The Commissioners-General, who apparently had been able to lay their hands on some of the British archives, in a 
letter to the Hague of 20th February, 1818, quoted a 
despatch to the Secret Committee in London of 15th August, 
1815 in which Raffles tried to persuade the British 
government to retain Java and requested:
"..that deeming it a matter of extreme consequence to 
the national interests in the present critical state 
of public events (Napoleon), to place all the author­
ities in England in the possession of the information 
now forwarded, since the opportunity might again occur 
of retaining under (the) British flag the possession of 
an Eastern Empire, the value of which has until lately 
perhaps been hardly known, and which if now given up, 
may be lost forever, or regained only at great expense 
of blood and treasure.... •••••••••••......
Source: Kemp P«H. van der "Sumatra in 1818 - naar oorspronk- 
elijke stukken", s1Gravenhage, Nijhoff, 1920. Bijlage II. 
p. 266.
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Dutch colonial administration of former close associates(26)
of Raffles such as Muntinghe. During 1817 the Dutch
authorities in Java appeared to have received intelligence
which pointed more directly to the actual plans which
Raffles had in mind. Van Braam, Commissioner for the take
over of the Dutch possessions in India, wrote from Chinsura
in August 1817 that rumours were circulating that Raffles
was departing from England with great plans of establishing a
system of administration in Sumatra similar to the one which he
had previously introduced in Java and that he would try to
(27)
extend British influence as far as Palembang. But even
before this report was received in Batavia, Elout had already
written to Holland that the appointment of Raffles to Bencoolen and
his designs on Sumatra, Bali and Borneo had put the Commissioners-
general on their guard and that steps had been taken to bring(28)
the princes there under Dutch influence.
(26) Muntinghe. Herman Warner (1773-1827); doctor of Law, 
Groningen, 1797; left for the Indies in 1804» where after 
quick promotion he was appointed President of the High 
Council of Justice (I809); during the British regime he 
was a member of the Council of the Indies and became the 
trusted advisor of Raffles, who in the foreword to his 
History of Java pays tribute to the capacities of Muntinghe•
(27) Van Braam to Batavia. 27th August. 1817, quot,Kertrp 
"Sumatra in 101c..” op.cit. p,5«
(28) Elout to Goldberg. Secretary-General of Dept, of Colonies. 
10th October. 1817« quotTltemp ^Opvattingen,.M op,cit,p,382,
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But while the Commissioners-General already attributed
the whole train of events since their arrival to Raffles i.e.
the protraction of the take-over and the insistent demand for
a Dutch guarantee of British treaties, the news of Raffles*
impending return and the foreknowledge of some of his plans
(29)forced the Dutch into taking preventive action. The Dutch 
therefore attempted to obliterate any vestiges of British 
influence which remained in the archipelago in order to 
prevent Raffles from finding any pretext for interference.
It was the fear of Raffles which made the Batavian government 
decide in October 1817 to demote the sultan of Palembang, 
because he had been put on the throne by the British in 1812 
and would therefore be susceptible to intrigue from Bencoolen. 
Muntinghe, who because of his previous close association was 
considered to be the most suitable person to deal with Raffles, 
was appointed as a special commissioner to bring the territory 
of Palembang under the firm control of the Dutch. Muntinghe 
who had been prevented from carrying out his mission speedily 
owing to bad sailing weather, arrived in Banka on 19th March, 
1818 on his way from Batavia to Palembang, while Raffles 
reached Bencoolen only a few days later (22nd March, 1818).
(29) Commissloners-General to Goldberg, 20th February. 1818. 
in. Kemp "Sumatra in 1818..** op.cit. p.26S.
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One of Raffles* first acts after his return to the Indies
was to claim part of the Dutch territory of the Lampongs in
Southern Sumatra, where he planned to establish harbour
facilities for British ships which were engaged in the China
trade. Such a port, as he remarked to Marsden, would soon
(30)
rival Batavia as an entrepot. When he sent a detachment of 
troops to occupy Semangka Bay, which was considered as a 
suitable location for a port, and had the British flag hoisted 
there, the Batavian government refrained from taking military 
action, but instead protested vigorously to the Calcutta 
government about what it considered as a violation of Dutch 
territory. The next trouble spot was Palembang, where Raffles 
took the opportunity to interfere when on 17th June, 1818 he 
received a letter from the Sultan requesting his help against 
Muntinghe who was approaching Palembang from Banka. He sent 
Captain Salmond with an armed party through the interior to 
Palembang in an attempt to anticipate the arrival of Muntinghe, 
but while this detachment was still on the way another letter 
from the Sultan arrived in Bencoolen informing that the Dutch 
had already arrived. Raffles then sent a despatch to Salmond 
ordering him to act as he saw fit and enclosing the Sultan’s 
letter, a proclamation, threatening letters to Muntinghe and
(30) Raffles to Marsden. 7th April, 1818 in ’'Memoir..'*
P.322.
op.cit.
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the Commissioners-General, and a request to Major Farquhar,
the resident of Malacca, not to hand over that territory to
the Dutch. The proclamation, which was issued in the name of
the Lieutenant-Governor of Bencoolen and the representative of
the British government in the Eastern Archipelago, stated that,
as the Dutch had proceeded to Palemhang under the protest of
the British authorities in Java and had made arrangements
which were injurious to the interests and the rights of the
Sultan, he declared those arrangements null and void because
(31)they were not in keeping with the Convention of 1814« In
another despatch to Salmond, Raffles included letters to the
Sultans of Riouw and Pontianak inviting them to become allies
of the British, who as they surely would know were far more
humane than the Dutch, with whom in any case they were not
bound to have relations according to the Convention of 1814*
He urged Salmond to take the utmost care to have those letters
delivered quickly, because he had received intelligence that
the Dutch were preparing to send a large force to Pontianak,(32)
although they had no exclusive rights there.
(31) Proclamation by the Hon. Sir Stamford Raffles Lieutenant- - 
Governor of Fort Marlbro1 and Representative of the 
British Government in the Eastern Archipelago. 24th June, 
1818. in Kemp "Opvattingen.•” op.cit. pp.458-459•
(32) Raffles to Salmond. 30th June, 1818 in Kemp "Opvattingen..** 
op.cit.pp.459-460.
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The c o u rs e  o f  e v e n ts  how ever r a n  d i f f e r e n t l y  from  w hat
R a f f l e s  had e x p e c te d  b e c a u se  th e  B r i t i s h  d e tach m en t was ta k e n
p r i s o n e r  and Salm ond was s e n t  b ack  to  B en co o len  v i a  B a ta v ia ,
w h ile  m ost o f  R a f f l e s 1 r a t h e r  com prom ising  c o rre sp o n d e n c e  had
f a l l e n  i n to  th e  h an d s  o f  M u n tin g h e . But more im p o r ta n t  to
R a f f l e s ,  th e  d e b a c le  a t  Palem bang was a s e r i o u s  s e tb a c k  to  h i s
p la n  f o r  b r in g in g  th e  w hole  o f  S um atra  w i th in  t h e  B r i t i s h
s p h e re  o f  i n f lu e n c e .  A cco rd in g  t o  R a f f l e s  i n  o r d e r  to  s to p
e n d le s s  d i s p u te s  w ith  th e  D utch  and t o  e n su re  f o r  B r i t a i n  a
f a i r  s h a re  o f  th e  E a s t  I n d ia n  t r a d e ,  S u m a tra :
" • • s h o u ld  u n d o u b te d ly  be u n d e r  th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  one 
E u ro p ea n  Pow er a lo n e ,  and  t h i s  pow er i s  o f  c o u rs e  
th e  E n g l i s h ,  .......... .. .......................... ......................... • • • • • • , "  (3 3 )
C o n se q u e n tly  R a f f l e s  had  t r i e d  to  expand  in to  S o u th e rn
S um atra  (Lam pongs) and i n  o r d e r  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a t e r r i t o r i a l
l i n k  b e tw een  B e n co o len  and Palem bang he had  jo u rn e y e d  i n t o  th e
m o u n ta in o u s  i n t e r i o r  o f  h i s  r e s id e n c y  w here on 2 3 rd  May he had
c o n c lu d ed  a t r e a t y  w i th  th e  Passum ahs who l i v e d  on th e  b o rd e r
(3 4 )
o f  B en co o len  and P a lem bang , I n  J u l y ,  1818 R a f f l e s  jo u rn e y e d  
o v e r  th e  m o u n ta in s  E a s t-w a rd  from  Padang in to  th e  h i t h e r t o
( 33 ) R a f f l e s  to  th e  S e c r e t  Com m ittee o f  th e  B r i t i s h  E a s t  I n d ia  
Company, 3 rd  J u l y ,  1Ö18, i n  D e v e n te r  "N e d e r la n d sc h  G e z a g .,"  
o p . c i t .  p p ,2 5 7 -2 5 9 .
(3 4 )  Kemp "S u m a tra  i n  1 8 1 8 ,• "  o p . c i t ,  p ,8 0 .
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unknown country of Minangkabau, where he concluded a treaty
with the "emperor", in which the Lieutenant-Governor of
Bencoolen was named as the representative of the "emperor" in
all the Malay states i.e. most of Sumatra. Raffles speculated
that if he established relations with Minangkabau, which in
former days had ruled over a large part of Sumatra, he would
be able to establish British influence indirectly in most of
the island. Furthermore an exclusive British treaty with
Minangkabau would make Padang, which was the natural outlet
(35)
for produce from the interior, useless to the Dutch. In the
meantime Raffles had already refused to hand over Padang to a
Dutch mission which had arrived in Bencoolen on 3rd June on
the grounds that the Dutch refused to guarantee to pay the
large deficit which had been incurred during the British
administration since 1795» but in fact Raffles wanted to
retain Padang, because it was "the only valuable station on
(36)
the West-Coast of Sumatra". The Palembang affair gave him 
an ever stronger pretext to protract the cession of Padang, 
which he would not surrender, so he wrote to Muntinghe, until
(35) Bastin. John "The native policies of Sir Stamford Raffles 
in Java and Sumatra An economic interpretation." Oxf., 
Clarendon, 1957* p.137-138.
(36) Raffles* Memoir op.cit. Vol.2. p.32.
2 5 .
t h e  a f f a i r s  o f  Palem bang had b e en  a r ra n g e d  a c c o rd in g  to  
(3 7 )
h i s  w is h e s .
I n  a d d i t i o n  to  th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a b o u t P ad an g , th e  a c t i o n  
o f  M untinghe to  e x c lu d e  th e  B r i t i s h  from  Palem bang a ls o  r e t a r d ­
ed th e  t a k e - o v e r  by th e  D u tch  o f  t h e i r  o ld  e s ta b l is h m e n t  o f  
M alacca  on th e  P e n in s u la .  The D u tch  co m m iss io n e rs  who had  
a r r i v e d  i n  M alacca  on 1 9 th  J u l y ,  1818 had  a l r e a d y  b een  h e ld  
u p  t i l l  th e  b e g in n in g  o f  S ep tem ber by th e  a b sen c e  o f  th e  
B r i t i s h  r e s i d e n t ,  M ajor F a rq u h a r ,  who had  b een  s e n t  on a 
m is s io n  to  B orneo i n  an  a t te m p t to  a n t i c i p a t e  th e  a r r i v a l  t h e r e  
o f  a D u tch  e x p e d i t i o n .  B ut when F a rq u h a r  had fo u n d  t h a t  B orneo 
was a l r e a d y  o c c u p ie d  by  th e  D u tc h , he i n s t e a d  c o n c lu d ed  a 
t r e a t y  w i th  th e  S u l ta n  o f  R iouw . A f te r  h i s  r e t u r n  h o w ev er, 
F a rq u h a r ,  who knew ab o u t th e  D utch  a c t io n  i n  P a lem bang , t r i e d  
to  p o s tp o n e  th e  h a n d in g  o v e r  o f  M alacca  a s  lo n g  a s  p o s s ib l e  
and he i n s i s t e d  t h a t  th e  D u tch  f i r s t  sh o u ld  come to  an  a g re e ­
m ent ab o u t B r i t i s h  f i n a n c i a l  c la im s .  The C om m issioners
how ever p e r s i s t e n t l y  r e f u s e d  and f i n a l l y  th e  c o lo n y  was handed
(3 6 )
o v e r  to  them  on 2 3 rd  S e p te m b e r, 1 8 1 8 . The C om m issioners had
(3 7 )  R a f f l e s  to  M u n tin g h e . 2 4 th  J u n e ,  1 818 , i n  Hoek I  H J  
"H et K e r s t e l  van  h e t  N e d e r la n d s c h  G ezag o v e r  Ja v a  en 
O n d e rh o rig h e d e d n  i n  de j a r e n  1816 t o t  1 8 1 9 " . s ’ G rav en - 
h a g e ,  Van C le e f ,  1 8 62 . B i j l a g e n .  pp.XIV-XV.
(3 8 )  Kemp P .H . v an  d e r  uDe Com m issien v an  den  S c h o u t-b y -n a c h t 
C .J .  W o lte rb e e k  n a a r  M alakka en  Riouw i n  Ju li-D e c e m b e r  
1818 en  F e b r u a r y - A p r i l  1 8 2 0 ."  (B i jd r a g e n  t o t  de T a a l -  
L an d -e n  V o lk en  kunde van  N e d e r la n d s - I n d ie .  1 9 0 0 .p p .1 4 -1 5 • )
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been instructed after the completion of their business at 
Malacca to proceed to Riouw, where they were to extend old 
contracts or conclude new ones, because Batavia considered 
that territory as Dutch, as abandonment before the war by the
(39)Dutch authorities of Malacca had never been officially approved.
Furthermore Muntinghe in a letter from Palembang early in
September had told the Commissioners about the intercepted
correspondence of Raffles with the Sultans of Pontianak and
Riouw and he urged them to sail as soon as possible to Riouw
(40)in order to prevent a British settlement there. The Dutch
arrived in Riouw on 8th November and concluded a new treaty
which they considered would supersede the earlier one made by 
(41)Farquhar.
By the end of 1818 then, a number of territorial disputes 
had arisen between the Dutch colonial authorities and Raffles, 
caused mainly by the vagueness of the Convention of 1814, which 
was open to different interpretations. While Raffles, as noted 
above, took the Convention of 1814 literally, the Dutch
(39) Ibid.pp.77-78.
(40) Muntinghe to Wolterbeek, Commissioner for Malacca, 18th 
August, lölö. quot.ibicl. pp.9-11*
(41) Yfc&terbeek to Resident of Malacca. 29th November, 1818, 
quot.ibid. pp.3b-37.
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i n t e r p r e t e d  th e  C o n v e n tio n  a s  r e s t o r i n g  to  them  t h e i r
p r e v io u s  sp h e re  o f  in f lu e n c e  in  th e  E a s t - I n d i e s ,  i . e .  th e
w hole o f  th e  a r e a  S o u th  o f  P u lu  P en an g . The way th e  D u tch
saw t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  in  th e  I n d ie s  i s  w e l l  i l l u s t r a t e d  by E lo u t ,
who re a s o n e d  t h a t  th e  E n g l i s h  j u r e  b e l l i  had o c c u p ie d  a number
o f  D u tch  c o l o n i e s ,  w h ich  a f t e r  th e  w ar had b e e n  r e s t o r e d  to
H o lla n d  by th e  C o n v e n tio n  o f  1 8 1 4 . On th e  o th e r  hand i n  th o s e
t e r r i t o r i e s ,  w h ich  th e  E n g l i s h  c o u ld  have  o c c u p ie d  ju r e  b e l l i ,
b u t  had  n o t done s o ,  th e  D u tch  r i g h t  had  ” s l e p t ” and had b een
(4 2 )
f u l l y  r e s t o r e d  a g a in  a f t e r  th e  c o n c lu s io n  o f  p e a c e . The 
D u tch  t h e r e f o r e  c o n s id e re d  th e  a c t i o n s  o f  R a f f l e s  a s  s u b v e r s iv e  
and a s  v i o l a t i n g  t h e i r  r i g h t s .
F o r  t h e  sa k e  o f  c l a r i t y  I  w i l l  a n t i c i p a t e  th e  r e s t  o f th e  
s t o r y  somewhat and i n d i c a t e  h e re  in  s h o r t  th e  m o tiv a t io n  
b e h in d  th e  D utch  r e s p o n s e  to  th e  c h a l le n g e  p o sed  by R a f f l e s .
The a c t i o n s  o f  R a f f l e s  i n  S um atra  and h i s  b u rro w in g  in  
Riouw and B o rn e o , w h ich  th e  C o m m iss io n e rs-G en e ra l c o n s id e re d  
n o t o n ly  a s  a d a n g e r  to  th e  p o l i t i c a l  s e c u r i t y  o f  th e  N e th e r ­
la n d s  I n d i e s  b u t  a l s o  to  t h e i r  p r o s p e r i t y ,  added c o n s id e r a b ly  
to  two m a jo r  i n t e r r e l a t e d  p ro b le m s , w hich  c o n f ro n te d  th e  D utch  
on t h e i r  r e t u r n  to  th e  I n d i e s  i n  1 816 . F i r s t l y  how to  r e ­
e s t a b l i s h  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  p r e s t i g e  and a u t h o r i t y  a f t e r  an
(4 2 )  ”B i jd r a g e n  t o t  de G e s c h ie d e n is  d e r  O n d e rh a n d e lin g e n  m et 
E n g e lan d  b e t r e f f e n d e  de O v e rze esch e  B e z i t t i n g e n ,  1 8 2 0 - 
1 8 24 , g e tro k k e n  u i t  de n a g e la te n  p a p ie r e n  van  w i j l e n  
den  M in i s t e r  van  S t a a t ,  E l o u t . ” s *G rav en h ag e , N i j h o f f ,  
1 8 6 3 .p .4 9 .
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absence of more than twenty years from most of the archi­
pelago, and secondly how to find a footing in the East Indian 
trade, which by that time had become a near-monopoly of the 
English. To the Dxxtch it was clear that if they wanted to 
succeed in solving those two problems they could not bear any 
foreign interference in what they considered as their territory, 
but especially not of a nation, which because of its unassail­
able competitive position could outbid or undersell any other 
competitor for the East Indian trade. As it appeared to the 
Dutch the only possible solution to the problem of regaining 
some of their previous commercial influence in their colonies, 
was to try to keep the English as far away as possible from 
Java, the centre of trade in the archipelago. The motive then 
behind the moves of the Commissioners-General to re-establish 
Dutch influence in as wide an area as possible was primarily 
one of economic survival, because the Dutch feared that if 
Raffles succeeded in establishing a British port closer to the 
centre of the archipelago in order to gain a fair share of the 
trade there, as he termed it, would mean the loss by Holland 
of the whole of that trade to Britain. Raffles therefore had 
to be stopped by every possible means.
When the Dutch returned to the Indies in 1816 they had to 
build up their commercial and political influence completely 
anew. The British had become the pre-dominant commercial
29.
power; and Holland had great difficulty in even finding a 
footing in the East-Indian trade, not only because the English 
had taken over from the Dutch during the long absence of the 
latter, but rather because the terms of trade had changed 
greatly in favour of Britain* While before the war the Dutch 
East India Company had still carried on a valuable trade in 
Indian textiles between India, Indonesia and the Par East, this 
trade had now been cut out by the destruction of the native 
Indian textile industry, which was not able to compete with the 
cheaply machine produced cottons from England. Dutch shipping 
was also at a serious disadvantage because English ships bound 
for the colonies carried the products of British industry and 
made a far more profitable voyage than Dutch ships which 
generally had to come out in ballast, as Holland had only little 
to sell. The English merchant in Java therefore was in a 
position to offer more for coffee and other produce owing to 
the cheaper shipping rates, while he could undersell any other 
competitor because the cost prices of British machine produced 
goods afforded him a wider profit margin.
But despite the odds, the Dutch were bent on regaining 
their previous commercial preponderance in the archipelago and 
they cherished rather grandiose plans of making Batavia into 
the sole entrepot for the Indies, while Palck wanted to go 
even further when he wrote that Batavia would fulfil only
30.
half its destination if it remained solely the administrative
centre of the East-Indies and did not become a rich commercial
city and the most frequented market place in the whole of(43)
Asia. To that purpose the Commissioners-General issued a
regulation in 1818 ordering all ships from Europe and America
to make Batavia their first port of call. The Commissioners,
so they wrote, had been impressed by the example of Raffles,
who in an attempt to protect British trade from the competition
of an expected increase in European shipping after the defeat
of Napoleon, had issued a decree on 1st February, 1815 making
Batavia the only port of call in the Indies for ships coming(44)
West of the Cape. Together with this measure to concentrate 
the whole of the East-Indian overseas trade in Batavia, the 
Commissioners-General introduced a new tariff which was 
designed to give Dutch shipping and trade a moderate amount 
of protection. While after the cession of the colonies the 
Dutch authorities pending an investigation into the desir­
ability of new legislation had left the existing tariff (45)unchanged and did not class British ships as foreign, the
(43) Falck. Minister of Colonies to the King. 1st October, 1819 
in Deventer ’’Nederlandsch Gezag..” op.cit.p.287.(44) ’’Rapport van den Commissarissen-Generaal over In en Uit-
gaande rechten op Java en Madoera.” 28th August,1818. 
in Elout’s Bijdragen op.cit. p.260.
(45) NoTe:Raffles on 1st February, 1815 had raised the tariff 
to a rather high level: 10$ of the invoice value plus 30$ 
on goods imported on British ships, and 10$ plus 60$ on 
goods imported on foreign ships. But when Major Nahuys 
arrived in Java in 1816, Raffles^ for obvious reasons, 
lowered the tariff from 10$ to 6$. Source: Welderen 
Rengers D.W. ’’The failure of a liberal colonial policy-
n ether lands Indies. 1816-1830. ’’The Hague, Ni jhoff ,1947* P.70.
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Commissionsrs-General had soon come under pressure from
interested quarters in the home-country demanding protection
for national shipping and industry. Although the prominent
(46)
Dutch liberal and anglo-phile G.K. van Hogendorp could
theorize that he did not believe that the Dutch merchants and
manufacturers were inferior to those of England nor that the
Dutch were lacking in capital and energy, the King and a
number of Dutch merchants and Belgian manufacturers realized
that if Holland wanted to gain some benefit from its overseas
possessions it could not afford to introduce a system of
complete free trade, because the competitive position of the
(47)
English was too unequal for the Dutch to overcome. Belgian 
manufacturers wanted a secure market for their goods which 
were difficult to sell in Europe after the Napoleonic free
(46) Hogendorp. Gijsbert Karel van (1771-1834); wrote a thesis 
on American federalism (Leiden, 1786); ardent Orangist and 
appointed Pensionary of Rotterdam; no official position 
between 1795-1813» but became head of an Amsterdam trading 
company; showed a great deal of interest in the plans for 
the reform of the East India Company and wrote a great 
deal on matters of colonial administration; Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs (1813-1814); Vice-President of 
the Council of State (1815) and largely responsible for 
the drafting of the Constitution of 1815; appointed 
Minister of State in 1815 "but resigned the following 
year owing to the continuous clashes of his strongly 
liberal ideas with the conservative outlook of the King; 
lost a great deal of his early fervour for the House of 
Orange; remained in Parliament from 1816-1825 and wrote
a great deal on economic matters,
(47) Welderen Rengers ’’Failure...” op.cit. p.33*
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trade system had been replaced by the old practice of high
tarrifs especially in Prance. Wappers-Melis, a Belgian and a
free-trade opponent, claimed that the Dutch Kingdom itself
produced far more iron products, clothing, glass and other
manufactures than were absorbed by internal consumption. This
surplus could easily be exported to Java, where the market
should be reserved for the mother country which had the right
to all the benefits of the Java trade, as it paid for the
(48)
running of that colony. Dutch merchants wanted protection of 
shipping and trade and a petition by the Amsterdam Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry in 1817 questioned if there existed any 
other nation which admitted Holland into its colonies on an 
equal footing. While British shipping and trade was not inter­
fered with in Java, the Dutch were trading at a great disadvan­
tage at the Cape and in Ceylon. Now that Java had been 
definitely secured, it was high time, so the petition went on, 
that the Dutch government took measures in order to gain some 
advantage from that territory, where trade and commerce were 
monopolized by the British, because by right the market for 
Java coffee belonged in Amsterdam not in London. The petition
(48) Wappers-Melis ’’Essay sur le commerce des Indes Orientales” 
1818 in Posthumus. ed. Documenten betreffende de Buiten- 
landsche handelspolitiek van Nederland in de negentiende 
eeuw. Tweede Deel: Onderhandelingen met Engeland over de 
Koloniale Handelspolitiex (1814-1838). pp.8-21.
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further suggested that duties on cargoes carried in foreign
ships to and from Java should be 25% higher than those carried
in Dutch ships; that the coffee trade should be exclusively
reserved to the Dutch; and that those measures should remain
in force till Dutch commerce and shipping was sufficiently
strong enough to compete with other nations on a free trade
(49)
basis# The Rotterdam Chamber of Commerce however and also the
Commissioners-General thought the Amsterdam proposals too
severe and were of the opinion that in any case Dutch shipping
was not sufficiently developed to carry on the major part of
(50)
the Java trade# Consequently the Commissioners-General on
28th August, 1818 introduced a rather moderate tariff which
was applicable to Java and Madura and which specified the
following duties: Dutch ships 6%; foreign ships with Dutch
goods 9%; foreign ships with other goods 12$; while the duties
would be calculated on the invoice value of the goods plus 30$#
On an invoice value of 100 guilders the duty would in fact
amount to 7.8$, 11*5$ and 15.6$ respectively, while previously
(51)they would have been 13$ and 16$#
(49) De Karner van Koophandel en Fabrieken van Amsterdam to 
Goldberg, 23rd January, 1817. in Posthumus, op.cit. pp#5-6.
(50) "Rapport van den Commissarissen-Generaal over In en Uit-
gaande rechten op Java en Madura, 1818" in Elout*s Bij— 
dragen op.cit, pp.269-273.
(51) Welderen Renders "Failure.." op.cit# pp.71-72#
34.
But British trade against which the new tariff was mainly 
directed, was hardly affected owing to the manner in which the
regulations were applied. Dutch customs officers were lowly
*
paid and on the whole they were inefficient and corrupt and so 
it was easy for British merchants to by-pass the new customs 
regulations. British traders used various practices to 
neutralize the effect of the new tariff such as the under­
valuation of goods shown on the invoice by subtracting 
premiums, discounts and other charges and by showing cost 
prices only. Even the exchange rates were tampered with in 
order to undervalue the £ in Batavia as compared with Calcutta. 
Another common practice was to naturalize British ships by 
issuing them with Dutch shipping papers on their arrival in 
Batavia; then those ships after having unloaded their cargo 
in Batavia, took Java produce to Holland from where they sailed
to English ports to collect goods which would be imported into
(52)
the Dutch colonies at the Dutch rate of duty. In 1823 English
cunning went as far as to re-baptize the British ship ’’Barossa”
(53)
into ’’Baroness van der Capellen”. Apart from the failure of 
the colonial authorities in properly executing the customs 
regulations of 1818 the Home government in any case proved
(52) Kemp P.H. van der ”De Geschiedenis van het onstaan der 
Ne de rl ans ch-Indische Li jnwadenverordening van 1824. " in 
Bijdragen tot de taal-Land-en Volkenkunde van Neder- 
landsch Indie, 1908. pp.440-445.
(53) Ibid. p. 453.
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to be dissatisfied with the degree of protection intended, and
on 25th April, 1819 a royal decree was issued declaring
products of Dutch origin brought in on national ships, free of
(54)duty, with the exception of victuals.
The Commissioners-General however were acutely aware that 
whatever measures they took to bind the trade and commerce of 
Java to the national economy, their efforts would have been 
largely in vain if the British succeeded in setting up a free- 
trade port in or near the centre of the archipelago, because 
such an establishment would undoubtedly draw away a great 
deal of trade from Batavia. Owing to their unfavourable 
competitive position the Dutch at that stage could not afford 
to indulge in the fashionable philosophy of commercial liberal­
ism, while the British could. Therefore the Batavian govern­
ment spent a great deal of effort attempting to prevent 
Raffles from realizing his plans.
In addition to the direct preventive action taken in 
Palembang, Riouw and Borneo, the Commissionsrs-General resorted 
to the sending of strong protests to the Calcutta government in 
August and October, 1818, in which they requested the British 
authorities to stop Raffles and in which they explained their 
preventive actions by pointing out that the Dutch colonial 
authorities were fully entitled to deal with an individual who
(54) Ibid, p.445.
36
without any authorization took it upon himself* to disturb
(55)peace and order in the East Indian area. The answer of 
Calcutta to those protests, which was received in January,
1819, disavowed the actions of Raffles in the following terms:
’’••We do not hesitate to declare to your excellencies, 
that we have never sanctioned, nor have approved the 
procedure of the Lieutenant-Governor of Port Marlbor­
ough in exercising any interference in the affairs 
of Palembang and in deputing a British officer thither 
for the purpose of counteracting your measures•••••••”(56)
And Batavia was further informed that Raffles had been given
strict orders to surrender Padang, to withdraw from the
Lampongs and to refrain from interfering in the rest of Sumatra,
At the same time however the government in Calcutta did not
seem to approve of the Dutch actions in Palembang, when it
added that it was not clear why the Dutch had been so hasty
in deposing the sultan and in anulling the British treaty of
1812, The latter points apparently went unnoticed when the
Commissioners-General highly satisfied with the official
disavowal of Raffles* actions, wrote a very amiable letter to 
(57)
Calcutta,
(55) Protest of Commissioners-General to Calcutta. 25th August, 
1818, quot,Kemp ”Opvattingen,•” op.cit. pp,393-394* 
Protest* of Commissioners-General to Calcutta. 5th October, 
1618, in Hoek ’’Herstel,,,” op,cit, Bi.1 lagen p, xv,
(56) Governor-General in Council (Calcutta) to Commissioners- 
General. 10th October, 1Ö1&, quot,Kemp ’’Qpvatt ingen, ,ir~ 
op.cit, pp.407-408,
(57) Commissioners-General to Calcutta. 26th January, 1819* 
quot. Kemp *f0pvattingen,,” p ,4Q9,
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F u rtherm ore , th e  B a tav ian  government had re p e a te d ly
req u es ted  The Hague to  com plain about R a ff le s  in  London.
But th e  Dutch am bassador to  B r i t a in ,  F a g e l, who a t  th e  end
o f 1818 had been o rd ered  to  ta k e  up th e  q u e s tio n , re p o r te d
th a t  C a s tle re a g h  seemed to  be f a r  b e t t e r  in s t ru c te d  on th e
m a tte r  th an  he had ex p ec ted , and i t  appeared  th a t  R a ff le s
not on ly  had se n t d e ta i le d  r e p o r ts  to  th e  Company bu t a lso
to  the B r i t i s h  governm ent. F agel f u r th e r  in tim a ted  th a t
C a s tle re a g h  appeared to  be r a th e r  im pressed by R affles*
argument th a t  th e  Dutch were t r y in g  to  exclude B r i ta in  from 
(58)
th e  A rch ip e lag o . On 1 2 th  Ja n u a ry , how ever, th e  Dutch
am bassador was ab le  to  re p o r t  to  h is  government th a t  the
a c tio n s  o f R a ff le s  were d isapproved  and th a t  the B r i t i s h
government would tak e  a c t io n ,  bu t u n fo r tu n a te ly  f o r  th e  Dutch
on th e  nex t day a p r o te s t  by R a ff le s  about th e  11 encroachm ents
o f H o lland” appeared in  th e  B r i t i s h  p re s s  and brought th e
(59)
whole q u e s tio n  in to  th e  open. C a s tle re ag h  was re p o r te d  to  
be g r e a t ly  d isp le a se d  about R affle s*  in d is c r e t io n  and a f t e r  
a q u e s tio n  had been asked in  th e  House o f Lords about th e  
Palembang a f f a i r ,  th e  government re fu se d  to  ta b le  th e  docu­
m ents concerned on th e  grounds th a t  R a ff le s  in  h is  su b o rd in a te
(56) Fagel to  th e  Hague. 1 s t  Ja n u a ry , 1819. quot,Kemp ”O p v att- 
in g e n .. ” o p . c i t .  p p .466-467.
(59) a) Fagel to  th e  Hague. 1 2 th  Jan u a ry , 1819. auot«Kemp 
”O p v a ttin g e n .. ” o p . c i t .  p .4 6 7 . 
b) R a f f le s * p r o te s t  in  "The B r i t i s h  P re s s ” o f 1 3 th  
Ja n u a ry , 1819. a u o t.  ib id ,  p .3 9 8 .
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position as commercial resident had no authority to act(60)
publicly. On 12th February, Castlereagh, in an official note 
to the Dutch ambassador, wrote that the acts of Raffles would 
be entirely disavowed, because that gentleman was merely a 
commercial agent, who had not been authorized to act polit­
ically in any matter whatsoever. But the points of difference, 
the note continued, which unfortunately had arisen should
become the subject of further discussion between the two(61)
governments. A copy of Castlereagh*s note was sent to the
Indies and the behaviour of the Commissioners-General were
commended by the King, who directed them to maintain with
calm determination the rights and the interests of the nation
and the prestige of the Dutch name in case of similar(62)difficulties in the future.
Although the Commissioners-General was gratified with 
the official disavowal of Raffles* actions, they were bent 
upon preventing the occurrence of similar trouble and this
(60) Fagel to the Hague, 15th January, 1819.quot.ibid.p.hOl
(61) Castlereagh to Fagel. 12th February, 1819. in Deventer "Nederlandsch Gezag.." op.cit. pp.277-278.
(62) Minister of Colonies to Governor-General van der Capellen. 
2nd March, 1819 in Ibid.p.277. Note: QnlSth January the 
Commissioners-General had declared their mission completed 
and Elout and Buyskens soon after departed for Holland, 
while Van der Capellen remained behind as Governor- 
General (1819-1825).
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in their view could only be effected by the removal of
Raffles from the archipelago. They had therefore repeatedly
suggested to the Dutch government that Bencoolen and the
other British possessions in Sumatra should be exchanged for
(63)the Dutch possessions in India. The idea of an exchange was
not new and already in 1814 G.K. van Hogendorp had written
that the Dutch colonies in India were valueless because of
the British preponderance in that area and he had therefore
suggested that they should be exchanged for Bencoolen and
Pulu Penang, leaving Southern Sumatra to the Dutch and Padang
and Northern Sumatra to the English. Although van Hogendorp* s
proposals were not taken up at the time, the danger to Dutch
commerce and trade and the general lack of peace and order in
the archipelago caused by Raffles* activities made the
Commissioners-General see the desirability of such an exchange
and this explains their interest in Sumatra at this time. As
early as October, 1816 the Commissioners-General had made it
clear to their government that their moves in Sumatra during
(64)this period were to be seen as preventive. And Elout wrote in
(63) Similarly to the Dutch, Raffles had urged his superiors 
to effect a territorial rationalization in order to stop 
the ever recurring demarcation disputes with Holland. He 
suggested therefore to leave Java and the Spice Islands 
exclusively to the Dutch, while Sumatra, Banka, Malacca 
and Borneo should become English. Source: Raffles to 
Secret Committee of the East India Company. 3rd. July, 
l6l6. in Deventer "Nederlandsch Gezag...^op.cit.pp.257-259.
(64) Commissioners-General to the Hague. 9th October, 1816. 
quot »Kemp "Opvattingen. .*• op.cit. pp. 303-384.
no.
1817 that, while the intended action in Palembang should be 
considered as an attempt to stop Raffles from realizing his 
known plan to extend British influence there, he also wished 
that Bencoolen and the other English possessions were in the 
hands of the Dutch, and he thought that it would be worth­
while giving the colonies on the continent of India in
(65)exchange for them. The government in The Hague, however, did 
initially now show a great deal of interest in the suggestions 
for territorial exchange, but it showed more concern when the 
Commissioners-General soon after Raffles* arrival in Bencoolen 
reported that their previous apprehensions had proved to be 
well founded, while pointing out that in regard to their actions 
in Sumatra:
"...it is not a vain desire for the extension of Dutch 
authority without use of definite purpose, which makes 
us think or act as we did, but it is the sincere and 
well founded conviction that it is absolutely necessary 
for Dutch trade and shipping, for the prosperity, yes, 
even for the security of Java (if there were stronger 
expressions we would use them) to have the complete mastery of Sumatra, if possible, but in any case to 
cede nothing of the influence and authority which the 
Dutch have exercised for so long in Palembang, and in 
the Lampongs.......... ...................••••••.•••”(66)
In another despatch Elout urged that the Dutch government should
make sure that "that restless person" would disappear from the
(65) Elout to Goldberg, 21st December, 1817* in Deventer 
"Nederlandsch Gezag.." op.cit.pp.210-212.
(66) Commissioners-General to Director-General of Colonies« 
30th June, l8T8~irTl)eventer "Nederlandsch~GezagTV7^ 
op.cit. pp. 254-256.
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Indies and this according to Elout could be best effected
by the cession of the Dutch factories in India in exchange
for the British possessions in Sumatra and by promises on
the part of both countries not to interfere in each others*
(67)sphere of influence. This continuous pressure from the 
Batavian authorities made the Netherlands government finally 
decide at the end of 1818 to suggest to Britain to settle 
the disputes which had arisen in the East by means of 
territorial exchange. But while Holland was under the imp­
ression that the British government would be sympathetic to 
its claims, both London and Calcutta by this time had become 
rather apprehensive of the Dutch designs in the Indies. The 
British feared that the Batavian government in its attempts 
to expand its influence as widely as possible and to protect 
Dutch trade and shipping, in fact was trying to exclude 
Britain completely from Malaysia both politically and 
commercially.
Raffles, who had arrived in Calcutta in October, 1818
in order to brief his superiors on the situation in the East
Indies, managed to bring the Governor-General, Lord Hastings,
around to his view concerning the danger to British trade(68)
caused by the Dutch moves in the Malacca Straits. But he
(67) Elout to Falck. Minister for Colonies. 9th August, 1818. 
in Paick^s Gedenks christen.** op.'cit". "p.453*
(68) Boulger "Raffles..." op.cit, p.296.
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failed to interest Lord Hastings in his plans for Sumatra,
because the Governor-General, so Raffles remarked, was more
inclined to make the Equator the demarcation line between
the English and Dutch spheres of interest and to exchange
(69)Sumatra for Malacca. Raffles however was able to write to
his friend Marsden in November, 1818, that:
M...it is determined to keep the command of the Straits 
of Malacca, by forming establishments at Acheen and 
Rhio (Riouw), and that I leave Calcutta in a fortnight, 
as the agent to effect this important object. Acheen 
I conceive to be completely within our power, but the 
Dutch may be before hand with us at Rhio (Riouw)...”(70)
Raffles after having found the Carimon Islands near Riouw
unsuitable and Riouw itself occupied by the Dutch, went on as
instructed to Johore where on 29th January, he landed on the
island of Singapore. The Dutch protested because they
claimed that Singapore came under the jurisdiction of the
sultan of Riouw, but they refrained from action as they
expected that also this time Raffles would be recalled by his
superiors. Singapore however remained occupied by the
British and in 1824 the Dutch gave up their claim to it.
Raffles then had finally succeeded in realizing part of his
plans for the archipelago by wedging a British post into the
protective barrier which the Dutch had attempted to build
(69) Raffles to Marsden. 16th October, 1818 in Raffles Memoir 
op.cit. vol.2. pp. 4-5*
(70) Raffles to Marsden. 14th November, 1818. auot. Boulger 
”Raffles..” op.cit. p.297.
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around Java. It should he remarked that even before the 
wars with Prance the British East India Company had been 
interested in a settlement at Riouw, but negotiations with 
Holland had not been completed when in 1795 the war with 
Prance broke out and the Dutch colonies in any case came under 
the control of Britain. Although after the war the need of 
the East India Company for East Indian produce to pay for 
China tea was far smaller, because opium had become plentiful 
in Indiaf British manufacturers, especially during the post- 
Napoleonic depression, were eager to find outlets for their 
products and they were putting a great deal of pressure on the 
British government to keep and to extend the market which had 
been built up in the East Indies during the war. The British 
government therefore found itself in a dilemma between the 
demands of traders and manufacturers in the home-country and 
the demands of its European foreign policy, which involved the 
cultivation of Dutch friendship. The problem was eventually 
solved by the well known British capacity to compromise: the 
Dutch were given the satisfaction of an official disavowal of 
Raffles* actions in Sumatra, while on the other hand Britain 
obtained a station at Singapore in order to satisfy its 
merchants and industrialists.
The Netherlands government, however, was apparently under 
the mistaken impression that the official disavowal of Raffles*
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actions, also meant an implicit approval by the British
of Dutch policies in the Indies. This is quite clear from
the instructions by The Hague to the Dutch Ambassador in
London, Pagel, who was requested at the end of 1818 to see
Castlereagh about a revision of the Convention of 1814 and
to suggest an exchange of the Dutch factories in India for
(71)the British colonies in Sumatra and Pulu Penang. As Pagel 
immediately and quite rightly pointed out, the British would 
never give up Pulu Penang. Moreover Castlereagh, whom Pagel 
previously had reported as rather impressed by the arguments 
of Raffles became suspicious, when in the middle of 1819 
reports arrived from India about the alleged aspirations of 
the Dutch in the archipelago and the subsequent occupation 
by the British of Singapore, and he wrote to Clancarty, the 
British ambassador in The Hague:
’’..The Dutch government probably think that they can 
establish the same exclusive dominion over the 
islands, which we have gradually acquired over the 
continent, and that other nations will submit to 
trade in those seas under such discriminating duties 
as may give the Dutch the sort of protection, which 
the British trade enjoys in the Indian ports......**(73)
(71) Falck to Pagel. 10th December. 1818. quot.Kemp P.H. van 
der "De Nederlandsche Factor!Jen in Voor-Indie in den 
aanvang der 19e eeuw.” in Bijdragen tot de Taal-Land-en 
Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch Indie, 1901, p.437.
(72) Pagel to Falck. 15th December, 1818. quot.Ibid. p.438.
(73) Castlereagh to Clancarty. 13th August, 1819 in Posthumus tr. • Documenten• • ** op. cit. p.29
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B ut, so th e  B r i t i s h  M in is te r  co n tin u ed , th e  N etherlands
government should  r e a l i z e  th a t  i t  could no t a f fo rd  the  armed
fo rc e s  needed to  c o n tro l  such a v a s t a rea  of i s la n d s .  In s te a d
i t  should  e s t a b l i s h  i t s  d i r e c t  a u th o r i ty  over Java  and t h e i r
o ld  p o s s e s s io n s , where he hoped th e  Dutch would no t in tro d u c e
an e x c lu s iv e  tr a d e  p o l ic y . In  reg a rd  to  th e  r e s t  of th e
a rch ip e la g o  H olland should  come to :
nan u n d e rs ta n d in g  w ith  th a t  power ( I  mean G reat B r i ta in )  
which may open th e  n a tiv e  commerce o f th e  o th e r  
is la n d s  to  a f a i r  and f r ie n d ly  c o m p e t i t io n , , .............., u(74)
Such an a rrangem en t, so C a s tle reag h  concluded , would taKe 
away th e  need f o r  B r i t a in  to  expand p o l i t i c a l l y  in  th e  a r c h i­
p e la g o , which in  any case was a g a in s t i t s  w ishes,
C lan ca rty  subm itted  C astle reag h * s d esp a tch  to  th e  Dutch 
F o re ig n  M in is te r ,  who r e p l ie d  th a t  H olland in  f a c t  was t r y in g  
to  e f f e c t  what the B r i t i s h  M in is te r  was su g g e s tin g . The 
N eth e rlan d s had no d e s ire  w hatsoever to  adopt “a mad p o lic y  
o f e x c lu s io n ” , bu t was on ly  concerned to  r e - e s t a b l i s h  au th o r­
i t y  in  th o se  p la c e s  which had been ceded by the  C onvention o f  
1814 and in  th o se  t e r r i t o r i e s  where Dutch a u th o r i ty  had 
la p sed  in  p re-w ar d ay s , bu t where i t s  so v e re ig n ty  had never 
been abandoned. T h ere fo re  th e  Dutch c la im s in  Riouw in  
a d d i t io n  to  those  in  Java  and Sumatra should  not be seen  as
(74) I b id .  p .3 0 .
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an attempt to exclude the commerce of other nations from
(75)the archipelago. But the Dutch denial of the accusations
brought against them did not convince the British government
nor deter it from pressing its claims for Singapore. Clan-
carty submitted a memorandum to the Netherlands government
containing the conditions on which the British government
was willing to negotiate. These were: The Netherlands was
to give a clear exposition of its territorial claims in the
East Indies, indicating how much of their claims rested on
direct sovereignty and how much on treaties concluded with
indigenous rulers. Furthermore Britain could never agree to
a practical exclusion or a mere toleration of its trade, nor
would it leave the keys to the China Sea, the Sunda and
Malacca Straits, completely under Dutch control. Other
conditions were a guarantee of free shipping and trade and(76)
the admission of consuls in the Dutch colonies. The position
however which the Dutch took up concerning the British demands,
(77)is probably most clearly expressed in a commentary by Elout, 
whose reasoning formed the basis of the King's instructions
(75) Clancarty to Castlereagh. 18th August, 1819* in Ibid. PP*31-32.
(76) Clancarty to the Netherlands Government. 20th August, 
1819» in Kemp P.H. van der ^De Stichting van Singapore, de afstand ervan met Malakka, etc.” in Bijdragen tot de 
Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch Indie. 1902. 
PP.341-346.
(77) "Consideratien nopens de afdoening der geschillen tussen 
Groot-Britannien en de Nederlanden, 18l9.u in "Elout's Bijdragen. op.cit. pp. 1-58.
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to the plenipotentiaries for the Anglo-Dutch talks in 
London (July-August, 1820).
Elout argued that the territorial disputes should he 
solved by territorial exchange: i.e. Sumatra for the Dutch 
possessions in India, because, so he reasoned, England would 
desire to have a free hand in India, while the same was true 
for the Dutch in the East Indies, and also because Bencoolen 
was of no commercial importance to Britain nor were the 
factories in India of any use to the Dutch anymore. Elout 
however considered to grant the British request for an expos­
ition of Dutch territorial rights in the Indies as dangerous, 
because he realized the difficulties which could be brought 
up concerning those territories, where Dutch authority had 
lapsed in the pre-war era. Furthermore he considered the 
request for a guarantee of non-interference in shipping and 
trade as superfluous, because instead of ”a practical exclusion” 
there already was ’’practical free commercial intercourse” in 
the Indies. But if the British insisted on this point, he 
had no objection to those principles being clearly expressed 
in the new convention, although it should be pointed out to 
the British government that it was not the Dutch, but the 
British themselves, who appeared to want a ’’practical exclusion”,
(78) Instructions of 10th July. 1820 in Ibid pp.81-90.
48.
because otherwise he could not explain the British monopolies 
at the Cape and Mauritius and the exclusive clauses in the 
treaties made by Raffles with the indigenous princes. Elout 
also maintained that Singapore should not be ceded to Britain. 
If the British were really worried about the safety of the 
keys to the China Sea, then surely, so he argued, they were in 
a position to seize those keys, should the Dutch ever prove to 
be troublesome. But in fact there had not been any obstruction 
to shipping in that area for 200 hundred years and in any case 
the interests of the one party were no sufficient grounds for 
interfering with the rights of the other. Then Elout again 
explained the motive behind the post-war Dutch expansionary 
moves in the Indies:
’’••And truely we do not desire to possess any of those 
places for their own sake. I would like to see them 
in the hands of any nation, which would be willing to 
guarantee me, that the interests of the Netherlands, 
as the weaker party, would be respected (and which 
would guarantee) that the commerce of Dutch citizens 
would not suffer neither from the measures taken by 
higher or lower authorities, nor from the open usurp­
ations or secret tricks of sub-ordinate agents.” (79)
But, so Elout continued his argument, the actual situation
was such that if the Dutch ceded Singapore and the Riouw
archipelago, they would lose their influence there completely,
and their trade in the rest of the Indies, especially the
coastal trade, would suffer a great deal. Furthermore Elout
advised against granting the other British request for
(79) Elout!s Bi.idragen. op.cit. p.57
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admission of consuls, which was not surprising considering
his personal experiences with a so-called "mere commercial agent".
Fagel however reported from London early in 1820 that the
British government had intimated that Holland should expect to
make sacrifices, because public opinion in Britain, owing to the
accusations of exclusion and monopoly, was unfavourable to the 
(80)
Dutch. Van Nagell, the Dutch Foreign Minister, was incensed at
(80) Fagel to Van Nagell.14th January, 1820, in Kemp "Geschie- 
denis..TractaatT.^ op.cit. pp.205-206. Note:Castlereagh*s 
foreign policy toward Holland and its colonies was severely 
criticised in the British press, as can be gauged from the 
following extract from "The Time^* of 31st July, 1820:
H..We thought it might be useful - and we are sorry for its 
being a truth of so disagreeable a nature - to inform him 
(i.e.Castlereagh), that the whole fabric of his foreign 
policy - that policy which, as his admirers have boasted, 
was more peculiarly and emphatically his own - is tumbling 
or about to tumble, about his ears, and, what is worse, 
about the ears of his countrymen in every quarter of the globe..... (Commenting on the Dutch) The Indian Government
of the Netherlands has since (i.e.1816) been accused by 
our authorities of pursuing a system of aggrandisement 
and exclusion hostile to the commercial interests of this 
country......One of the means by which this plan (of the
Dutch) is said to be prosecuted has been the renewal of 
all the dormant and obsolete treaties, which, in the course 
of two centuries, the Dutch had imposed upon the natives.
We hope there may be no truth in these accusations......•
But, if it be otherwise, it is undoubtedly time that the 
firmness of Ministers should be called into play, to re­
deem, so far as may yet be practicable, the bad effects 
of their own singular munificence. The post established 
by Sir Thomas Raffles at Sincapoor (Singapore) appears to 
have given umbrage to the Dutch. •• (but) The Dutch have attempted Palembang...(and) We do not know that the Brit­
ish government has resented this encroachment...on the 
contrary, the whole effort of our Colonial Minister in the 
House of Lords was to screen the Dutch, and to disclaim 
Sir Thomas Raffles. Well, then why should Holland quarrel 
with our occupation of Sincapoor (Singapore), which be it 
remembered, is, on the part of England, a purely defensive 
position, to cover her direct trade with China from her 
own dominions? With the Straits of Sunda we have not 
meddled...(but) Let us ask our Dutch neighbours fairly, 
what business they have with the Straits of Malacca? Do 
they wish to lay tolls upon that passage, as Denmark has done upon the Sound?................. ...... ..... ....♦»
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(8 1 )
t h e  p ro s p e c t  o f  m aking new s a c r i f i c e s ,  b e c a u se  H o llan d  d id  n o t  
c la im  a n y th in g  w h ich  d id  n o t b e lo n g  to  h e r .  A l l  i t  t r i e d  to  
do w as:
1f, , , q u ’ a c o n s e rv e r  l e s  d e b r i s  de l e u r  immense f o r t u n e ,
Un em ploye de l a  Compagnie d es  In d e s  A n g la is e s  ( i , e .  
R a f f l e s ) ,  e s p r i t  t u r b u le n t  e t  b r o u i l l o n ,  e c h a u f fe  une 
q u e r e l l e ,  e t  a c c u se  a u d ac ie u se m e n t l e s  v u es  du G ouvern­
em ent d es  P a y s -B a s . P a r  s e s  i n t r i g u e s  e t  s e s  d e l a t i o n s  
i l  envenim e l e s  e s p r i t s ,  e t  p o u r  l e s  t r a n q u i l l i s e r ,  i l  
f a u d r a  que l e s  P ay s-B as  f a s s e n t  d e s  s a c r i f i c e s ,  • • , . ,  .  (8 2 )
B ut t h i s  was n o t  o n ly  th e  v iew  o f  i n t e r e s t e d  D utchm en; C la n c a r ty
c o u ld  s e e  how th e  d i s p u te s  i n  th e  I n d i e s  had s t a r t e d  when he
w r o te :
” , , 1  b e l i e v e  t h a t  a l l  o u r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w ith  th e  D utch  in  
th o s e  p a r t s  ( i . e ,  th e  I n d i e s )  have  o r i g in a t e d  from  S i r  
S tam fo rd  R a f f l e s ,  H is  c o n d u c t e x c i t e d ,  a s  i t  a p p e a r s ,  
th e  j e a lo u s y  o f  Mr. C a p e lle n  ( i . e .  Van d e r  C a p e l l e n ) , . , .  
Hence grew  s e v e r a l  o f  th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n ts  made by them , 
and from  th e s e  th e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  m aking o th e r s  on o u r 
p a r t  a p p e a re d  to  o u r  own governm ent a t  C a l c u t t a . . . . . , H(8 3 )
I t  was how ever i n  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  B r i t i s h  t r a d e  p o l i c y ,  w hich  
a l r e a d y  s in c e  b e fo r e  th e  war had  b e en  c o n c e rn e d  to  f i n d  a 
s t a t i o n  in  th e  a r c h ip e la g o  S o u th  o f  P u lu  P en an g , t o  u se  th e  
a c c u s a t io n s  o f  R a f f l e s  and  C a lc u t t a  a s  a p r e t e x t  f o r  occupy­
in g  S in g a p o re , B ecause  r a t h e r  th a n  d e fe n s e  o r  a d e s i r e  f o r
(8 1 )  H o lla n d  had  a l r e a d y  l o s t  t o  E n g la n d : The C ape, C ey lon  and 
p a r t  o f  G uyana.
(8 2 )  Van N a g e ll  to  F a g e l .2 5 th  J a n u a r y ,  1820 i n  Kemp " . .G e s c h ie ' 
d e n i s . r T r a c t a a t .T ” o p . c i t .  p .207*
(8 3 )  C la n c a r ty  to  C a s t l e r e a g h . 2 0 th  A u g u s t, 1 8 19 , i n  " C o r re s -  
p o n d e n c e , D e s p a tc h e s ,  and o th e r  P a p e rs  o f  V isc o u n t 
C a s t l e r e a g h .11 1853* v o l .  x i i .  p .137*
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territorial expansion, it was the commerce and trade of 
the archipelago which the British were primarily interested 
in, unless they feared that Holland might again he occupied 
by Prance and therefore would pose an indirect danger to 
the safety of the Straits of Malacca, But this however 
was unlikely to happen at that time. The disputes between 
Raffles and the Dutch had brought to the fore again the 
pre-war demands by Britain, which had remained unsettled in 
the Convention of 1814, for a fair share of the trade of the 
archipelago and a station South of Pulu Penang, The occupa­
tion of Singapore therefore should be seen as a continuation 
of pre-war British trade policy and as an attempt to exclu­
de a large share of the East Indian trade from being charged 
with Dutch duties, however moderate they might be. Or to 
put it in different terms: in occupying Singapore and 
declaring it a free-trade port, Britain was actually attempt­
ing to perpetrate its already existing near-monopoly in the 
East-Indian trade, A British free-trade port would obviously 
attract many indigenous traders, because there they were 
able to sell higher (no import duties) and to buy cheaper 
than in the Dutch held ports. While the British were happy 
to leave Java, Sumatra and the rest of the archipelago 
exclusively to Holland, English influence through Singapore 
was felt till deep into the Dutch territories. Some evidence 
for my contention that London used the accusations of Raffles
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and Calcutta mainly as a pretext for occupying Singapore, 
can be found in the content and tone of the instructions 
sent to Bengal for the implementation of the Anglo-Dutch
(84)
treaty of 1824.
Such then was the state of opinion of both Britain and
(84) Directors of Politcal Committee to the Government of
Bengal (Calcutta). 30th July, 1&24. in Kemp "..Geschie- 
denis.• Tractaat.op.cit. pp.237-239* The comments of 
the Directors about freedom of navigation were as 
follows:
M13* The treaty contains no stipulation concerning the 
freedom of navigation as it has not been alleged that 
British vessels have met with any interruption in any 
part of the archipelago•"
and in respect of most favoured nation treatment which 
was to be accorded in the respective colonies, the 
instructions read:
”..We are not aware that this stipulation will require 
any new measure on your part in favour of the Dutch 
or that it will entitle British subjects to any new 
privilege at Dutch ports, of which they are not 
already in possession* ................ *..... ..*•«»”
The fact that the Dutch had been accused of concluding 
treaties with the indigenous Indonesian princes in order 
to monopolize trade was commented upon as follows:
"•••These statements have been denied by the Dutch and 
we have certainly had no specific evidence of the 
fact; but however this may have been, the evil cannot 
exist in future M
I think it is clear from the above extracts that the 
Directors of the Company were aware of the exaggeration 
of the accusations which had been brought against the 
Dutch colonial authorities. They appeared to consider 
the Treaty of 1824 as a preventive move to stop the 
Dutch from carrying out any such designs in the future. 
But apart from normal trade relations with the Nether­
lands East Indies the British wanted also to draw away 
as much trade as possible from the Dutch and that was 
the reason for their persistence in obtaining Singapore.
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H olland on th e  problem s which had a r is e n  in  the  E ast I n d ie s ,  
a t  th e  tim e when n e g o t ia t io n s  commenced in  London a t  th e  
end of J u ly ,  1820, By 5 th  August agreem ent had a lread y  been 
reached  on a number o f p o in ts  such a s :  a d isavow al o f th e  
a c tio n s  o f su b o rd in a te  a g e n ts , in c lu d in g  the  t r e a t i e s  of 
R a f f le s  in  Sum atra; most favoured  n a tio n  tre a tm en t was to  
be accorded by bo th  n a tio n s  in  t h e i r  r e s p e c tiv e  c o lo n ie s , 
b o th  c o u n tr ie s  were to  g u a ran tee  n o n - in te r fe re n c e  in  sh ip p in g  
and t r a d e ,  w ith  th e  ex cep tio n  o f the M oluccas, where th e  Dutch 
were allow ed to  keep t h e i r  sp ic e  monopoly; no ex c lu s iv e  
c la u se s  were to  be allow ed in  t r e a t i e s  w ith  n a t iv e  p r in c e s ,  
w hile  a l l  th o se  t r e a t i e s ,  p a s t and fu tu re  o nes, had to  be 
n o t i f ie d  to  th e  o th e r  p a r ty .  But among th e  more im portan t 
problem s which rem ained unso lved  were th e  q u e s tio n s  o f Singa­
p o re , B i l l i t o n ,  th e  Dutch f a c to r i e s  in  In d ia ,  and re c ip ro c a l  
t a r i f f s .  I t  was d ec ided  hov/ever to  postpone the  d is c u s s io n s  
on S ingapore t i l l  O c to b er, 1820, when i t  was expected  th a t  
more d e ta i le d  in fo rm a tio n  on th e  s i t u a t i o n  would have reached  
London, But in  f a c t  th e  n e g o t ia t io n s  had broken down, because 
o f the u n w illin g n ess  o f  th e  Dutch to  renounce t h e i r  c la im s on 
S ingapore; and i t  was n o t t i l l  th e  second h a l f  o f 1823 th a t
( 6 5 )
th e  d isc u ss io n s  were resumed ag a in .
(8 5 ) V erbaal van h e t verhandelde tu s s e n  de B r its c h e  en N eder- 
Tandsche gevo lm achtigden , t e r  re g e l in g  d e r In d isch e  zaken 
irT l8 2 0 , 20 th  J u ly ,  -  5 th  A ugust, 1820 in  E lo u tfs B i j -  
dragen o p ,c i t , p p ,100-147.
Once again Singapore ‘became a stumbling block and to
the British suggestion to buy the island from the Dutch, the
Netherlands replied that from their point of view the main
purpose of the negotiations was to effect territorial exchange.
Consequently, the Dutch plenipotentiaries showed more interest
in another British proposal to exchange Bencoolen and the
other British possessions in Sumatra for Malacca and Singapore.
They reasoned that Singapore in itself was of no value to the
Dutch and they doubted if the British would gain much benefit
from it, because the flourishing of that free-trade port would
be largely dependant on Dutch trade policy. The more Holland,
so the negotiators argued, would facilitate trade in its own
ports, the smaller would be the share of the East Indian trade(86)
which Singapore would draw. This argument however was rather 
out of touch with the actual state of affairs in the Indies, 
where the Dutch, because of their uncompetitive position, would 
be forced rather towards protection than free-trade. As Van 
der Capellen wrote in 1825:
’’...Here we are less enthusiastic about the treaty of 
March 1824 than one appears to be in the Netherlands, 
and also (we are less enthusiastic) about our acquisi­
tions in Sumatra, which will press heavily on our 
finances^ while Sinkapoer (Singapore) has not changed 
in importance since all I have written about it from 
1819 onwards. But that does not appear to have aroused 
one’s curiosity, as the Estates-General have not even 
requested the tabling of the correspondence on this 
important p o i n t . ....... •••••••” (87)
(86) Fagel and Falck to Elout. 12th January, 1824* in Ibid, 
pp.173-178.
(87) Van der Capellen to Falck. 9th April, 1825. in Falck’s 
Gedenkschriften. op.cit. pp.526—527.
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The Dutch negotiators pointed out further that Malacca, which
for a long time had been a financial burden, would after the
British occupation of Singapore, become completely valueless;
and although Bencoolen had also proved very costly to the
British, the ownership of that territory would mean the
disappearance of all other European influence in Sumatra and(88)
that consideration should outweigh all other objections,
Elout however was not greatly impressed with the argumen­
tation and the proposals of the Dutch negotiators in London, 
because he considered that Bencoolen was not enough in exchange 
for Malacca and Singapore* Although he agreed that a deter*- 
mination of the two countries* spheres of influence was a 
desirable thing, he added that such an arrangement should be 
clearly circumscribed and apart from the Straits of Malacca 
also the rest of the archipelago should be included in the 
attempt to demarcate British and Dutch political influence.
(89)Ke cited Borneo in this regard and also Billiton.
Agreement on territorial exchange was finally reached 
and a treaty was signed by the two countries on 17th March, 
1824. The first seven articles of the treaty dealt with 
commerce and trade and apart from the stipulation that duties 
in the respective colonies were not to be higher than double
(88) Fagel and Falck to Elout. 12th January, 1824 in Elout*s 
Bijdragen op.cit. pp.17^-177•
(89) Elout to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 20th January, 1824. 
in Ibid. pp.179-101.
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those levied on national goods and ships, they confirmed
(90)the principles agrees upon at the discussions in 1820.
But in addition: the Netherlands ceded to Britain: Malacca,
Singapore, the factories in India, while undertaking not to
interfere politically in the Malayan Peninsula. On the other
hand Britain ceded to Holland: Bencoolen cum annexis, Billiton,
Riouw and the Carimons, while undertaking to refrain from
making any settlements or concluding any treaties in Sumatra.
Furthermore in regard to Achin, where Raffles had concluded
a treaty in 1819, Holland agreed not to interfere politically
in that territory, while England would change its treaty with
Achin, which was exclusive, into an agreement for the friendly
reception of British ships. Another important clause in the
treaty was the stipulation that the territories which had been
ceded under the terms of the treaty could not be surrendered
to a third power. If abandoned, then those territories would
(91)come automatically in the possession of the other party.
Sir Charles Forbes, who called the British and the Dutch
equally rapacious, described the treaty of 1824 well when he
(92)
termed it a "division of spoil."
X90) See page : 53*
(91) Full text of treaty in Elout’s Bijdragen, op.cit.pp.222-234.
(92) Sir Charles Forbes, 1774-1849, member for Malmesbury, 
founder of the House of Forbes and Co. at Bombay, in 
Hansard, 17th June, 1824 (Debate on Anglo-Dutch treaty 
of 17th March, 1824.).
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SECTION I I
THE EXTENSION OF DUTCH INFLUENCE ON THE WEST—COAST 
OF SUMATRA: 1 8 1 9 -1530  ^ —
S u m atra  i n  th e  f i r s t  q u a r t e r  o f  th e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry  
was n o t a p o l i t i c a l  u n i t y ,  b u t c o n s i s t e d  o f  a number o f  
d i f f e r e n t  s t a t e s  and com m un ities some o f  w hich  w ere in d ep en d ­
a n t ,  w h ile  o th e r s  w ere d e p e n d e n c ie s  o f  o th e r  In d o n e s ia n  o r  o f 
E u ro p ean  p o w ers .
The s o le  b in d in g  e lem en t b e tw een  th o s e  d iv e r s e  n a t io n s  and 
co m m u n ities  was a s i m i l a r i t y  i n  r e l i g i o n  and la n g u a g e . The 
Mohammedan r e l i g i o n  had  by t h i s  t im e  s p re a d  th ro u g h  m ost o f  
S u m a tra , a l th o u g h  w ith  th e  n o ta b le  e x c e p t io n  o f  th e  B a t ta  
t r i b e s  i n  th e  N o r th e rn  p a r t  o f  th e  i s l a n d  and s m a l le r  p o c k e ts  
i n  th e  i n t e r i o r .  A lso  v a r io u s  d i a l e c t s  o f  th e  M alay la n g u a g e  
w ere spoken  i n  S o u th e rn  and E a s te r n  S u m a tra , i n  th e  i n t e r i o r  
(M in an g k ab au ), and in  th e  c o a s t a l  d i s t r i c t s ,  b u t  th e  m a jo r 
e x c e p t io n  a g a in g  w ere th e  B a t t a s  and a l s o  th e  A ch in ese  a t  th e  
N o r th e rn  t i p  o f  th e  i s l a n d ,  who b e lo n g e d  to  a d i f f e r e n t  
l i n g u i s t i c  and r a c i a l  g ro u p .
The p o p u la t io n  o f  S um atra  a t  th e  b e g in n in g  o f  th e  n in e ­
t e e n t h  c e n tu ry  h a s  b e e n  e s t im a te d  ro u g h ly  a t  s e v e n  m i l l i o n
(i)
p e o p le .
( 1 )  B l in k .  H. "Opkomst en  o n tw ik k e lin g  van  S um atra  a l s
e c o n o m is c h -g e o g ra p h isc h  g e b ie d .1’ s 1 G rav en h ag e , M outon, 
1 926 . p .3 5 .
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The coastal fringes of the island were generally
inhabited by the so-called Coastal Malays, Chinese and
Arabs and a small number of Europeans, who were nearly all
engaged in carrying on trade with the peoples of the interior.
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the
Dutch and the English had occupied a number of points at the(2)
West-Coast, while at the East-coast the Dutch had an estab­
lishment at Palembang and had also concluded commercial 
treaties with the sultanates of Djambi and Siak. The polit­
ical influence, however, of the Europeans had never extended 
any further than their coastal establishments, from where 
they carried on trade with the interior.
While the Dutch in the period 1816-1824» as was pointed 
out, in the previous section, were mainly interested in 
Sumatra because of its strategic importance, soon after 
returning to Padang in 1819, they attempted to extend their 
political influence into the hinterland of Padang i.e. 
Minangkabau. An investigation as to why and how the Dutch 
attempted to establish their authority in Minangkabau during 
the period 1819-1830, forms the substance of this Section.
The land of Minangkabau is situated in Western Sumatra 
in the centre of the mountain range (Bukit Barisan), which
(2) The English had establishments at Bencoolen, Natal and 
Tapanulli, while the Dutch had posts at Padang, Ajer 
Bangis and Baros.
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d iv id e s  th e  i s l a n d  from  N o rth  to  S o u th . M inangkabau P ro p e r
c o n s i s t e d  o f  th e  r e g io n s  o f  Tanah D a ta r ,  Agam and Lima P u lu h
K ota  ( F i f t y  T ow ns), from  w here  th e  M inangkabaus had  s p re a d  t o
th e  N o r th  a s  f a r  a s  th e  B a t ta  l a n d s ,  and E a s tw a rd s  i n t o  th e
u p p e r  b a s in s  o f  th e  S ia k  and Kampar r i v e r s ,  and ev en  as f a r  a s
th e  M alayan P e n in s u la ,  w here in  th e  f i f t e e n t h  c e n tu ry  th e y
(3 )
h ad  e s t a b l i s h e d  a num ber o f  c o lo n ie s  (N e g r i  S e m b ila n ) . S o u th -  
w ards th e  M inangkabaus had  m ig ra te d  in to  K o r i n t j i  and I n d r a p u r a .  
I n  th e  f o u r t e e n th  and  f i f t e e n t h  c e n tu ry  th e  M inangkabau
(4 )
d y n a s ty  had  e s t a b l i s h e d  i t s  hegemony o v e r  th e  w hole o f  c e n t r a l
(3 )  J o s s e l i n  de Jo n g  P .E . de "M inangkabau and N e g ri S e m b ila n -  
S o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  in  I n d o n e s i a .” The H ague, N i j h o f f ,  
1 9 5 2 . p .9 .
(4 ) N o te ; M inangkabau k in g s h ip  was i n  f a c t  e x e r c i s e d  by a 
t r i u m v i r a t e ;  e a c h  o f  th o s e  p r in c e s  e n jo y e d  e q u a l  p r e s t i g e  
and had  b een  a s s ig n e d  a d e f in e d  f i e l d  o f  a u t h o r i t y .  The 
R ad jo  alam  ( r u l e r  o f  th e  w o r ld ) ,  who r e s id e d  a t  P a g e r ru jo n g  
p r e s id e d  o v e r  p o l i t i c a l  a f f a i r s  and was a l s o  th e  l a s t  s o u rc e  
o f  a p p e a l  i n  d i s p u te s  ab o u t n o n - p o l i t i c a l  m a t t e r s .  The s e c ­
ond p r in c e  was th e  R ad jo  A d a t, who r e s id e d  a t  Buo and who 
e x e r c i s e d  th e  h ig h e s t  a u th o r i t y  i n  l e g a l  m a t t e r s ,  w h ile  th e  
R ad jo  Ib a d a t  a t  Sumpu Kudus was i n  c h a rg e  o f  r e l i g i o u s  
a f f a i r s .  Those t h r e e  p r in c e s  w ere a d v is e d  by f o u r  n o b le s
o f  th e  r e a lm : th e  B andaharo  o f  S u n g a i T a ra p , who was i n  
c h a rg e  o f  th e  S o u th e rn  r e g io n s  o f  th e  W e s t-C o a s t;  th e  Tuan 
K a l i  o f  Padang G a n tin g  who to o k  c a re  o f  th e  B a tan g  H a r i  
d i s t r i c t s ;  th e  Mangkudum o f  Sum ani, who h a n d le d  th e  a f f a i r s  
o f  th e  c o lo n ie s  i n  M alaya (N e g ri S e m b ila n ) ;  and th e  Indomo 
o f  S u ro a s s o ,  who was i n  c h a rg e  o f  th e  N o r th e rn  d i s t r i c t s  
o f  th e  W e s t-C o a s t. Those fo u r  n o b le s  c a r r i e d  th e  t i t l e  o f  
D atu  P am u n tja  and w ere  a llo w ed  to  w ear th e  c o lo u r s  o f  th e  
re a lm  and to  le v y  t a x e s  i n  t h e i r  d i s t r i c t s .  A ll  m a t t e r s  
w h ich  a ro s e  w ere f i r s t  b ro u g h t b e fo r e  th e s e  f o u r  c o u n c i l l ­
o r s ,  b u t  i f  no ag reem en t c o u ld  b e  re a c h e d  th e n  th e  m a t t e r  
was r e f e r r e d  to  th e  p r in c e s  a t  Buo o r  Sumpu K udus. I f  
s t i l l  no s o l u t i o n  c o u ld  be fo und  th e n  th e  d i s p u te  was 
r e f e r r e d  f o r  f i n a l  d e c i s io n  to  th e  R ad jo  Alam a t  P a g e r ru — 
jo n g . S o u rc e : E n c y c lo p a e d ic  van  B e d e r la n d s c h  O o s t - I n d i e ,  
v o l .  2 . ,  1 9 18 . a r t i c l e  on M inangkabau p p .7 3 8 -7 4 0 .
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Sumatra and it controlled the ports of Padang, Bencoolen,
Priaman and Indrapura at the West-Coast and Palembang,
Djambi, Indragiri, and Siak at the East Coast. But by the
time the Dutch arrived in Sumatra in the seventeenth century,
the authority of the Minangkabau princes had dwindled down
considerably and their power did not extend much further than
Minangkabau Proper. Achin, a principality in Northern Sumatra
had taken over the control of a large tract of the Western sea
board; and Palembang, Siak and Djambi had become independant,
although those sultanates still looked for a considerable
time to the House of Minangkabau with a mystic veneration
(5)
and considered it as a "primus inter pares". (6)Kingship, however, was a foreign imposition, which had 
not succeeded in supplanting the originally democratic polit­
ical structure of Minangkabau; and in fact the political 
functions of the Minangkabau princes had never meant much 
more than to act as mediators in the ever recurring disputes 
between the many independant political units (nagari) which 
made up the realm of Minangkabau. The authority of the
( 5) Note; Raffles had tried to speculate on this "mystic ven- 
eration", when in 1818 he concluded a treaty with the 
"emperor" of Minangkabau, which he thought would facilitate 
the execution of his plan to bring the whole of Sumatra 
under British influence. See Bastin "..Native policies.. 
Raffles.." op.cit. pp.137-138.
(6) The dynasty was of Hindu origin.
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Minangkabau princes was completely dependant on the good­
will of the people, because they had no army to enforce 
their regulations, nor had they sufficient wealth to recruit 
one:
’’••They were kings without soldiers: the poorest pretense of monarchs the world has known. With 
their disappearance, the actual government of the 
negari (nagari) went on quite as before,...... ..”(7)
There was no central sovereign power in Minangkabau, but
political authority was exercised by the representatives of
a number of ’’super-clans” (suku), of which there were
originally four. Those suku however, did not live in different
regions of the country, but instead small sections of each of
those suku had together formed a large number of independant
small republics (nagari). Sovereignty however was not vested
in those republics as such, but had remained in each of the
sections of the various suku of which the nagari was comprised.
Furthermore the suku was not only a political entity but also
a social unit, which was organized on a matrilineal basis.
The smallest social unit was the djurai i.e, the family, which
was headed by the eldest borther (mamma) of the eldest woman
in the house. A number of djurai constituted a kampueng (clan)
(7) Loeb E M and Heine-Gelderen R. ’’Sumatra - its history and 
people; the archaeology and art of Sumatra.” Wien, 1935 
p. 102,
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i.e. a group of people descended from the one common female 
ancestor; and in charge of a kampueng was a panghulu, who was 
chosen from the male relatives of the oldest woman of the 
lineage. A number of kampuengs finally made up the suku, at 
the head of which usually the panghulu of the oldest kampueng 
was placed. It should be added that office bearers were not 
only selected on account of their seniority in the clan, but 
also because of their capabilities in performing their office 
satisfactorily; and a representative had to be healthy, both 
physically and mentally; law-abiding; sensible; and trust­
worthy. The nagari then was administered by a council comp­
rised of the representatives of the respective suku in the 
community. Although the council had executive power it could 
not initiate legislation nor make laws; and its function was
largely advisory as it was concerned only to interpret the law
(8)which had been laid down in the adat and the Mohammedan code.
(8) Adat originally meant custom, tradition, legend, but it
came to mean to the Indonesian the nature of things in the 
sense of our expression "second nature". Adat could be 
described as the constitutional basis of indigenous life, 
but it should not be seen as a completely rigid set of 
rules. Adat is a living thing, which gradually changes 
according to the need of society, as is apparent from the 
following indigenous classification of the adat:
1) Adat nan sabana adat i.e. true adat or what has been 
received from the Prophet in the Qu’ran;
2) adat nan di adatkan i.e. adat which has been originally 
given*
3) adatnan taradat, i.e. adat which has gradually grown*
k) adat istiadat i.e. adat which has become invalid.
Source: Joustra M "Minangkabau-overzicht van Land, Geschie- 
denis en Volk* s* 1 23Gravenhage, Nijhoff, 1923, pp.88-89« 
According to tradition Minangkabau adat (adat nan di adat­
kan) originated from two famous law givers, Karumanggungan,
(Contd.)
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A ll  d e c i s io n s  how ever had  to  be  a r r i v e d  a t  u n a n im o u s ly , n o r  
c o u ld  l e a d e r s  o f  lo w e r ra n k  su c h  a s  mamma1s  and p an g h u lu s  
a c t  on t h e i r  own a c c o u n t ,  b e c a u se  a n y th in g  th e y  d id  needed  
th e  unanim ous a p p ro b a t io n  o f  th e  d j u r a i  and kampueng 
r e s p e c t i v e l y .  S o v e re ig n ty  t h e r e f o r e  rem ain ed  v e s te d  in  th e  
f a m ily  u n i t  and p ro b a b ly  a more d e m o c ra tic  sy s te m , in  th e  
t r u e  s e n s e  o f  th e  w o rd , c o u ld  n o t be d e v is e d ,  a s  m i n o r i t i e s  
c o u ld  n o t be ty r a n n iz e d  by m a j o r i t i e s .  On th e  o th e r  hand 
u n d e r  su c h  a sy s te m  o f  governm ent many d i s p u t e s  w ere l i a b l e  
to  a r i s e  and i t  was th e  f u n c t i o n  o f  th e  M inangkabau d y n a s ty  
to  m e d ia te .  A p a rt from  th e  t i e s  o f  r a c e ,  la n g u a g e  and k in s h ip  
th e  M inangkabau d y n a s ty  was th e  s o le  e x t e r n a l  f a c t o r  w hich  
gave to  t h i s  a g g lo m e ra t io n  o f  sm a ll  in d e p e n d a n t r e p u b l i c s  a 
c e r t a i n  d e g re e  o f  u n i t y .
The c o n v e rs io n  o f  M inangkabau to  I s la m  i s  th o u g h t to  
have  commenced in  th e  m id d le  o f  th e  s i x t e e n t h  c e n tu r y ,  i . e .  
i n  th e  p e r io d  when th e  S u f i  movement was an  im p o r ta n t  e lem en t
(8 )  c o n td .
who was more a u t o c r a t i c  i n  h i s  v ie w s , and P a r a p a t ih ,  who 
was more d e m o c ra tic  m inded . T h e re fo re  two d i s t i n c t  a d a t— 
sy s te m s came a b o u t and th e  f o u r  o r i g i n a l  suku w ere b i ­
p a r t  i t i o n e d  in to  two l a r a s  ( a d a t - s y s te m s )  c a l l e d  K o to - 
P i l i a n g  and B o d i-T ja n ia g o .  A n a g a r i  b e lo n g in g  to  th e  
K o to - P i l ia n g  sy s te m  h a s  more d e m o c ra tic  f e a t u r e s  e . g .  th e  
f l o o r  o f  th e  c o u n c i l  h a l l  ( b a l a i )  i s  l e v e l  a s  an  i n d ic a ­
t i o n  t h a t  a l l  th e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a re  e q u a l i n  s t a t u s ;  and 
more sc o p e  i s  g iv e n  t o  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  d i s c u s s io n  and 
e l e c t i o n .  I n  a n a g a r i  a d h e r in g  t o  th e  B o d i-T ja n ia g o  sy s te m  
some o f  th e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  s i t  on a d a i s  i n  th e  b a l a i ,  
w h ile  th e  e x i s t i n g  o f f i c e  b e a r e r s  have  some sa y  i n  th e  
a p p o in tm en t o f  t h e i r  s u c c e s s o r s .
S o u rc e : J o s s e l i n  de Jo n g  "M inangkabau and N e g ri S em b ilan ” 
o p . c i t .  p p .71- 75.
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in Islamic civilization. In contrast to the earlier 
traditions of Islamic teaching, which emphasized the 
relation of God to His creation and what man had to do in 
order to be saved, the Sufi were concerned to show how the 
ultimate goal could "be reached. Mysticism was an integral 
element of the Sufi systems and many mystical orders (tarikas) 
sprang up, some of which still exist to-day in the Muslim 
world, including Indonesia. What is important in this context 
is that the Sufis absorbed many non-Islamic elements in 
their teachings and:
“....it is possible to characterize the Sufis as they 
presented themselves to the Indonesians as follows: 
they were peripatetic preachers ranging over the 
whole knov/n world, voluntarily espousing poverty; 
they were frequently associated with trade or craft 
guilds according to the order (tarika) to which they 
belonged; they taught a complex syncretic theosophy 
largely familiar to the Indonesians, but which was 
subordinate to, although an enlargement of the funda­
mental dogmas of Islam; they were proficient in magic 
and possessed powers of healing; and not least, 
consciously or unconsciously, they were prepared to 
preserve continuity with the past, and to use the 
terms sind elements of pre-Islamic culture in an Islamic 
context........... ............ ................ 9)
Islam modified the spirit of indigenous life and thinking, but
it did not overthrow the established social and political order.
The Muslim religious teachers became part of Minangkabau
(9) Johns A.H, “Sufism as a category in Indonesian literature 
and history.” in Journal of Southeast Asian History* Vol.2 
No. 2 July, 1951. p.15*
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society and participated in the discussions of the council 
meetings alongside the adat-chiefs, hut they had no power 
of compulsion either in religious or political matters. The 
balance between Islam and adat is expressed in such proberbs 
as 2
"the shara states the law, adat puts it into effect"
and
"the shara is naked, adat is its covering...•••••••"
During the eighteenth century a sect of fanatic puritans, the 
Wahabites appeared in Arabia; and their teachings spread also 
to India and Indonesia, where they seem to have made a special
impact on the religious teachers of Minankabau, and were the(10)
cause of a fierce and devastating civil war.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century three religious 
teachers returned from Mecca to Minangkabau: Hadji Miskin,
Hadji Piobang, and Hadji Sumanik, who under the influence of 
Wahabi doctrine embarked upon a reformation of morals and 
religion in Minangkabau. When Hadji Miskin on his return
(10) The Wahabites wanted a return to the early teachings of 
the Qu*ran; and anything which had since accrued to the 
body of Islamic teachings was classed as heretical and 
as detracting from the worship of Allah. Veneration of 
the saints and holy men of Islam and the mysticism of the 
Sufis was condemned and had to be eradicated. Institut­
ional religion according to the Qu’ran was introduced 
often by fire and sword; and the shaving of beards, the 
smoking of tobacco were forbidden, while alms had to be 
given on secret profits such as those on trading.
Source: Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam. Leiden, Brill,
1953, p.618.
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to Pandai Sike in the region of Agam tried to induce the 
people to adopt a stricter observance of the faith and to 
refrain from indulging in cockfighting, tobacco and opium 
smoking and the use of alcohol, vices which were prevalent 
among the Minangkabaus, he struck a great deal of opposition 
and was eventually forced to flee.' During his exile he met 
Tuanku nan Rintji of Kamang, who was impressed by his teachings 
and concluded an alliance with seven other Tuankus in Agam, 
which came to be called ’’harimau nan selapan” or the ’’eight 
tigers”; Nan Rintji then commenced to ’’convert” the region 
of Agam by fire and sword.
In Tanah Datar the reform movement was headed by Tuanku
Passaman, later better known as Tuanku Lintau, who i.a.
introduced regulations as to the kind of dress the reformers
had to wear i.e.: a white dress reaching to the ankles and a
white turban. Prom this practice came the name orang putih
(men in white) as distinct from the opposition party the
orang hitam (men in black). Other terms used are orang muda
(young or new men) and orang tua (old, conservative men). A
more common term used in the literature is that of Padris,
which probably denotes ’’man from Pedir” in Northern Sumatra(11)from where Islam originally spread Southwards.
(11) Van Ronkel P.S. ’’Inlandse getuigenissen aangaande de
Padri-oorlog” in Inische Gids, August, 1915« P» 1103«
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Another Padri stronghold was Bondjol in Alahan Pandjang, 
which under the leadership of Tuanku Imam Bondjol held out 
till 1837 against the Dutch drive to subdue the Padri held 
regions of Minangkabau.
The moral reforms which the Padris attempted to introduce
caused a great deal of dissatisfaction and in some instances
they interfered with the adat; e.g. cockfighting, which the
Padris wanted to abolish was part of the ritual of house
building, harvest festivals and even marriage ceremonies;
and as a Minangkabau proverb said: each nagari should be
provided with a council hall, a mosque, pathways, a bathing-(12)
place and cock fight pit. But the Padri movement was far 
more than an attempt at moral reform, because it cut much 
deeper into the traditional social and political structure 
of Minangkabau. There were two features in Minangkabau 
society, i.e. matriarchy and the suku system of government, 
which especially conflicted with the Muslim law, to which the 
Padris strictly adhered; and therefore they introduced, where— 
ever they extended their influence, a pattern of Islamic 
government, appointing imams (theocratic rulers) and kadis 
(judges), who often replaced the traditional adat-leaders.
It was especially this revolutionary aspect of the Padri 
movement, which caused a great deal of fierce opposition
(12) Josselin de Jong "Minangkabau.•.** op.cit. p.78.
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from most of the Minangkabauß who through the whole of their
history had been strongly adat-conscious, But when the Padris
initially did not make much headway, some of their leaders
resorted to terrorizing practices in order to reach their
goal: and soon the whole country was in the grip of a relent-
(13)less civil war. One account by a moderate Padri adherent 
about the beginning of the civil war in the district of IV 
Angkat in Agam, commences as follows:
"I, Fakih Saghar, am full of burning desire to extend 
the faith; I am full of inexpressable joy when the 
numbers of believers increase. Therefore the desire 
took hold of me to dissuade the people from staging 
cockfights, the drinking of toeak and of all the actions which are not allowed by God and the prophet 
of God............................................”
But, so the story continues, the people were opposed to the
introduction of a stricter observance and they broke into the
mesdjid (mosque) and plundered it. But when later some Padris
came to stop a cockfight and the people became very menacing
causing the reformers to take flight, Pakih Saghar told his
men;
£ 5) Note“: While most of the tuankus (religious teachers) of Minangkabau wanted to introduce a stricter observance of 
the faith; not all of them agreed with the terrorizing 
methods used by Nan Rintji and his followers. Tuankji 
Nan Tua one of the most prominent religious teachers in 
Minangkabau, at whose feet many of the Padri leaders had 
sat, disapproved strongly of the murdering tactics of his 
pupils and advocated the peaceful introduction of the 
purified religion by means of preaching and example. 
Source: Account of Pakih Saghar in De Stuers "De Vestiging 
en uitbreiding der Nederlanders ter Westkust van Sumatra." 
vol. 2. Bijlagen, 246-251*
69*
"••if we do not fight now, then our shame will never 
be expiated and will stain our children and grand 
children. Therefore let us commence firing. Perhaps 
the enemy will be wounded in vengeance for the 
destroyed mesdjid. Then I fired. God ruled that a 
man from Bukit Belabuh was mortally wounded and 
another one was killed by my men. Prom that day on­
wards the war flared up with great force. Much 
commotion, envy, treason and enmity came about. Hate 
flamed up between brothers and sisters and between 
parents and children.••••••••• ..... ............. • ••"
The following quotation from Fakih Saghar*s account is an
illustration of what most Minangkabaus probably felt about
the Padris:
M..we have to kill Fakih Saghir; because his intentions 
are not pure in the furthering of religion, but he 
feels upset about the destruction of the mesdjid; he 
wants to show off his wisdom and show that he is above 
us; he is destroying us and is despoiling our customs 
and traditions, and making our land unhappy. We never 
saw the tuankus of former days act like this, but this 
is only done by their children......••••••••••••• • (14)
Initially Tanah Datar, where a great number of the adat- 
party had fled, managed to repulse the attacks of the Padris, 
but eventually also most of this region was conquered by the 
reformers. Tuanku Lintau then called a meeting of all the 
nobles and adat-chiefs at Kota Tenga, where he openly accused 
a number of nobles of immorality and godlessness and then had 
them killed on the spot. A general bloodbath ensued, from
• • it(14) "Account of Fakih Saghir" in De Stuers "Vestiging 
op.cit. pp.243-246.
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which only a few of the nohility escaped, including the 
Radjo Alam of Minangkabau, Jang di Pertuan Radja Muning, 
who fled to Djambi. Thus after having conquered nearly 
the whole of the country, the Padris tried to complete 
their revolution by extinguishing the Minangkabau dynasty, 
which as we have seen, was the only external factor keeping 
the many Minangkabau republics together.
When nearly the whole of Minangkabau had come under 
the rule of the Padris and the civil war had practically 
ended, a third force appeared on the scene: the Dutch, who 
soon after their return to Padang in 1819 tried to drive the 
Padris out of Minangkabau and to bolster the power of the 
adat-party. This was a new development, because the Dutch 
never had any direct dealings with Minangkabau before; and 
the direct political influence of the Dutch East India 
Company had never extended any further than the narrow strip 
of territory situated between the Bukit Barisan and the sea* 
There the Company had erected a number of fortified posts 
such as those at Padang, Priaman and Ajer Bangis, where it 
traded such commodities as textiles, ironware, and salt in 
exchange for pepper, gold, benzoin and other produce, which 
was brought down from the interior by indigenous, Chinese or 
Arab traders.
Nor had the British, who had been in control of the Dutch 
posts at the West Coast since 1795» made any attempts to extend
their influence beyond the narrow coastal strip; or at
least not till Raffles arrived in Sumatra in 1818« Raffles
was probably the first European to enter into the till then
rather mysterious land of Minangkabau; in July, 1818 he had
journeyed into Minangkabau, ostensibly on a scientific
mission, but in fact in an attempt to extend British influence
there in order to render the port of Padang useless to the
Dutch, if they eventually returned there. Raffles had
(15)
concluded a treaty with the ’’emperor** of Minangkabau and
at the request of the people he had left a British garrison
behind at Samawang near Lake Sinkara as a protection against(16)
the Padris, with whom he had not been able to come to terms. 
However, the British garrison at Samawang was withdrawn after 
Raffles* nlans for Sumatra had been disapproved by his 
superiors.
Initially, the Dutch, who had returned to Padang on 17th 
May, 1819, had no intention of following Raffles* example and 
extend their authority into the interior of the island. The
(15) See Section I, p. 24.
(16) Kielstra. E.B. ’’Sumatra’s Westkust van 1819-1Ö25.” .in 
Bijdragen tot de Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde van Neder- 
lands-Indie. 1887. p. 12. Note: Any further references 
to this source will be indicated by: Kielstra I.
(17) See Section I, p. 36.
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(18)
Dutch Resident, Du Puy, reported soon after his arrival
that at that time there was not much to be feared from
Raffles in the interior, as the British troops had been
withdrawn from Samawang; and although he had not been able
to ascertain the exact intentions of Raffles* moves in
Minangkabau, so much was clear that they had not been uthe
friendliest towards the Netherlands government”; furthermore
he had sent a fact-finding commission to Minangkabau and he
intended to consult with the military commander of Padang
about the necessity of establishing a Dutch garrison at 
(19)
Samawang. But in another despatch dated the same day, Du
Puy advised that the post at Samawang should be occupied and
also that the garrison of Padang needed reinforcements,
because of the dangers nosed by a fanatical sect called(20)
the Padris.
However, the Batavian government was not impressed by 
the arguments of Du Puy nor was it eager to extend its control 
into the interior, considering the difficulties which it
(18) Note: Du Puy, James; English born; entered the British 
administration of Java in 1812; in 1816 went over into 
the Dutch colonial service. Because of his previous 
relations with Raffles, he was appointed to the "trouble 
spot” of Padang. See. Kielstra I, p.14.
(19) Du Puy to Batavia. 15th June, 1819* quot.Kemp P.H. van der 
"Een Bijdrage tot E.B. Kielstra*s Opstellen over Sumatra’s 
Westkust" in Bijdragen tot de Taal-Land en Volkenkunde 
van Nederlands-Indie. 1894* p.265.
(20) Du Puy to Batavia. 15th June, 1819. quot. Kielstra I., 
op.cit. p.23.
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(21)already had to cope with in Palembang, Borneo and the Celebes; 
and it replied that to divide the small military force, which 
was available at the West-Coast, would endanger the safety of 
all the Dutch possessions there, while it could not see
reasons why the garrison of Padang should be reinforced. 
Chasse", who had been head-merchant of the Company at Padang 
from 1792-1794 and on whom the Batavian government at that 
time depended for advice on the affairs of the West-Coast of
(21) Note: The sultan of Palembang had rebelled against the 
Dutch in 1818 and had repulsed an expedition from Java 
in 1819; Palembang remained virtually independant till 
1821, when a large Dutch force (2580 men and 414 guns) 
finally captured the town’s fortresses and the sultan was deposed. The new sultan however also schemed against 
the Dutch and in 1825 Palembang became government territory i.e. under the direct administration of Dutch 
officials.In Borneo where the Dutch had concluded treaties in 
1818, the Chinese kongsis refused to submit to increased 
poll-taxes and increased indirect taxation (opium and 
salt); the sultans were too weak to assert themselves and 
in 1821 a Dutch expedition was sent, but it took till 1825 
before order was restored.In the Celebes the principality of Boni had already 
defied the government during the British regime. The 
Dutch on their return were engaged in a practically 
continuous struggle of more than forty years to maintain 
their authority in Southern Celebes.Source: Klerck E.S. de "History of the Netherlands Indies" 
vol. II, pp.140-46 and pp. 310-315*
(22) Resolution of the Governor-General in Council. 6th 
November. 1819. quot. Kielstra I» pp.23-24*
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Sum atra, was o f th e  o p in io n  th a t  R a ff le s  had meant th e  
p o s t a t  Samawang as a p o in t o f d e p a rtu re  f o r  B r i t i s h  pene­
t r a t i o n  in to  Minangkabau; and th e re fo re  th a t  p o st was no t 
s u i te d  f o r  the  defence o f Padang, because i f  i t  proved to  be
too  s tro n g  th en  the enemy would b y -p ass  i t  and pour in to  th e
(23) /
Lowlands, To i n t e r f e r e ,  so Chasse co n tin u ed , in  th e  Minang- 
kabau c i v i l  war would be Ma v a in  m isuse of p eo p le , money and
(24)
w a r-m a te r ia l, ”
A lthough i t  seems q u ite  c e r t a in  th a t  th e  B a tav ian
government would have p re fe r re d  to  tak e  th e  advice o f C hasse,
th e  c ircu m stan ces  a t  th e  W est-Coast had changed co n s id e rab ly
s in c e  p re-w ar days and fo rc ed  th e  government to  tak e  a
d i f f e r e n t  course  o f a c t io n ;  and in  Septem ber, 1820 i t  decided
to  i n t e r f e r e  in  Minangkabau on th e  s id e  of th e  weaker p a r ty
(25)
i , e ,  th e  a d a t - c h ie f s ,  A number o f reaso n s  fo r  t h i s  d e c is io n  
can be a s c e r ta in e d .
F i r s t l y  th e re  was th e  f e a r ,  as expressed  by Du Puy, o f 
a P ad ri a t ta c k  on th e  Dutch p o s ts  a t the  c o a s t ;  and t h i s  f e a r  
was no t a l to g e th e r  w ithou t ground, as in  f a c t  du rin g  the  
B r i t i s h  regim e th e  P a d r is  had a ttem p ted  to  sack  Padang and 
had on ly  been re p e l le d  a f t e r  re in fo rc em e n ts  from  Bencoolen
(23) N o te : The Dutch u s u a lly  term ed the  c o a s ta l  s t r i p  around 
Padang as the  Padang Lowlands and Minangkabau as th e  
Padang H igh lands,
(24) R eport o f Chasse* to  th e  B a tav ian  governm ent, 1 5 th  Ju n e , 
1819, q u o t, K ie l s t r a  I ,  p ,2 5 .
(25) R e so lu tio n  o f th e  G o v ern o r-G en era l-In -C o u n cil, 11 th  
Septem ber. 1820, q u o t,  K ie l s t r a  I ,  p , 26,
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(26)
had been called in, while on other occasions the British
(27)authorities had kept the Padris at bay by buying them off.
But the apprehension of the Resident appears to be somewhat 
exaggerated, considering that there is no evidence that the 
Padris planned or actually did attack the Dutch posts during 
the fifteen months it took the Batavian government before it 
decided to take action in Minangkabau. Most probably the 
anxiety of the resident was caused by the highly coloured 
reports about the situation in Minangkabau given to him by a 
number of emigre Minangkabau adat-chiefs, who had fled to 
Padang. Those emigres had already during the British admin­
istration pressed the authorities to interfere on their 
behalf in the Minangkabau civil war, but until the arrival 
of Raffles without success. Raffles during his journey into 
the interior in 1818 had been accompanied by two Minangkabau 
nobles, two Tuankus of Suroasso, who were probably related
to the Indomo of Suroasso, one of the councillors to the(28)
Minangkabau dynasty. Raffles actually had taken the side of
the adat-party when he concluded a treaty with the remainder
of the Minangkabau dynasty, by means of which he planned to
(29)
bring a large part of Sumatra under British control. On his
(26) Van Braam to Batavia, 19th July, 1817. ouot. Kemp ’’Sumatra 
in 1818..” op.cit. pp.73-4.
(27) Report of General de Kock to the Governor-General. 12th 
April. 1823. quot. Kielstra I, op.cit. p.9.
(28) See p.59. note (4).
(29) See Section I, p. 36
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r e tu r n  from Minangkabau he had c a l le d  the  two Tuankus o f 
S uroasso  to  Bencoolen where they  were co nsidered  as re p re s e n t­
a t iv e s  o f  th e  Minangkabau Court and were g iven  a monthly 
a llo w an ce . However, soon a f t e r  th e  r e tu r n  of th e  Dutch th e  
two Tuankus appeared in  Padang and th e  B a tav ian  government 
approved a re q u e s t o f Du Puy to  g ran t them a m onthly rem ittan c e
because i t  was considered  th a t  th o se  two p r in c e s  might be u se -
(30)
f u l  to  th e  government i f  i t  ev e r decided  to  invade Minangkabau.
Soon a f t e r ,  th e  two Tuankus of Suroasso  accompanied by a
detachm ent of s o ld ie r s  were s e n t to  Minangkabau on a f a c t
f in d in g  m iss io n ; and i t  was la r g e ly  on th e  r e p o r t  o f t h i s
m iss io n  th a t  Du Puy based h is  a p p ra is a l  o f the  s i t u a t io n  in  
(31)
Minangkabau.
A lthough Du Puy, as he re p o r te d  to  th e  government d u rin g
a v i s i t  to  B a tav ia  in  A ugust, 1820, had so f a r  no t g iv en  in
to  th e  o v e r tu re s  o f th e  a d a t-p a r ty  and had re f ra in e d  from
g iv in g  m i l i ta r y  a s s is ta n c e ,  he p o in ted  out to  th e  B a tav ian
a u th o r i t i e s  th a t  he had h e ld  out some hope to  them o f government
a s s is ta n c e  in  the f u tu r e ,  f e a r in g  th a t  o th e rw ise  th ey  might
(32)
approach th e  B r i t i s h .  Leaving a s id e  th e  q u e s tio n  of how much
730) R e so lu tio n  o f th tT G overnor-G eneral in  C o u n c il. 9 th  A ugust, 
1820 q u o i.K ie l s t r a  I ,  p.2l+.
(31) Du Puy to  th e  B a tav ian  governm ent. 11 th  A ugust, 1820. 
q tto t. K ie l s t r a  I .  p .25
(32) I b id .
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Du Puy*s apprehension of the British was founded, it should
he noted that Dutch suspicion of Raffles was still very real;
and this was especially so after Raffles had refused to cede
the old Dutch post of Ajer Bangis to the North of Padang, on
the grounds that this establishment had been abandoned by the
(33)Dutch East India Company before 1795. Furthermore the official 
disavowal of Raffles both by the Calcutta and London govern­
ments were taken rather sceptically by the Batavian government, 
when the British steadily refused to abandon Raffles* settle­
ment at Singapore. As van der Capellen reported to the Hague 
in 1820:
’’..now everything is quiet (in Padang), although the 
neighbourhood of Bencoolen does not hold out hope for a continuous peace, as long as the government there 
remains in the hands of a man who will leave nothing 
untouched to put the Dutch government in an unfavour­
able light and to create enemies against her........w (34)
Dutch suspicion of British plans in regard to Sumatra is still
quite noticeable as late as 1824, when Muntinghe, commenting
on the proceedings of the Anglo-Butch negotiations, was of the
opinion that the English would never leave the whole of
Sumatra within the Dutch sphere of influence; and he expected
that the Dutch requests for the whole of Sumatra would be
(33) Kielstra I. p.16. Note; The question of Ajer Bangis was 
only finally settled at the treaty of 1824, when that 
establishment together with all the other British posts 
in Sumatra were ceded to the Dutch.
(34) Van der Capellen to the Hague. 1st March, 1820. quot. 
Deventer ’’Gezag..’* op.cit. p.301.
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countered by the British contention that they considered
such states as Minangkabau, Siak, Djambi and Indragiri as
independant and that they therefore had no jurisdiction in 
(35)the matter. The Dutch negotiators at the Anglo-Dutch talks
in London in 1824 went as far as to blame the difficulties
(36)
with the Padris solely on the machinations of Raffles.
But in addition to his fears of British intervention in 
the affairs of Minangkabau, the Resident of Padang urged the 
Batavian government to establish close relations with that 
country on a number of other grounds. The incursions and the 
pillaging of the Padris, so Du Puy argued, had brought 
indigenous economic life nearly to a standstill; production 
had decreased considerably and the flow of trade from the 
interior districts to the West-Coast, which was so vital to 
the prosperity of the Dutch establishments there, had become 
a mere trickle. The government therefore should interfere in 
Minangkabau and restore peace and order there; and in doing so 
it would not only safeguard the security of its coastal poss­
essions but also their prosperity. Furthermore, so the 
Resident assured the Batavian government, it would add an 
extensive, populous and fertile region to its territory. But 
there were two further points of informaton given by Du Puy,
(35) Muntinghe to Elout (Junior). 23rd January, 1824* in Falck's 
Gedenkschriften op.cit. p.f?50*
(36) Fagel and Falck to 
12th January, 1Ö24*
Reinhold. Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
in ,lEloutT s Bl.jdragen...'* op.cit.p.l7o»
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which probably turned the scale in favour of intervention
there and then, when he told the government that a comm-
(37)
ission which he had sent to Minangkabau had reported firstly
that the adat-chiefs were willing to cede their territory to
the Netherlands government in exchange for protection against
the Padris, and secondly that the Minangkabau people were
expected to rise immediately against the hated Padris when
(38)
the Dutch troops would arrive in the country.
At any rate the Batavian government was apparently quite 
impressed by the arguments of the Resident and it authorized 
him:
"•••if at his return (to Padang) nothing to the contrary 
had happened, to conclude with the heads of the interior 
districts treaties on the basis of surrender to and 
occupation by the government of their territory, and 
the establishment of a military post at Samawang or 
elsewhere, consisting of a hundred men and a few pieces 
of artillery, in order to protect the inhabitants 
against the Padris and to restore peace and order in 
the highlands,• •..... ....... ..................... ,," (39)
In addition the reported willingness of the Minankabaus to
cede their country to the Dutch and to rise against the Padris,
was seen by the Batavian government as a favourable condition
for reaching at comparatively little cost its main objective
(37) See p, 76 para, 1.
(38) Du Puy to the Batavian Government, 11th August, 1820, 
in Kielstra I« op.cit, pp, 2J>*26,
(39) Resolution of Governor-General in Council• 11th September, 
1820, quot, Kielstra I, p.26.
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in interfering: i.e. the restoration of peace and order in 
Minangkabau, which was a pre-requisite to the prosperity of 
Padang and the other Dutch possessions at the coast. It should 
he noted that exploitation for the benefit of the mother- 
country was generally accepted at the time as the sole raison 
d’etre of colonies; and therefore anything which interfered 
with that major objective would be considered as very serious 
by the colonial authorities. Consequently, in order to 
understand the Batavian government’s concern about the pros­
perity of Padang, it should be seen in the wider context of 
general Dutch economic policy in the Indies; and a digression 
on the general economic situation especially in Java seems 
therefore necessary at this point.
The Dutch on their return to Java in 1816 tried to 
increase the output of export commodities as much as possible 
in order to put the financial and economic structure of the 
country on a sound basis; and also in order to repay the 
considerable debt which the Netherlands government had taken 
over from the bankrupt East India Company at the beginning of 
the century. However, a fundamental problem which had to be 
solved was the unwillingness of the Javanese farmers to 
produce for the European export market. But while the Dutch 
East India Company had overcome this difficulty by the 
introduction of a system of forced deliveries of a number of
81.
specified products such as coffee, the re-introduction
of a similar system conflicted with the “liberal'* ideas of
colonial policy which were prevalent in government circles
at the time. It was therefore decided to extend and modify
the land rent system, which had been introduced by Raffles
in a number of districts in Java. Under this system the
government considered itself as the owner of the soil, which
it rented out to the farmers, who could produce what they
(40)liked and could pay their rent in kind or in money. .But in 
order to ensure a steady amount of government revenue during 
the switchover to the land rent system, the Batavian author­
ities decided, as Raffles had done, to continue, despite their 
liberal principles, the system of forced deliveries in the 
important coffee producing areas of the Preanger (West-Java) 
and the Minahassa (North Celebes). Coffee at that time was 
the most lucrative Indonesian export product and its price
had increased from 7.50 dollars per picul in 1816 to 20,00
(41)dollars per picul in 1818. But in addition coffee was very
important to the Treasury and e.g. in 1818 accounted for
about half of government revenue; and although this proportion
had declined to about one-third of the total in 1823, coffee
(42)
remained the mainstay of government financial stability.
(40) Welderen Renders “Failure..“ op.cit. pp.60-68.
(41) Gonggrijp. G “Schets ener economische geshiedenis van 
Indonesie“, Haarlem, Bohn, 1957. p.67
(42) Welderen Rengers “Failure..“ op.cit. p.81.
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Another experiment tried by the government in order to 
raise the output of agricultural commodities for export, was 
the leasing of virgin lands to European planters; and to safe­
guard the interests of the indigenous population a regulation 
issued in 1818 restricted such leases to virgin soil, forbidd­
ing the renting of communal lands and the buying of villages 
and seignorial rights from Javanese nobles* Planters however 
sidestepped those regulations by concentrating their holdings 
in the semi-independant principalities of DJocJakarta and 
Surakarta, where they rented large tracts of soil, villages 
and their manpower included, from the Javanese princes* Sub­
sequently Governor General van der Capellen decided in 1823 
to abandon the system of granting leases to private enter­
prise for various reasons. Firstly he appears to have been 
genuinely concerned about the alleged bad treatment of the 
Javanese villagers by European planters in the Principalities; 
secondly the settlement of Europeans in the Principalities where 
they might obtain political power was considered an obstacle 
to the government’s plan to bring those regions under its 
direct control; furthermore the government viewed the competi­
tion to its own coffee by that produced on private estates as
(43)a threat to its financial stability*
But the failure of this experiment together with a fall 
in coffee prices and bad financial management generally, was
(43) Ibid* pp* 80-81.
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responsible for the financial difficulties the Batavian 
government found itself at the beginning of the twenties.
This financial embarrassment was increased even more by the 
costly expeditions which had to be sent to many points in the 
Outer-Possessions, many of which proved to be a loss finan­
cially; and as van der Capellen wrote in 1820:
"••as well as things keep going in general in our 
beautiful Java, the more sorrowful I am lately about 
nearly all our Outer-establishments. Financially 
everything is disappointing......................." (44)
However, the governments opinion of Padang seemed to be
more hopeful; and already in 1818 Elout had pointed out that
Padang was an important possession, because of its coffee(45)production, while van der Capellen commenting on a proposal 
by Palmer, a British merchant, to exchange Padang for Bencoolen, 
was of the opinion that:
”....Bencoolen itself is worthless and is only important 
for us because of its closeness to our other possessions. Padang, so far as I know, is an important establishment 
capable of improvement..•••••••......... ••••••••••••••
It was the promise of profitability and especially its coffee
potential which made the Batavian government consider Padang
(44) Van der Capellen to The Hague. 22nd February, 1820. in 
Falck* s Gedenkschriften.•"op.cit• p.493.
(45) Elout to Goldberg. 10th May, 1818. in Deventer "Gezag..." 
op.cit. p.2l4u
(46) Van der Capellen to The Hague. 1st October, 1820. in 
"Falck1 s Gedenkschriften,"op.cit. p.489*
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as an important establishment* Du Puy had reported in 1819 
that government income at Padang consisted of the sale of 
opium, arak and of customs revenue, but that it was especially 
the latter which showed a great deal of promise, because of 
the rise in coffee production. In 1818 exports of coffee had 
reached 6000 piculs and this figure was expected to increase 
12-15,000 piculs in 1819 and double that amount in the 
following years, providing the high coffee prices were main­
tained on the world market. Direct taxation did not exist, 
so the Resident further reported, but in regard to indirect 
taxation he was of the opinion that a salt monopoly would be
the most profitable tax, as great quantities of that commodity
(47)were imported into Padang.
The Batavian government, however, was keen to develop
Padang into a paying proposition as soon as possible; and it
instructed Du Puy to carry out a more thorough investigation
into taxation and to report which taxes he considered could(48)
be introduced in Padang and its dependencies.
But Du Puy replied that he was sure that the population 
of the West-Coast was as yet too uncivilized and too poor to 
bear any taxation of any importance. The state of agriculture 
was far from advanced and it was only coffee from which the
(47) Du Puy to Batavia. 15th June, 1819. in Kemp MEen Bijdrage.." 
op.cit. pp. 270-71
(48) Resolution of the Batavian government. 4th October, 1819. 
in Ibid, p .279*
people in some district gained some benefit* In another
despatch of a few days later the Resident was somewhat more
explicit about the possibilities of coffee as a source of
government revenue. The Resident thought that if the proper
measures were taken, coffee cultivation could be introduced
throughout the whole of the residency; and as coffee was the
only agricultural commodity from which any advantage could be
expected around Padang, its production should be encouraged.
But the manner in which the output of coffee should be
increased the Resident left for the government to decide,
although he was of the opinion that as coffee production had
sprung up spontaneously it should be left free, providing the
whole crop was marketed at Padang; and therefore an annual
census of production should be introduced in order to check
(50)on any smuggling to Bencoolen or elsewhere.
However, the great interest shown by the Batavian govern­
ment in the coffee potential of the West-Coast of Sumatra should 
be seen in the light of its financial difficulties in Java and 
the generally disappointing results in the other Outer-* 
Establishments, It is not surprising therefore that the 
Batavian government set aside its general objections to expand­
ing its authority in the Outer-Possessions, in order to ensure
(49) Du Puy to Batavia, 14th August, 1820, in Ibid, p,281,
(50) Du Puy to Batavia. 17th August, 1820, in Kemp MEen 
Bijdrage..,” op.cit, pp, 285-9*
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that the chance of Padang becoming a paying proposition and 
a source of future wealth would not be adversely affected 
either by British interference or by internal disruption.
But apart from the all important economic motive and the 
fear of the British, it should also be pointed out that the 
anti-Padri attitude of the Dutch was in keeping with their 
traditional hostility tov/ards any fanatical religious move­
ments, which tried to curb the power of the indigenous 
princes, through which the Dutch actually ruled. The Dutch 
East India Company in the past had supported the secular 
rulers against the attacks of fanatical Muslims, who had
become dissatisfied with the pomp and splendour and the world-
(51)liness of the princely courts. This policy of combatting 
Muslim fanaticism and of supporting the indigenous political 
structure through which the Dutch exerted their influence was 
not changed after the fall of the Company; and Muntinghe even 
suggested that the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824 should incor­
porate a clause obliging the two governments to co-operate:
"..to make the pilgrimages to Mecca difficult, to 
weaken and gradually undermine the Mahommedan faith,."(52)
(51) Wertheim W.F. "Indonesian society in transition", The 
Hague/Bandung, Van Hoeve, 1959* P*202.
(52) Muntinghe to Elout (.junior). 24th January, 1824, in 
"Palck*s Gedenkschriften.•" p.552.
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In accordance with the resolution of the Batavian government
(53)of 11th September, 1820 Du Puy went ahead and on 10th 
February, 1821 he concluded a treaty with a number of Minang- 
kabau chiefs, who as the treaty describes, were deputed by all 
the heads of the country. In the treaty the whole of the 
realm of Minangkabau was formally ceded to the Netherlands 
government, which undertook to protect the inhabitants 
against the Padris and to restore peace and order. The
(54)government also undertook not to interfere with the adat.
It seems hardly possible that such a small number of chiefs 
could have had the authority to cede the whole of Minangkabau, 
considering the political structure of the country, which 
consisted of a great number of political jurisdictions. The 
rather cynical remarks of De Stuers, who was Resident of 
Padang from 1825-1829, are quite to the point: the people who 
signed the treaty, so De Stuers argued, were desperate and 
had nothing to lose, but everything to gain. The signatories 
who were deputies could only have agreed to a preliminary 
draft, which according to the adat had to be approved unan­
imously by every single head in the country. But so De Stuers 
continued:
(53) See p. 79.
(54) Treaty with Minangkabau of 11th February, 1821, quot. 
Kielstra I, pp. 27-28.
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“ •••b y  th e  i l l u s i o n  o f  th e  s o - c a l le d  form al c e s s io n  o f 
th e  coun try  and th e  h ighsounding and im ag in a tiv e  name
o f the  realm  o f Minangkabau......... . .o n e  soon f e l l  f o r
th e  dream, which d id  not seem im possib le  to  r e a l i z e ,  
o f s u b je c tin g  th e  whole of th e  co u n try  to  th e  a u th o r ity  
o f  th e  g o v e r n m e n t . . . . . . ............................................ ( 55)
At any r a t e  th e  t r e a ty  soon proved to  be a dead l e t t e r ,  because
th e  co n d itio n s  upon which i t  was based h a rd ly  e x is te d .
When on 28th  F ebruary  the  post a t  Samawang was occupied
by a hundred s o ld ie r s  th e  heads o f  th e  ceded d i s t r i c t s
im m ediately req u es ted  th a t  a number o f v i l l a g e s  around th e
Dutch p o s t ,  which were P a d ri c o n t ro l le d ,  should be a tta c k ed
and burned fo r th w ith .  But th e  R esiden t adv ised  th a t  those
v i l l a g e s  were to  be su b je c te d  by p ea ce fu l means. L e t te r s
which were su b seq u en tly  se n t to  th e  r e s p e c tiv e  v i l l a g e  heads
re q u e s tin g  them to  s u b je c t  them selves to  th e  Dutch government
d id  not have th e  d e s ire d  e f f e c t ,  and Du Puy a f t e r  c o n s u lta t io n
w ith  th e  m i l i ta r y  commander decided  to  make a show of s tr e n g th
in  o rd e r  to  in tim id a te  th e  P a d r is .  On 28 th  A p r i l ,  C ap ta in
G o ff in e t a tta c k e d  th e  v i l l a g e  of S u l i t a j e r  w ithou t p ro v o ca tio n ,
b u t th e  P a d r is  pu t up such a f i e r c e  r e s is ta n c e  th a t  the  p la ce
on ly  f e l l  two days l a t e r .  T his r a th e r  h a s ty  a c t io n  by the
Dutch s ta r t e d  o f f  a war w ith  th e  fo rm id ab le  P a d r is ,  which would
l a s t  f o r  more th a n  tw enty  y e a rs . D esp ite  th e  s tro n g  o p p o s itio n
which he had encoun tered  a t  S u l i t a j e r ,  C ap ta in  G o ffin e t d id  not
(55) De S tu e rs  to  B a ta v ia . 30th  A ugust, 1825* iD K ie l s t r a  I .
p . 130•
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seem unduly perturbed about the military threat of the Padris;
and he was of the opinion that with another fifty soldiers and
another howitzer he would be able to crush Padri resistance
even as far as Lintau, which was considered as their main 
(56)
stronghold.
The Batavian government was very perturbed about the
military action, which had taken place in Minangkabau, and it
commented rather tersely on the proceedings of Du Puy, who was
told that he had apparently overstepped his instructions:
“partly because he had requested the cession of the whole 
of Minangkabau and partly because he had admitted to the 
treaty those princes who were fugitives and who had no 
authority over those territories which they had ceded 
in the treaty........ ................................."
Aggressive military action, so Batavia pointed out, was 
contrary to its intentions which were to act as a protector 
and not as an aggressor; and it ordered the Resident to 
avoid as far as possible any military action in the Samawang 
area, not only because this would give a wrong impression of 
the government’s intentions but also because the safety of 
such a small garrison, which was so far removed from the coast, 
was involved. However, the government decided to send re­
inforcements to Padang, but it instructed the Resident:
(56) General de Kock.HAlgemeen verslag over de militaire 
verrichtingen in het Padang^sche.” 12th April, 1823* 
quot. Kielstra I. pp. 32-33.
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!,. . t o  f i n d  o u t a c c u r a t e ly  and w ith o u t d e la y  ab o u t th e  
s i t u a t i o n  i n  th e  i n t e r i o r ,  and e s p e c i a l l y  i f  th e  P a d r is  
have  ta k e n  c o n t r o l  o f  th o s e  la n d s  and th e  w hole o f  th e  
re a lm  o f  M in an g k ab au .• • • • • • • • and to  s t a t e  e x a c t ly  w hat
a d v a n ta g e s  th e  governm ent w ould g a in  i n  d r i v in g  o u t 
th e  P a d r i s ,  i f  th e y  r e a l l y  have  co n q u ered  th e  w hole o f  
M inangkabau and e x e r c iz e  c o n t r o l  t h e r e . . . . . . . .  •• . . . . . "  (5 7 )
I t  i s  e v id e n t  t h a t  th e  B a ta v ia n  governm ent d id  n o t have
th e  s l i g h t e s t  id e a  ab o u t th e  a c t u a l  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  in
M inangkabau , n o r  t h a t  th e y  b e l ie v e d  t h a t  th e  P a d r i s  w ere su ch
a fo rm id a b le  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e .  But soon  a f t e r ,  when th e  P a d r i s
a t t a c k e d  th e  D u tch  p o s t  a t  Samawang, th e  governm ent b eg an  to
r e a l i z e  t h a t  i t  had  come i n to  c o n ta c t  w i th  a  movement w h ich  had
f a r  l a r g e r  r e s o u r c e s  and m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h  th a n  had o r i g i n a l l y
b e e n  im ag in ed  and w i th  w hich  th e  th e n  a v a i l a b l e  f o r c e s  a t  th e
W est-C o a s t c o u ld  n o t c o p e . Du Puy and c o n s e q u e n tly  th e
B a ta v ia n  governm ent had  a c te d  on i n s u f f i c i e n t  i n t e l l i g e n c e .
S in c e  th e  R e s id e n t  had  n e v e r  v i s i t e d  th e  i n t e r i o r  p e r s o n a l l y ,
th e  in f o r m a t io n  w hich  he had  s u p p l ie d  to  th e  governm ent was
l a r g e l y  b a sed  on th e  r e p o r t s  o f  a n t i - P a d r i  c h i e f s ;  and a s  was
a l r e a d y  p o in te d  o u t b e fo r e  th e  f a c t  f i n d in g  com m ission  w h ich
Du Puy had  s e n t  t o  M inangkabau had  c o n s i s t e d  o f  two M inangkabau
p r i n c e s  (T uankus o f  S u r o a s s o ) ,  who c o u ld  h a rd ly  be e x p e c te d  to
be  f r e e  from  b i a s  and to  g iv e  a t r u e  p i c t u r e  o f  th e  s i t u a t i o n  in
(5 7 )  R e s o lu t io n  o f  th e  G o v e rn o r-G e n e ra l i n  C o u n c i l . 1 7 th  
S e p tem b er. 1 8 21 . o u o t .  K i e l s t r a  I .  p .3 4 .
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the interior* Du Puy, Judging "by the scanty information he 
sent to Batavia knew hardly anything about the Padri move­
ment and what the reformers actually stood for* Already in 
1818 Raffles had warned the Commissioners-General about the 
dangers posed by the Padris, but this warning had been dis­
missed, because those fables of Raffles:
**..could not make a great impression on us, who had 
heard similar arguments at the take-over of Java,
(and) who had been well informed about the unimportance 
of the so-called trouble in Padang. *••••••*•••  ......11 (58)
Although it has not been proved possible to find out who 
informed the government in 1818 about the ^unimportance” of 
the Padri movement, it is certain that the Batavian govern­
ment definitely underestimated the Padris* In a sense the 
government blundered into a war with a formidable enemy, owing 
to the lack of proper intelligence about the local situation; 
and at a time when it could least afford it, considering the 
financial difficulties in Java and the many other trouble 
spots it had to deal with in the rest of the archipelago*
In October, 1821 the Batavian government decided to send
(59)Lieutenant-Colonel Raaff with reinforcements to Padang, instruc-
(58) Commissioners-General to The Hague* 30th June, 1818. quot* 
Kemp 1 Sumatra in ifilSM op*cit. p* 76.
(59) a. Raaff Antoine Theodore (1794-1824); born at s’Hertogen-
bosch (Bois-le-duc); fought as sous-lieutenant in 
Napoleon*s Russian campaign; Joined the Dutch colonial 
army in 1815 and made rapid promotion and was appoint­
ed Lieutenant-Colonel in 1821; died from fever at 
Padang in 1824*
b. The total strength of the Dutch forces on the West- 
Coast of Sumatra was now brought to 500 officers and 
men*
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ting him that the troops should only he used after 
consultation with the Resident and after a proper evaluation 
of the situation in Minangkabau had been made; and the govern­
ment emphasized that everything possible should be done to 
come to terms with the Padris in a peaceful way. But Raaff, 
who arrived in Padang on 8th December, 1821, reported that the 
military situation in Minangkabau had so deteriorated that 
there was no other way out than to hit the Padris hard; and 
that only after they had been sufficiently subdued negotiations 
should be started. The existing indecisive policy, so Raaff 
argued, had made the Padris more audacious, while the insuff­
icient protection granted by the Dutch forces to the^population
had caused many villages to go over to the other side. In(61)
contrast however to the views of De Stuers, who was of the opin­
ion that Raaff could have avoided a war with the Padris and 
could have come to an understanding with them, it seems to me 
that there was hardly any other way open to Raaff than to 
start an offensive. It should be pointed out that the Padris 
who were waging a holy war (perang sabil) had already been 
provoked a great deal before Raaff arrived; and therefore no 
reason exists to believe that the reformers would have 
desisted from attacking the Dutch possessions at this stage.
(60) General de Kock "algemeen report..”op.cit. quot. Kielstra I, 
PP.38-39-
(61) De Stuers MVestiging...u op.cit. Deel I, p.59.
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Prom the P ad ri p o in t o f  view f i r s t  R a ff le s  and th en  the Dutch 
had openly s id ed  w ith  th e  d egenera ted  and g o d less  a d a t-p a r ty  
and th ey  had harboured  f u g i t iv e s  in  Padang, w ith  whom they  
had c lo s e ly  co -o p era ted  ( e .g .  th e  Tuankus o f S u ro a sso ) . Also 
th e  t r e a ty  o f F eb ru a ry , 1821 was o b v io u sly  d ir e c te d  a g a in s t 
th e  P a d r is  and th e  subsequent a t ta c k  on S u l i t a j e r  would have 
c e r ta in ly  d is p e l le d  any rem aining  doubts as to  th e  in te n t io n s  
o f th e  Dutch governm ent. The P a d r is ,  however, were a t  the  
h e ig h t o f t h e i r  s t r e n g th  and had occupied th e  g r e a te r  p a r t  of 
Minangkabau; and th ey  would never have l e t  th e  D utch, th e  
u n b e lie v e rs  ( k a f i r s )  occupy th e  co u n try  w ithou t f i e r c e  
o p p o s it io n . The P a d r is ,  as was p o in ted  out b e fo re , were 
a ttem p tin g  to  b r in g  about a com plete r e v o lu tio n  in  Minangkabau 
and in  f a c t  had a lre a d y  e s ta b l is h e d  a number o f Is lam ic  s t a t e s ,  
which would r e s i s t  fo r  as long as they  could becoming su b je c t 
to  a n o n -Is lam ic  ( k a f i r )  governm ent.
On th e  o th e r  hand th e  B a tav ian  government was u n w illin g  
to  be done out o f i t s  ,,r i g h t s ,, conceded under th e  t r e a ty  o f 
F eb ru a ry , 1821; and a lth o u g h  i t  had reprim anded Du Puy about 
th e  com prehensiveness o f th e  c e s s io n  and about th e  f a c t  th a t  
many o f the  s ig n a to r ie s  were re fu g e e s  who had no r e a l  a u th o r i ty ,  
th e re  i s  no ev idence in  th e  correspondence th a t  th e  government 
ev e r thought o f revok ing  th e  t r e a t y .  A ll B a tav ia  seemed to  
com plain about was th a t  those  t e r r i t o r i e s ,  a g a in s t  e x p e c ta tio n ,
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w ould have  to  be  c o n q u e re d . F u r th e rm o re , a l th o u g h  i t  
p ro b a b ly  r e a l i z e d  t h a t  th e  t r e a t y  o f  F e b ru a ry ,  1821 was 
"p h o n ey " , i t  c o u ld  n o t  w ith d raw  and le a v e  M inangkabau t o  
th e  P a d r i s ,  b e c a u se  t h i s  w ould have m eant a s e r io u s  l o s s  o f  
p r e s t i g e ,  w h ich  was u n d e s i r a b l e  a t  a tim e  when D utch  a u t h o r i t y  
was c h a l le n g e d  a t  many p o i n t s  in  th e  A rc h ip e la g o .
T h e re fo re  th e  i n s i s t e n c e  o f  th e  D utch  on t h e i r  " r i g h t s 11 
t o  occupy M inangkabau and th e  n a tu r e  o f th e  P a d r i  m ovem ent, 
c o u p le d  w ith  w hat had a l r e a d y  happened  b e f o r e ,  made a f u l l  
s c a l e  w ar i n e v i t a b l e .
But a l s o  R a a f f  was u n d e r e s t im a t in g  th e  m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h  
o f  th e  P a d r i s ,  a s  he so o n  fo und  o u t ,  when he s t a r t e d  h i s  a l l  
o u t d r iv e  a g a in s t  th e  s t r o n g h o ld  o f  L in ta u .  R a a f f  f i r s t  to o k  
h i s  t r o o p s  a lo n g  a d i f f e r e n t  r o u te  o v e r  th e  m o u n ta in s  i n t o  
Agam and  fro m  th e r e  i n t o  T anah D a ta r ;  and h i s  p la n  was to  
c ru s h  th e  f o r c e s  o f  Tuanku L in ta u ,  w hich  i f  s u c c e s s f u l ,  would 
b ra k e  P a d r i  r e s i s t a n c e  c o m p le te ly ,  so  R a a f f  th o u g h t .  B ut i n  
o r d e r  to  s a fe g u a rd  h i s  s u p p ly  l i n e s  R a a f f  was fo rc e d  f i r s t  to  
s u b ju g a te  th e  VI K o tas  i n  Agam; and t h i s  m anoeuvre cau se d  th e  
P a d r i s  o f  B o n d jo l and Rau to  th e  N o rth  o f  Agam who c a r r i e d  on 
t r a d e  w ith  t h i s  a r e a ,  to  come to  th e  r e s c u e  i n  g r e a t  num bers 
u n d e r  th e  l e a d e r s h ip  o f  Tuanku Imam B o n d jo l .  O nly a t  th e  end  
o f  1822 d id  R a a f f  f e e l  c o n f id e n t  enough  to  a t t a c k  th e  P a d r i  
s t r o n g h o ld  o f  L in ta u ,  w here  Tuanku L in ta u  had  f l e d  a f t e r  h i s  
d e f e a t  by th e  D utch  in  T anah  D a ta r .  But th e  cam paign a g a in s t
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Lintau ended in a failure for the Dutch; and owing to his 
depleted forces Raaff could only resort to mopping up oper­
ations in Tanah Datar and he left Lintau alone for the time 
being. In the beginning of 1823 Raaff, after having received 
reinforcements from Java, attempted another attack on Lintau, 
but again the operation ended in failure and the Dutch forces 
were routed at the strong mountain fortress of Marapalm.
Soon after this defeat the Padris of Bondjol with strong 
forces moved towards the Lowlands, but with the help of the 
Dutch navy and a manoeuvre by Raaff towards the VI Kottas, 
this dangerous attack was repelled. Notwithstanding the 
military difficulties which were experienced, the Batavian 
government had full trust in the actions of Raaff and Du Puy 
and by a resolution of 8th April, 1823 the Resident and the 
military commander of Padang were both commended for the way
in which they had furthered the interests of the government(62)
on the West-Coast of Sumatra.
But in reply to a request by Raaff and Du Puy for 
instructions after the setback suffered at Marapalm, the 
government instructed that Raaff should for the time being 
remain on the defensive and refrain from attacking Lintau.
(62) Resolution of the Governor-General in Council. 8th April, 
1623. in De Stuers op.cit., Deel II, Bijlage A. pp.216-217.
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Furthermore he was ordered to do everything possible to
reinforce the Dutch hold on the territory which had already
been conquered, while he should attempt to obtain better and
more comprehensive intelligence about the military strength
of Lintau; and finally it instructed Raaff to return to
Batavia in order to consult with the government about what
(63)further action was to be taken in the Padang Highlands.
When Raaff left in September, 1823 for Batavia, he had succ­
eeded in conquering the greater part of Tanah Datar and part 
of the region of Agam, but his forces were too weak to stage 
an offensive against that part of Minangkabau which was still 
under Padri rule. So by 1823 the Dutch had succeeded in 
establishing a strong foothold in the middle of Minangkabau, 
but their objective, i.e. the complete defeat of the Padris, 
was still far from being achieved. The consultations of 
Raaff with the Batavian government resulted in a confirmation 
of the earlier instructions to put a temporary stop to the 
drive against the Padris. Raaff was given reinforcements in 
order to complete the original strength of his forces; and 
the government was of the opinion that:
u..his (Raaff*s) return to Padang with that show of force would undoubtedly have a beneficial effect on 
friend and enemy alike...(and)...the peaceful estab­
lishment of our authority may therefore be expected.."(64)
(63) Resolution of Governor-General in Council. 6th June, 1823 
in Kielstra I, pp. 82-83«
(64) Vander Capellen to Minister for Colonies. 4th December, 
182~5 ouot. Kielstra I. op.cit. p.lo4.
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While there were strong convictions in government circles 
in Batavia that the whole of Minangkabau should be conquered 
forthwith, the decision to assume a defensive attitude should 
be seen in the context of the financial crisis in Java, which 
had been latent for a number of years, but which had now come 
to a head. Van der Capellen had become so financially pressed 
that he was forced to negotiate for a loan with the House of 
Palmer and Co. of Calcutta, offering as collateral the colon­
ial revenue and the movable and unmovable property of the
(65)Netherlands government in the Indies. Under those circum­
stances, and especially if Raaff*s estimate that another 950
men would be needed for an effective offensive against the(66)
Padris is taken into account, the governments decision to 
temporize becomes more intelligible.
While the Batavian government, as was pointed out 
previously, was mainly concerned to restore peaceful conditions 
in Minangkabau in order to safeguard the prosperity of Padang, 
it did remain hesitant for some time about retaining the 
conquered territories after the Padris would have been defeated; 
and van der Capellen as late as October, 1822 commented about 
the military action in Minangkabau as follows:
'(65) Welderen Renders "Failure.." op.cit. pp. 91-92.
(66) Kielstra I, p.82.
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’’••But what all this will result in, and what the 
advantages of these new possessions will be, if 
it is thought advisable to retain them, is yet 
uncertain. However, it is far less uncertain that 
the restoration and permanent establishment of 
peace and order in both the Padang Lowlands and 
Highlands, which will be the result of this oper­
ation, will open up new and considerable sources 
of prosperity, which if properly guided, will 
increase the trade of Padang considerably.......u(67)
However, by April, 1823 the earlier qualms of van der Capellen
about the advisability of keeping the conquered districts had
apparently been set aside; and the government resolved to
inform the Resident of Padang and the Military Commander that:
”...it is considered appropriate and desirable to keep 
part of the Sumatran interior, and especially Tanah 
Datar, in the possession of the Government..........” (68)
Furthermore in the same resolution the authorities at Padang
were requested to submit proposals as to where forts had to be
erected and where administrative officials should be placed.
In regard to administrative policy they were ordered to ’’take
account as far as possible of the manners and customs of the
inhabitants of the realm of Minangkabau”. In addition a
careful investigation was ordered into the rights of succession
of the remaining members of the Minangkabau dynasty to the
(67) Van der Capellen to the Minister for Colonies. 3rd 
October. 1822. quot. Kielstra I. op.cit. p.7o.
(68) Resolution of Governor-General in Council. 8th April, 
1&23 in De Stuers ’’Vestiging..’1 op.cit. Deel II, Bijlage 
A. pp.216-217.
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government of the country; and finally the Padang authorities 
were empowered to appoint indigenous chiefs to administrative 
positions; and to report on what kind of taxes could be levied 
in order to recompense the government for the considerable 
expenses incurred in bringing peace and order to the country*
In reply to the above instructions Raaff and Du Puy reported 
that they considered the existing fortifications as sufficient 
to keep the country under control; and that they had appointed 
an assistant-resident at Pagerrujong to take over the admin­
istration and government of all the districts of Minangkabau, 
which had been brought under government control, but that in 
regard to the districts bordering the Padris it was advisable
to leave authority in the hands of the military for the time(69)being* They further reported that Radja Muning was the last
legal prince of Minangkabau, but as this prince had declined
to take on the government of his country on account of his
advanced age and had requested that one of his legal successors
would be appointed instead, they suggested that Sutan Alam 
(70)Begagar Shah should be appointed as Radja of Minangkabau; who 
should be empowered by the Governor—General to appoint the 
indigenous administrative officials in order to enhance his 
prestige with the population* Hov/ever, in regard to taxation
(69) Rad ja Muning was the only member of the ruling trium­
virate which had managed to escape the bloodbath at Kota 
Tengha* (see p*69-70)
(70) Nephew of Radja Muning, who had fled to Padang and who also had been one of the signatories of the treaty of
February, 1821*
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it was pointed out that as the population had never been
subject to any indirect taxation, a simple tax such as a
poll-tax should be introduced, while indirect taxation could
be levied on such items as opium, tobacco, cockfights and
(71)market places.
Subsequently on 4th November, 1823 the Batavian govern­
ment issued provisional regulations for the administration and
(72)public finance of Padang and dependencies.
The regulations were based largely on the legislation in
force in Java and which had been designed for Javanese
conditions. The Resident who was the highest source of
executive power was aided in his task by a number of assistant-
residents and also by a hierarchy of indigenous officials,
(73)ranging from the Head-Regents of Padang and Minangkabau to the 
village heads. The Head-Regents and Regents were to be appoint­
ed by the Governor-General and the district-heads by the 
Resident, who was also to approve the election of the village 
heads, who were to be proposed and chosen according to the 
customs of the land. This division of administrative power, 
centred as it was in the Resident, constituted a revolutionary
(71) Raaff and Du Puy to Batavial 1st September. 1823. In 
Kielstra I, op.cit.pp.88-91«
(72) Provisioneel Reglement on het binnenlansch bestuur en dat 
der financien in de residentie van Padang en onderhoorig- 
heden. in Kielstra I, op.cit. pp. 95-103*
(73) Regents were high indigenous officials in the colonial 
administration of Java; the Regents usually belonged to 
the Javanese nobility.
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change in the traditional political and social structure of 
Minangkabau; and as De Stuers rightly remarked a few years 
later:
"..This regulation conflicts entirely with the independant 
and republican form of government of this country........
which does not restrict itself to so many radJas or minor 
princes, but which in addition to them consists of so 
many heads of laras, sukus and tribes (and which there­
fore) cannot at once be changed into a centralized form 
of government without causing the greatest shock......”(74)
Difficulties occurred immediately when the Resident commenced
to make appointments to the various administrative posts; the
people of the XIII Kotas, East of Padang, objected to the
person appointed as Head-Regent of Padang, who as it seems was
in any case hardly known outside the town, because the people
tended to stick to their traditional leaders; and also the
appointment of Sutan Alam Bagagar Shah as regent of Tanah Datar
caused a great deal of Jealousy among the other Minangkabau
(75)notables.
The second revolutionary innovation was direct taxation.
The Batavian government, dismissing the advice of Raaff and Du 
Puy, insisted on the introduction of a land rent similar to the 
one introduced in Java. So long as no proper survey of the 
land had been made the tax should be levied on the village as 
a whole. Furthermore the land rent could be paid in money or
(74) Report of De Stuers and Verploegh to the Batavian Govern­
ment . 30th August. 1825» in Kielstra I, pp. 128-150.
(75) Ibid. P.140.
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in kind, but the price of the products delivered for tax 
purposes was to be determined in such a way that the popul­
ation would prefer to pay in money. The village heads were 
to be made responsible for the gathering of the taxes and 
would be paid 8% of the tax paid, or 10 cents per guilder.
Raaff during his visit to Batavia in September, 1823 
had apparently given the government a rosy picture about 
Minangkabau and about the eagerness of the population to 
co-operate with the Dutch authorities, at least this is the
impression given by a despatch of van der Capellen to the
(76)
Hague of October, 1823f and consequently Batavia went ahead
Tl6) Van der Capellen to Falck. 29th October, 1823« in "Falck*s 
Gedenkscriften" op.cit. pp.520-521. The comments of Van 
der Capellen about Raaff*s visit are as follows:
Colonel Raaff (an excellent officer, who also would 
make a good administrator) is here at the moment. We 
are busy regulating the affairs of Padang and Minang­
kabau. Only now, after having been informed about all 
the particulars by Raaff, I must do justice to Mr.
Raffles, because he did not exaggerate his reports about 
that beautiful land, as was thought earlier. Imagine 
that the population which now falls under the rule of 
the government amounts to about one and a half million 
people, including both the coastal districts and the 
fertile regions from which the Padris have been driven 
by our weapons, and where the population is very thank­
ful for the liberation from the Padri suppression.
They fear nothing more than to be left by us, and they 
are prepared to accept from us any institution which 
we want to introduce there, especially when the intro­
duction thereof is entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel Raaff, 
who has spent one and a half years among them with his 
well disciplined troops; and whom they have seen depart 
from there with uneasiness. The orders given by him 
(Raaff) to complete roads which had been started, and 
to cut timber for the reinforcement of our establishments; 
and other measures which indicate our intentions to 
remain there, have put them (the Minangkabaus) at ease.
(cont* d)
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introducing a number of measures which were quite revolution­
ary. Buth those regulations, considering the conservative 
nature of the Minangkabaus and their attachment to the adat, 
caused a great deal of dissatisfaction.
Colonel Nahuys, who visited Minangkabau in 1824 compared 
the marked divergence in national character between the Sumat­
ran and the Javanese with the difference which existed between 
the free North American and the down trodden Russian; and he 
pointed out that the government was making a big mistake in 
trying to introduce a land tax in Minangkabau, which undoubt­
edly would cause a great deal of dissatisfaction. The co­
operation of the Minangkabaus would be far easier obtained if 
the government abstained from forcing its administrative 
regulations on them, which the people could not understand
(76) Cont*d.
Earlier (i.e. when Raaff was there) the inhabitants 
executed all the work which was ordered by Colonel Raaff 
with the greatest willingness and speed. I am certain 
that not one indigene could complain about his (Raaff*s) 
treatment. After having everything explained to me, I 
am convinced that a regular system of land tax, initially 
on a very low scale, could be introduced without much 
trouble, and could ensure us, as in Java, increasing 
revenue, especially when at the same time continuous care 
is taken to have proper justice and a good police protec­
tion of property and persons, and good treatment of the 
population, which seems to be attached to us. Shortly 
Colonel Raaff will depart from here with all he needs 
and he will be appointed as Resident of Padang. Our 
possessions at the West-Coast of Sumatra will become 
after Java the most important establishments of this Arch- 
ipelago... ........ .............
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in the first place, as according to the adat they were only 
obliged to follow up the orders of the nagari government. 
Agriculture and trade, so Nahuys argued, would undoubtedly 
increase more if supported by the government by means of
(77)monetary incentives instead of being burdened by taxation.
In addition the indirect taxes on opium, cockfights, 
tobacco and market places, and the repeated requisitioning of 
unpaid forced labour for the construction of roads and forts 
caused a great deal of hostility to the Dutch in the govern­
ment districts; this hostility was even more increased by the
often dismal behaviour of the Dutch troops, who not only repaid
(78)
the cruelty of the Padris with the same measure, but who also
(77) Brieven over Bencoolen. Padang. Het Riik van Menan&kabau. 
Rhiouw. Sincapoera en Poelo-Pinang» door den Lt«KoloneT" 
Nahuys. Breda, Pijpers, 1Ö26. pp.146-151*
(78) Nahuys comments on the behaviour of the Dutch troops as 
follows:"But when I consider, that all our victories have to be bought with the blood, not only of those who are guilty 
and of indigenes who have taken up arms against us, but 
also of many innocent people, women, children and defen­
celess old people, then I have no desire for such laurels 
stained with murder. And this is however nearly always 
the case when our troops overrun an enemy dessa (village) 
Young and old, able-bodied or defenceless, are not given 
any quarter by our savage soldiers, but are pitilessly 
put to the sword."(Source: Ibid, p.195*)
Nahuys relates the following incident about a Padri 
prisoner:
"..I found an unarmed Padri, who had surrendered himself, 
in the hands of a few of our soldiers and Minangkabaus, 
who were cold-bloodedly torturing the unfortunate man to 
a cruel death....Not without difficulty did I stop the an
gry evil-doers, who openly claimed to have the right to 
treat the Padri, whose beard had already been partly 
pulled out, in the same way as they would be treated 
when captured by the Padris...••••••••••••••••••••.••••”
(Source: Ibid. p.21l)
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often treated the anti-padris Minangkabaus with little 
respect.
However in 1825, the government tried to bring its
administrative policy closer into line with popular thinking;
and it abolished the positions of head regents and stipulated
that from then on the regents were to be chosen in rotation
from the four original sukus, i.e. Bodi-T^aniago and Koto-
Piliang; and it was also decided to postpone the introduction
of the land tax for the time being, while instead an attempt
would be made to extend the indirect taxes over the whole of
the country. But the emphasis in the new regulations on the
hated taxation on opium, cockfights etc. and the fact that
nothing was done to alleviate the burdens of unpaid forced
labour, did hardly anything to abate the ill-feeling of the
(79)Minangkabaus towards the government.
Resident Du Puy had requested permission to retire from
the colonial service on account of sickness; and on 4th
November he was honourably discharged, and as a sign of the
government’s satisfaction with his services he was given a
gratuity of 6000 guilders. In his place Colonel Raaff was
appointed, who was now put in charge of both military and(80)
civil matters in the residency of Padang.
T79) Resolution of the Governor-General-in-Council. 20th 
December, 1§25* in Kielstra I, pp. 150-152.
(80) Governor-General to the Minister for Colonies. 4th 
December, 1823. in Ibid. pp.l03-5.~
106.
At the beginning of January, 1824, Raaff received
intelligence that the Padris of Bondjol were willing to come
to peaceful terms with the government; and a Malay merchant
who had been sent to investigate, reported that the Tuankus
of Bondjol and Alahan Pandjang were willing to negotiate for
a peaceful settlement and requested that Mr. A.P. van den
(81)
Berg, with whom they had trade dealings should be sent to them(82)
in order to carry out negotiations.
In view of the latest instructions of Batavia to con-
(83)
solidate Dutch power in Minangkabau, a treaty with the powerful 
Padris of Bondjol was very welcome to Raaff. Although in 
addition there was the fear that the British, who apparently 
had sent an emissary from Bencoolen to Bondjol in order to 
conclude a peace treaty, might attempt to draw the whole of the 
trade of the Northern districts of Minangkabau to their own
(84)ports.
Apart from the mutual antipathy on religious and political 
grounds there were two other factors which kept the Padris of 
Bondjol and the Netherlands Indies government divided. Firstly
('S'lJ Van den Berg was an ex-government official turned merchant; 
in the thirties he established a sugar plantation and 
sugar mill near Padang.
(82) Raaff to the Batavian Government. 26th January, 1824. quot. 
Kielstra I, op.cit. p. loST
(83) See p.96*
(84) Nahu.ys ’'Brieven. •" op.cit. p. 194.
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the Bondjol Padris violently opposed the attempts of the
Dutch to occupy the VI Kottas in Agam, which conducted their
trade mainly with Bondjol; and secondly, the attempts of the
Dutch to seal off the coast between Priaman and A3er Bangis,
where the people of Bondjol carried on their export and import
(85)trade with Achin, Malaya and Singapore; e.g. the independant 
sultan of Trumon, at the Northern part of the West-Coast, 
exported to Bondjol guns, powder, textiles, salt and iron, 
while buying gold and other produce. However, some trade must 
also have existed between Bondjol and Dutch ports, considering 
the reference made by the Tuankus of Bondjol to the Dutch 
trader van den Berg.
Hov/ important and flourishing the trade of Bondjol had 
become can be gauged from the Memoir of the Bondjol leader, 
Tuanku Imam, who relates that since the Padri government of 
the Tuankus Imam, Gapu and Halamat had been established in 
Bondjol:
(85) Dawis Datoek Mad.iolelo and Ahmad Marzoeki "Tuanku Imam 
Bondjol, Perintis DJalan ke Merdekaan", Djakarta/Amster- 
dam, Djambatan, 1951* P«78.
(86) Francis E "Herinneringen uit den levensloop van een 
Indisch Ambtenaar, van 1815 tot 1851* Medegedeeld in 
Brieven. Batavia, Van Dorp, 1856. p.184* Note: Francis lists also opium as an important item of trade with 
Bondjol. But this seems rather far fetched considering 
the aversion of the Padris for this commodity.
108.
"...this place (i*e. Bondjol), after five years under 
the government of Tuanku Imam, grew extensively, while 
its prosperity increased so much, owing to the increase 
in trade and industry, that many went there, because 
victuals were cheap, and rice, cattle and horses were 
plentiful.......(and) When the construction and armament
of the fort had been taken care of, the people only 
concentrated on trade; (and) with the enjoyment of peace 
and concordance the nagari of Bondjol increased in 
prosperity; and the merchants of neighbouring places 
went to trade there,•.••••.••••••••••••• ......... • ••••*,(87)
Owing to the absence of any reference in the Memoir of Tuanku 
Imam Bondjol to the treaty of 22nd January, concluded between 
the Dutch and Bondjol and also because of the lack of any 
other indigenous sources, it is difficult to establish precise­
ly why the leaders of Bondjol at this point of time were
interested in concluding a peace treaty with the Dutch. However,(88)
the explanation of De Stuers, who was on the spot soon after 
the event, sounds reasonable. The Dutch navy was patrolling 
the coast in order to stop "smuggling", as the Dutch termed it, 
and although this measure was not completely effective, it 
affected the trade of Bondjol to some extent. Bondjol realized 
that if it came to terms with the Dutch and paid lip service 
to the latters* request for co-operation with their policy of 
channeling all the trade of the interior through Dutch ports, 
they would not in fact lose a great deal of their commercial
(87) "Memorie van Tuanku Imam” in De Stuers op.cit. Bijlage B. 
pp.222-223.
(88) Ibid. vol. 2. pp. 77-78.
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freedom. Looking at the commercial clauses of the treaty
(89)between Bondjol and the Dutch, it seems hardly likely that 
the people of Bondjol, who were traders, ever seriously con­
sidered buying salt and other items from Padang or from other 
Dutch ports, while elsewhere they were able to buy the same 
commodities for lower prices. But the realization of the 
fact that war was damaging to their trade probably weighed 
as heavily on the minds of the Bondjoilers as it did on the 
Dutch; and in this sense the desire for peace by Bondjol was 
probably genuine enough. At least some support for this 
contention is given by Tuanku Imam in his Memoir, when he 
gives the impression that Bondjol went to war with the Dutch 
in order to safeguard Agam; and the intrusion by the Dutch
into Minangkabau had disturbed the continuous development of
(90)
Bondjol during a twenty-five year period of peace and order. 
Furthermore at the time of the treaty the initial cause of 
friction with the Dutch i.e. the VI Kotas in Agam, had been 
removed, because this region which had been conquered by Raaff 
in July, 1823» had fallen into the hands of the Padris again
(89) Full text of the treaty between Bondjol and the Dutch of 22nd January, 1824 .in Bijdragen tot de Taal-Land-en 
Volkenkunde van Nederlands-Indie, 1888. pp. 141-144.
ed. E.B. Kielstra.
(90) "Memorie van Tuanku Imamf..u op.cit. p.233.
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(91)in September of the same year. But when the Dutch attacked
the VI Kotas soon after the treaty with Bondjol had been
concluded, the leaders of Bondjol sent the treaty document
back to Padang, because in their opinion the treaty had been
(92)
broken by the Dutch. Obviously the people of Bondjol wanted 
a recognition of the status quo; and they desired peace in 
order to return to their trading and business activities which 
had been interrupted by the threat of the Dutch to their 
security.
However, Raaff, who appears to have been elated by the 
treaty, wrote that the government would greatly benefit from 
it mainly in respect of j
,t..trade, the establishment of the authority of the 
Netherlands government on the West-Coast of Sumatra; 
and the subjection of the remaining Padri leaders in 
the realm of Minangkabau.... .M (93)
But Raaff*s explanation about the change of heart of the
Padri leaders of Bondjol in trying to seek closer relations
with the Dutch, which he attributed to their recent military
setbacks in Agam, does not seem sufficient; especially if
there is taken into account the tremendous fighting spirit
and military power of Bondjol, which was to keep the Dutch
(91) Kielstra I, op.cit. p.63.
(92) G.A. Baud to Batavia, 14th June, 1824. quot. Kielstra I, 
op.cit. p. 109*
(93) Raaff to Batavia. 26th January, 1824* quot. Ibid, pp.106- 
107.
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at bay until 1837* Raaff also optimistically believed that 
the Padris of Bondjol would co-operate with the Dutch author­
ities in subjecting the other Padri nations, v/hich were still 
defying Dutch authority; and he therefore had no qualms about 
attacking the VI Kotas when this region did not seem willing 
to conclude a treaty with the government. But as pointed out 
before, the Padris of Bondjol considered the treaty of January, 
1824 as a recognition of the status quo; and so they considered 
the clauses of the treaty making it obligatory to help the 
Dutch in subjecting their unwilling brethren and to police 
the Dutch trade regulations, merely as ornamental and which 
therefore could be disregarded when convenient. Furthermore 
Bondjol knew well enough that the Dutch did not have sufficient 
power to enforce those regulations and clauses.
From the Dutch point of view, however, the VI Kotas were 
of strategic importance, because this region commanded the 
supply route from the coast to the Dutch posts in Minangkabau. 
As Raaff had explained to Batavia in 1822, the conquest of the 
VI Kotas would ensure that:
’’....once peace had been established, a desired commun­
ication would be effected between Priaman, Agam and 
Tanah Datar............ ................ ..........."(94)
But before Bondjol returned the treaty document, Raaff had
suddenly died, overcome by fever, on 17th April, 1824 when
(94) quot. Kielstra I, p.56 no exact date quoted.
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only twenty nine years old,
G.A. Baud, who was appointed as temporary Resident 
was instructed;
"•••in expectance of the appointment of a new resident 
of Padang to continue carefully along the lines of the 
previous resident; and to keep especially in mind the 
desire of the government to consolidate its position 
in the Padang Highlands and to try to negotiate with 
the heads of the Padris, who are not yet subjected,."(95)
Baud first tried to convince the Padris of Bondjol by letter
about the "justness" of the Dutch attack on the VI Kotas.
But Bondjol replied that it would not be agreeable to negotiate
unless the VI Kotas were evacuated by the Dutch, As Baud
doubted the authenticity of the reply, he sent a pro-Dutch
Muslim religious leader to Bondjol with a letter and a copy
of the doubted reply, but soon afterwards the Resident
received a report that his emissary had been killed in the
(96)neighbourhood of Bondjol,
Colonel De Stuers, who had been appointed Resident of 
Padang on 2nd November, 1824, did not fare much better in 
his attempts to come to terms with the Padris of Bondjol,
The new resident had been instructed i,a, to investigate 
the possibilities for ending satisfactorily the continuing 
hostilities with the Padris; and he had been requested to do 
everything possible to come to an agreement with them about
(95) Resolution of the Batavian government, 13th May, 1824» 
quot. Ibid, p, 109*
(96) Baud to Batavia. 6th September, 1824« quot. Ibid, p.110.
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demarcation lines, which were not to be violated by either(97)party, Batavia apparently wanted to avoid the mistake made
by Raaff over the VI Kotas and was eager to make a settlement
on the basis of the status quo.
But at the end of 1825 De Stuers was only able to (98)
report to Batavia that so far his attempts to come to terms 
with the Padris of Bondjol had been in vain. Bondjol had 
asked nothing less than a complete withdrawal by the Dutch 
from Again, "which regarding our military position cannot be 
spared,"
However, his attempts to come to terms with the Padris 
of Lintau and L Kotas, so the Resident continued his report, 
had been more successful. Although during the first eight 
months of office it had proved impossible to come into contact 
with Lintau or L Kotas, De Stuers had been fortunate in making 
the acquaintance of a young Arab merchant called Said- 
Salimu’l-Djafried, who had declared himself willing to go to 
Lintau, This merchant after having been thoroughly briefed 
by the Resident, left for Lintau on 29th September, 1825; 
and he succeeded in persuading Lintau and L Kotas to send 
representatives to Padang, The Padri delegates arrived in
(97) Resolution of the Governor-General«-in-Council. 2nd 
November, 1824. ouot. Kielstra I, pp.113-114.
(98) De Stuers to the Batavian government. 25th November, 1825, 
in Ibid. pp. I53-162.
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Padang on 29th October, 1825 and after a formal reception,
De Stuers handed them a short statement explaining the Dutch 
position i.e. the government would be willing at all times to 
protect Padri traders in its territories; and it would never 
interfere in the religious affairs of Padris and non-Padris 
alike. However in return the government expected that the 
traders from the Dutch territories would be allowed to travel 
in the Padri countries and that they would be given protec­
tion there; and furthermore the government expected that the 
Padri leaders would take firm measures against those sub­
ordinate officials in their territories, who were responsible 
for the repeated burning and pillaging in the Dutch border 
districts.
However, the immediate reply of the Padri representatives 
was that they desired that the Dutch government would help 
them in introducing their religious teachings in the whole of 
Minangkabau, the government districts included. But, so De 
Stuers reported, they did not insist as on previous occasions, 
that the Dutch should completely withdraw from Minangkabau.
De Stuers, true liberal as he was, replied to the Padri request 
that:
"•••it was open to anybody to take on the Padri religion.
The government would rather see the inhabitants 
religious than godless, but it could not stand for the 
destruction of the land and the murdering of the people (99) 
as a pretext for the introduction of the new principles.
(99) De Stuers to the Batavian government. 25th November, 1825. 
in Kielstra I, op.cit. pp. 157-158*
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A few days later the Padri delegates communicated to the 
Resident that they were in general agreement with the views 
of the government, but with the exception of two points which 
they considered were in conflict with their religious beliefs:
w,..The first point is that the people are allowed to 
play and the second point is that they are allowed 
to smoke opium. Both those things are bad for the 
people and preclude them from being happy. The Col­
onel should be convinced of that. If we Malays (i,e. 
Minangkabaus) are allowed to do both those things, 
then it is impossible that there will be peace as they 
always will cause disturbances. And if the Colonel 
wishes to live in peace with us for ever, then we 
request that he for our sake will forbid those things 
gradually,...... ................... ... ........ . ,”(100)
Subsequently on 15th November, 1825 a treaty was signed
between the Padris of Lintau and L Kotas and the Netherlands
government. Both parties recognized each others* sovereignty
in their respective territories and they promised to deliver
criminals and wanted persons. Furthermore traders from both
sides would be protected in the respective countries and the
Padri governments promised to take measures to stop the(101)
invasions and pillaging in the border districts.
De Stuers attributed the willingness of the Padris of 
Lintau and L Kotas to come to peaceful terms with the Dutch 
government to the severe military defeats which they had
(100) Ibid, p.159.
(101) Full text of treaty in Ibid, pp,l60-l62.
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suffered at the hands of the Dutch when in the beginning 
of 1825 they had attempted several times to invade Tanah 
Datar. Those defeats so the Resident thought, had made the 
Padris realize that the ’’kafirs” (unbelievers) were there to 
stay, and they therefore had adjusted their thinking accord­
ingly; and there is some support for this contention of the 
Resident if the course of events of the next few years is 
taken into account. The point is that, as soon as it became 
apparent to the Padris that Dutch military strength had been 
considerably weakened by the transfer of a large number of 
troops to Java in 1826, they put the treaty of 1825 aside 
and started again to attack the Dutch positions in Tanah Datar.
In order to see the story in Minangkabau in its proper 
perspective, it is necessary at this point to divert to Java 
where new developments had taken place, which caused the 
government order of 1823 to the Padang authorities to temp­
orarily stop their offensive against the Padris, to remain
in force far longer than originally had been expected. As(102)
was discussed before, the financial situation in Java during 
the years I82I4/25 had worsened into a severe crisis. But 
when the news of the projected loan with Palmer and Co. of 
Calcutta had become known in the Hague, which so far had been 
under the impression that the financial situation in Java was 
sound, it caused a great furore. Immediately a special
(102) See p.97*
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Commissioner-General, Count Du Bus de Gisignies, was
appointed to restore the financial stability of the Indies
and to report to the Home government as to what kind of
measures were to be taken to make the colonies a paying 
(103)proposition. Du Bus immediately introduced a programme of
severe economy measures; public expenditure was heavily cut,
retrenchments were made in the colonial service, and salaries
were slashed. In regard to the Outer-possessions he ordered
a strict observance of the principles of non-intervention and
non-expansion. On the strength of a despatch of Du Bus, who
had not yet arrived in the Indies, the Lieutenant-Governor-
General De Kock sent a circular in March, 1826 to all the
civil and military authorities in the Outer-Possessions,
emphatically instructing them to abstain strictly from any
military action and from interfering in local affairs, but
to take every care to maintain or improve their good relations
(104)with the princes and the people. This policy decision alone 
would already have handicapped De Stuers a great deal in his 
attempts to bring about a general state of peace and order in 
Minangkabau, but his dilemna was made far more acute when he
(103) Welderen Renders "Failure....” op.cit. pp. 100-101.
(104) De Kock to the authorities in the Outer-Possessions.
March, 1025. in Kielstra E.bI ^ Sumatra*s Westkust 
van 1826-1832” in Bi^dragen tot de Taal-Land-en Volke- 
enkunde van Nederlands-Indie. 1888. pp. 217-218. Note: 
Further references to this source will be indicated by 
Kielstra II.
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was ordered in August, 1826 to send a large part of his 
military forces to Java, where a serious rebellion had 
broken out under the leadership of the Javanese Prince 
Diponegara. This large scale rising had broken out in the 
Principalities and it took the Dutch five years (1825-1830) 
and a large number of their forces to wipe out resistance, 
mainly because of the guerilla tactics used by the Javanese.
But in the meantime De Stuers was in the unenviable 
position of trying to keep intact the conquest made so far 
by the Dutch in Minangkabau, while the military forces at his 
disposal were quite insufficient to withstand a full scale 
attack by a united Padri force. The actual strength of the 
Dutch forces at the West-Coast of Sumatra had been reduced 
from 1568 men on 1st July, 1825 to 682 men on 20th September,
C105)1826.
Under those circumstances the Resident could only try 
to do his utmost in coming to terms with the Padris. While 
previously the Dutch army had been able to keep the two con­
tending parties in Minangkabau separated by force, now the 
only way open to De Stuers was to follow the opposite policy 
and try to bring the Padris and their opponents together in 
order to ensure the greatest possible degree of peace in the 
country, which was a pre-requisite to the survival of the 
Dutch in Minangkabau. Obviously if a major war had broken
(105) Kielstra II, p.219.
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out "between the Padris and the anti-Padri districts, the 
Dutch with their weak military forces would have been swiped 
out of the country together with the adat-party.
But, so De Stuers reported, this attempt at reconciliation 
was made difficult by a number of factors# Firstly the open­
ing up of normal trade communications between the Padri and 
anti-Padri districts was severely hampered by the unwilling­
ness of the Padri leaders to let their people traverse the 
government districts, where they would be exposed to the 
temptations of cockfighting and opium smoking# In order to 
overcome this obstacle the Resident introduced measures for­
bidding the staging of cockfights, but this action of course 
caused great dissatisfaction among the adat-party# However, 
the most obvious and fundamental obstacle to bring about a 
fraternization, was the strong and unbridgeable division of 
opinion of the two contending factions about socio-political 
matters. The adat-chiefs considered the Padri leaders as 
usurpers of the legal government of the country. On the other 
hand the Padris considered the adat—chiefs as the greatest 
obstacle to the introduction of their principles, not only 
because they condoned the smoking of opium and the staging of 
cockfights, but even more so because they had an obviously 
vested interest in the suku-system of government and the 
matrilineal social organization, which were considered to
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(106)be in direct conflict with the Muslim Law.
A further point which made the establishment of peace­
ful conditions very difficult was the absence of any central 
indigenous authority which was able to keep the many politi­
cal units under control. But in this regard, so the Resident 
reported, a solution suggested itself in the person of Said- 
Sal imu’l-Djafried, whom De Stuers continued to employ as his 
agent among the Padris. The Said had proved himself in 
bringing about the treaty of 1825; and after that he had been 
able to make contact with the representatives from Bondjol 
who had been sent to Lintau to enquire about the treaty of 
1825* The Said returned with those Bondjol emissaries to 
their homeland, where at Passam he met the Tuankus of Bondjol, 
who expressed their desire to him for a government post 
consisting of a merchant and a few soldiers, in order that 
trade relations could be established; and at another meeting 
with the tuankus of Bondjol at Basoh the Said had explained
to them the meaning of the treaty of 1825 with the Padris of
(107)Lintau and L Kotas. Soon after the Resident received a 
letter from an unknown source requesting him to remove the 
existing regent of Tanah Datar from his post and to replace
(106) Report of De Stuers to the Minister for Colonies,
27th September, 1826. in Ibid, p.233
(107) Report of De Stuers to Coramander-in—Chief, 1836 quot. 
Kielstra II op.cit. p.235«
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him by the Said, while other letters originating from
Bondjol and Rau repeatedly stated: !,We follow Lintau. we(108)
put the Said at our head'*. Although it appeared that the 
Said was trying to carve out an important position for him­
self, the Resident decided that he could not do without his 
services and in order to enhance his status among the Minang- 
kabaus he gave him the title of Radja Perdamaian (Prince of 
Peace). It should be noted however that in any case the Said 
i.e. a person related to the Prophet, would have commanded a 
great deal of respect among the population and this probably 
accounts for his successful dealings with the Padris. But 
unfortunately the Said was not able to complete his task fully, 
because a few years later he was murdered, probably on the
orders of the Regent of Tanah Datar, who felt himself threat-
(109)ened in his position.
However, the most important factor enabling De Stuers 
to hold on to the government occupied part of Minangkabau with 
the small military force available to him, was the increasing 
dissension among the Padris themselves. Already soon after 
his arrival in Padang in 1825 De Stuers had reported:
Ibid. p. 236.
Ibid. p. 237.
(108)
(109)
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’’....this internal division of the Padri leaders is 
very useful to the Netherlands government, because 
it will gradually cause their doom, and it would be 
therefore more advisable for the sake of our interests 
to maintain as much as possible the state of peace which 
at present exists between the Padris and the Government, 
than to cause them by forceful means and a threatening 
attitude to again unite their forces. Only such a union 
makes their power dangerous to us................ ....**(110)
It was reported that in Bondjol, Tuanku Nan Gapok had been
murdered by one of his own men; and that after the treaty of
1825 Lintau and the region of Talawas had become hostile to
each other and that Tuanku Lintau had several attempts made
on the life of Tuanku Nan Saleh of Talawa% because he disagreed(111)
with this Tuanku*s rather moderate teachings. The Resident
thought that there was a possibility of an even greater degree
of anarchy among the Padris, when their present leaders died.
He believed that it could mean the complete disintegration of(112)
the Padri sect.
Although De Stuers had managed to avoid an open clash 
with the Padris, the authority and prestige of the Dutch 
government had diminished gradually to nothing. How low the 
prestige of the government had sunk among the Padris is 
illustrated by the fact that the Tuankus who had signed the
(110) Quoted in the Resolution of the Governor-General in 
Council, 13th June, 1825* quot. Kielstra I, op.cit.p.lll.
(111) De Stuers to the Minister of Colonies. 27th September, 
1825. in Kielstra II, op.cit. p.233«
(112) De Stuers to the Batavian Government. June, 1827. in 
Ibid. pp. 251-252.
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treaty of 1825 requested the Resident in 1827 that they 
should be paid a djizjah i.e. a tribute paid by the con­
quered to the victor. Subsequently De Stuers obtained 
approval from Batavia to send yearly ’’friendly presents” 
worth one hundred guilders each to the tuankus Nan Rintji 
of Agam, Passaman of Lintau, di Gugu of L Kotas and Nan
Saleh of Talawas, providing those Tuankus promised to stop
(113)the continuing troubles in the border districts. By 1829, 
when De Stuers after repeated requests had been granted 
permission to resign from his post, the authority of the 
Dutch in Minangkabau had become no more than nominal. In 
a report written before he left Padang, De Stuers described 
the situation in Minangkabau as follows: Unrest was wide­
spread in most of the territory, but intervention by the 
government was useless and dangerous, considering its 
insufficient military strength. Military action could only 
be effective in those places where the government had forts 
i,e, at eight points on the Coast and four in the interior. 
Pointing to the growing dissatisfaction among the population, 
the Resident advised that, as nothing could be done to stop 
the pillaging of the Padris in the border districts, the 
government should try to alleviate the ill-feeling caused
(113) De Stuers to the Minister for Colonies. 27th September, 
1826. in Kielstra I, p.233.
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by some of its administrative regulations, such as the
leasing of opium sales. The Minangkabaus, he added, were
opposed to any kind of taxation, and as the government was
not able in any case to police the opium regulations in the
whole of the country, it would not lose a great deal if they
were abolished altogether, while it would take away one of
(114)the grievances of the Minangkabaus,
But De Stuers* successor, Resident Maclllavry, was far
more pessimistic about the military danger posed by the
Padris, The new Resident reported in November, 1829 that it
was solely because of their internal division that the Padris,
who could not be trusted in any case, had not wiped out the
Dutch positions in Minangkabau during the term of office of
De Stuers, The fact that during 1827 and 1828 some large
scale attacks by the Padris of Lintau and L Kotas had taken
place in the border districts, convinced the resident that
the reformers would not confine themselves to pillaging and
burning excursions, as De Stuers had tried to make out in his
reports. The Padris were apparently still bent on further
conquest; and the assumption of De Stuers that since 1825 a
state of peace had existed with the Padris of Lintau and L,
Kotas was disproved by the facts, so Maclllavry argued. The
(114) Report of De Stuers to the Military Department in
Batavia, 30th December, 1829» in Kielstra II, pp,254-255* 
and Report of De Stuers to the Batavian government, 30th 
June. 1829, in Ibid, pp, 255-259*
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authority of the government was laughed at by Padri and 
anti-Padri alike and the Resident felt that the only way 
to improve the situation was to re-establish the greatly 
diminished prestige of the government by military force*
He therefore pointed out to Batavia that military reinforce­
ments were sorely needed and that the policy of De Stuers to
leave the Padris in the hope that they would disintegrate on
(115)their own account, was unrealistic and dangerous*
While the Batavian government seemed to agree with
Maclllavry, it put his request for troop reinforcements aside,
till the military situation in Java, where the rebellion
under Diponegara was still not completely suppressed, had(116)
sufficiently improved*
But now the Resident took affairs somewhat into his own
hands when he wrote to the military commander of Minangkabau
that, although he could not give any general approval for
offensive action, he would agree to any military moves made
outside the forts which were designed to help the population
in re-conquering those villages which they had lost to the
(117)
Padris since 1825. The Resident pointed out that as long as
(115) Renort of Maclllavry to the Batavian Government, 20th 
November. 1&30* in Ibid, pp.262-269*
(116) Resolution of the Governor-General-in-Council. 25th 
March, 1830* quot. Ibid, p.272*
(117) Maclllavry to Captain de Rochemont. 5th November, 1830 
quot, Kielstra II, op.cit. pp* 27^-75•
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the expansionist moves of the Padris had not extended 
behind the Dutch defence line, military action had not been 
necessary, but now the Padris were penetrating between the 
Dutch forts and therefore threatening the entire military 
position of the Dutch in Minangkabau.
However, disquieting reports from Padang about attacks 
on Tapanuli by the Achinese, the withdrawal of the Dutch 
garrison from Tiku owing to Padri pressure, and the pene­
tration of Bondjol to the coastline near Natal, impelled the 
Batavian government to follow the same line of action as taken
by Maelllavry; and it decided in May, 1830 to send a hundred
(118)
troops and a man of war to Padang.
By the middle of 1830, then, the period of complete
military inaction as inaugurated under De Stuers had ended;
and Kota Gadis in A^am was severely punished and its defenders
put to the sword, while also an attack on Ajer Bangis by a
combined force of troops from Bondjol and Achin was repelled(120)
with great loss to the enemy.
(118) Resolution of the Governor-General in Council. 3rd May 
1830. quot. Ibid. p.27Ö*
(119) Report of Maelllavry to the Governor-General. 25th 
August, 1830/ quot. Ibid. pp. 280-81•
(120) Ibid. pp. 285-286.
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SECTION III
VAN DEN BOSCH AND SUMATRA;185Q~18hl.
Although the Commissioners-General and subsequently 
Governor-General Van der Capellen had tried to replace the 
policies of the Dutch East India Company with a more "liberal" 
system of colonial administration, the principle that the 
colonies should not be a burden but rather a source of profit 
to the mother country was adhered to as strongly as ever. The 
objective of profitability was clearly expressed in the instr­
uctions to Commissioner-General Du Bus de Gisignies, who was 
ordered, while making policy decisions, to keep firmly in 
mind:
"•••••the rule, that the purpose of government ought 
to be, to balance with the income from the Netherlands 
Indies all the expenses of administration;,.........." (l)
The instructions went on to point out that the Indies existed 
mainly for the benefit of Dutch trade, shipping and industry, 
and the "further monetary and other interests of the mother 
country". Then, as an afterthought, and in keeping with the 
"liberal" principles fashionable at the time, it was added 
that also the "happiness" of the population of those possess­
ions was to be furthered.
(l) Confidential Instructions to Commissioner-General Du Bus 
de Gisignies by Royal Decree no. 79 of 13th September.1&25. 
quot. Wi.ick H van der MDe Nederlandsche Oost-Indische 
Bezittingen onder het bestuur van den Kommissaris - Gener- 
aal Du Bus de Gisignies, (1826-1830)." s*Gravenhage, 
Nijhoff, 1866. p.6.
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The failure of colonial policy under van der Capellen
brought to the fore the question as to how the colonies should
be made into a profitable commercial venture, and on this
question of policy a great deal of controversial opinion
existed both in the Indies and in the Netherlands.
The financial and economic situation in the Indies during
the years 1826-1830 was far from favourable. The large deficit
left behind by van der Capellen was balanced by a loan of(2)
20 million guilders from the Amortization Syndicate in 1826, 
while repayments and interests, amounting to 1.J+ million 
guilders per year were guaranteed by the Estates-General.
A similar loan of 15 million guilders had to be made in 1828 
in order to pay for the costs of the Java War (1825-1830).
The economizing policies of Du Bus had improved the 
financial situation in the colonies to such an extent that 
the yearly repayments of the loans of 1826 and 1828 plus 
interest could have been met from the East Indian budget
(2) The Amortisatie Syndicaat was an institution - a type of 
public corporation - created by law on 27th December, 1822 
primarily for the purpose of debt amortization. The second 
function of the Syndicaat was to obtain funds from the 
public - in addition to the revenue it received in the form 
of an extra percentage on taxes and from crown lands - in 
order to cover government expenditure which was not 
provided for in the budget. The King, however, obtained 
complete control of the Syndicaat and used it as means to 
remain financially independant from Parliament.
1 2 9.
(3 )
s u r p lu s  when th e  J a v a  War had  ended* The r e a l l y  im p o r ta n t
p ro b lem  w hich  c o n f ro n te d  th e  I n d ia n  governm ent a t  th e  end o f
th e  tw e n t i e s  was th e  w o rse n in g  b a la n c e  o f  paym en ts s i t u a t i o n .
The e x p o r t  income o f  th e  I n d i e s  had  b e en  s t e a d i l y  d e c l in in g
b e tw een  1824 and 1829 , owing to  th e  c o n tin u o u s  f a l l  i n  w o rld  
(4 )
m ark e t p r i c e s  and th e  e x c e s s  o f  im p o r ts  o v e r  e x p o r t s  am ounted
(5 )
t o  ab o u t one m i l l i o n  g u i ld e r s  in  1 8 3 0 . The f a l l  i n  th e  e x p o r t  
t r a d e  from  th e  I n d i e s  made th e  u s u a l  way o f  r e m i t t i n g  money to
th e  N e th e r la n d s  i . e .  by b u y in g  b i l l s  o f  s a l e  from  p r i v a t e  
t r a d e r s ,  p r a c t i c a l l y  im p o s s ib le ,  s in c e  h a r d ly  any l a r g e  t r a n s ­
a c t io n s  o f  t h a t  k in d  w ere made. R e m itta n c e  i n  th e  form  o f  g o ld
(3 ) K nibbe W.A. ”De v e s t i g i n g  d e r  M o n a rch ie . H et C o n f l ic t  
E lo u t-V a n  den  B osch i n  v e rb a n d  m et de v o o rg e s c h ie d e n is  
d e r  r e g e e r in g s - r e g le m e n te n  v an  1830 en  183&.” (U tre c h ts©  
B i jd r a g e n  t o t  de G e s c h ie d e n is , h e t  S t a a t s r e c h t ,  en  de 
Econom ie van  N e d e rla n d sc h  I n d i e ) n o . 4 . ) ,  U t r e c h t ,  O o s th o ek , 
1935. P .100.
Ja v a -V a lu e o f  e x p o r t s ( a ) -  I n  '0 0 0 g u i l d e r s .
In d ig o C o ffee R ice S u g ar T obacco T o ta l
1823 — 1 4 ,5 6 1 9 675 — 1 5 ,2 4 5
1824 — 7 ,6 8 6 61 574 — 8 ,3 2 1
1825 37 8 ,5 8 3 194 221 167 9 ,2 0 2
1826 . . — — — - —
1827 36 6 ,8 5 0 145 481 ft# 7 ,5 1 2
1828 94 7 ,8 3 1 424 438 43 8 ,8 3 0
1829 151 4 ,8 5 0 398 1 ,1 9 5 ft# 6 ,5 9 4
1830 48 4 ,5 4 6 251 1 ,5 3 1 27 6 ,4 0 3
( a )  S o u rc e : C e n t r a a l  K a n to o r , H a n d e l s s t a t i s t i e k ,  T ab e l
I Q .  q u o t .  Reinsm a R. ”H et v e r v a l  van  h e t  C u l t u u r s t e l -  
s e l ” . s* G rav en h ag e , Van K e u le n , 1955* P . 1 3 .
(5 )  Wei d e re n  R en d ers  . . F a i l u r e . . ” o p . c i t .  p .  1 2 2 .
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and silver specie of which already a large amount had been 
exported became difficult and was furthermore actively dis­
couraged in order to prevent a complete upset of the colonial 
monetary system, while the large amounts of copper money which 
the Indian government received were not suitable for exchange 
transactions.
The King was adamant that the colonies should become self- 
sufficient and profitable in the shortest time possible, because 
his political prestige was at stake as he was sure that parlia­
ment would not grant any more loans, without demanding a 
greater say in the running of the colonies. The problem to be 
solved then was largely one of balance of payments. To cut 
imports was not politically possible as this would adversely 
affect the home industry, especially that of Belgium. The only 
other solution was to increase the value of the export trade 
by increased production. This brought up the question as to 
what was the best way to increase the productive capacity of 
the colonies i.e. by the extension of the Company system of 
forced deliveries or the introduction of private European 
capital and management and the use of free indigenous labour.
In a report of May, 1827, submitted by Du Bus, but 
written by his secretary, the prominent liberal, Willem van 
Hogendorp, a solution was proposed to the problem of raising 
the agricultural output of the Netherlands East Indies. Van
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Hogendorp suggested that the policy of van der Capellen
should be reversed and that private European entrepreneurs
should be re-admitted into Java, to whom virgin soil was to
be rented or given on perpetual lease* The existing system
of forced deliveries in the Preanger (West-Java) should be
abolished and instead free indigenous labour was to be used(6)on the European plantations*
The Minister for Colonies, Elout, agreed that in principle 
colonial agricultural production should be developed by Dutch 
private enterprise, but realizing that such a development would 
take time, he advised the King that the system of forced 
deliveries in the Preanger should be kept intact until Javanese 
agriculture had been sufficiently developed by private enter­
prise*
The King submitted those proposals on colonial agricul­
tural policy to van den Bosch, who in a report of March, 1829
(6) Knibbe "..Vestiging*..” op.cit. pp. 101-102*
(7) Ibid. p. 102.
(8) Note: Johannes van den Bosch (1780-1844); at the age of seventeen went to the East Indies as a lieutenant of the 
Royal Engineers. Pell in disfavour with General Daendels 
and was forced to leave the Indies for Holland in 1810, 
where in 1815 he was put in charge of the military affairs 
of the East Indies. In 1816 he was promoted to major- 
general. In 1818 he published a work on the Dutch colonies 
entitled: ”De Nederlandsehe Bezittingen in Azie, Amerika
en Afrika, in derzelver toestand en aangelegenheid voor dit 
rijk, wijsgeerig, staathuishoudkundig en geographisch 
beschouwd,f in which he criticized the policies of Raffles 
and showed himself a supporter of the policies of the 
Company, providing that the misuses which had crept in 
would be stopped* In the 1820*s van den Bosch was in 
charge of the Maatchappij van Weldadigheid (Humanitarian(Cont*d)
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showed that he v/as generally opposed to the introduction 
of a system of production as advocated by van Hogendorp and 
Elout.Van den Bosch, cn the basis of a comparative study of 
production costs of Java and the West-Indian colonies, of 
which he had first-hand knowledge, argued that the cost prices 
of Javanese sugar and coffee would be G0% higher on the 
European market than the lowest cost prices of West-Indian 
sugar and coffee. He insisted therefore that the system of 
forced deliveries as existing in the Preanger should be
extended over the rest of the Government-owned territory of
(9)
Java.
As a solution to the problem of ensuring the benefit of 
the increased agricultural output of the colonies to the mother 
country, van den Bosch proposed that three quarters of the 
export crop should be guaranteed to the Nederlandsche Handels- 
maatschappij ( N . H . M . V a n  den Bosch argued that even a 23%
(8) Cont*d.
Company) which was concerned to resettle city paupers 
on the undeveloped moors in the Eastern Netherlands. In 
1827 van den Bosch was appointed Commissioner General to 
the Netherlands West Indies and on his return he was 
appointed Governor-General of the East Indies on l6th 
October, 1828.
(9) Knibbe u..Vestiging..u op.cit. pp. 102-103.
(10) Note: The Nederlandsche Handelsmaatschappij was created by 
Royal Decree of 29th March, 1824 for the purpose of 
increasing Dutch trade and industry. Although essentially 
a private joint stock company in which the King personally 
had invested a great deal of money and had guaranteed the 
payment of dividends to investors in case of trading losses, 
the N.H.M. enjoyed a number of privileges. It v/as given 
monopoly of the transport of government goods from and to 
the colonies and the government coffee produced in the 
Preanger and the spices of the Moluccas were consigned to it for transport and sale in Holland. On the other hand the N.H.M. was ordered to use only Dutch ships and export by preference Dutch goods.
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tariff differential apparently did not enable Dutch merchants 
to compete successfully with the English and Americans, who 
between them accounted for most of the East Indian trade. In 
order therefore to avoid that the Netherlands would be running 
its colonies largely for the benefit of others, the government 
should directly interfere and grant the N.H.M. a distinct 
privileged position in regard to the trade in Java produce. 
This last suggestion of van den Bosch, especially, was grist 
to the King’s mill, who had a great personal interest in the 
welfare of the Company that had been set up at his own instig­
ation. Owing to the continuous financial losses of the 
N. H. M., the King, who had personally guaranteed dividends to
its shareholders, had been forced already to pay million
(13)
guilders out of his own pocket by 1829»
The King became very favourable towards the system of 
van den Bosch, because the latter’s proposals promised far 
quicker results than those of Elout who advised Ma wait and 
see” policy and to let the situation be remedied by the 
“natural laws of demand and supply”. The financial and econo­
mic distress in which the Netherlands had been since the
(11)
(11) See. Section IV, pp.
(12) Van den Bosch to the King. 13th May, 1829* in Knibbe 
”..Vestiging.. ” op.cit. Bronnen (Sources) pp.45-50«
(13) Welderen Renders ”..Failure..” op.cit. p. 123*
134.
Napoleonic wars demanded positive action; and in addition
the Kingfs political position and his own financial interests
were at stake, if the colonies were not quickly made into a
profitable business proposition* In a personal interview of
23rd May, 1829 the King told van den Bosch to go ahead and
charged him with the express assignment that, above everything,
the East Indian Budget should be balanced within the shortest
possible time* When Elout was notified of the King’s decision
he resigned, as he saw the system of van den Bosch, especially
the privileged position of the N.H*M., as a return to the days
(14)of the Dutch East India Company*
On 24th July, van den Bosch departed for the Indies where 
he arrived on 2nd January, 1830*
The most important objective of Dutch colonial policy 
during the period 1830-1870 was to increase the size of the 
remittances from the Indies in order to enrich the Netherlands 
treasury* The large profits of the nculture system”, as the 
system of forced deliveries of van den Bosch came to be called 
were not used for the development of the Netherlands East 
Indies, but instead the instructions to van den Bosch laid 
down that the administration of the colonies should be kept
(14) Elout to van den Bosch, 20th May, 1829 in Knibbe 
’‘••Vestiging**’1 op*cit* p* 67.
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on as simple a footing as possible, lest the profitability
of the colonies to the mother country would be reduced.
Legitimate interest in the Outer—Possessions could only be
taken if the norm of profitability, actual or potential,
was satisfied; otherwise those areas should be left as they
were, although they could not be abandoned without the express
(15)permission of the Hague.
In addition to the norm of profitability there was the 
question of manpower, both civil and military. Van den Bosch 
argued that Java alone offered such an extensive field for 
Butch enterprise that for years to come it could absorb most 
of the manpower and other resources available. Better results 
could be expected from an effort that was concentrated and 
that was under the close supervision of the central adminis­
tration, than when the Dutch wasted their energies over the
(15) The order to simplify administration as much as possible, 
especially in the Outer-Possessions is contained in 
article 26 of the Instructions to the High Government 
of the Netherlands Indies by Royal Decree of 16th May, 
1829. in Knibbe opf cit. Bronnen (Sources) p.56$ article 
1 of the Special Instructions to Governor)General van 
den Bosch by Royal Decree of 16th May, 1829. in Knibbe 
op.cit. Bronnen (Sources) pp. 59-60 forbids i.a. the 
abandonment of any part of Netherlands Indies Territory, 
while articles 13(p.63) and l6(p.64) illustrate the 
profitability motive.
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whole extent of the archipelago. While concentration of
resources was advisable for purposes of defence, the fact
that most of the Outer-Possessions proved to be a financial
burden was also of great importance, Banka and Banda (and
also Sumatra, he hoped, in the near future) were the only
profitable establishments outside Java. The whole variety
of produce suitable for the European market could be produced
on Java and Sumatra alone, and it would be advisable therefore
to cut down on military and administrative expenditure in the(16)
other islands as much as possible.
The policy of van den Bosch to concentrate on Java,
Sumatra and Banka only, while strictly abstaining from expan­
sion of control in the other possessions was finally approved
by the King in 1837, although in practice this policy had been
(17)the rule since the early thirties.
Apart from the general policy objective of profitability, 
and the fact that consequently only limited resources of man­
power and capital were made available for the development of 
the Outer—Islands, the thinking of van den Bosch in regard to
(16) Bosch J van den "Verslag mijner verricht ingen in Indie, 
gedurende de jaren 1830, 1831 $ 1832 en 1833” (Account of my actions in the Indies during the years 1830 etc.....) 
in BTLV. 1864* p.466.
(17) Somer, J.M. "De Körte Verklaring" (utrechtse Bijdragen tot 
de Geschiedenis, het Staatsrecht en de Economie van 
Nederlandsch Indie. No. 11.) Breda, Corona, 1934« PP.45-46.
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those territories was largely conditioned by two other 
important considerations. Firstly, article 14 of his instruc­
tions requested the Governor-General to investigate how far the 
system of import and export duties, adopted since 1825, had 
been effective, and he was to forward proposals for improving 
the situation if need be. In addition Van den Bosch was 
requested:
"...to give his particular attention to the means whereby 
the indigenous trade, now to a large extent shifted to 
Singapore, can again be attracted to the ports of the 
Indian Archipelago, and in that regard he shall be 
allowed to take such measures as he shall think useful, 
while taking into account the stipulations of the treaty 
of 17th March, 1824, concluded with England........... *'(16)
The second consideration was the Governor—General*s admiration 
for the policies of the Dutch East India Company, which in 
terms of the Outer-Possessions had generally meant trade relat­
ions only and the least possible political interference. Van 
den Bosch argued that:
‘‘..Everywhere where the former Company had been established 
in that way, our return is desired; only where the greed and the desire to rule of the officials of that Company 
had sidetracked her and let her strive for territorial 
possessions, did she waste her energies and exhaust her 
finances............ ........................... . . .“(19)
(18) Bi.jzondere Instructie voor den Gouverneur Generaal Van den 
Bosch, K.B. 16 Mei, 1Ö29. (Special Instructions for Govern­
or-General Van den Bosch) in Knibbe op.cit. Bronnen 
(Sources) pp.63-64.
(19) Van den Bosch to Baud. 31st, January, 1831. in Briefwiss- 
eling tussen J. van den Bosch en J.C. Baud, T529-1832 en 
1834-1836. Eerste Deel. Brieven van den Bosch. Uitgegegeven 
door J.J. Westendorp Boerma. (Utrecht. Historisch Genoot- 
schap-Werken. Derde Serie No. 80.) 1956. p.80 (Correspond­
ence between Van den Bosch and Baud.)
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Van den Bosch was convinced that it would he in the Dutch 
interest to bring the whole of the Indian archipelago as much 
as possible under Dutch influence, but he criticized the 
previous attempts made in that direction on the grounds that 
the measures taken had been haphazard and that no definite 
objectives had been projected. He hoped that during his term 
of office he would be able to construct a sound basis upon 
which Dutch authority throughout the whole of the archipelago 
could gradually be built. He argued that as the sole purpose 
of extending Dutch influence was to secure the export and 
import trade of those countries, territorial possession would 
not lead to any results, but would involve costly administr­
ations to be set up and wars to be conducted to the detriment 
of friendly relations with the people concerned. Nothing was 
more hateful to an uncivilized people than when:
”...a handful of Europeans take it on themselves to 
request money from them, and in case of non-payment, 
either out of incapability or unwillingness, to see 
them take away their own possessions........... ....’’C20)
Instead van den Bosch proposed that on all the islands where
the government had or could obtain rights it should take
control of all the important trading towns at the coasts and
establish fortified posts or small forts there. Taxation in
(20) Van den Bosch to Baud. 31st January, 1831 in n..Brief- 
wisseling.. op.cit. p.77.
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those places should not be higher than was needed to cover
the expenditure of the establishment, while a fair degree of
protection should be given to Dutch trade. If it was thought
useful, communications should be opened up with the interior,
where a fortified market place should be established, where
the population could exchange their produce for the commodities
they wanted. The people should however be left free to
dispose of their crops at the coast, if they wished to, lest
the market place should become hateful to them. Government
authority and interference in indigenous affairs should not
extend further than the range of the forts* guns, although,
when asked to, the government should mediate in internal
disputes. This, so the governor-general argued, was the only
feasible way to turn the people away from trading with
Singapore, as the commodities they wanted would be put up(21)
for sale at their doorsteps and at a lower price.
Van den Bosch during the thirties and early forties 
showed a great deal of personal interest in Sumatras
M...an island that accounts for at least 40 shiploads 
of products yearly and that can be an outlet for 
much industrial produce............................” (22)
(21) Ibid, pp.78-79.
(22) Van den Bosch to Baud. 27th August, 1831» in ”Brief- 
wisse!ing...M op.eit. p. 106.
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The actions of the new Resident of Padang, Lieutenant-
%
Colonel Elout, who took up his post on 4th March, 1831,
cannot he fully understood unless they are seen in the
perspective of the plans and thinking of van den Bosch*
Before Elout’s departure for Padang, the governor-
general had taken great pains to explain to him the general
principles of policy which were to he persued on the West-
(23)Coast of Sumatra# Dutch influence could not he properly 
established on the basis of military conquest and territorial 
possession, hut only by proving to the indigenous population 
that their own interests were closely tied up with those of 
the government# The first major task to he accomplished was 
to pacify the Padris, which he hoped could he effected by 
peaceful means after it was clearly explained to them that 
all the government was interested in was to facilitate trade, 
hut that it did not plan territorial expansion# Assuming 
that peace could he established in such a way then the next 
step would he to improve communications and to set up a 
trading post near the Padri territories# If it was found that 
the interior could easily he reached along the East-ward 
flowing rivers, then also the East-Coast of Sumatra would have
(23) Van den Bosch to Elout. 26th December, 1830# in Kiestra II, 
op.cit# pp.287-295«
to be occupied at strategic points* If however the peace 
overtures to the Padris did not have any success then 
initially all efforts should be concentrated on the protection 
of the anti-Padri districts* Prom time to time at opportune 
moments "painful blows" should be inflicted on the Padris who 
would finally have to be beaten decisively* This hov/ever 
should not be attempted before sufficient forces were avail­
able* The resident was ordered not to engage in offensive 
operations but if these were considered necessary then an 
expeditionary force from Java would be sent. The co-operation 
of the leaders in the anti-Padri districts should be cultivated 
as carefully as possible; the mistake of seeing indigenous 
institutions and philosophies through western eyes was to be 
avoided and:
"...in a word, we must act in the spirit of those 
governments in Europe, where many feudal institutions 
still continue to exist, and where the rights of the 
landlords are only interfered with in so far as 
general laws are broken..••••••••••••••••••••••«••*"(24)
Van den Bosch made it clear to the Resident that he would
personally take charge of the whole plan for Sumatra, but that
he had tried to explain his ideas for Elout’s benefit when
submitting policy proposals.
(24) Van den Bosch to Elout. 26th December, 1830, op.cit. p.291*
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Provisional instructions based on the ideas of van den
Bosch described above were issued to Elout on 14th January,
1831 and the resident was given a few hundred troops, largely
(25)recruits, as reinforcements.
Elout arrived in Padang on 5th February, 1831 and after
a survey of the situation he became very pessimistic, as his
predecessor Maclllavry had been, about the military position
of the Dutch and the authority of the government in general.
In one of his first letters to van den Bosch he complained that
if he could not get another 300 fully trained soldiers he could
not guarantee the safety of the posts in the interior nor of(26)
those on the coast.
The situation at the coastline was critical for the Dutch.
In December, 1829 the Dutch post on the small island of Pontjan
in the bay of Tapanuli had been taken by surprise by Achinese
raiders, v/ho after destroying most of the fortifications had
left again before an expeditionary force from Padang had 
(27)arrived. Early in January, 1830 the Dutch establishment at
(25) Voorlopige Instructievoor de Resident van Sumatra^ West- 
kust. 14th January, 1831. in Kielstra II, op.cit. pp.295- 
298. (Provisional instructions etc.)
(26) Elout to van den Bosch. 19th March, 1831« in Kielstra II, 
op.cit. pp.288-289.
(27) Maclllavry to Minister for Colonies. 23rd April, 1830. 
in Kielstra II, op.cit. p.276.
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Ajer Bangis had been besieged by a combined force of Achinese
and Padris from Bondjol. The post which was defended against
great odds by its tiny garrison was relieved after four days
by the armed praos of a Buginese trader from Padang, who was(28)
friendly to the Dutch government. Soon after, Natal was
closed in by the Achinese from the seaside and by the Padris
of Bondjol from the landside, but the post was relieved by a
(29)Dutch expeditionary force on 7th April, 1830. Those attacks
by the Padris of Bondjol were designed to keep open their
trading outlets and they were apparently suggested by the
(30)
Achinese.
During the period of Dutch military inaction under de
Stuers the Padris of Bondjol had steadily expanded their
influence into the Batta lands and the Northern regions of the
(31)coast, while the Dutch were watching helplessly. Bondjol was 
stirred into action against the Dutch forces by the more active 
policy of Maclllavry and Elout, the successors of the Stuers, 
who:
"....had tried hard to re-establish peace in the country, so that the population (i.e. of Bondjol) began to live 
again, as it were and started to make frequent visits to 
Padang again.••••• ........ ...... ....... ••••••••• ....”(32)
(28) Kielstra II, op.cit. p.285*
(29) Lange "..Nederlandsch Oost Indies Leger.•" op.cit. Vol. 1
P*li3*(30) According to Tuanku Imam Bondjol in Van Ronkel ".*Inland- 
sehe Getuigenissen.." op.cit. p.1107#
(31) Maclllavry to Minister for Colonies. 23rd April, 1830. in 
Kielstra II, pp.277-278.(32) "Memorie van Tuanku Imam Bondjol.." in De Stuers op.cit.
P.244.
In January, 1831 the XIII Kotas attempted an attack on
Padang, but they were repulsed by a detachment of Dutch troops
(33)and put to flight,
Narras, a coastal tov/n to the North of Priaman, and its
hinterland, the VII Kotas, which since the time of Du Puy had
been under the rule of Tuanku Nan Tjerdik had for some time
refused to recognize the supremacy of the Dutch government.
Attempts at the end of December, 1830 to subjugate Nan Tjerdik
had failed and Elout had been instructed to try to persuade
this district to come to terms in a peaceful way. If this
could not be accomplished, then he should try to gather as
much intelligence as possible about the military strength of 
(34)the area. The negotiations with Narras however were not 
successful and Elout complained repeatedly that further post­
ponement of decisive action against Nan Tjerdik and the VTI 
Kotas would produce an unfavourable effect on the rest of the 
Low-lands, Van den Bosch became eventually convinced about 
the necessity of military action in the coastal area and he 
sent an expeditionary force of 450 men to the West-Coast in 
May, 1831 for the immediate purpose of bringing Narras and 
the VII Kotas to reason. Van den Bosch instructed Elout that,
(33) kanp;e ”• .Nederlandsch Oost Indies Leger,,•” op.cit, vol, 1, 
p, 1Ö4*(34) Provisional Instructions to Elout, 14th January, 1831, in 
Kielstra II, pp, 29^-97*
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when peace and o rd e r  had been e s ta b l is h e d  a t  N a rra s , s te p s  
shou ld  be tak en  to  r e in fo rc e  th e  governm ent’ s p o s i t io n  in  
A je r Bangis and N a ta l ,  w h ile  a lso  th e  s i t u a t i o n  a t  th e  c o a s t­
l i n e  betw een Tiku and A jer B an g is , which had been re p o rte d  by
(35)
M ac lllav ry  as be ing  com plete ly  under the  in f lu e n c e  o f B ond jo l, 
should  be in v e s t ig a te d .
To van den Bosch, im pressed as he was w ith  th e  methods
o f th e  o ld  Company, only  two methods suggested  them selves to
c o n tro l  th a t  p a r t  o f the  W est-Coast ( i . e .  between Tiku and
A jer B an g is): a b lockade by th e  navy to  s to p  a l l  tr a d e  o r
what would be more e f f e c t iv e  in  te a c h in g  the  P a d r is  o f Bondjol
a le s s o n ,  to  d es tro y  th e  p o r ts  o f K atiangan  and Massang and th e
v i l l a g e s  a few hours in la n d , and to  p rev en t them from being
r e b u i l t .  Van den Bosch expected  f u r th e r  su g g e s tio n s  on the
m a tte r ,  bu t he wanted to  make i t  c l e a r  th a t  h i s :
" o b je c tiv e  would alw ays be to  m aste r th e  whole c o a s t l in e  
from th e  Southern  co rn e r  o f  Sumatra to  A chin, and to  
b lockade th e  en tra n ce  to  h o s t i l e  p o r t s ,  which we m ight 
no t be a b le  to  occupy, o r  to  d e s tro y  th o se  p o r t s * . (36)
E a rly  in  Ju n e , 1831 N arras was tak en  a f t e r  heavy f ig h t in g
and th e  V K o tta s  and V II K otas were su b seq u en tly  subdued. The
s u c c e s s fu l  m i l i ta r y  a c t io n s  in  the  Lowlands ap p a re n tly  had
f r ig h te n e d  some o f  th e  d i s t r i c t s  in  the H igh lands, and B atipu
(35) M aclllav ry  to  th e  M in is te r  f o r  C o lo n ie s . 23rd A p r i l ,  1830 
in  K ie l s t r a  I I ,  o p . c i t .  pp . 2?7-2?8~.
(36) Van den Bosch to  E lo u t . 10 th  May, 1831. in  K ie ls t r a  I I ,  
o p . c i t .  p .305 .
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subjected itself voluntarily, while Tanah Datar showed a
(37)more friendly attitude towards the government.
While van den Bosch was pleased with the military actions
so far, he stressed again that his main objective was to
subject the whole of the coast to Dutch influence, even if
this goal had to be obtained by burning and destroying
villages along an extensive part of the coastline. But any
military offensive against the Padris in the Highlands had
to be avoided because of the situation in Europe, where the
(38)Belgian revolution had broken out. Van den Bosch did not
want to weaken the military position of Java as long as the
international implications of the Belgian revolution were
not yet clear. A conflict with England was possible and the
governor-general wanted to defend Java which was of great
economic importance to the Dutch, as strongly as possible.
The uncertainty about the outcome of the Belgian question
prevented van den Bosch from taking any decisive action against
the Padris of Minangkabau till about the middle of 1832 when
it had been clear that a war between England and Holland
(39)would be very unlikely. In the meantime van den Bosch ordered
(37) Lange "..Nederlandsch Oost Indisch Leger.op.cit.
ppTt76-177.
(38) Van den Bosch to Elout. 2nd September, 1831# in. Kielstra 
II, PP.307-309.
(39) Van den Bosch to Baud. 13th May, 1832. in ’’..Brief- 
wisseling...^ op.cit. p. 143.
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that the objective to be pursued would be the consolidation
of Dutch power along the coastline and the improving of
(40)
communications with the Highlands*
The military situation in Minangkabau, however, had 
unexpectedly improved, when the military commander, Captain 
de Quay, mindful of the earlier instruction of van den Bosch 
to inflict “painful blows” to the Padris at opportune moments, 
took the formidable redoubt of the Marapalm by surprise in the 
night of 5th August, 1831* Elout who had shown himself 
opposed all along to the non-offensive policy of van den Bosch 
against the Padris, seized this opportunity to press again for 
decisive military action to be taken against the Padris of 
Minangkabau* The taking of the Marapalm had opened up the 
whole of Lintau to the Dutch and the advantage obtained should 
be followed up as quickly as possible in order to make use of 
the tremendous impression which this military feat had made on 
the whole of Minangkabau, where previously the Dutch had been 
repulsed with great losses* Before advancing into Lintau the 
other Padri districts in the rear should be brought under 
government control or at least those areas which had been under 
Dutch influence during the time of De Stuers* The question 
whether the Padris of Minangkabau should be completely annihi­
lated would depend on how much the government was willing to
(40) Van den Bosch to Elout« 2nd September, 1831* in Kielstra 
II, PP.307-309.
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spend on the West—Coast of Sumatra, which ”in regard to the 
soil is not inferior to Java#1* West—Sumatra would never be 
able to show a profit if its administration was not working 
properly and to effect this additional soldiers were needed. 
The quicker those re-inforcements came, the sooner could 
Batavia expect the residency to become self-sufficient, and 
even profitable. The first steps to be taken in that direc­
tion would be the subjection of the Northern part of the
(41)coast and the XIII Kotas near Padang.
At the end of August, 1831 the region of the XX Kotas,
including the stronghold of Sulitajer, and the region of
(42)
Talawas were again brought under Dutch control. This
consolidation process continued and in October Elout reported
(43)the occupation of Ladang Lawas and Padang Luak, in Agam.
Van den Bosch refused Elout*s demands for additional
troops to be employed in Minangkabau, but instead he sent an 
extra 300 men to Padang in order to occupy the port of Katian- 
gan, where the "smuggling” trade, which was so damaging to 
Dutch interests, was concentrated. After Katiangan had been 
occupied, attempts should be made to come to friendly terms 
with the Padris of Bondjol and then the situation in Baros
(41) Elout to van den Bosch. 1st September, 1831* in Kielstra 
II, pp.312-313.(42) Kielstra II, p.314.
(43) Elout to van den Bosch. 24th October, 1831 in Kielstra II, 
PP. 318-319.
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and Tapanuli was to be investigated. Elout was also re­
minded that a report was still expected about how the West- 
Coast of Sumatra could best be made useful to the interests 
of the government. Van den Bosch made it emphatically clear 
to Elout that 2
"••To conduct wars or to subject peoples, and to ask 
only after one has reached his goal, what to do with 
the conquests, does not fit in with our interests nor 
with our ways of thinking..........................."(44)
In order to set up a good administration and to use the avail­
able means to the best advantage, the first requirement would 
be, van den Bosch argued, to know and to obtain the benefit of 
the resources of the land. He would therefore send no more 
troops before he was properly advised about the benefits which 
could be expected from the West-Coast of Sumatra.
Katiangan, which was fiercely defended by the Padris of
(45)Bondjol fell into Dutch hands on 11th December, 1831.
Major Michiels, who left on a fact-finding mission to 
the Northern part of the coast at the end of December, 1831, 
advised on his return that the situation there was far from 
favourable. Michiels was of the opinion that the great 
efforts which had been expended on the conquest of Minangkabau 
should have been used to confirm the hold of the Dutch on the
(44) Van den Bosch to Elout. 14th October, 1831* in Kielstra II, 
P«32l.
(45) Lange "..Nederlandsch Oost Indisch Leger.•" op.cit vol. 1. 
pp.192-193.
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whole of the coastline. The pressure of the Dutch on the 
Padris of Min&ngkabau had forced the latter to direct their 
attentions to the North and the Dutch posts there (Ajer 
Bangis, Natal and Tapanoeli) had not been properly protected. 
The Dutch should re-establish themselves in Baros, which so 
far had remained undamaged and which had increased in pros­
perity through the immigration of merchants from the destroyed
(46)
regions of the South.
Elout was squarely opposed to Michiels on this issue. The 
Resident argued that if the Dutch had not tried to stop the 
Padris in Minangkabau then they would have undoubtedly pene­
trated into the coastal areas and Padang would have been in 
the same position as Michiels had found the Northern ports.
The Padris at the Northern end of the coast were hostile to 
the Dutch because of the interference to their trade with 
the Achinese. The more this trade was stopped the less would 
be the means at the disposal of the Padris to wage war against 
the government and they would be gradually forced to conduct 
their trade with Dutch controlled ports. A proof of this was 
the increased supplies of coffee and other produce to Priaman 
and the growing imports of cottons and other textiles into 
Padang. If the government tried to expel the Padris from the
(46) Michiels to van den Bosch. 15th February, 1832. in 
Kielstra II, p. 327#
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Northern ports then they would still be able to interfere
with traders from the interior coming to the Dutch-held ports
and trade therefore would be diverted to the East-Coast.
Prom a military point of view it would be better, Elout
argued, to keep considerable forces in Minangkabau in order
to drive the Padris northwards, where they would become
entangled in a war with the Achinese of Trumon, Singkel and 
(47)Tapus. This stand of Elout was in line with his continuous 
demands to van den Bosch for an extension of government con­
trol in Minangkabau, where the situation had approved apprec­
iably since the military actions of 1831* but where still much 
was left to be desired. It was necessary to have strong
garrisons in Minangkabau in order to deal quickly and effect—
(48)
ively with any trouble. Elout also submitted a report by the 
military commander of Minangkabau, Captain de Quay, on the 
military policy which he thought should be followed. De Quay 
was of the opinion that the military advantages obtained in 
1831 such as the surprise of the Marapalm would be useless if 
they were not followed up and if they were not used to rid the 
Minangkabaus once and for all from their enemies: the Padris. 
Only in this way could peace and order be established on a 
sound basis. De Quay suggested further that all the indigenous
(47) Elout to van den Bosch. 6th March, 1832. in Kielstra II, 
PP.327-329.
(48) Elout to van den Bosch. 17th December, 1831» in Kielstra 
II, PP. 330-334.
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fortifications should be demolished as soon as they had
fallen into government hands. This would prevent the Minang-
kabaus from putting up strong armed resistance against the
government after the Padris had finally been defeated,
because in the field the Minangkabaus were no match for the
Dutch whom they were only able to resist in fortified posit-
(49)ions. Maclllavry had earlier reported that a split seemed
to have occurred among the Padris and that a moderate faction
had been making headway and van den Bosch in his first
instructions to Elout had ordered the Resident to attempt to
play off the moderate faction against the other Padris and to
(50)try to obtain peace in that way. Elout reported in June, 
1832 that the disunity among the Padris had become quite 
pronounced and that the moderate faction had grown in import­
ance. It appeared therefore that the Padri reforms had not 
made a lasting impression on the population, but that:
M...nearly the whole of the population at present 
prefers to be Malay (i.e. N o n - P a d r i ) . ; 
consequently the majority is inclined towards the 
rule of the government, and the time has come in 
which we have to master the whole of the interior*
In general we have held a too high opinion of the 
strength and unity of the Padris...............•u (51)
(49) Report of De Quay. December, 1831* in Kielstra II, pp.335-3W.
(50) Van den Bosch to Elout. 26th December, 1830. in Kielstra 
II, PP. 2Ö9-290.
(51) Elout to the Minister for Colonies. 2nd June, 1832, in 
Kielstra II, pp. 342-3#
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In the meantime van den Bosch had already decided in 
March, 1832 that he was free to take up his plans for Sumatra 
again, as he had received news from the mother-country that 
the Belgian question was about to he settled* First of all 
government authority was to he firmly established in the 
Sumatran interior i.e. the area bordered to the South-East 
by Palembang, to the North by the Battalands, to the East by 
Djambi, Indragiri and Siak, and to the West by Padang, because 
that part of the island:
tf.f contained that rich and extensive country, which, 
inhabited by a more industrious people, had steadily 
provided the means for a not inconsiderable coastal 
trade and which had been the most important consumer 
of imported goods there (i.e. of the whole of Sumatra; 
tr. note.)....«................... ••••••••••••....." (32)
Van den Bosch further pointed out that while the Dutch East 
India Company had been able to restrict its activities to the 
coast from where it carried on its import and export trade 
with the interior, changed circumstances after the war forced 
the Dutch to occupy Minangkabau in order to remedy the 
unsettled conditions that were responsible for keeping prod­
uction below par and in order to prevent the Minangkabaus 
from trading with Singapore. Experience had taught, van den 
Bosch argued, that the best means for establishing sound and
(52) Van den Bosch to Elout. 20th February, 1832. in Kielstra 
II* pp. 344-348.
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durable control over an indigenous society was to exercise 
that control through the indigenous leaders themselves. He 
suggested therefore that the dynasty of Minangkabau should 
be revived, because such a prince, who would be completely 
dependent on the Dutch for his position would be a very 
malleable instrument through which to further the governments 
interests. A contract should be concluded with the prince of 
Minangkabau in which the latter was to recognize that his 
principality was a fief of the Dutch government and that it 
would be taken away from him if he did not exactly follow 
the orders and wishes of that government. Before the estab­
lishment of the dynasty, and in order to give it a greater 
degree of prestige, it was necessary to conquer the rest of 
Minangkabau and to establish the authority of the government 
there. After those areas had been conquered the authority 
of the government should first be consolidated and measures 
were to be taken to make the area profitable. Serviceable 
roads from Padang to the interior and from there to the East- 
Coast were a necessity, while another main road from North 
to South would facilitate communications with the Padang- 
East-Coast road. All the remaining trade outlets in Sumatra 
would have to be controlled in order to channel the whole of 
the island1s trade into Dutch-held ports. The productive 
capacity of the island should be increased by means of forced
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deliveries or by leaving the initiative to the population 
themselves, whichever proved to be feasible, but it should 
be kept in mind that Dutch rule was to be made as bearable 
as possible,
Elout was very enthusiastic about the proposals of van 
den Bosch, but he disagreed with the re-establishment of the 
Minangkabau dynasty, which for years had not exerted any 
influence on the population. To act through such an insig­
nificant intermediary would give the population the impression 
that the government was really weak. The governments interest
was therefore better served, according to Elout, when it ruled
(53)the Minangkabaus directly.
Even before Elout*s comments had been received van den 
Bosch had decided to go ahead and had sent reinforcements to 
Padang, which arrived there during June, Soon afterwards, 
the Dutch offensive against the Padris of Minangkabau started 
and the Padri forces crumbled against the well-directed Dutch 
attacks, Lintau was conquered by the end of July; Bondjol 
fell into Dutch hands in September; and the last resistance 
of the Padris in the L Kotas was broken at the end of October, 
The Padris of Minangkabau who had resisted Dutch pene­
tration since 1821, had finally, so it seemed, been decisively 
beaten,
(53) Elout to van den Bosch, 8th June, 1832, in Kielstra II,P73C9T“
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E lo u t w rote e n th u s ia s t i c a l ly  about th e  s i t u a t io n  in
Minangkabau and he re p o r te d  t h a t  th e  v ic to r i e s  of th e  Dutch
over th e  P a d r is  had made a trem endous im pression  in  the whole
country#  Many d i s t r i c t s  su b je c te d  them selves v o lu n ta r i ly
and th e  le a d e r s  o f a re a s  as f a r  away as th e  B a tta  coun try  o f
Angkola and Toba came to  s u b je c t them selves to  th e  government
and to  ask  i t s  p ro te c t io n  a g a in s t th e  u su rp a tio n s  o f the
P a d r is  and Achinese# The d e fe a te d  P a d r is  them selves seemed
s u rp r is e d  a t  th e  humaneness w ith  which th e  government t r e a te d
them and a t  th e  Dutch p ra is e  of t h e i r  a ttem p ts  to  s to p  the
v ic e s  o f  th e  Minangkabaus such a s  co ck fig h tin g #  Trade was
f lo u r i s h in g  and no le s s  than  70,000 p ic u ls  o f co ffee  had been
d e l iv e re d  to  Padang in  1832# Roads and f o r t s  were under
(54)
c o n s tru c tio n  in  th e  newly conquered t e r r i t o r i e s #  The r e s id e n t  
however was no t a l to g e th e r  happy about th e  m i l i ta r y  s i t u a t i o n ,  
as he was a f r a id  th a t  th e  number o f tro o p s  a v a ila b le  would n o t 
be s u f f i c i e n t  to  cope w ith  a m ajor u p r is in g  a g a in s t the  govern­
ment in  such a v a s t ly  expanded area#  He se n t C ap ta in  de Quay 
to  B a tav ia  to  e x p la in  th e  m i l i ta r y  s i t u a t i o n  to  th e  government 
p e rs o n a lly  and to  re q u e s t more tro o p s  to  keep peace and o rd e r
and to  m a in ta in  th e  a u th o r i ty  o f th e  government in  the  re c e n tly
(55)
acq u ired  p o ssessions#
(54) E lo u t to  B a ta v ia # 1 5 th  December, 1832. q u o t. 
PP. 371-372#
(55) K ie l s t r a  X I, p . 373.
K ie l s t r a  I I ,
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In the beginning of January, 1833 van den Bosch sent 
provisional instructions to Elout dealing with the administr­
ation and the military occupation of the West-Coast. It was 
repeated again that the main policy objective of the govern­
ment was to add the whole of the territory between the Sunda 
Straits and the border of Achin to its possessions. The 
administrative structure as prescribed by the instructions 
differed in certain important aspects from the administrative 
regulations of 1823 and 1825 (See pp. 98-102 and pp. 105-106.) 
European officials were invested with administrative power to 
the district level and the positions of head-regents and regents 
were to be abolished. The village heads who were to be chosen 
according to local custom, were made directly responsible to 
the European official in charge of the district. The capital 
of the residency was to be established at such a point in the 
interior that troops could reach the most distant areas of the 
Residency within four or five days marching. In order to keep 
peace and order effectively small forts with a garrison of about 
25 men should be erected in each district, while care was to 
be taken that all the indigenous fortifications would be 
abolished. No new taxes should be introduced, but the exist­
ing taxes on opium, salt, and passars (market-places) and the 
rates on imports and exports were to remain in force for the 
time being. Officials should try to abstain from interfering
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in internal affairs as much as possible, while they should
try to increase the productive capacity of the country by
means of persuasion* In general the administration should he
(56)conducted in the most simple and inoffensive manner*
There was however no opportunity to put those instructions 
of van den Bosch into practice, because by the time they had 
reached Padang the country was in full uproar*
On the first of January, 1833 intelligence was received 
at Port de Kock that two soldiers of the garrison of Bondjol 
had been killed near Pisang* Lieutenant-Colonel Vermeulen 
Krieger who with a detachment of troops had gone to Pisang to 
investigate, received a report there on 12th January, that the 
whole garrison of Bondjol had been killed by the population on 
the previous day* All the other garrisons of the Northern part 
of Minangkabau, with the exception of Port Amerongen at Rau, 
shared the same faith as that of Bondjol* The governments 
authority in Agam and L Kotas was also severely shaken, but 
Elout managed to avoid a complete military collapse by concen­
trating his troops in Agam and Tanah Datar and by reinforcing 
the posts at the coast.
The fact that the Dutch forces were spread so thinly over 
the whole of the country, e.g. the garrison of Bondjol consisted
(56) Van den Bosch to Elout, 9th January, 1833* in Kielstra II, 
pp. 374-380.
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of only 46 men, provided the Minangkabaus with the opportunity 
to stage a general rising, but its main cause was the growing 
dissatisfaction of most quarters of Minangkabau society with 
its new rulers* After the general defeat of the Padris in 1832 
Elout tried to introduce measures to ensure endurable conditions 
of peace and order, but his attempts, although well intended, 
were generally unsuccessful* The measures which Elout took in 
Bondjol are an example of the failure of his policy to create 
settled conditions after the upheaval of the Padri war* Init­
ially the resident re-established the original suku government 
in Bondjol, but when he found that Baginda Kale, the most 
prominent of the adat—chiefs, was not suitable to govern, he 
by-passed all of this chiefs twelve sons and the other 
adat-leaders, and instead appointed the former Padri leader, 
Tuanku Muda, the right-hand mad of Tuanku Imam, as regent of 
Bondjol. Elout had apparently been advised to take this step 
by Tuanku Alam of Kota Tua, whom he trusted completely, as this 
leader had succeeded several times in persuading Padri leaders 
to subject themselves to the government* Tuanku Alam managed 
to have Tuanku Imam and Tuanku Muda return to Bondjol from 
their hiding place in order to subject themselves to the 
government on the condition that their lives would be spared
(57)
(57) Kielstra E*B* “Sumatra^ Westkust van 1833-1035” in BTLV 
1889. P* 163* Note: Any further reference to this work 
will be indicated by: Kielstra III*
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and they would he allowed to keep the possessions which they
still retained. Tuanku Alam then suggested that Tuanku Mud a
should he appointed regent and Elout agreed to this. The
resident called a meeting of the population informing them that
this choice was provisional till the time when more candidates
with greater rights to the government of Bondjol would have
heen found. Tuanku Muda was to govern according to the rules
which were laid down hy the Dutch government and was not allowed
under any circumstances to re-introduce the severe measures of
(58)Tuanku Irpam of which he had heen largely the executor. This
(58) Elout "Overzicht der geheurtenissen ter Westkust van
Sumatra van 1830-1834“ (Survey of happenings at the West- coast of Sumatra between 1830-1834) quot. Kielstra III,
PP. 362-363* 
Note: Tuanku Imam in his Memoirs relates the story of the 
appointment of Tuanku Muda as follows :After Elout had called Tuanku Imam before him the resident 
told him: n,You are old now, Tuanku Imam, You should not take any more work on; it is better, that you will enjoy 
peace and quiet in your old days and leave the care of 
work to the younger people.* *1 agree*, Tuanku Imam said,
*1 will follow your advice and your wise judgement,
Colonel, and I subject myself to your wishes.• *Then you 
can*, so Colonel Elout continued, ’choose somebody from 
amongst you, who is capable of becoming your successor.* 
Thereupon Tuanku Imam replied: *1 will follow your wishes 
Colonel; because I do not know anybody who would be 
capable to succeed me than him on whom your choice will 
fall.* *If then Tuanku Imam leaves that choice to me* 
so continued Colonel Elout, ’then I would like to appoint 
Tuanku Muda as regent of the region of Alahan Pandjang, 
because is not this Tuanku Muda really the favoured of 
Tuanku Imam and has good judgement and is capable and 
courageous?’ ’I agree,* Tuanku Imam said, *1 will follow 
your advice.* Then Colonel Elout suggested to call together 
on the following morning all the penhulus and hulubalangs 
and the people of Bondjol, in order to appoint Tuanku 
Muda as regent of the region of Alahan Pandjang....••
Source: De Stuers op.cit. vol. 2. Bijlage B. p. 229.
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move obviously caused a stir among the adat-party and with 
them the larger part of the population resented the appoint­
ment of a person, who had terrorized them for so many years*
A second factor which caused a great deal of dissatisfaction 
was the rather drastic way in which Elout disposed of the many 
disputes which existed about the ownership of property between 
the Padris and their opponents who had returned from exile.
The Resident ordered that those who were in the actual poss­
ession of property at the time of the arrival of the Dutch 
forces would be considered as the legal owners* Elout had 
also ordered that prisoners of war kept as slaves should be 
released on the payment of ransom. This caused a great deal 
of trouble in regard to the Batta slaves who were pagans and 
therefore not considered by the Minangkabaus as coming under 
the provision of the adat. Elout ordered that the Batta 
slaves should be gradually released so that the people of
Bondiol would be forced to work their own ricefields and take(59)
a greater interest in agriculture generally* This measure 
also caused a great deal of dissatisfaction with the Dutch, 
because many of the Batta women who had been taken prisoners 
had been taken as second or third wives or concubines by the 
men of Bondjol and even the regent Tuanku Muda was forced to
(59) Elout "Overzicht.•*M op.cit. quot. Kielstra IIf pp.367-377*
162.
release a woman who had a child by him. The third and 
probably the most important cause for dissatisfaction with 
the Dutch was the wanton behaviour of the troops and their 
arbitrary interference with the people*s liberty and property. 
The soldiers lived in the temple and in the houses of the 
town, from which they had ejected the inhabitants, and they 
brought:
‘•dogs and all kind of dirt into the temple and the houses..*1
and the people had to contend with forced labour and deliveries
of rice without payment, while the troops appropriated the
people’s fruit, cattle and fish
’•..The severe and callous actions of the troops caused 
a general rumbling in Alahan Pandjang and brought the 
inhabitants together at a general meeting at Tandike..”(6l)
Many grievances were brought up at that meeting and it was 
deplored that instead of a peaceful and quiet administration 
which they had expected under the government of the Dutch, they 
had instead been maltreated and surpressed. It was therefore 
resolved that the people would not stand for it any longer and 
that they would revolt. Letters were sent to the other distr­
icts exhorting them to rise against the Dutch on 3rd January, (62)
1833.
(60) Government-Commissioner Van Sevenhoven to van den Bosch. 
25th December. 1833 in Kielstra III, p. 333«
(61) ’’Memorie van Tuanku Imam” in De Stuers op,cit. pp.230-231.
(62) ”Memorie van Toeankoe Imam...” in De Stuers op.cit. pp.
230-231.
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In Agam and Tanah Datar the people became dissatisfied
with the government, when on the insistence of the former
Padri leaders the Tuankus Alam and Nan Gapok it forbade the
(63)staging of cockfights, except on high feast days. Moreover, 
the name of the government was often made even more hated 
among the Minangkabaus by the unauthorised levying of taxation 
by indigenous officials who would use those levies for their 
own benefit. The regents of Bua and Tanah Datar had been 
found to levy tithes on their own account and when they were 
severely reprimanded by Elout they also became hostile to the
(64)government. The situation in Minangkabau was such that, even 
apart from the often bad behaviour of the troops and the 
inefficient civil administration which was largely conducted 
by inexperienced army officers, the hate and the jealousy 
which existed between the Padri and anti-Padri sections of 
the community had made it very difficult for the Dutch to 
introduce measures which would not offend at least one section 
of the Minangkabaus.
Soon after the rising occurred, Elout realized that he
had put too much trust in the Padri leaders, who:
"..had only in appearance subjected themselves to the 
government, but their real purpose had been to win 
time. They will not be ruled by the uncircumcised,
(i.e. the Dutch)..... ............... .•••••••••.•"(63)
(63) Kielstra II, p.370.
(64) Ibid, p. 371.
(65) Elout to De Quay. 26th February, 1633. quot. Kielstra III,
p. 166.
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Elout suspected that Sentot, the Commander of the Javanese
legion, had been in contact with the leaders of the revolution
long before it had taken place. According to the Resident,
Sentot had planned to become the ruler of Sumatra with the
help of the Dutch, whom he had promised the leaders of the(66)rising to discard after he had reached his goal. Van Sevenhoven
later was of the opinion that the Minangkabaus who hated
Sentot because of his ostentation and his grand airs had 
n (67)played on his vanity and had therefore caused his downfall.
In any case Sentot was tricked into coming to Padang from where
he was sent to Batavia to justify himself against the charges
brought by the Resident. The government was at a loss what to(68)do with the prince and eventually exiled him to Bencoolen.
Elout received information in March that the regent of Tanah 
Datar and the tuankus Alam, nan Gapok and nan Tjerdik had been 
involved in the conspiracy which had resulted in the rising 
of the previous January. Soon afterwards he had nan Tjerdik 
arrested and sent to Batavia, where he was released again, 
but forbidden to return to Sumatra. Tuanku Alam who was
captured at the end of April was on the orders of Elout to be
tried before the full assembly of the heads of Agam, but the
tuanku was found dead in his prison and his ”head was cut off
(69)and stuck on a pole”. In May the regent of Tanah Datar was
(66) Kielstra III, op.cit. p. 169*
(67) Van Sevenhoven to van den Bosch. 25th December, 1833* in 
Kielstra III, p. 355.
(68) Kielstra III, op.cit. p. 184»
(69) Ibid, p. 187.
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taken prisoner and sent to Batavia,
In May, 1833 van den Bosch decided to send an expedition
of 1100 men to Sumatra under the command of Major-General Riesz,
who was appointed Government-Commissioner for Sumatra with
supreme civil and military authority, Elout was to remain
military and civil commander of the West-Coast but he was to
take his orders from Riesz, Van den Bosch planned to come to
Sumatra himself to regulate affairs there in July or August
by which time he expected that the whole of the interior would
(70)
have been brought under control.
The expedition arrived in Padang in the latter part of
June and the Dutch soon afterwards took the offensive again,
Agam and L Kotas were brought under control once more and Riesz
ordered that all the indigenous defensive structures around
the kampongs of Agam were to be demolished within three weeks
unless those kampongs wanted to be regarded as hostile to the 
(71)
government, Elout who had already taken a tougher line in his 
dealings with the Minangkabaus and had banished a number of 
their leaders, now advised to Riesz that the only way to estab­
lish order in Minangkabau was by brute force and he persuaded 
the government Commissioner to set an example to the population
(70) Van den Bosch to Elout, 9th May, 1833» Kielstra III,
pp. 205-206,
(71) Riesz to Elout» 13th July, 1833« in Kielstra III, p. 210,
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by executing a number of Minangkabau leaders who had figured
(72)
prominently in anti-mitch activities.
Van den Bosch arrived in Padang at the end of August,
1833 and he ordered that a full scale attack on Bondjol should
take place on 16th September. The first attack on Bondjol
failed. Renewed attacks in the next few days, under the command
(73)of van den Bosch himself, were not any more successful. After 
this rather miserable debut on Sumatra soil, the Commissioner- 
General turned his attention to matters of administrative 
policy.
Soon after his arrival van den Bosch had observed that 
the population showed feelings of extreme bitterness towards 
the army and vice versa, which he believed was largely the
(74)
fault of the formers1 insensitive behaviour. When van den 
Bosch returned to Padang from his tour of the interior, he 
decided on a number of principles that would form the basis 
of a new administrative policy for the West-Coast of Sumatra.
The general hostility shown to the government, he argued, was 
clearly due to the excessive use of unpaid forced labour, too 
much interference in internal affairs, onerous taxation, and 
arbitrary executions. The proof of his allegations were to be
(72) Riesz to Elout« 22nd July, 1833« in Kielstra III, p. 212.
(73) Kielstra III, p. 225.
(74) Van den Bosch to the Minister for Colonies« 26th August, 
1833. in Kielstra III, pp. 221-222.
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found in the friendly dispositions shown to the government
by such districts as Batipu and Halaban where those incidents
(75)had not occurred, or only to a minor degree. The strong
feelings of the Minangkabau towards his freedom and his own
institutions and customs had apparently not been taken into
(76)
account sufficiently by the officials and army personnel.
The only way to restore the trust of the people in the Dutch 
government was to change the system of administration and to 
replace the existing Resident, who, although he was not to 
blame, would be connected too much in the people’s mind with 
the old practices, Elout therefore was honourably discharged 
and replaced by the Councillor of the Indies, Van Sevenhoven, 
who was appointed Government Commissioner for Sumatra in
(75) Van den Bosch seemed to ignore the motives of those 
small districts to be on friendly terms with the Dutch, 
They had become the staunchest supporters of the govern­
ment in its drive against the Padris in order to be able 
to rob and plunder the Padri-districts, The Dutch were only too careful not to offend those districts and they 
did everything possible to cultivate their friendship. 
But when the Padri war had finally ended and the oppor­
tunity to obtain spoils of war had dried up, Batipu 
revolted against the Dutch in 1841, but hardly gained any support of the rest of Minangkabau, which apparently 
had not yet forgotten what it had to suffer from that 
district during the civil war,
(76) Van den Bosch to Van Sevenhoven, 11th October, 1833. 
p. 230, Kielstra III,
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conjunction with Major-General Riesz, although the latter
would have the final say on points in dispute. Van Sevenhoven
would be assisted by Francis, the inspector for the Outer—
(77)establishments.
The new system of administration was to be based on the 
following principles:
The indigenous population should be freed from all
pressing taxation; forced labour was to be avoided as much as
possible, but if it was needed then it should be paid for. In
fact a number of taxes had already been abolished by van den
Bosch: a decree of 2nd October, abolished the tax on passars
(market places) and fixed the wage rate for forced labour at 50
cents per day. On 7th October the tax on the killing of pigs
and cattle was abolished and on the same day a tax on indigenous
businesses in Padang, which had been introduced by Elout in
(78)
the previous January, was withdrawn.
The previous system of paying indigenous officials with 
part of the tax revenue was to be abolished, but instead those 
officials were to be paid monthly salaries ranging from 25 to 
250 guilders according to their status and their capacity for 
furthering the interests of the government. The taxes on salt
(77) Resolution of van den Bosch. 11th October, 1833« Kielstra 
III, p. 230
(78) Kielstra III, pp. 228-229.
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and opium would remain as they were, but export duties were
(79)to be increased by 20^.
The autonomous rights of the population in internal
affairs should be interfered with as little as possible and
therefore the government was to refrain from appointing heads,
interfering with the indigenous judicial system and any other
internal matters* On the other hand the Dutch would retain the
right to call up villagers for military service in case of
emergency; to have access for its troops to the whole of the
country; and to build roads and fortifications* Furthermore
the government would have the right to arbitrate in internal
(80)
disputes and to forbid or prevent wars*
Production, especially of those commodities which were 
in demand on the European market, was to be encouraged by 
monetary incentives and the grower should be free to dispose 
of his products* The population should be shown the benefits 
of Dutch rule, not its burdens. It would not be difficult to 
further the interests of the government concurrently with those 
of the population, because they converged to a large degree.
The trade from the interior to the coast was of the utmost 
importance both to the government and to the Minangkabaus 
themselves, therefore anything which obstructed this trade such 
as taxation was to be abolished, while anything which would tend
(79) Resolution of van den Bosch of 11th October, 1833» .in 
Kielstra III. p* 231«
(80) Ibid. p. 232.
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to increase it, such as the building of roads, should be 
encouraged. Depots were to be erected at important centres 
in Minangkabau such as Port van der Capellen and Port de Kock, 
where a government guaranteed minimum price of 9 guilders per 
picul would be offered for coffee. This would attract a 
large proportion of the coffee crop to the government, because 
the local dealers would not be able to compete at this price 
and it would also encourage the population to increase their 
output. The Nederlandsche Handelsmaatscappij should be co­
opted in the effort to raise the productive capacity of the- 
country. The N.H.M. should be given a number of depots in 
the interior where the population could exchange their produce 
for such commodities as textiles, iron, salt and opium. The 
last two items could be supplied to the N.H.M, by the govern­
ment at fixed prices. The Company would then have to deliver 
coffee to the government in exchange at the price of 9 guilders per 
picul. In order to prevent private traders from raising the 
local price of coffee the government could manipulate the 
export duties. On the other hand private enterprise should 
not be completely killed in order to prevent the N.H.M. from 
charging exorbitant prices for commodities to the population.
This increase in production was only possible if an efficient 
transport service was set up and if roads were improved and new
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(öl)ones built of a kind that could carry carts and horses.
Van den Bosch left Padang on 15th October, 1833 and 
arrived in Batavia on 13th November, where he wrote to the 
Minister for Colonies that in Sumatra new efforts had to be 
made in order to reach the final goal, but that after a 
personal visit and investigation he :
",, was more than ever convinced that that possession 
should be considered as of the utmost importance to 
the government, and the setback experienced there in 
the execution of the planned measures must be ascribed 
to the wrong direction which has been given to the 
affairs in Sumatra. •••••••••••• ............... . *..."(82)
The Government Commissioners Riesz and van Sevenhoven
commented on the policy instructions of van den Bosch as follows:
"••••the principles, prescribed and developed therein, 
are completely different from those which formerly had 
been accepted for this coast, and which were the fruit 
rather of the illusions of the officials than of a 
thorough knowledge of people and land,•••••••••••••••"(83)
On 25th October the Commissioners issued a decree, the so-
called Plakaat-Pandjang (lit. Long Decree), which contained an
exposition of the new government policy as prescribed in the
resolution of 11th October, The decree was addressed to the
population of Minangkabau and it stressed that the government
had tried to redress those measures which were irksome to the
(61) Resolution of van den Bosch of 11th October. 1833, in 
Kielstra III, pp. 235-23&I
(82) Van den Bosch to the Minister for Colonies, 23rd November, 
1833. Quot, Kielstra III, p. 2i+9.
(83) Van Sevenhoven and Riesz to the Minister for Colonies,
11th November, 1833in Kielstra III, p. 327,
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population and those which were oppressive. The government 
was only interested in furthering the interest of the popul­
ation as well as its own interests by trying to increase trade 
and by interfering as little as possible in the internal
affairs of the country. In order that this plan should succeed
(84)the co-operation of the population was needed.
The new policy of van den Bosch however presumed that the 
whole of Minangkabau was effectively, or would soon be effect­
ively under Dutch influence. But in this the Commissioner 
General was somewhat premature, because the subsequent long war 
with Bondjol (1833-1637) drained the resources and the energy 
of the Dutch to such an extent that they were prevented from 
putting the new ideas into practice.
After the departure of van den Bosch from Sumatra it took 
practically another four years before Bondjol was finally 
captured by the Dutch. This unexpected and rather costly 
affair brought van den Bosch nearly to despair and made him 
even consider abandonning his project for Sumatra altogether. 
Probably the most important factor responsible for this long 
drawn out war was the indecisiveness of the Dutch local 
authorities, which was caused by a sharp division of opinion
(84) Plakaat Panjang (Long Decree), 25th October, 1833. in 
Kielstra III, pp. 322-326.
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as to how Bondjol and the rest of the West-Coast was to be 
pacified*
The instruction left behind by van den Bosch for the new 
military commander Colonel Bauer did not leave much doubt as 
to how the Commissioner-General wanted military affairs 
conducted. Bondjol had to be captured by force as quickly as 
possible. The new commander was ordered firstly to pay special 
attention to questions of diseiplire and training* In regard 
to tactics he was advised to use surprise attacks, because 
experience had taught that open attacks on the enemy positions 
were often unsuccessful. Matua and the XII Kotas should be 
taken as quickly as possible and then Bondjol should be 
mastered. Auxiliaries of districts which had shown themselves 
friendly towards the government such as Batipu and Halaban 
should be used and their leaders were always to be treated with 
distinction. The army however should be severely disciplined 
at all times, because the people of the districts which were 
to be conquered should have no need to add any more grievances 
to the ones which they already harboured against the govern­
ment. The population of the districts which came under 
government control after armed conquest should initially be 
required to work on the roads and to build forts and they should 
also pay the normal tribute to the Minangkabau auxiliaries.
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After that, however, no more unpaid services were to be
(85)
demanded from them.
Van Sevenhoven after he had investigated the situation 
in Minangkabau felt even more strongly than van den Bosch that 
so far the policies of the Dutch at the West-Coast had been 
clearly oblivious of the fact that instead of pacifying the 
population as intended they were creating a strong feeling 
of resistance against the government:
M...We did not even see that our actions were an un­
bearable burden; we have affected the arteries of the 
basis of the social existence of the Minangkabaus, and 
did not notice it.............. .”(86)
In regard to Bondjol he thought that the Dutch themselves
were largely responsible for the rising of January, 1833
because of their senseless actions. The people of Bondjol
were right, in their view, to throw the oppressors out of their
country. And although the Bondjollers were usually seen by
the Dutch as traitors and murderers who should be punished,
he could not see why:
"•••we have the vocation to punish the nations for the 
wrongs which they, (only) according to our views, 
committed........ ............... ..•••••••••••.....”(87 )
(85) Instruction of van den Bosch to Bauer, 13th October, 1833 
in Kielstra III, pp. 244-24*/•
(86) Van Sevenhoven to van den Bosch. 25th December, 1833« 
p. 328 Kielstra III.
(87) Van Sevenhoven to van den Bosch, 25th December, 1833 in 
Kielstra III, p. 33U«
175.
Van Sevenhoven therefore was of the opinion that attempts 
should be made to conclude peace with Bondjol and with the 
other hostile districts and he would bend all efforts in that 
direction. Van Sevenhoven however was not given a great deal 
of time to put his plans into effect, because soon afterwards 
he was replaced by his assistant Francis, who was appointed 
Resident of the West-Coast.
In a lengthy report Van Sevenhoven reiterated his opinions 
as to what policy should be followed on the West-Coast of Sumatra. 
He pointed out that the decision to go ahead with the conquest 
of Bondjol and the other hostile districts would mean that the 
new policy of administration would suffer a great deal, because 
the request for auxiliaries, victuals and coolie labour would 
undoubtedly cause a great deal of dissatisfaction. Furthermore 
any defeat suffered by the government troops on the West-Coast 
would endanger again the safety of the whole government terri­
tory. And defeat was not out of the question, because it could 
be expected that Bondjol and the other northern regions would
put up fierce resistance, especially as the long drawn out war(88)
had taught them a great deal about the European military arts.
Van Sevenhoven*s successor Francis had very 
similar ideas in regard to the policy to be followed on the 
West-Coast and although it was established from the instructions
(88) Report of van Sevenhoven. 17th April, 1834. .in Kielstra III, 
PP. 345-350.
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left by van den Bosch, who in the meantime had left for
Holland, that Bondjol and the surrounding districts were to be
taken by force, Francis disagreed with this procedure and
(89)Governor-General Baud decided on a compromise. The orders of
van den Bosch would be changed to the extent that no attack on
Bondjol would take place till all the requirements needed for
such an assault were available. The Resident in the meantime
would continue to try to bring those districts to terms by 
(90)
negotiation.
Despite this decision the military commander, Lieutenant- 
Colonel Bauer, started a military offensive in June, 1834 
against the Padri districts to the North of Agam. Francis 
however had received reports that those districts were willing 
to co-operate with the government, although the position of 
Bondjol was still uncertain. In any case the Resident had 
specifically forbidden the military commander to start a military 
offensive, because it would endanger the life of the negotiators
(89) Baud J C; born at The Hague, 1789; arrived in the Indies 
I811; secretary of General Janssens; employed by British 
administration, 1811-1816; secretary of Commissioners— 
General and Governor-General van der Capellen; returned 
to Holland in 1821; member of the foundation commission 
of the N.H.M.; secretary Department of Colonies, 1824- 
1832; on special mission to the Indies, 1832; Governor- 
General ad interim, 1833-1036; Staatsraad (State Concillor), 
1836; member of Raad van State (Advisory Council), 1838; 
Minister for Colonies, 1840-1848; member of the Tweede 
Kamer, 1850-1858.
(90) Decision of Governor-General Baud. 2nd May, 1834« in 
Kielstra III. p. 355.
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and  i t  w ould a l s o  b r in g  th e  i n t e n t i o n s  o f th e  governm ent
u n d e r  s u s p ic i o n .  The R e s id e n t  p o in te d  o u t t h a t  th e  i n s e n s i b l e
a c t i o n s  o f  B au er had  g r e a t l y  damaged th e  t r u s t  o f  th e  M inang-
k a b a u s  i n  th e  governm ent and th e  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  th e  p e o p le
w ould grow c o n s id e r a b ly ,  b e c a u se  th e  w hole c o u n try  had  to  be
p u t  on a w ar f o o t in g  a g a in  w ith  th e  c o n se q u e n t b u rd e n s  o f
t r o o p  d e l i v e r i e s ,  f o r c e d  la b o u r  f o r  t r a n s p o r t ,  and th e  c o n s t r u e —
(9 1 )
t i o n  o f  ro a d s  and f o r t s .
B au er j u s t i f i e d  h i s  a c t i o n s  by p o in t in g  to  th e  i n s t r u c t i o n s
o f  van  den  B osch and th e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  r e l i e v i n g  th e  p r e s s u r e
e x e r t e d  by th e  P a d r i s  on th e  D u tch  f o r c e s  to  th e  N o rth  o f  B ond-
(9 2 )
j o l ,  fro m  w here he had  r e c e iv e d  u r g e n t  r e q u e s t s  f o r  h e lp .
The m i l i t a r y  o f f e n s iv e  o f  B au er c a u se d  a d i s p u t e  a b o u t 
j u r i s d i c t i o n  and b o th  F r a n c i s  and B au er had  w r i t t e n  to  B a ta v ia  
and The H ague, w here van  den B osch was now m in i s t e r  f o r  C o lo n ie s ,  
and t r i e d  to  r u l e  th e  a f f a i r s  o f  S u m atra  from  a f a r ,  b u t  w i th  no 
l e s s  e n th u s ia s m . As a r e s u l t  o f  h i s  u n a u th o r iz e d  a c t io n s  B au er 
was s e v e r e ly  rep rim an d e d  by G o v e rn o r-G e n e ra l Baud and a l th o u g h  
van den  B osch a g re e d  w ith  B a u d 's  a c t i o n  he was v e ry  much opposed  
to  th e  p o l ic y  p u rsu e d  by F r a n c i s .  The m i n i s t e r  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  
th e  a t te m p ts  by v a r io u s  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  o f f i c i a l s  on th e  W e s t-  
C o ast to  i n t e r p r e t  h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n s  to  B au er a s  n o t n e c e s s a r i l y
(9 1 )  F r a n c i s  to  B aud . 3 0 th  J u n e ,  1 8 3 4 . i n  K i e l s t r a  I I I ,  p p .3 7 0 -7 1 .
(9 2 )  K i e l s t r a  I I I ,  p .  3 6 3 .
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meaning aggression, had been:
’’..only a pretext in order to drive through their 
opinions about the way matters should be handled 
there, instead of strictly obeying orders. That 
Colonel Bauer should not have attacked without 
the permission of the resident is perfectly true; 
but the latter was also not allowed to protract 
the attack when everything was favourable to it...” (93)
Van den Bosch was not convinced at all that the Northern districts
could be brought under control by peaceful means, because he
believed that the Padris were only playing for time.
Peace negotiations with Tuanku Imam in October, 1834 had
come to nothing because, Bauer believed, the war party in Bond—
jol was still too strong in Bondjol for the Tuanku to cope with.
Subsequently the military commander against the will of Francis
pressed on with his campaign and tried to isolate Bondrjol as
(94)much as possible. The Resident however predicted that the
resources available were not sufficient to take Bondjol by
storm and he was of the opinion that the Padri stronghold would
(95)eventually give up if the blockade was kept up. Bauer in any 
case was forced by the approaching wet season to postpone his 
attack on Bondjol till the following year.
While in the first few months the preparations for the 
final assault on Bondjol continued, Francis went on to try to 
end the war by peaceful means. But by April the Resident had to
(93) Van den Bosch to Baud. 16th February, 1835. in Kielstra III.
P. 377. —
(94) Bauer to Elout, 7th October. 1834. in Kielstra III. 00.472-5737"  ”
(95) Francis to Baud. 12th December, 1834* in Kielstra III,p.475
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admit that the successful completion of the negotiations was
very doubtful and that to postpone the attack on Bondjol any
(96)
longer would serve no purpose.
Bauer commenced his operations again on 21st April,1835 
and by June he had succeeded in surrounding the Padri fortress. 
This siege however, would last for more than two years. The 
Dutch forces were too weak to take Bondjol by storm and the 
effectiveness of the army and its morale was gradually weakened 
by the long wait and the recurrent fevers and diseases. By the 
end of 1835 Bauer was inclined to try negotiations again but 
now Francis was opposed to them because he feared that the dis­
couragement of the troops, both European and indigenous, would 
become even greater. A decisive victory was sorely needed 
because the length of the war was causing a great deal of diss­
atisfaction among the rest of the Minangkabaus.
In November, 1835 the Batavian government decided to send 
Lieutenant Steinmetz to the West-Coast to compile a report on 
the actual situation in order to enable the government to take 
proper action to end hostilities. Steinmetz arrived in Padang 
on 8th January, 1836 and reported that the situation was bad, 
but not altogether hopeless. The force before Bondjol which 
consisted of only 1300 hundred regulars and 1500 hundred
(96) Francis to Bauer. 10th April, 1835. in Kielstra III, pp.
464- 405.
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auxiliaries with a few pieces of ineffective artillery, was
clearly insufficient to take Bondjol, and it was not even
capable of conducting an effective siege, especially as disease
and demoralization among the troops was high and even the
commander, Colonel Bauer, was repeatedly incapacitated by 
(97)
sickness. The conclusion of Steinmetz that the Dutch forces
were not able to close off Bondjol properly from the rest of
Sumatra ties in with the reason given by Tuanku Imam in his
memoir why he was able to keep the Dutch at bay for such a long 
(98)
time. Steinmetz continues his report by pointing out that for 
the Dutch troops to withdraw through such mountainous country 
would be murderous, especially as so many sick had to be 
carried. Furthermore the Minangkabaus in general seemed to be 
very dissatisfied with the situation and they appeared only to 
wait for the first major Dutch defeat in order to rise again 
against the government. Therefore there was no solution other 
than to destroy Bondjol but in order to do that considerable
(97) Report of Steinmetz 1836. in Kielstra E.B. ’’Sumatra’s 
Westkust van 1830-1840" in BTLV. 1890. pp. 128-137. Note; 
Further references to this source will be indicated by: 
Kielstra IV.
(98) Tuanku Imam relates:
"..the heads and the hulubalangs of the surrounding 
district of Agam and other districts, which had been 
conquered by the Dutch troops, sent letters from all 
sides to Tuanku Imam, in order to encourage him and 
to press him not to give up, while they came to his 
aid with people, powder and lead, which enabled him 
to resist so strongly.
Source: De Stuers op.cit. p. 236.
181*
reinforcements of troops and better and heavier artillery 
was needed.
The government in Batavia acted quickly on this advice and
in February, 1836 it sent Major General Cleerens with strong
reinforcements to Padang. Cleerens was told by Francis that a
quick victory was sorely needed because of the threat of a
general rising in the rest of Minangkabau, but Bauer was of the
opinion that negotiations should be continued because of the
deteriorated state of the army. Cleerens agreed with Bauer
that peace should be made with Bondjol in order to avoid a
(99)general military collapse.
Francis, rather against his will, effected an armistice, 
but the following negotiations were very protracted owing to 
the dissension within Bondjol about the peace proposals suggested 
by the Resident. Both the Resident and the military leaders 
seemed to think that Tuanku Imam was willing to conclude peace 
but that he was held back from doing so by the warlike sections 
of the Bondjol community. Cleerens wrote at the end of May,
1836:
”•..Daily I am becoming more confident about the negotia­
tions; the raprochement between the soldiers and the 
Padris of Bondjol is growing every day. I am of the 
opinion that the fortifications on the mountain of Bond- 
jol cannot be taken by force, and everybody else shares that feeling.................................... ....."(100)
(99) Cleerens to Bauer. 28th April. 1836. in Kielstra IV. pp. 
150-151.(100) Cleerens to Cochius. 26th May, 1836. in Kielstra IV pp.
154-55.
182.
Cleerens* hope for a peaceful settlement was rudely shattered 
when the Padris resumed hostilities at the beginning of June, 
1836. The Dutch were now forced to act offensively, but it 
was not until December that after long preparation Cleerens
attempted to take Bondjol by assault. The attack hov/ever was(101)
a complete failure.
The government now sent General Cochius, Commander in Chief,
to Sumatra in order to investigate the situation and to report
on what action was to be taken. Cochius suggested that Major-
General Cleerens should be replaced in his command by an
officer who was less hesitant, but who was well versed in Indian
warfare and who had the capacity of infusing his troops with(102)
confidence and courage.
At the end of May, 1837 Batavia decided to replace Cleerens
with Lieutenant-Colonel Michiels who was considered to have the
required qualities, but had also shown himself to be very self-
opiniated. Cochius therefore was requested to remain in Sumatra
till he was sure that Michiels could be entrusted with the 
(103) task.
Colonel Michiels took over the command of the army before 
Bondjol on 6th August, 1837 and he managed to capture this 
Padri redoubt by 16th August.
(101) Kielstra IV., p. 160.
(102; Cochius to the Governor-General. 8th May, 1837* in Kielstra 
IV. pp.. 171-172.
(103) Governor—General De Kerens to Cochius. 31st May, 1837* in 
Kielstra IV. pp. 172-173.
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Tuanku Imam had fled but on 28th October, 1837 he gave
himself up to the Dutch who sent him into exile, first to Java
and later to Ambon* He was transferred from there to Menado
(104)in 1841 where he died on 6th November, 1854.
After the fall of Bondjol the next military operation 
which the Dutch conducted was directed against the XIII Kotas, 
near Padang. Michiels had drawn a cordon of troops around this 
district and opened up negotiations with its leaders in order to 
effect a peaceful subjection. On 10th January, 1838 an agree­
ment was reached with the Radja Bandara of Solok and Datu 
Sutan of Selaju to the effect that if they had not succeeded 
in persuading their people to subject themselves by the 26th 
of the month the Dutch would take up arms. The people of the 
XIII Kotas did not agree to this and the Dutch, aided by aux­
iliary troops from Batipu, Halaban, Tandjong Alam and Agam, 
invaded the district which after sporadic fighting fell into 
government hands at the end of February. The adjoining district
(105)of IX Kotas then also subjected itself to the government.
The most important military activities at the end of 1837 
and during 1838 were concentrated in the Northern districts, 
where the Dutch were trying to eliminate the last of the Padris
(104) Kielstra IV. pp. 176-177.
(105) Michiels to Batavia. 12th February, 1839. in Kielstra IV. 
pp. 259-270.
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who under the leadership of Tuanku Tambusi ruled over an 
extensive area largely populated by Battas. In November,
1837, van Beethoven, the officer in command of the Northern 
district occupied Pertibi, Kota Pinang and Padang Lawas. By 
March, 1838 Tuanku Tambusi had been pushed back within his own 
area and the Dutch troops were only five marching days from his 
main stronghold there: Dalu-Dalu. Owing mainly to the lack of 
sufficient forces it was December, 1838 before the Dutch 
captured Dalu-Dalu, the last stronghold of the Padris in 
Sumatra. The main purpose of the operations against Tuanku 
Tambusi had been, according to Michiels, to :
’’..free the Battas from the suppression of the Padris and 
thus.....to secure the aid of a people, whose allegiance 
was guaranteed both by self interest and thankfulness.”(106)
Michiels received intelligence in December, 1838 that
Tuanku Tambusi had instigated the head of Panei on the East-
Coast to make a diversionary movement at the rear of the Dutch
forces and that the head of Kota Pinang who did not want to
co-operate in this move had been murdered. A detachment of
infantry which was sent towards Kota Pinang went further than
originally intended and set up a post at the confluence of the
Panei and Bila rivers. Michiels also reported that in the
beginning of 1838 relations had been established with the
people of Mintareh, V Kotas, Kampar nan Sembilan, and VI Kotas
(106) Michiels to Merkus. 12th December, 1839» in Kielstra IV.
PP. 273-74.
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Panghalan Kota Baru, which were subsequently situated from
North to South alongside the Dutch held territories of Lunder,
Lubu Sikaping and L Kotas. Michiels thought that this would
probably bring the sultan of Siak, the most powerful nation at
the East-Coast, within the Dutch camp, because the districts
which were government controlled accounted for most of Siak*s 
(107) 
trade.
Soon after the fall of Bondjol the heads of Baros, a port 
at the Northern end of the West-Coast, had requested Resident 
Francis under the terms of treaties made with the former Dutch 
East India Company for help against the Achinese who were 
pressing Southwards. The occupation of Baros however had to 
wait till Tuanku Tambusi had finally been defeated. In the 
meantime a few men-of-war went to Baros and surrounding ports 
in order to show the flag. Finally in April, 1839 Michiels had 
enough troops available to occupy this port. The Dutch occupa­
tion of Baros caused a stir among the Achinese of the seatowns 
of Tapus and Singkel and the commander at Baros reported that 
the Achinese were taking on a threatening attitude, Michiels 
decided to bring the ports of Tapus and Singkel into submission 
by a naval blockade, but his measure was apparently not effect­
ive nor did negotiations with the Radja of Singkel have any
(107) Michiels to Merkus, 12th December, 1839* in Kielstra IV. 
P. 272.
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tangible results. On the 10th October, 1839 the Achinese 
attacked Baros in force but the assault was repulsed. The 
Dutch however did not want to attack the Achinese ports till 
they had sufficient troops and armaments available. On 9th 
April, 1840 Michiels started the offensive and by 13th April, 
Tapus was occupied, while Sinkel fell into Dutch hands on 23th 
May. The goal set by van den Bosch to bring the coastline of 
Sumatra from the Southern point to Singkel had been reached, 
while in the interior the government was in control of Minang- 
kabau, the Southern Battalands, and had extended its influence 
as far as the East-Coast.
After a period of seventeen years of practically continuous 
warfare the Dutch had finally managed to extend their influence 
over an extensive part of the Western Coastline of Sumatra and 
the interior. Dutch authority in this area however was largely 
nominal, based as it was on conquest and subsequent military 
occupation. The anti-Padri sections of the community had so far 
stood behind the government and had aided it with troops, labour 
and food supplies, albeit with ever growing unwillingness, 
especially during the long fight with Bondjol. With the fall 
of Bondjol and the subsequent final defeat of the Padris the 
bond which tied the anti-Padri population to the Dutch was 
broken. The fear of the return of the ruthless Padris had 
shackled many of the Minangkabaus to the Dutch cause, but now 
those same allies had become actual or potential enemies of
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the government. Already as early as 1824, Nahuys had pointed 
at the possibility of such a development when he quoted a 
Minangkabau leader as having said:
"•••if only we had peace with the Padris of Lintau 
(then) we would have no need here of the Orang 
Hollands (Netherlanders) ••••••••••••.... .”(108)
The continuous warfare with Bondjol had prevented the
execution of most of the policy decisions which van den Bosch
had made in 1833, but soon after this formidable Padri fortress
had been conquered, attempts were made to put the administration
of the West-Coast on a more solid footing, taking the plans and
decisions of van den Bosch as a basis.
(109)
On 29th November, 1837 Colonel Michiels was appointed
governor of the West-Coast of Sumatra and the Resident Francis
was honourably discharged. The governor was invested with the
highest civil and military power and the area under his command
was divided into two residencies: Padang, which included Minang-(110)
kabau; and Ajer Bangis, which included the Batta lands. This 
administrative change was largely the result of representations
(108) Nahuys ”..Brieven...11 op.cit. p. 147.
(109) Michiels Andreas Victor, (1797-1849); 2nd Lieutenant in 
Napoleon’s army, 1814; went to the Indies in 1816; prom­
oted to captain, 1818; major, 1828; lieutenant-colonel, 
1832; colonel and governor of the West-Coast of Sumatra, 
1837-1849; killed in action in Bali, 1849*
(110) Resolution of the Governor-General in Council. 29th 
November, 1837. in Kielstra IV. p. 193*
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made by the Government-Commissioner, General Cochius, who 
had pointed out that the area under the governments control 
was too large to be handled effectively by the one Resident.
The prescribed policy of economic development and non-inter­
ference in internal affairs, as laid down by van den Bosch in 
1833» would take a great deal of supervision from above, which 
the Resident could not be expected to give, as he was tied up 
too much with administrative affairs in the capital Padang. 
Cochius had further argued that both the highest civil and 
military authority should be vested in the one person, in order 
to avoid the recurrence of clashes of opinion such as had 
occurred between Bauer and Francis, which had been so detri-du)
mental to the Dutch cause.
It was explained in a set of instructions to administrative 
officials that the major policy objective would be to make the 
Dutch government the most respected body in the countryf 
surpassing the indigenous leaders in trustworthiness, wisdom 
and power. This process would be facilitated if care was 
taken to treat indigenous institutions and customs with the 
highest esteem. Another point to be kept in mind was that the 
existing disunity among the Minangkabaus in religious matters,
(111) Cochius to De Eerens. 20th October, 1837« in Kielstra IV. 
pp. 181-189.
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caused by the rise of the Padri movement, should be left as 
it was, because such a situation was of political advantage to 
the government. Co-operation with the indigenous population 
was of the greatest importance but interference should be guard­
ed against. Administrative officials were urged to learn more 
about indigenous languages and customs, which would help them 
in their attempts to explain to the population the rationale 
of government policy and which would also avoid misunderstanding 
that could so easily lead to unnecessary friction and trouble.
In case of open conflict with the government, local authorities 
were empowered to act on their own initiative, without first 
contacting their superior officers, If such action was taken 
then it would have to be effective, because experience had
shown that a single defeat could be more damaging to the govern-(112)
ment*s cause than inaction while awaiting reinforcements.
In the instructions to the governor it was emphasized that 
the objectives which van den Bosch had stipulated in 1833 were 
to be continuously striven for. As Bondjol had been conquered, 
a feat that had created a great deal of respect for the govern­
ment through the whole of the country, and as a large army was 
still in the field, the situation appeared favourable for the
(112) Instructions for Officers and Officials at the West-
Coast of Sumatra• Resolution of Batavian Government.
29th November, 1837« in Kielstra IV. pp. 195~8«
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attainment of those objectives. But, first of all the 
available military forces were to be used to consolidate the 
power of the government in those territories which had already 
been conquered in order that some benefit from those possess­
ions in the form of increased agricultural exoort would accrue
(113)
to the government.
In December, 1837 General Cochius had submitted proposals
for the military establishment to be kept on the West-Coast,
while also keeping in mind the plans of van den Bosch for the
extension of Dutch control over the whole of Sumatra with the
exception of Achin. The removal of the Padri threat, which
made the whole of the Minangkabau population a potential enemy
of the government necessitated the placing of strong garrisons
in Minangkabau, while with Bondjol out of the way the opportunity
should be taken to expand into the Northern areas where the
Battas were apparently willing to become subjects of the govern-
(114)raent. The general estimated the number of troops needed on
(115)
the West-Coast at 5239, excluding those required for Bencoolen.
Colonel Michiels was in full agreement with the proposals 
of Cochius and stressed that the opportunity should be taken
(113) Resolution of the Batavian government. 11th January, 1838. 
in Kielstra IV. pp. 198-200.
(114) Cochius to the Governor-General. 9th December, 1837* in 
Kielstra IV. pp. 209-220.
(115) Lange ’’..Nederlandsch Oost Indiesch Leger...’1 
vol. II. p. 299*
op.cit.
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to bring the whole coastline as far as Sinkel under Dutch
control, but he would need extra troops in addition to those
requested by Cochius in order to carry out such a campaign(116)
with success. Steinmetz, head of the civil administration
of Minangkabau, was also of the opinion that the fall of
Bondjol had exerted a favourable effect; the opportunity should
be taken to execute the plans for expansion, especially as so
many Sumatran nations of the Eastern side of the island were
sending emissaries to establish relations with the Dutch 
(117)
government.
Although governor-general De Eerens was in general agree­
ment with the proposals of Cochius, he referred the final 
decision to the Hague, especially as the cost of the proposed 
military establishment was high. At an estimated two million 
guilders per year it formed a quarter of the total military 
budget approved by the King. The governor-general informed 
the home government that he had authorized the Military Depart­
ment in Batavia to work for the time being on the basis of
(116)Cochius* proposals.
The Hague however was not very impressed with the rather 
expensive proposals and the King on the advice of van den Bosch
(116) Ibid. Despatch of Michiels. 5th December, 1837« PP.302-303•
(117) Steinmetz to the Governor-General. 15th April, 1838. in 
Kielstra IV. p. 266.
(118) Kielstra IV. p. 285.
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a p p ro v e d  th e  a p p o in tm en t o f  P . M erkus (1 1 9 ) a s  G overnm ent 
C om m issioner f o r  S u m a tra , w hose t a s k  i t  w ould be  t o  d e v is e  a 
c i v i l  and  m i l i t a r y  o r g a n i s a t i o n  f o r  S u m a tra , more i n  l i n e  w ith  
th e  th in k in g  o f  th e  H igh G overnm en t, e s p e c i a l l y  t h a t  o f  van  den 
B o sc h , who in  a lo n g  and d e t a i l e d  memorandum to  th e  g o v e rn o r -  
g e n e r a l  e x p la in e d  h i s  id e a s  a s  to  how th e  a f f a i r s  o f  S um atra  
w ere to  be  h a n d le d  i n  f u t u r e .  Van d en  B osch c r i t i c i z e d  th e  
p ro p o se d  o r g a n iz a t io n  on th e  g ro u n d s  t h a t  th e  p r o p o s a ls  w ere 
a p p a r e n t ly  made w ith o u t  c o n s id e r in g  th e  a c t u a l  o b j e c t iv e  w hich  
th e  governm en t had  i n  m ind i n  r e g a rd  t o  S u m a tra . I t  was im poss­
i b l e  to  s u b j e c t  and s u b s e q u e n t ly  occupy th e  w hole i s l a n d  by 
f o r c e .  The e s ta b l is h m e n t  o f  D u tch  a u t h o r i t y  c o u ld  o n ly  be 
b a se d  on  a p o l ic y  o f  c o - o p e r a t io n  w ith  th e  in d ig e n o u s  p o p u la t io n  
and c o n s id e r a t i o n  t o  i t s  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and c u s to m s . A u th o r i ty  
w ould be  d u ra b le  and w e ll  e s t a b l i s h e d  o n ly  when th e  S um atrans 
f i n a l l y  r e a l i z e d  t h a t  th e y  w ere b e t t e r  o f f  u n d e r  th e  c o n d i t io n s  
o f  p r o t e c t i o n  and o f  p e ac e  and o r d e r  g r a n te d  by th e  g o v e rn m en t.
(1 1 9 ) M erkus. P i e t e r ;  b o rn  a t  N a a rd e n , 1787 ; s tu d ie d  law  a t
L e id e n ; w ent to  th e  I n d i e s  i n  1815 w here he h e ld  a num ber 
o f  im p o r ta n t  a d m i n i s t r a t iv e  p o s t s ;  g o v e rn o r  o f  th e  M o lu ccas , 
1 8 2 2 -1 8 2 7 ; P r e s id e n t  o f  th e  H igh C o u r t ,  1828 ; Member o f  
th e  Raad van  I n d ie  (C o u n c il  o f  th e  I n d i e s ) ,  1829; r e tu r n e d  
to  H o lla n d  I 8 3 6 , w here ow ing to  h i s  l i b e r a l  id e a s  he came 
i n  c o n f l i c t  w i th  van  den  B osch  and was p e n s io n e d  o f f ;  
r e i n s t a t e d  t o  h i s  p re v io u s  p o s i t i o n  i n  1838 and r e tu r n e d  
to  th e  I n d i e s  i n  1839 ; governm en t co m m issio n e r f o r  S u m a tra , 
1839 ; v i c e - p r e s i d e n t  o f  th e  Raad van  I n d i e ,  1840 ; a c t in g  
g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l ,  1 8 4 1 ; g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l ,  1 8 4 2 ; d ie d  a t  
S u ra b a y a , 1844 .
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If that policy objective had been kept in mind then it would 
have seemed obvious that military force was hardly necessary 
nor that such a large administrative staff would have been 
needed. The main task of the administration was to keep intact 
the indigenous institutions and the friendly relations with 
the population, while interfering as little as possible in the 
internal affairs of the country. Van den Bosch agreed that 
financial sacrifices had to be made in order to subject 
Sumatra to government control, but he was opposed to accepting 
the submitted proposals unless it could be proved that there 
was no other way of reaching the desired objective, which was 
to make the productive capacity of Sumatra serviceable to the 
Dutch. The Cochius submission, van den Bosch,complained, also 
failed to show how the money was to be found for such an 
expensive organization. It would seem that the expenditure 
required would absorb a large part of the profit made in Java 
for a considerable time to come. It would be very unwise to 
try to reach the projected goal of increased production and 
trade by force because the Sumatrans themselves had their own 
industries and they liked to trade and they v/ere furthermore 
very attached to their freedom and their own way of life as 
regulated by the adat. Unfortunately too many officials, 
especially military officers, were unable to see that the 
administrative policies followed in Java were not suitable in
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Sumatra, where circumstances and the indigenous background 
were so different. In Sumatra the Dutch should only interfere 
when the state of peace and order was interrupted by internal 
dissension or by open resistance against the government. In 
the areas which had already been subjected the following 
principles of administration were to be adhered to:
The indigenous leaders should be united with the government 
cause. Any measure which would diminish the prestige and 
standing of the indigenous leaders were to be avoided. The 
alliance of the population to their leaders was not to be used 
under any circumstances to introduce taxation or compulsory 
labour services, because a head who v/as willing to co-operate 
in those matters with the government would lose his influence 
among his people. The indigenous leaders were to be paid 
regular salaries the cost of which was to be met from the 
income of import and export duties and not from direct taxes 
on the indigenous population.
The sole advantage then which the Dutch could expect from 
Sumatra was a greater share of that island*s trade, while on 
the other hand they should try to increase that trade as much 
as possible. This would not be difficult, considering that the 
Sumatrans were industrious and carried on a considerable trade 
on their own account. Production and trade would increase when 
communications were improved and Dutch traders moved into the 
interior to establish trading posts there and to introduce the
195.
population to European manufactures*
In regard to the territories which were not yet under 
Dutch control van den Bosch laid down the following rules 
which were to be observed when expansion into those areas 
was planned: firstly, the construction of roads leading to 
those districts was a pre-requisite for any further move* The 
coastal area should be occupied first, where the policy of 
non-interference and economic development should be strictly 
adhered to, and where indigenous fortifications were to be 
demolished. The next step would be to contact, with the help 
of the indigenous leaders of the coastal area, the people of 
the interior districts, who van den Bosch thought, would be 
sensible enough to co-operate with the government when they 
had witnessed the prosperity of the coastal district growing 
under the rule of the Dutch.
Van den Bosch was convinced that such a policy if strictly 
adhered to could not produce any friction nor dissatisfaction as 
neither the political liberties nor the economic prosperity 
of the inhabitants was adversely affected but instead would 
be greatly improved. He agreed however that such a state of 
affairs could not be expected to come about straight away 
and for the time being extraordinary means would have to be 
employed. In peace time the following policy was to be 
adopted: the strength of the military establishment would be
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as large as Sumatra itself could pay for, while as a last 
resort and in times of great necessity a temporary loan could 
he raised on expected revenue. In case of war milita
expenditure would have to he supplemented from Java.
Those principles and ideas of van den Bosch were incor­
porated in the instructions given to the newly appointed 
Government-Commissioner for Sumatra, Merkus, who arrived in
Padang in July, 1839«
While Merkus was ordered to adhere to the principle of
least possible interference, as laid down by van den Bosch, he
realized that the European government had to make some contact
with indigenous society if it wanted to reach its objectives.
One of the main objectives of the Dutch was the maintenance of
peace and order, which was a pre-requisite to the real interest
of the government in Minangkabau: the advancement of production
and trade. The indigenous political situation, as Merkus saw
it, was still very unsettled and explosive. The Minangkabaus
were by nature quarrelsome and small disputes, which were ever
recurrent, could and often did develop into more serious
trouble* In addition the Padri war, which only recently had
Tl20) Memorandum of van den Bosch to Governor-General de
Eerens, 29th December, 1838: The Introduction of this 
memorandum is printed in Kielstra IV, pp. 285-289« and 
the remainder is to be found in the Ti.idschrift voor 
Nederlandsch Indie. 1867, I, pp« 387-UÖ7«
(121) Instructions to Merkus. 29th December, 1838. XU Tijds- 
chrift voor Nederlands Indie, 1867»I PP. 408-414«
(12
(121)
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been decisively concluded, had left in its wake many points 
of dispute of a political and socio-economic nature. The 
introduction of a centralizing and a stabilizing force was 
highly necessary. Previous attempts to introduce an indirect 
system of government as existed in Java where a number of 
regents, who were directly responsible to the Dutch government, 
stood at the head of an indigenous administrative system, had 
ended in failure. The first regent of Tanah Datar, who was a 
member of the old Minangkabau dynasty, had been removed from 
his office because of inefficiency and treason, while in Agam 
and L Kotas the appointed regents commanded far less prestige 
among the people than the traditional suku-heads. Even in 
Batipu the regent, who had enriched his people such a great 
deal with the spoils of war from the anti-Padri districts 
during the Padri war, appeared to have difficulties in keeping 
his territory under control. The introduction of a more central­
ized indigenous administration, as the Padris had attempted 
and which had caused such a great deal of fierce opposition 
from the adat-eonscious Minangkabaus, was still very impolitic. 
The place taken in Java by the indigenous officials (regents) 
should in Minangkabau be occupied by the Dutch themselves.
Those European officials would have as their main task to 
become acquainted with the numerous indigenous leaders in their 
districts and they should try to cultivate the friendship of
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these heads as much as possible in the interest of the govern­
ment* They should try to get the nfeel" of the people’s mental­
ity and try to gain their confidence in order to guide them 
gradually to the realization that their own interests were 
closely tied up with those of Dutch. The regulations of 1837, 
Merkus argued, did little to remedy the political anarchy which 
existed in the country. Under those regulations the country 
was divided into a large number of districts, where the officers 
in charge received their orders directly from Padang. This 
caused a disruption of administrative cohesion where it was 
most needed i.e. at the local level. Merkus therefore suggested 
that the large number of districts should be reformed into 
larger administrative units (afdeling) at the head of each of 
which an administrative officer with the rank of assistant 
resident should be placed, who would have sufficient discret­
ionary power to deal with those affairs which were related to 
his own area. In addition the prestige of the administrative 
officer, which had suffered such a great deal during the 
Padri-war, should be enhanced by raising his status and granting 
him more power in order to obliterate the existing image of the 
administrative officer among the population:
Has a subordinate authority, supplying coolies and 
foreseeing in the needs of the military..........” (122)
(122) Proposals of Merkus on the administrative organisation
of the West-Coast, 13th March, 181+0 in Kielstra IV. p.322.
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Merkus then proposed to divide the West-Coast into the 
following assistant-residencies: Padang, Tanah Datar, Agam,
L Kotas, Priaman, Ajer Bangis, Rau, Mandailing and Ankola.
Apart from the introduction of larger self-contained 
administrative units Merkus wanted to integrate those units 
into residencies, the areas of which were demarcated according 
to ethic lines. The Batta population of the Northern districts 
was to he administratively separated,from the Minangkabaus, 
while Padang and surrounding districts would form a separate 
residency from Minangkabau Proper. Merkus concluded that the 
proposed administrative structure would probably conflict with 
the intentions of his instructions, but he considered that the 
idea of van den Bosch to leave indigenous society completely 
on its own was not practicable under the circumstances, A 
great deal of European supervision was needed to keep peace 
and order in the country and only when the population had been 
forced to become used to conditions of peace and order could 
they be left to their own devices and the size of the admin­
istrative establishment be subsequently diminished.
Those proposals of Merkus were provisionally approved by
(123)the Batavian government, pending final acceptance in The Hague.
On 3rd September, 1840 Merkus issued regulations for the 
governor of Sumatra’s West-Coast and the residents of the
(123) Resolution of the Batavian Government. 13th April, 1840. 
in Kielstra IV, pp. 326-328.
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Padang Highlands (Minangkabau) and Ajer Bangis. Those
regulations formed the basis of Dutch administrative policy
(124)on the West-Coast till 1870 and they were the final outcome
of a period of trial and error that had lasted for nearly
twenty years. Gradually the Dutch had come to realize that
the Sumatran social and economic structure and the mentality
of the people demanded the application of principles of
administrative policy different from those adhered to in Java.
The regulations of 1840 were a far cry from the attempt in the
early twenties to introduce a uniform administrative system
(125)throughout the Archipelago, based on the Javanese pattern.
The Dutch realized that they were not strong enough to rule 
the whole of the East Indies by force, nor that they had 
enough manpower available of the right calibre to set up an 
administration which was run completely by European officials. 
And even if they had, the cost of such an establishment would 
have been regarded as prohibitive in the light of the profit 
motive which was the most important basis of Dutch colonial 
policy at this time. The Dutch therefore assigned to themselves 
the role of a police force which would establish and maintain 
conditions of peace and order as a pre-requisite to the 
encouragement of production and trade. Indigenous society was
(124) Kielstra IV, pp. 337-341.
(125) See pp.
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to be left as it was and no new-fangled European political 
or social ideas, including Christianity, were to be introduced 
to the population, lest peace and order should be disturbed 
and remittances to the mothercountry suffer. In Java the 
"culture system" was introduced, a system, which according to 
van den Bosch, was based on principles that were generally 
accepted in the existing indigenous society. The Prince was 
the landlord while the farmers were his tenants paying rent 
in the form of money or in kind to the Prince. The govern­
ment had taken the place of the former landlords. In Minang- 
kabau the land was largely owned by the village communities 
and therefore the government could not take over ownership, as 
it had done in Java, without causing a great deal of social 
and political disturbance. Thus van den Bosch decided to 
improve the productive capacity of Minangkabau by indirect 
means: i.e. improvement of the system of communications, the 
introduction of the population to European manufactures, the 
protection of merchants and traders and the granting of minimum 
prices for coffee and other produce desired by the government. 
At the same time the population^ autonomy in the running of 
its own affairs would be untouched. Increased prosperity 
would make the Minangkabaus eventually realize that their own 
interests co-incided with those of the government and a closer 
co-operation with the Dutch would be the result. Van den Bosch 
was convinced that economic development would increase the
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state of civilization of the indigenous population, which would 
hecome more ’'reasonable" and therefore less troublesome, to the 
greater benefit of both parties concerned.
The governor then was specifically ordered to carry out 
his administration according to the principles laid down by 
van den Bosch in 1833. In no case was he allowed to undertake 
military expeditions without the foreknowledge and approval of 
the Governor-General. The main objective of his administration 
was the maintenance of peace and order, and the development 
and extension of production and trade, in order to increase 
by those means the country’s income. The population of the 
West-Coast was to be given the greatest possible autonomy in 
the running of its own affairs and the governor was instructed 
to pay special attention to the improvement and extension of 
communications, the introduction of new branches of agriculture 
and the extension of the existing ones, the advancement of 
trade with areas which were not under the immediate control 
of the government, the production of building^materials and 
the training of indigenous people as tradesmen.
The instructions for the residents were on similar lines
(126) Instructie voor den Gouverneur van Sumatra’s Westkust.
3rd Spetember, 1840. in Kielstra IV. op.cit. pp.333-337*
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as those to the governor, although they were somewhat more 
(127) 
detailed.
The governor of the West-Coast, Colonel Michiels, was 
particularly vexed about the regulation forbidding him to 
undertake military expeditions without the previous approval
(127) Instructie voor de residenten der Padangsche Boven-
landen en A.ier Bangis. 3rd September, 1840. in Kielstra 
IV. op.cit. pp. 337-341.
Extracts:
11 Art. 5. They shall always keep in mind that as main 
principle of the administration of the West-Coast of 
Sumatra has been adopted:
a. that the indigenous population shall be exempted 
from all pressing direct taxes;
b. that she shall be exempted from all unpaid seignorial 
services, with the exception of the construction and 
maintenance of roads;
c. that, as the population of the various districts 
shall be left in the complete possession of its 
autonomous rights, the Government will refrain from 
appointing heads and from interfering with the 
internal police, the carrying out of justice and 
all internal affairs; but that to the contrary it 
has retained for itself (the right):
1* to call up, if necessary, from each district men, 
the number of whom to be regulated later, to be 
used as auxiliaries either against internal or 
external enemies;
2. to erect forts and to construct roads for the 
maintenance of public order and the advancement 
of trade;
3. not to allow wars between districts or kampongs, 
but to settle all disputes, about which the parti­
es cannot come to an agreement, by mediation and 
common discussion;
4. to punish before the Council of Justice at 
Padang, crimes committed against the Government 
such as rebellion, obstruction, the murder or ill 
treatment of government personnel or soldiers,
the theft of its property and also similar offences 
committed against persons, who are under the 
Government's protection’*
...•/Contd
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of Batavia. Merkus had further explained to Michiels that
he could act on his own account in cases, where districts,
which so far had remained independent, showed willingness to
subject themselves voluntarily, but were held back from doing
so by influential minorities. If a major conflict developed
from such military action then the governor would have to(128)
refer to Batavia. Michiels argued that it was not possible to 
judge a priori if the expected resistance of a minority group 
in an unoccupied district would not develop into a major con­
flict, If it did then one could not expect the military 
commander to wait for orders from Batavia. According to Mich— 
iels persuasion would not be enough to bring the remaining 
independent districts under government control. Persuasion 
should be supported by at least a show of force if not the 
actual use of it. The governor concluded his argument by 
pointing out that the great change to the better which had 
taken place on the West—Coast since 1837 had occurred during
(127) Contd,
"Art. 10, They shall encourage with all the proper means 
the output of all products suitable for the 
European market, (they shall) try to improve 
the existing branches of production, especially 
those of coffee and pepper, and try to intro­
duce new ones. For the encouragement thereof 
and that of trade they shall give all help and 
assistance,
(128) Merkus to Michiels, 7th September, 1840. in Kielstra IV, 
op.cit. pp. 341-342.
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h i s  te rm  o f  o f f i c e  and as  a  r e s u l t  o f  h i s  p o l i c i e s :
" . .A l r e a d y  one s e e s  th e  M alay ( i . e .  M inangkabau) 
f o r g e t  h i s  b e lo v e d  r i f l e  f o r  new a g r i c u l t u r a l  
p u r s u i t s ;  (a n d )  p ro p e r  c o f f e e  p l a n t a t i o n s  a re  
b e in g  l a i d  o u t i n  th e  P adang  H ig h la n d s  u n d e r  th e  
d i r e c t i o n  o f  th e  o f f i c i a l s . . . . . . . . ............... (1 2 9 )
T h is  r a t h e r  i d y l l i c  s i t u a t i o n  as  p o r t r a y e d  by M ic h ie ls  was
r u d e ly  and u n e x p e c te d ly  d i s tu r b e d  by an  a n ti-g o v e rn m e n t
r e b e l l i o n  in  B a t ip u ,  a r e g io n  w hich  f o r  a num ber o f  y e a r s  had
b e e n  one o f  th e  s ta u n c h e s t  s u p p o r te r s  o f  th e  D utch  i n  t h e i r
d r iv e  a g a i n s t  th e  P a d r i s .  The r i s i n g  o f  B a tip u  w i l l  be
d i s c u s s e d  in  th e  n e x t s e c t i o n  a s  i t  h ad  some a f f e c t  on a
d e c i s i o n  made i n  th e  Hague i n  1841 to  r e v e r t  o r  r a t h e r  s lo w
down th e  r a t e  o f  D utch  e x p a n s io n  in to  S u m a tra , a s  e n v is a g e d
b y  v an  den  B osch and M ic h ie ls .
(1 2 9 )  M ic h ie ls  to  van  den B o sch . 22nd O c to b e r , 1840 i n  
K i e l s t r a  IV . o p . c i t .  pp .345 .
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SECTION IV.
SUMATRA SEEN IN THE LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
AND HOME POLITICS:l84l-l850«
By 1840 the plan of van den Bosch to subject the whole 
of Sumatra - with the exception of Achin - had nearly been 
completed. In their drive against the Padris since 1821 the 
Dutch had occupied Minangkabau; the Southern Battalands; the 
West-Coast up to the borders of Achin; and they had also pene­
trated into the East-Coast, where at the confluence of the 
Panei and Bila Rivers they had established a small post. In 
the meantime the Dutch had expanded into the East-Coast area 
from another point i.e. Palembang. In 1834 the Sultan of 
Djambi had called on the Dutch resident of Palembang for help 
against his unruly vassals. Subsequently a treaty was concluded 
in which the Dutch were granted the right to rebuild their old 
fort at Muara Kompeh and to levy import and export duties. In 
1839 after continuing internal dissension the Batavian govern­
ment decided to dethrone the sultan and to declare Djambi 
government territory i.e. to bring this region under direct 
Dutch administrative control instead of leaving the administra-(i)tion to the Sultan and his officials. In 1838 a contract was
(1) Veth P.J. MSchets van het eiland Sumatra1 1, Amsterdam, Van
Kämpen, 1867. P* 67*
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concluded with Indragiri in which sovereignty was transferred 
to the Netherlands government, hut the indigenous administrative 
structure left intact. However, when the Batavian authorities 
in 1840 were preparing to extend their influence over Siak and 
its dependencies - which would have completed their objective 
of controlling the whole of the East-Coast - they were stopped, 
rather unexpectedly, by an order from The Hague.
On 1st September, 1841# Baud, the Minister for Colonies,
ordered the Batavian government to withdraw its troops from
Eastern Sumatra. But he added rather significantly that before
the actual withdrawal the local rulers should be made to recog-(2)nize Dutch sovereignty. This decision to withdraw was obviously 
in conflict with the Sumatra policy of van den Bosch, which was 
designed to bring the whole of Sumatra within the control of the 
Dutch within a 25 year period. Yet in trying to find an 
explanation for this new move it is difficult to assume that 
Baud, who was the right hand man of van den Bosch and the
(2) Baud to Batavia. 1st September, 1841* in Kielstra V, pp. 
590-597.Note: The order of Baud was as followssM...in 
general the following line of action is to be prescribed 
i.e. a.Withdrawal of all civil and military posts at the 
East-Coast, also of those posts in the interior which are 
immediately connected with the occupation of the East-Coast. 
Djarabi, Bila and other intermediary points are included in 
this order; but care has to be taken, when withdrawing, to 
obtain full recognition of our sovereignty..
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ex e c u to r  o f th e  " c u ltu re  system**, d isa g re e d  on p r in c ip le  w ith  
th e  e s ta b l i s h e d  Sumatra po licy *  In  p o in t o f f a c t  most o f th e  
a v a i la b le  ev idence shows th a t  The Hague’s d e c is io n  to  w ithdraw  
from  th e  E ast-C o ast o f Sumatra was th e  r e s u l t  m ainly o f B r i t i s h  
p r e s s u re .  For th i s  reaso n  i t  i s  n ecessa ry  a t  t h i s  p o in t to  
d is c u s s  in  some d e t a i l  th e  s t a t e  o f Anglo-Dutch r e l a t io n s  s in c e  
1824.
A lthough th e  t r e a ty  o f 1824 o s te n s ib ly  had s e t t l e d  th e  
t e r r i t o r i a l  and economic q u es tio n s  which had a r is e n  s in c e  the  
r e tu r n  o f th e  Dutch to  th e  In d ie s  in  1816, th e  r e la t io n s  between 
th e  two c o u n tr ie s  had d e te r io r a te d  c o n s id e ra b ly  s in c e ,  owing 
m ainly to  in c re a se d  com mercial r i v a l r y .
A ccordingly  i t  should  be r e c a l le d  th a t  H olland s in c e  1816
had been t r y in g  to  r e g a in  a sh a re  of th e  Jav a  m arket by means o f
(3 )
p ro te c t in g  i t s  sh ip p in g  and in d u stry *  But when i t  appeared th a t  
th o se  m easures d id  no t have the  d e s ire d  e f f e c t ,  th e  B atav ian  
a u th o r i t i e s  took  more d r a s t i c  s te p s  and in  F eb ru a ry , 1824 passed  
an ord inance which su b je c te d  co tto n s  and w oollens o f  fo re ig n  
o r ig in  to  a du ty  o f 25$, w hile  ad m ittin g  Dutch t e x t i l e s  d u ty - f r e e .  
T h is m easure, a s  th e  B r i t i s h  were qu ick  to  p o in t o u t ,  was in  
c o n f l ic t  w ith  a r t i c l e  2 o f the  t r e a ty  of 1824, which s t ip u la t e d
(3 ) See: , S ec tio n  I ,  pp . 29-35.
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that duties on British imports were not to be more than one 
hundred percent higher than those levied on Dutch goods, while
in the case of Dutch goods being admitted duty-free, no more 
^  (4)than 6% was to be levied on British goods. But the Dutch govern­
ment contended that as the article in question only referred to
ships and citizens and not to goods, the ordinance of February,
(5)1824 was not at variance with the treaty.
At any rate Britain appears not to have pressed the 
question any further. Probably the most important reason for 
this was the desire of the British government - considering that 
British imports into Java were still rising despite the high
(4) Canning to Falck. 25th February, 1825# in Posthumus "Documenten..** op.cit. p. 112.
(5) Elout to van Reede. Minister for Foreign affairs. 19th 
March. 1825. in. ibid, pp. 115-115. Note: The actual wording 
of article 2 of the treaty of 1824 was as follows: ”The 
subjects and vessels of one nation shall not pay, upon 
importation or exportation, at the ports of the other in 
the Eastern Seas, any duty at the rate beyond the double of 
that at which the subjects and vessels of the nation to which 
the ports belongs, are charged. The duties paid on exports 
or imports at a British port on the continent of India or in 
Ceylon on Dutch bottoms, shall be arranged so as in no case, 
to be charged at more than double the amount of duties
paid by British subjects, and on British bottoms. In 
regard to any article upon which no duty is imposed, when 
imported or exported by the subjects, or on the vessels of 
the nation to which the port belongs, the duty charged upon 
the vessels or the subjects of the other shall in no case 
exceed six percent.” in Smulders C M ”Geschiedenis van het 
tractaat van 17 Maart, 1824 gesloten tussen Nederland en 
Groot-Britannie.Utrecht, 1856. pp.64-65.
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(6)
duties - not to strain unnecessarily the traditional ties of 
friendship with Holland at a time when its relations with the 
ultra-reactionary Holy Alliance - of which France in the mean­
time had become a member - had become far less cordial, 
especially after it had given support to the nationalist move­
ments in Greece and South America.
Yet, soon after Belgium had broken away from Holland in
1830, Britain re-iterated its previous requests for an allev­
iation of duties on British imports in the Dutch colonies. This
renewal of British protests about Dutch colonial tariff policy 
after a lapse of more than six years should be seen in the 
context of the vast change which had taken place in the European
(6) The following statistics might illustrate this point:
Imports of cottons into Java - in Dutch guilders 
1825 T S 25 1827 IS2S Total.
Dutch origin 213,061 1,266,495 856,087 2,940,635 5,276,278
British origin 1,384,834 738,186 1,698,740 1,819,435 5,641,195
Other foreign 80,478 119,367 43,359 23,631 266,835
Total 1,678,373 2,124,048 2,598,186 4,783,701 01,184,308
Source: Posthumus ’’Documenten..'1 op.cit. p. 228.
(7) Note: It should be noted that the Dutch King, although bound 
by a written constitution in fact ruled as a benevolent 
despot. He was able to do so because by a great deal of 
financial juggling he managed to avoid Parliamentary censure 
on many of his personal policies. Continued pressure from 
Britain could have driven the Dutch into the French camp, 
which would have defeated Britain’s original intention in 
setting up the United Kingdom of the Netherlands to act as 
a strong bulwark against France*
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international situation since the French and Belgian revolu­
tions of 1830,
For, soon after the Belgians had revolted against the 
Dutch in August, 1830, it became apparent that the Dutch King 
stood alone in his attempts to subdue his rebellious subjects 
in the South* The Great Powers - who at the Congress of Vienna 
had guaranteed the integrity of the United Kingdom of the 
Netherlands - one after the other refused to intervene on 
behalf of William I, because most European statesmen - with the 
exception of a few french and Dutch extremists - were unwilling 
to risk a general war over Belgium, which it was feared would 
result from intervention* The immediate danger, however, of a 
war between France and Belgium on the one side and the Eastern 
Powers - i*e* Russia, Austria and Prussia - on the other was 
averted by two developments* Firstly Russia which intended to 
send an army against the Belgians was prevented from doing so 
by the outbreak of the Polish rebellion* Subsequently Austria 
and Prussia refrained from military intervention, as they were 
now without the actual support of Russia* Secondly England, 
which - in order not to disturb its rapid economic growth - was 
bent upon preserving peace, to that purpose called a meeting of 
the Great Powers in London* Talleyrand - now Louis Phillipe*s 
ambassador in London - supported the British proposal to declare 
Belgium independent, a move which had actually been designed by 
Palmerston to keep the Belgians from asking for military assist-
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ance from  th e  F rench . But Louis P h i l l i p e ,  r e a l i z in g  th e  danger
posed by th e  Holy A llia n c e  to  h is  reg im e, d e s ire d  to  come to
term s w ith  E ngland, th e  on ly  o th e r  n o n -a b s o lu t io n is t  power in
E urope. Both P alm erston  and T a lley ran d  were convinced o f  th e
d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  an A nglo-French "rapprochem ent" in  o rd e r to
c o u n te r-b a la n c e  th e  Holy A llia n c e . C onsequently  an e n te n te
betw een England and F rance -  a lth o u g h  a very  uneasy and p r e c a r -
( 8 )
io u s  one -  came a b o u t.
Thereupon th e  G reat Powers -  to  the  ch ag rin  o f  the  Dutch 
King -  decided  in  December, 1830 to  d e c la re  Belgium independen t. 
However, th e  c o n d itio n s  of s e p a ra tio n  -  th e  s o -c a l le d  XXIV 
A r t ic le s  -  were r e je c te d  by the  B elg ian  C ongress; and a r e v is io n  
o f  th e  A r t ic le s  was in  tu rn  r e je c te d  by th e  Dutch K ing. But in  
o rd e r  to  s e t t l e  th e  B e lg ian  q u e s tio n  sp e e d ily  th e  G reat Powers 
g u aran teed  th e  newly e le c te d  King o f th e  B e lg ia n s , Leopold o f 
Saxe-Coburg, the  ex ecu tio n  of the c o n d itio n s  o f  s e p a ra t io n . Upon 
which W illiam  I  se n t h is  army in to  Belgium ; and th e  Dutch were 
o n ly  p rev en ted  by French m i l i ta r y  in te rv e n t io n  from  com pletely  
ro u tin g  th e  B e lg ian  f o rc e s .  S u b sequen tly , in  o rd e r  to  fo rc e  
th e  Dutch King in to  l in e  th e  B r i t i s h  and French governm ents 
decided  in  O ctober, 1832 to  b lockade th e  Dutch c o a s t and to  p lace  
an  embargo on Dutch sh ip p in g . T his embargo, however, was l i f t e d
(8 )  Pemberton W B aring  "Lord P a lm ers to n " , L ond ., B atchw orth ,
1954» pp.42-45*
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again in May, 1833, when at a conference in London between 
England, France and Holland a preliminary settlement was reached, 
which provided for an armistice and the retention of the status 
quo until the question would be finally settled. However, the 
Dutch King, clinging to the hope for a change in the inter­
national climate that would be more favourable to the Dutch 
cause, refused to come to a final agreement with Belgium until 
1839. This policy of "perserveranee" proved to be a very heavy 
burden on the Dutch treasury, because Holland was forced to keep 
a large standing army and was furthermore obliged to repay the 
whole of a considerable state debt, >t of which would have
otherwise been taken over by Belgium.
The Belgian revolution and its aftermath i.e. the obstinacy 
of William I in refusing to accept the conditions of separation 
as laid down by the London Convention - had a profound effect on 
Dutch colonial policy.
In order to state the issues at stake clearly it should be 
recalled here that the economic policy of William I had been 
designed to reach the following three objectives: to revive Dutch 
trade; to encourage secondary industry in the home country; and
(9) Kluit Marie E "De Koning mokt, het land ontwaakt, het Noor- 
den van lÖ30-,39" in Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden. 
Vol. IX. Chapter XII. pp. 333-359. Zeist, De Haan, 1956.
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to make the colonies financially selfsufficient and, if possible,
profitable to the mother country. Those three objectives were
interdependent. Consequently in order to break the British
monopoly of the Java trade William I had founded the Nederlandse
Handelsmaatschappij (Netherlands Trading Company) a large trading
body, which the King argued would be in a better position to(10)
challenge the British than small individual ventures*. Prom their 
side the East Indian authorities had introduced a number of 
measures protecting Dutch shipping and Belgian industry. Although 
those measures benefited Dutch merchants and Belgian industrial­
ists, the price differential between East Indian imports and 
exports, especially after the fall in coffee prices during the 
twenties, caused a chronic balance of payments problem in the 
Indies. A reduction of imports was not feasible as Belgian 
manufacturers were dependent on the colonial market and Dutch 
shippers were in need of home manufactures in order to make 
voyages profitable in the fact of stiff English competition.
The only other solution to the problem therefore was to raise the 
output of export commodities* The "culture system**, as proposed 
by van den Bosch, was primarily intended to solve the recurrent 
balance of payment problems in the colony* Furthermore, van den 
Bosch argued, a state-controlled production system would enable
(10) For a more detailed description of the Nederlands Handels- 
maatschappij see Section III, p* 132* Further references 
to this company in the text will be indicated by the 
abbreviation: N.H.M.
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the government to make the N.H.M., which hitherto had suffered
only losses, a paying proposition by consigning to it government
produce for shipment to Holland, thereby cutting out a great deal(11)of foreign competition.
But while van den Bosch was still engaged in introducing 
his system, the outbreak of the Belgian revolution and the sub­
sequent heavy financial burdens on the home treasury forced him 
to expand the " culture system” on a far wider scale than origin­
ally had been intended. Apart from being a remedy for colonial 
financial difficulties the system of van den Bosch became an
indispensable means of keeping Holland financially afloat during(12)the difficult years of "perseverance” between 1830 and 1839.
Secondly the Belgian revolution had an equally drastic 
effect on Dutch colonial trade. Prior to 1830 Belgian industrial 
production had been an integral part of Dutch economic policy.
The King who was a shrewd merchant and who had studied at first 
hand the tremendous economic changes which had been taking place 
in England during his prolonged stay there, realized from the 
inception of his reign that Dutch traders would never be able to 
compete with the British, unless they could export manufactures 
produced in the home country which would make their outbound
(11) See : Section III, p.132.
(12) Brugmans I J "Paardenkracht en Mensenmacht-Sociaal-Econo- 
mische Geschiedenis van Nederland." 1795-1940. sfGraven- 
hage, Nijhoff, 1961. pp.110-111.
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journeys worthwhile. Consequently the King actively supported 
Belgian industry - which had sprung up during the regime of 
Napoleon - by opening up the colonies for its products.
However, with the separation of Belgium in 1830, one of 
the cornerstones of Dutch post-war economic policy i.e. 
industrial production, fell away; and Holland which had virtually 
no industry found itself in a worse trading position than in 
1814.
British traders were not slow in seizing the opportunity 
presented by the Belgian separation and the resulting weakened 
international position of Holland to request the British govern­
ment to press the Dutch for tariff concessions in Java. British 
commercial and manufacturing interests welcomed the break up of 
the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, which meant that Belgium 
would loose its preferential position in the Dutch colonial 
market, while Holland, devoid as it was of secondary industry, 
would be forced to supply its colonies with manufactures from 
foreign sources. Under those circumstances, it was argued in 
British trading circles, it would obviously be harmful to Dutch 
interests to keep charging high duties on foreign imports into 
Java, because the resulting high prices would cause a consider­
able decline in the consumption of European imports. Therefore 
the British government should request Holland to lower its 
tariffs in the colonies, offering in return a larger share of
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the British home market for such Dutch staple products as gin 
and dairy produce. British intentions are clear from the 
following extract:
”..to us it would ensure the principal supply of cotton 
and woollen manufactures to the rest of the population 
of the Indian archipelago on such terms as would in a 
short time double the consumption, and as it would be 
impossible for the manufacturers of the Netherlands, or, 
indeed, of any other country, to compete with us in 
those markets on equal terms to any extent (it) would (13) 
quadruple our present exports to the Indian archipelago.•”
The Dutch, however, were not content, as van den Bosch put
it, to restrict their trading activities in the East Indies to
(14)’'earn a small commission fee” on foreign commerce. Hence the
Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce in order to channel exports of
foreign cottons to Indonesia through Dutch ports suggested to
the government to subject imports of foreign cottons into Java
to a duty of 10$ if re-exported from Holland and to a duty of
(15)20$ if exported directly from the country of origin. Following
this a Royal decree of 4th May, 1831 subjected cottons imported
into Java to a duty of 125-$ if re-exported from Holland and to(16)
a duty of 25$ if shipped directly from the country of origin.
(l3\ Deans to" Wellington. 25th October« 1830. in Posthumus 
’*Documenten” op.cit. pp.196-198.
(14) Van den Bosch to Clifford« Minister of Colonies, 8th 
December. 1Ö31. in Ibid, p.243.
(15) De Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken van Amsterdam to the 
King. 13th December, 1830 in Ibid, pp.204-219.
(16) Clifford to van den Bosch. 15th August, 1831. in Ibid.p.239.
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This measure, however, was abolished again in October, 1832
when it appeared that it was mainly Belgian industry which was
benefiting from it* Belgian textiles - which were forbidden to
enter Holland after November, 1830, went via Dunkirk or England
to Rotterdam from where they were re-exported to the Indies at
(17)the lower rate of duty*
At any rate van den Bosch - whose opinions weighed very 
(18)
heavily with the King - considered that a tariff differential
of 10%, as suggested by Amsterdam, would not be a strong enough
incentive for British traders to ship their goods through Dutch 
(19)ports* He pointed out that British ships, which came out 
directly from England to Java would only discharge there that 
part of their cargo which could be disposed of profitably, while 
the remainder would be sold at Singapore from where those goods 
would be re-exported to the rest of the Archipelago, Indo-China, 
and China* More important, van den Bosch argued, was the fact 
that British freight charges on homebound journeys were far lower
(17) Mansvelt W M F "Geschiedenis van den Nederlandsche Handels­
maat schappiju vol. i* Haarlem, Enschede, 1934* pp#277-278.
(18) Note: The reports of van den Bosch’s success could not fail to impress the King, especially not when already in 
August, 1831 a remittance of one million guilders could be 
made from the Indies to the home treasury*
(19) Note: There is evidence, however, that English merchants in 
fact did take advantage of the lower duties. See Tarling N 
"British policy in the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago, 
1824-1871’* (Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal 
Asiatic Society* vol* XXX, part 3 (no. 179) P* 100*
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than those charged by Dutch shippers. The reason for this
freight differential was that ships - numbering from 50 to 60
per year — which were chartered by the British government to
transport convicts to Australia at high prices, on their
return voyage were able to pick up cargoes in the Indies for(20)
as low a rate as 80 guilders. British merchants therefore 
were able to offer higher prices for colonial produce, causing 
the driving up of prices in the colony, which was largely 
responsible for the continuing losses suffered by the N.H.M. 
while preventing smaller Dutch concerns from participating in 
the East Indian trade at all. Van den Bosch therefore suggested 
that - as a transitory measure - import duties on foreign cottons 
should be put at 50% and those on Dutch goods at 25$. This 
measure, according to the governor-general, was not incompatible 
with the treaty of 1824 and would have the double advantage of 
increasing Dutch shipping and cutting out British competition 
and its concomitant of high prices. But although it was important 
to prevent Dutch colonial shipping from being replaced by the 
British, it was even more important - so van den Bosch argued -
(20) Note: The fact that the Dutch merchant navy was only very 
small after the war and the N.H.M. was only allowed to 
charter Dutch ships caused freight rates to be very high. 
In 1828 the rate was still 230 guilders for an outward 
and return voyage. But when in the beginning of the 
thirties Dutch shipyards had caught up with the shortage 
the N.H.M. would not offer more than 180 to 190 guilders 
per voyage. Source: Mansvelt op.cit. pp. 231-232.
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to ensure Dutch traders of a regular supply of Dutch manufactured 
goods. Only when industry at home and in the colonies would have 
been made complementary to each other, would Dutch trade be 
based on a sound foundation. In addition a Dutch textile indus­
try with an ensured outlet for its products in the colonies 
would provide a profitable source for investment for Dutch
rentiers, who so far had invested a great deal of their money(21)
in foreign enterprise. Furthermore the establishment of
factories would increase employment and hel]D ^0 ease the growing
pauper problem in the larger Dutch cities. However, the only
way to ensure a definite market for Dutch textiles in the
colonies, according to van den Bosch, was to instruct the N.H.M.
to export those textiles to the Indies and to sell them there at
any cost. The profit made on the export and sale of colonial
produce - which the company would receive in consignment - would
compensate it amply for any losses made on the importation of
(23)Dutch manufactured cottons.
(21) Note: In 1829 still half of Dutch private capital funds were 
invested in foreign countries. Source: Westendorp Boerma J J 
HDe tijd van Koning Willem I in het Noorden (1815-50 ).'* in 
Algemeene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden. Vol.IX. Chapter IX, 
P.239.(22) Note: Van den Bosch was genuinely interested in the re­
settlement of paupers; in 1819 he had been responsible for 
the founding of the Maatschappij voor Weldadigheid(Humanit- 
arian Society) which was engaged in settling city paupers 
on reclaimed land.
(23) Note: Those ideas of van den Bosch are contained in two 
letters to Clifford, Minister for Colonies, dated respect­
ively; 15th August and 8th December, 1831* in Posthumus
MDociimenten..'* op.cit. pp.239-249»
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In the next few years those ideas of van den Bosch were
put into practice with only slight modifications.
Both the King and the N.H.M. showed a great deal of interest
in furthering the development of a Dutch textile industry. This
development was greatly facilitated by the influx into Holland
of a number of Belgian textile manufacturers - and their skilled
employees - who were unwilling to forego the profitable outlet
for their products in the Dutch colonies. Subsequently in
January, 1833 the Dutch government approved the following plan -
(25)proposed by Ainsworth and modified by the N.H.M. - for the
establishment of a textile industry. Firstly weaving schools -
to be paid for by the government in conjunction with the N.H.M. -
were to be established in order to teach modern production
methods. Secondly the N.H.M. was to advance low interest loans
to manufacturers while in addition a Royal decree of 18th
January, 1833 offered a premium of 25 cent for each piece of(26)
calico produced in Holland from Dutch spun yarn.
But van den Bosch, who in the meantime had returned to 
Holland where he was appointed Minister for Colonies, was not
(2h) Brugmans I J "Paardenkracht.." op.cit. pp.74-75*
(25) Note:Thomas Ainsworth; son of Lancashire cotton manufacturer, 
who was in partnership with Sir Robert Peel. After his 
father’s bankruptcy Ainsworth went to France. In 1827 he 
was invited to Belgium by Cockerill, the founder of Belgian 
heavy industry. In 1830 he went to Holland where he acted
as technical advisor in the textile industry.
(26) Mansvelt "Geschiedenis..•” op.cit. pp.276-280.
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satisfied with the growth of the Dutch cotton exports -
valued at 1.5 million guilders per year -; and he proposed to
the N.H.M. to double that amount immediately. But the N.H.M.
was unwilling to do this unless the government would guarantee
a substantial percentage of possible losses. Subsequently in
April, 1835 a contract - the so-called "Lionwaden-contract" -
was concluded which obliged the N.H.M. to export yearly Dutch
cottons to the value of 3 million guilders. Those cottons were
to be sold as quickly as possible and at any price. In return
the Minister for Colonies guaranteed to compensate the company
(27)for losses up to 12$ of the yearly invoice value.
In addition to a government guarantee on import losses the
N.H.M. was given a practical monopoly of the trade in Java
produce. This development was largely the result of the growing
financial difficulties of the Home government owing to the
prolonged Belgian crisis. When after 1830 the Amortization(28)syndicate found it increasingly difficult to provide the King 
with extra-parliamentary funds, owing to the loss of Belgian 
domains and taxes, the government was forced to look for another 
supply of extra funds. This was found in another creation of 
the King i.e. the N.H.M. Van den Bosch pressed the company into
(27) Ibid. pp.284-290•
(28) See P a r t , Section lit P« /^<?note. x.
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a number o f  r a th e r  unorthodox f in a n c ia l  t r a n s a c t io n s  w ith  the 
governm ent, th re a te n in g  to  g ive consignm ents o f Java produce to  
p r iv a te  t r a d e r s  i f  th e  N.H.M. d id  n o t comply. The N.H.M. was 
fo rc e d  to  p ro v id e  th e  King w ith  ev e r in c re a s in g  forw ard lo a n s  
on th e  s e c u r i ty  of the Jav a  c ro p . T h is development o f " th e  
c u l tu re  and consignm ent system ” d id  n o th in g  to  a l l e v i a t e  th e  
c o lo n ia l  ba lance  o f payments p r  obi eras, which had been th e  cause 
o f th e  ad o p tio n  o f van den Bosch’ s system  in  th e  f i r s t  p la c e . 
T h ere fo re  in  1835 -  in  o rd e r  to  overcome t h i s  problem  -  an
arrangem ent was made whereby th e  N.H.M. would d e p o s it th e  pro­
ceeds of i t s  t e x t i l e  im ports in to  th e  c o lo n ia l t r e a s u ry ,
(29 )
re c e iv in g  in  r e tu r n  government produce fo r  consignment to  H o lland .
The r e s u l t in g  r i s e  in  im ports of h ig h ly  p ro te c te d  Dutch 
(30)
c o tto n s  and th e  ev er growing im portance of th e  N.H.M. as an
TWJ
(30 )
M ansvelt "G esc h ie d en is .77" o p . c i t .  p p .400-403.
N o te : The fo llo w in g  s t a t i s t i c s ,  r e p re s e n tin g  th e  v alue  o f 
pu rchases of Dutch m anufactured c o tto n s  by th e  N.H.M. do
i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  p o in t :
Year G u ild e rs  Year
1532 6 ,000 153?
1833 89,000 1838
1834 600,000 1839
1835 1 ,837 ,840  1840
1836 3 ,580 ,799  S o u rce : M ansvelt
G u ild e rs
4,1+25,916
5 ,741 ,802  
6 ,669,558 
6,003,231 
o p . c i t . p .236
The p o s i t io n  o f th e  Dutch and E n g lish  s h a re s  of th e  Java  
im port tr a d e  can be seen  from th e  fo llo w in g  f ig u r e s :  
Im ports o f  c o tto n s  in to  Java  and Madura.
Year T o ta l
1
D u tc h ( in c l. 
r e - e x p o r ts )
m i l l ,  g u i ld e r s .  
B r i t i s h  Y ear T o ta l D u tc h ( in c l. 
r e - e x p o r ts )
B r i t i s h
1535“ 3 .8 2 .3 173 1836 6 .1 3 .2 2 .6
1831 2.9 1 .3 1 .2 1837 7 .1 3 .6 2 .9
1832 1 .9 0 .06 0 .4 1838 9 .7 5 .7 3 .2
1833 3 .9 0 .0 9 2 .5 1839 10.5 7 .3 2 .5
1834 4 .4 0 .33 3 .4 1840 13.1 8 .8 2 .8
1835 4 .1 1 .5 2 .2
S o u rce ; M ansvelt o p . c i t .  p .3 3 3 .
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(31)
exporter of Java produce made it increasingly more difficult
for private traders to compete. Hence numerous British
protests about Dutch trading policy in Java followed. But when
the Dutch government steadily refused to comply with British
demands for tariff concessions, the British notes became increas-
(32)
ingly sharper in tone. Finally - at the end of 1835 - the 
Dutch government, mainly out of fear of direct hostile action
(31) Note: The growing importance of the N.H.M. as an exporter
of colonial produce can be noted from the following statist­
ics:
Year Total Exports N.H.M._____ Year Total Exports N.H.M.
million guilders.
1830 15.9 5.9 1836 43.2 27.1
1831 16.2 4.7 1837 45.0 34.91832 22.1 4.6 1838 45.7 36.7
1833 23.6 13.0 1839 60.2 43.41834 30.4 18.5 1840 76.1 50.4
1835 34.9 19.5
Source: Mansvelt op.cit. p.18 vol.2
(32) Note: e.g. Palmerston on 16th November, 1835 instructed
Jerningham, the British ambassador in The Hague, to inform 
the Dutch Minister: »‘..that H.M.’s government cannot consent 
to prolong a correspondence between the two governments, 
which has been so wholly unsatisfactory in its result; and 
you will express to H.Exc. the confident expectation of 
H.M.’s government that this question will now be brought to 
a prompt and satisfactory settlement by the immediate issue 
of orders to the governor-general of Java to carry into 
full execution the stipulations of the treaty of 1824f and 
by the prompt repayment of the duties, which have been 
unjustly levied from British subjects...."
Source: Posthumus "Documenten.•." op.cit. p.345.
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(33)by Britain against Dutch shipping and trade, decided to give in
to the British demands for tariff concessions in Java* But
although The Hague instructed the East Indian authorities to
charge from then on Dutch imports with 12i% and British goods
with 25$, the Dutch Foreign Minister expressly stated that
Holland did not agree with the British interpretation of article
2 of the treaty of 1824 as to mean the inclusion of goods as well
(34)as ships and subjects*
The British government, however, was not satisfied with
the Dutch concessions; and kept pressing for restitution of
excess duties paid by British merchants since 1824 and the
admission of British goods on Dutch ships at the lower rate of 
(35)12J%* The Hague refused to give in to those demands, but 
instead pointed out that Dutch imports in British India were 
charged with more than 6% - the limit set by the treaty of 1824 —
(33) Note: In December. 1835 the Dutch Foreign Minister advised the King that he and other members of the Cabinet were inclin­
ed to give into to the British demands for trade concessions 
in Java, because they feared that Britain again might put an 
embargo on Dutch shipping. This fear was based on: H..*the 
opposition and jealousy which the trade, shipping, industry 
and the overseas possessions of the Netherlands have always 
met with from the side of the English (and on) the existing 
spirit of hostility towards the Netherlands of the present 
British cabinet, especially of Lord Palmerston, and (was 
based on) the weak diplomacy of Austria, Prussia and Russia, 
those powers of which especially Russia had several times 
openly declared that - although regrettingly - it will look 
on without opposition at measures taken by Great Britain at
sea against the Netherlands*••••• *.... ................ ***H
Source: Posthumus op*cit. p*360.
(34) Verstolk* Dutch Foreign Minister, to Jerningham* 25th Decem­
ber, lS35. in Posthumus op.cit. pp*3Vi-373.(35^Palmerston to Disbrowe. British ambassador to The Haguef 
26th January, 1836 in Ibid* pp*384-367*
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while British goods were admitted duty-free. The British 
government, however, decided to continue its demand for 
restitution, while Palmerston in the meantime attempted to 
induce the British East India Company to modify its tariffs in 
India in order to bring them into line with the official 
British interpretation of article 2 of the 1824 treaty. But 
early in 1838 Palmerston was forced to let his claims for res­
titution restf owing to the unwillingness of the British East
(37)India Company to change its tariffs.
Nevertheless British demands for further trade concessions 
in Java - accentuated as they were by the severe economic crisis 
of the late thirties and early forties - continued. Furthermore 
Disbrowe, the British Ambassador in the Hague suspected that the 
N.H.M. which now had to pay 12j# duty on its cotton imports, was 
secretly refunded by the government. The ambassador also com­
plained that the valuation of imports in Java was carried out
(38)
arbitrarily and unfairly. Actually the British ambassador was 
on the right track, because a new secret "Lijnwaden-contract" 
had been concluded with the N.H.M. on 14th October, 1837* This 
contract included a provision for the compensation by the Butch
(36) Verstoik to Disbrowe. 29th April. 1836. in Ibid, pp.435-437
(37) Tarling N "British policy..." op.cit. pp. 108-110.
(38) Tarling op.cit. pp.110-111.
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government of any extra cost incurred by the company in its 
cotton exports to Java* The reference to imports duties here 
is obvious. This new secret arrangement with the N.H.M. was 
again largely the work of van den Bosch, who had urged the 
company to increase its exports to a value of 8 to 10 million 
per year* By increasing the volume of cotton exports van den 
Bosch tried to stop the considerable outflow of specie from 
Java, which was caused by the fact that private English and 
Dutch traders - who were unable to exchange their goods for 
colonial produce - were forced after the Anglo-American finan­
cial crisis of 1837 to remit in specie because drawing bills on
(39)London had become impossible.
But the drain on silver continued; and in July, 1839 the 
Java Bank suspended the payment of specie. As a result a 
recession occurred in the Java textile trade and large stocks 
remained unsold. In the meantime the unorthodox and rather 
erratic financial operations of the King and van den Bosch had 
brought both the N.H.M. and the Dutch government to the verge 
of bankruptcy. The N.H.M. had found it increasingly difficult 
to balance the forward loans which it was forced to make to the 
government with the proceeds of Java produce, which it received
(39) MansveIt op.cit. pp.294-297.
228,
as collateral, especially after the spectacular fall in world
prices which took place since 1837« This financial crisis
forced the King to abandon his policy of "perseverance” in
regard to the Belgian question; and by the treaty of 19th
April, 1839 he accepted the conditions of separation (XXIV
Articles) as laid down by the Great Powers. Furthermore the
government - after attempts by the N.H.M. to raise the necessary
funds on the loan market had failed — was forced to submit to
Parliamentary approval a loan of 56 million guilders - on the
security of the colonies - for the liquidation of the state
debt, which since 1830 had increased by 300 million guilders,
of which 40 million guilders were owing to the N.H.M. But the
Dutch Parliament, which then for the first time was given a
true picture of the state’s finances - rejected the budget. As
a consequence van den Bosch and the minister for Finance
resigned. Next, the King, who had been forced to concede to
Parliament the right of disposal over future colonial surplusses,
~ (40)abdicated on 7th October, 1840.
This, however, did not solve the problem of the state debt. (41)
Although Disbrowe could speculate that since the colonial 
monopoly system of van den Bosch was under heavy criticism in 
the Dutch parliament, the prospects for trade concessions to
(40) Mansvelt op.cit. p.443»
(41) Tarling. op.cit. p.112.
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Britain had improved, the problem remained of refunding the
government’s debts of nearly 40 million guilders to the N.H.M.
In fact the King - before his abdication - had already concluded
the so-called uKapitalisatie-contractH whereby the debt - put at
39 million guilders at 3% - was to be paid off before 1849,
while the N.H.M. was to receive till 1848 all government colonial
(42)produce in consignment, with the exception of spices and tin. 
Therefore owing to its vast financial difficulties the Dutch 
government was not in a position to grant further concessions 
to British traders in Java. Consequently when Disbrowe in 1843 
was still negotiating with the Dutch government for a satisfact­
ory agreement on the Java trade, Baud, the new Minister for 
Colonies, concluded a contract with the N.H.M. for the export 
of 3 million guilders worth of cottons to the East Indies. The 
Company was not given - as previously - a guarantee against 
losses, but at the same time it was put into a favourable
position by having its proceeds remitted at par while the official
(43)rate stood at 80%.
It was not till the end of the forties - when Britain 
itself had abandoned the Navigation Acts and the Netherlands 
had regained a great deal of its economic and financial strength - 
that the Dutch government made any concessions to Britain in
(42) Mansvelt op.cit. pp.436-440«
(43) Mansvelt op.cit. p.443*
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re g a rd  to  th e  Java  t r a d e .  U n til  then  th e  Dutch s tead ily - 
re fu se d  to  g iv e  in  on such  is s u e s  as g e n e ra l t a r i f f  re d u c tio n  
and th e  adm ission  o f  c o n s u ls .
The u n su c c e s s fu l a ttem p ts  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  government to  
induce the  Dutch to  abandon th e i r  m e r c a n t i l i s t  p o l ic ie s  in  th e  
E ast In d ie s  had a profound e f f e c t  on th e  F o re ig n  O ff ic e fs 
a t t i t u d e  in  reg a rd  to  Dutch expansion  in  Sum atra. A lready in  
1837 a p e t i t i o n  o f S ingapore m erchants had reached  London 
com plain ing  about a decree  o f the  Java  government -  is su ed  in  
1834 -  which r e s t r i c t e d  fo re ig n  tra d e  w ith  th e  E ast In d ie s  to  
th e  p o r ts  o f  B a ta v ia , Semarang and Surabaya. The com plaint 
however was put a s id e ,  as  a t  t h i s  tim e th e  B r i t i s h  government 
s t i l l  hoped f o r  a g en e ra l commercial s e ttle m e n t in  the  A rchi­
p e la g o , w h ile  in  a d d i t io n  i t  d id  no t want to  je o p a rd ize  th e  
s u c c e s s fu l outcome o f Anglo-Dutch n e g o t ia t io n s  on a commercial
(44)
t r e a ty  in  Europe which were being  conducted a t  the  tim e . But
when in  1838 i t  became c le a r  th a t  the  B r i t i s h  demands about
Java would n o t be m et, th e  F o re ign  O ffic e  decided  th a t  f u r th e r
expansion  by th e  Dutch in  th e  A rchipelago  would be u n d e s ira b le
(45)
and harm ful to  B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t s .  The F o re ig n  O ffic e  was 
concerned to  f in d  a g en e ra l commercial s e ttle m e n t in  th e  A rchi­
pelago  and as long  as B r i t i s h  demands f o r  tr a d e  concessions were
(4 4 ) T arling o p .c i t .  p.138 N ote; An Anglo-Dutch commercial tr e a ty  
p erta in in g  to  Europe only was signed  in  1837. The trea ty  
provided f o r  rec ip ro ca l m ost-favoured nation  treatm ent; and 
the eq u a lis in g  o f shipping charges.
(4 5 )  N ote; tt..S u c h  an ex ten s io n  o f Dutch in f lu e n c e  o r t e r r i t o r i a l  
p o sse ss io n  would in  a l l  p r o b a b i l i ty  be a tten d e d  w ith  conse­
quences in ju r io u s  to  B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t ,  and should  be looked 
upon w ith  je a lo u sy  by the  government of t h i s  c o u n try .." S o u rc e • 
F o re ign  O ff ic e  d esp a tc h , J a n u a ry ,1838. q u o t. T a r lln g  o p .c l f t— #
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not met, it would oppose any extension of Dutch power in the 
East-Indies. The first instance in which Britain actively 
opposed Dutch expansion was in Sumatra. The Foreign Office 
took up the complaints of the Straits Settlements, which saw 
Dutch expansion in Sumatra as a threat to their entrepot trade. 
But the first protest - in June, 1839 - about the proceedings 
of the Dutch colonial authorities in Baros and Singkel petered 
out when it appeared that those places were old possessions of 
the Dutch, which had been re-occupied on the orders of the
(47)government in accordance with article 6 of the treaty of 1824.
Palmerston accepted the Dutch explanation and went even as far
as to declare in Parliament on 27th March and 28th May, 1840
(48)
that Holland had not broken article 6 of the treaty of 1824. 
Power politics probably explain this rather unexpected behaviour 
of Palmerston, who otherwise was certainly not very gentle in 
his dealings with the Dutch. In 1839 the so-called Eastern 
Question had come to a head when Mehemet Ali had met out a 
crushing defeat to the Turkish Sultan. England and France were 
opposed to each other on this question; the first being inclined 
to support the Sultan while the other stood behind Mehemet Ali. 
Anglo-French relations became very strained indeed when in July,
(46) See : Section III, pp. 185-186.(47) Tarling op.cit. pp.139-140. Note: Article 6 read:”It is 
agreed that orders shall be given by the two governments 
to their officers and agents in the East, not to form any 
new settlements on any of the islands in the Eastern Seas, 
without previous authority from their respective govern­
ments in Europe.11
(48) Goedemans A.J.M. ’’Indie in de branding-een diplomatiek 
steekspel, 1840-1843 Utrecht, 1953. P.43 note 2.
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1840 England together with Prussia, Austria and Russia - hut 
without Prance - imposed a settlement on the two contending 
parties. During this international crisis both the French 
and English ambassadors were concerned to obtain the diplomatic 
support of the Netherlands. To the great discomfort of Disbrowe 
the French suggested to Holland that it should conclude treaties 
with the United States, Sweden and Denmark in order to protect 
its neutrality. Furthermore in September, 1840 a Franco- 
Dutch commercial treaty was signed in Paris opening up the 
Moselle and the Rhine for Dutch trade and permitting Java 
produce to be imported into Eastern France. Despite the growing 
friendly relations between Holland and France, the French 
ambassador, Bois le Comte, clearly realized that if Holland 
was forced to choose it would have to side with England, because:
”..the Netherlands which has to maintain its finances, 
its trade, its whole existence by its possession of 
Java, is thereby completely dependant upon England.
On the day it will be forced to take sides, it will 
express itself for England out of fear to loose Java.• ”(49)
Disbrowe of course also knew the economic predicament the Dutch
would be in if they ever lost Java; and as he wrote in January,
1841, the break with Belgium had disturbed the natural economic
development of the Netherlands, because Holland had become
completely dependant on its colonies. The industrial competition
(49) Bois le Comte to Guizot. 25th March, 1841« quot.Goedemans 
”Indie in de branding..” op.cit. pp.26-27.
233.
between England and Holland had actually ended and the Dutch
navy was so insignificant that it could not stop the English
(50)fleet either in Europe or the colonies. Nevertheless Disbrowe
was apparently alarmed about the growing influence of the
French ambassador in official Dutch circles; and he thought this
development important enough to request an audience with Queen
(51)Victoria. However, in October, 1840, Disbrowe was able to
report home with a great deal of satisfaction that he had
interviewed the Prince of Orange, who:
"spoke to me about the Eastern Question...and I know he 
felt convinced....of the justice of our cause and of 
the folly committed by M.Thiers." (52)
In the meantime Palmerston was taking a tougher line again in
regard to the Dutch colonies; and in August, 1840 a rather
unsubstantiated claim by trading interests in the Straits -
exaggerating the killing of a native trader by the Dutch at
Panei (East-Coast of Sumatra) into an attempt to stop native
traders from dealing with Pulu Penang - was taken by Palmerston
as a pretext for reminding the Dutch government that it should
(53)keep strictly within the limits laid down by the treaty of 1824.
T50I Disbrowe to Palmerston. 30th January.l64l. quot. Ibid.p.10.
(51) Disbrowe to London. 23rd May, 1840. quot. Ibid, p.44.(52) Disbrowe to Palmerston. 6th October,1840. quot. Ibid. p.44.
(53) Palmerston to Disbrowe. 3rd September, 1840. in Papers 
relative to the Execution of the Treaty of 182C, by the 
Netherlands authorities in the East Indies, p.3. printed in: 
House of Commons. Accounts and Papers, Vol.XXX, 1Ö42.
PP.125-184.
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Soon afterwards, the earlier complaints by Singapore merchants
about increased tariffs and restriction of foreign shipping to
a few ports, were taken up by the Foreign office; and Disbrowe
was instructed to protest that those measures were in conflict
(55)with the 1824 treaty. But Verstolk, the Dutch Foreign Minister,
replied that the higher duties imposed since 1834 bad been
(56)directed against Belgian trade; and that consequently after 
the 1839 treaty with Belgium had been signed those measures had 
been recalled. The movements of foreign shipping had been 
restricted to facilitate the levying of customs; and although 
also this decree would be withdrawn, it had not- so Verstolk
(54) See p.230
(55) Palmerston to Disbrowe. 29th January, 1841. in Ibid,pp,21- 
22. Note: Article 4 of the treaty of 1824 read as follows: “Their Britannic and Netherlands Majesties engage to give 
strict orders as well to Their civil and military author­
ities, as to Their ships of war, to respect the freedom
of trade established by articles 1,2 and 3; and in no case, 
to impede a free communication of the natives in the 
Eastern Archipelago with the ports of the two governments 
respectively, or of the subjects of the two governments 
with the ports belonging to the native powers*u
(56) Note: It should be noted that as officially no state of 
peace existed between Holland and Belgium during the 
years 1830-1839, the Dutch instead of military measures 
resorted to economic warfare. Consequently in 1834 
Belgian imports into the Dutch colonies were charged 
with a duty of 50-70$.
Source: Mansvelt op.cit. p.287.
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argued - contravened the stipulations of the treaty of 1824.
In addition the Dutch Minister dismissed charges of attempts
(57)to exclude British trade from the Archipelago; and in order to
emphasize this point Verstolk added a copy of the Dutch treaty
(58)
of 1834 with Djambi,
In the meantime, however, Disbrowe had managed to lay his 
hands on some compromising documentary material - obtained from 
members of the liberal and Anglophile party in The Hague - about 
the real intentions of the Dutch in Sumatra« Disbrowe informed 
Palmerston early in 1841 that according to confidential informa­
tion he had received, the Dutch were actually planning to 
establish a trade monopoly in Sumatra* The King, so the ambass­
ador continued, had recently requested a person who had been in 
the Indies for a considerable time to advise him on the situation 
in Sumatra, The report brought out by this expert was strongly
(57) The following extract serves as an illustration of British 
thinking on that point: "«.For it is notorious that the 
result (i.e. of the treaty of 1824) has been a most pain­
ful contrast to the anticipations of the Contracting 
Parties; the Dutch having increased the imports on British 
manufactures five or sixfold beyond what they were before 
the said treaty; and they have engaged in wars of many 
years’ duration with the best customers of British subjects 
in the four chief islands of the Archipelago; they have 
infringed on the promised freedom of trade by the creation 
of a royal commercial monopoly, and subjected British 
commerce and intercourse to greater difficulties and res­
traints than they were liable to before any treaty existed; 
and the consequence has been, that British trade with the 
native states in those islands has been injuriously affec­
ted, • 11 Larpent, Chairman of the London East India and China 
Association, to Palmerston« 11th January, 1841. in Papers 
relative,,op.cit,p.5,
(58) Verstolk to Disbrowe, 10th April, 1841. in Ibid,pp,36-47.
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opposed to the existing policy of expansion in Sumatra on
the grounds that it would eventually lead to trouble with
England. The advantages of the present policy in Sumatra
were so uncertain that it would not be worthwhile to cause
an argument with Britain. Disbrowe further related that he 
, (59)knew from a reliable source that the King had not as yet made
up his mind about what policy to follow in Sumatra; and
therefore, Disbrowe advised, the time was opportune to send
another protest to The Hague about the Dutch actions in(60)
Sumatra. In addition Disbrowe had been able to obtain a copy
(61)
of the "Kapitalisatie-Contract** — a secret arrangement —; and
he wrote to Palmerston that although there was nothing in the
contract suggesting that foreigners were to be kept from the
Indies, he feared that English trade would stop completely if
the Dutch succeeded in introducing into Sumatra the same
(62)restrictive measures they applied in Java.
Subsequently on 31st May, 1841 Palmerston - who obviously 
had made good use of the inside information sent to him by 
Disbrowe - protested to the Dutch government that its treaty 
with Djambi conflicted with article 3 of the treaty of 1824*
(59) Note: It should be kept in mind that until 1848, it was the 
King who had the final say in colonial affairs.
(60) Disbrowe to Palmerston. 8th February,1841, quot. Goedemans 
op.cit. PP.5O-5TI(61) See p. 229.
(62) Disbrowe to Palmerston. 22nd February, 1841# quot. Ibid. 
P.53.
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because it allowed the Dutch to levy customs and to introduce(63)
a salt monopoly. At about the same time a more substantial 
point was raised by Britain when it protested against the 
rumoured occupation by the Dutch of Siakf an independent 
native state, with which Farquhar in 1818 had concluded a 
treaty* This treaty, although it had not been communicated 
to the Dutch in 1824, was, according to Palmerston, not 
invalidated by article 9 of the treaty of 1824, because this 
article only referred to ’’prospective engagements1* and not to
(64)
existing ones. Verstolk, however, disagreed with the British 
interpretation of article 9 and denied the validity of 
Farquhar*s treaty. Article 9 according to Verstolk, should
(63) Palmerston to Disbrowe. 31st May, 1841. in Papers relative 
etc. op.cit. pp.54-55. Note; Article 3 of the 1824 treaty 
reads as follows: ’’The High Contracting Parties engage 
that no treaty, hereafter made by either with any native 
power in the Eastern Seas, shall contain any article, 
tending, either expressly or by the imposition of unequal 
duties, to exclude the trade of the other Party from the 
ports of such native power and that, if in any treaty now 
existing on either part, any article to that effect has 
been admitted, such article shall be abrogated upon the 
conclusion of the present treaty. It is understood that, 
before the conclusion of the present Treaty, communication 
has been made by each of the Contracting Parties to the 
other, of all treaties or engagements subsisting between 
each of them respectively, and any native power in the 
Eastern Seas; and the like communication shall be made of 
all such treaties concluded by them respectively hereafter.**
(64) Palmerston to Disbrowe. 8th March, 1841. in Papers relative 
op.cit.p.29. Note: Article 9 of the treaty of 1824 reads: 
**The factory of Fort Marlborough and all the possessions of 
Great Britain on the island of Sumatra are hereby ceded to 
His Netherlands Majesty; and His Britannic Majesty further
engages that no British settlement shall be formed on that 
island, nor any treaty concluded by British authority, with 
any native Prince, Chief or State there in.. •'*
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be read  in  co n ju n c tio n  w ith  a r t i c l e  10, which s t ip u la t e d  th a t  
th e  Dutch government undertook  to  r e f r a i n  from conclud ing  any 
f u r th e r  engagements in  the  Malayan P e n in su la , S u re ly , so 
V e rs to lk  arg u ed , th e  B r i t i s h  government would no t adm it th a t  
any t r e a t i e s  concluded by th e  Dutch in  th e  P en in su la  b e fo re  
1824 were s t i l l  v a l id .  The only  ex c ep tio n , so th e  Dutch no te  
c o n tin u e d , to  a r t i c l e  9 was th e  s p e c ia l  p ro v is io n  made in  the  
t r e a ty  in  reg a rd  to  A chin, w ith  which R a ff le s  in  1819 had 
concluded a t r e a t y ;  and:
» • . I f  i t  had been the in te n t io n  o f  th e  High C o n trac tin g  
P a r t i e s  to  adm it o f o th e r  e x c e p tio n s , based on t r e a t i e s  
p r io r  to  th a t  o f 17 th  March, 1824» th e  ex p lan a to ry  n o te s  
in  q u e s tio n  would c e r ta in ly  no t have f a i l e d  to  make 
m ention  o f th o se  t r e a t i e s ,  a s  th ey  have done of th a t  
which r e l a t e s  to  th e  Kingdom o f A cheen,• • • , , , • • . • • • • • • • » ( 6 6 )
I f  H o llan d , so the no te  con tinued , w anted to  e s ta b l i s h  i t s e l f
in  S ia k , then  the  F arquhar t r e a ty  of 1818 was no t a v a l id
o b s ta c le .  But th e  Dutch government had no d e s i r e  to  occupy
th a t  t e r r i t o r y  as y e t and o rd e rs  to  th a t  e f f e c t  had a lre ad y
been se n t to  th e  governor—g en era l of th e  E a s t - In d ie s ,
(65)
(65) N ote: A r t ic le  10 of the  t r e a ty  o f 1824 re a d s :  »The town 
and f o r t  of M alacca and i t s  dependencies, a re  hereby  
ceded to  H is B r i ta n n ic  M aj,, and H is N e th e r l , Maj. engages 
H im self and His s u b je c ts ,  never to  form any e s tab lish m e n t 
on any p a r t  o f th e  P en in su la  o f M alacca, o r to  conclude 
any t r e a t y ,  w ith  any n a t iv e ,  P r in c e , C hief o r  S ta te  
th e re in .»
(66) V e rs to lk  to  D isbrow e. 11 th  May, 1841. in  P apers r e l a t i v e  
e t c .  o p . c i t .  PP.UÖ-51*
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It should be noted here in this context that van den 
Bosch already in December, 1838 had warned governor-general 
De Eerens that the establishment of Dutch authority at the 
Siak river and to the North of it would have to be prepared 
with the utmost caution in order to forestall English opposition
until the Dutch had effectively established themselves everywhere
(67)in Sumatra, In reply to a request by Merkus, government 
commissioner for Sumatra, for elucidation on this point, Baud 
stated that van den Bosch had been acutely aware of the possi­
bility of English opposition to Dutch expansion in Sumatra,
This apprehension, so Baud continued, had certainly been 
substantiated by later developments as the British government 
had asked the Dutch government for an explanation of its 
policies in Sumatra, There were indications that Britain 
wanted to side step the treaty of 1824, as it insisted that 
a treaty concluded in 1818 with Siak was still valid* Further­
more a number of vicious articles in the British press left 
no doubt as to the unfavourable public opinion in England in 
regard to the actions of the Dutch in Sumatra, In conclusion
therefore Baud advised Merkus to delay the occupation of the(68)
East-Coast,
(67) Van den Bosch to de Eerens, 29th December, 1838, in 
Kielstra V , op.cit, p,385,
(68) Baud to Merkus« 26th November, 1840, in Ibid, pp,385—386,
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But Palmerston was hardly impressed by the reply of 
Verstolk; and instead pointed out that the British treaty 
of 1819» with Achin had been specifically mentioned because 
it contained some exclusive clauses which conflicted with the 
spirit of the treaty of 1824 and had therefore to be modified. 
But this did not mean that it had been abolished. In contrast, 
the treaty of 1818 with Siak did not contain any exclusive 
clause and was therefore not specifically mentioned in the 
treaty. However, this also did not mean that this treaty had 
become invalid and that:
"...Great Britain abandoned all interests in the 
maintenance of the independence of the native 
states of Sumatra, and engaged not to interfere 
in support of that independence. On the contrary, 
the Declaration of the British Plenipotentiaries of 
the 17th March, 1824 contains a passage directly at 
variance with that interpretation, for it distinctly 
expresses the confidence of the British Government, 
that no measures hostile to the King of Acheen, of 
which there was then reason to apprehend were in 
contemplation, would be taken by the Dutch autho­
rities in Sumatra: and now, upon the same principle 
and equally in consonance with the stipulations of 
the Treaty of 1824, Her Majesty*s Government express 
their hope that ho measures will be undertaken by 
those authorities, for destroying the independence 
of the State of Siac........ •••••••••••••••••.•••" (69)
When it thus became quite obvious that Palmerston was not
content with a temporary postponement of the occupation of Siak
(69) Palmerston to Disbrowe« 11th May, 1841* in Papers relative 
op.cit. pp.56-57.
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by the Dutch, but contested the right of the Netherlands to 
expand its authority at all in the East-Coast area, the Dutch 
Foreign Minister was at a loss what to do and could only 
advise Baud not to reply to the British note for the time 
being.
But a development within Sumatra itself forced the issue.
In June, 1841 the first reports reached Holland about the
(70)
rebellion at Batipu in Minangkabau. However the importance of 
this incident became very much inflated, especially in the mind 
of the King, who apparently saw the rebellion as a confirmation
of the earlier warnings given to him about the impractibility
(71)
of the existing policy in Sumatra. Consequently soon after 
official reports about the Batipu incident had been received on 
12th August, 1841 it was decided at a conference between the 
King and Baud:
’’••that it would be desirable in many ways to change 
those principles to such an extent that although the 
subjection of that territory (i.e. Sumatra) to the 
border of Achin would remain the final goal, this 
would no longer be considered as an object which had 
to be pursued using every effort......... ..”(72)
(70) See Section III, p. 205.
(71) See Disbrowe to Palmerston., 8th and 22nd February, 1841. 
pp. 235-236 of this section.
(72) Kielstra V, op.cit. p. 390.
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Thereupon on 1st September, 1841 an order was sent to the
Governor-General instructing the withdrawal of the Dutch
forces from the East-Coast of Sumatra and extending to Sumatra
the general rule of non-expansion and non-intervention as laid
down by van den Bosch for all the Outer-Possessions with the(73)exception of Sumatra, Banka and Banda. Baud based this decis­
ion on the argument that the conquest of Sumatra drew away too 
many troops from Java. Furthermore, so the Minister argued, 
the recent rebellion of Batipu had shown that the territory 
which had already been brought under Dutch influence was still 
far from being pacified. It was therefore necessary first to 
consolidate the power of the government in the territory which 
was already occupied; and only when this objective had been
accomplished could the rest of Sumatra be conquered without(74)the need for extra troops from Java.
However, in agreement with most commentators on this issue, 
I have found that Baud’s argument of the weakened military 
position in Java was a pretext; and that in fact the real 
reason for the decision to withdraw from the East-Coast of 
Sumatra - as will be shown in the next pages - was far different 
from the one given by Baud publicly.
(73) Baud to Batavia, 1st September, 1841. in Kielstra V. PP*390-397. See also p. 207 of this section.
(74) Ibid.
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Although Baud took the view that it was no business of
the British to interfere in Dutch colonial affairs, he was
acutely aware of the weak position of Holland* First of all
he feared that England - if sufficiently provoked - might
take away the colonies* A pretext for doing so could easily
be found in the fact that one of the conditions under which
the colonies had been returned - i*e. the unification of
Holland and Belgium - was not being fulfilled anymore* Secondly,
the Belgian question had brought the country to the verge of
bankruptcy and made its recovery completely dependent upon the
(73)possession of the colonies, especially Java* Thirdly the Dutch 
liberal party - which had a strong bias towards England - had 
grown considerably in strength; and wanted to avoid at any cost 
a clash with Britain, its spiritual leader* Lastly, the new 
King, William II, was bent upon avoiding any conflict, at 
least at the beginning of his reign, in order to restore the 
popularity of the throne, which had declined in some quarters 
of the Dutch population owing to the Belgian policy of his 
father and the subsequent financial debacle* Therefore Baud — 
as we have seen - was forced to make concessions to the British^ 
in order to stop any further provocation* Taking those factors 
into consideration then, the following dictum of Baud about the 
East-Coast:
(75) See This section p* 232*
“..that that territory is not considered valuable 
enough to venture a clash with England about,.....“(76)
becomes more intelligible. This opinion by Baud about the
value of the East-Coast was probably based on a report by
Merkus, who, after having conducted investigations, concluded
that the trade of the East—Coast had decreased in proportion
to the increase of the trade of Padang. Exports of coffee
were small and imports of salt had decreased. Most of the
salt and cottons imported into Siak during the last few years
(77)had come from Minangkabau. The same information is contained
in a despatch from Baud to Merkus of 6th May, 1841 in which
(78)
the earlier request to temporize with the occupation of the
East-Coast was repeated more positively. Although, so Baud
wrote, he had nothing against the policy of van den Bosch to
bring the whole of Sumatra under Dutch control it was obvious
that the execution of such a policy was sub-ordinate to more
important interests and that:
’‘•••we have to avoid i.a* encouraging by means of 
hastiness and persistence the obvious inclination (79) 
of England to obstruct the realization of our plans..“
The necessity for the Dutch to settle in Siak was not great
enough to risk a controversy with England. If, so Baud argued,
after the occupation of Siak this port would be opened up to
(76) Baud to Verstolk. 8th April, 1841* quot. Goedemans op.cit, 
P.58(77) Merkus to Batavia. 28th April, 1840. quot. Klerck E.S* de 
“De At^eh Oorlog-Deel If Het ontstaan van den oorlog." 
sfGravenhage, Nijhoff, 1912* p.181.
(78) See this section p. 239*(79j Baud to Merkus. 6th May, 1841* Kielstra VI. op.cit. 
pp.3öb-/ö9.
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i n te r n a t io n a l  tr a d e  -  as the  Dutch would he fo rced  to  do -  
th e n  H olland would have no b e n e f i t  from  i t ,  as  the B r i t i s h  
would c e r t a in ly  c la im  th a t  acco rd ing  to  a r t i c l e  3 o f  th e  
t r e a ty  o f 1824 no d i f f e r e n t i a l  t a r i f f  could  be in tro d u ce d .
But a lth o u g h  the Dutch government could  v a l id ly  o b je c t th a t  
a r t i c l e  3 d id  no t apply  to  independen t s t a t e s  which were 
conquered , th e  E ast-C o ast was no t o f s u f f i c i e n t  im portance to  
argue about w ith  th e  B r i t i s h .  While Baud conceded th a t  the  
p o sse ss io n  o f th e  E ast-C o ast would g r e a t ly  f a c i l i t a t e  reach in g  
th e  f i n a l  o b je c tiv e  o f  com plete ly  c o n t ro l l in g  th e  whole of th e  
Sum atran im port and ex p o rt t r a d e ,  he p o in ted  out th a t  th e  same 
o b je c t iv e  could  be reached  by l e s s  o f fe n s iv e  means; i . e .  th e  
c o n s o lid a t io n  o f Dutch power in  th e  populous i n t e r i o r ,  which in  
any case  accounted  f o r  most o f th e  p ro d u c tio n  of co ffee  and th e  
consum ption o f c o t to n s ,  as th e  E ast-C o ast was on ly  sp a rse ly  
p o pu la ted  and p o o rly  endowed w ith  n a tu r a l  r e s o u rc e s . T his 
o b je c t had a lre a d y  been ach ieved  to  a g re a t  e x te n t and as a 
consequence most of th e  E ast-C o ast tr a d e  w ith  the i n t e r i o r  o f  
Sumatra had been d iv e r te d  to  th e  W est-C oast. Baud f u r th e r  
p o in te d  ou t t h a t :
" . .A t  p re se n t we have in  th e  i n t e r i o r  advanced so 
c lo s e ly  to  th e  b o rd e rs  of S iak ; and we have under such 
com plete c o n tro l th e  m arket p la c e s  from where fo rm erly  
produce was sen t e x c lu s iv e ly  to  S ia k , where req u irem en ts 
o f  European goods were o b ta in e d , th a t  E n g lish  tr a d e  
w ith  S iak  on i t s  own account and w ith o u t our e s ta b l i s h ­
ment on th e  r i v e r  o f th e  same name w i l l  co n s id e rab ly
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decrease. Therefore such an establishment, it 
appears to me, could safely he postponed to a more opportune time.........................*» (80)
To recapitulate, Baud realized that England could not he 
provoked much more, or Java, the mainstay of the Dutch economy 
might he lost. Dutch expansion into the East-Coast was useless 
if the Dutch could not introduce differential tariffs there. In 
any case the Dutch already controlled the wealthy interior of 
the island and thereby most of the Sumatran trade. Under those 
circumstances it would he unwise to persist in occupying the 
East-Coast and running the risk of losing everything which had 
been gained so far. This appears to me the real motive behind 
the decision of Baud to stop expansion in Sumatra. Therefore 
the incident of Batipu should he seen as a pretext for making 
the withdrawal from the East-Coast more palatable for Dutch 
public opinion.
Indeed, the weakness of the argumentation in Baud’s public 
statements about the reversal of the Sumatra policy of van den 
Bosch can be gauged from the comments by the East Indian admin­
istration on the order of 1st September, 1841* The reaction to 
this despatch was very unfavourable; and Michiels in reply to a 
request by the Batavian government for his comments on the change 
of policy, objected to Baud’s contention that owing to the rapid
(80) Ibid.
247.
expansion of control in Sumatra since 1838 the Dutch had over­
reached their strength. The importance of the Batipu incident 
had been overemphasized in Holland, according to Michiels, 
because in fact peace and order in the Dutch controlled territ­
ories was established so soundly that a considerable number of 
troops could be withdrawn from Sumatra without endangering the 
security of the Dutch position. It was a great pity that now 
the completion of the final goal - i.e. the subjection of the 
whole of Sumatra - was so near, the government saw fit to stop 
expansion altogether, because:
"..not one century, nor twenty-five years are needed 
for the subjection of Sumatra; one year, (and) the 
will alone is sufficient to complete that task in 
the fullest sense of the word«...•••••••••••....." (81)
However, in order to comply with the instructions from The
Hague, Michiels proposed a number of modifications in the
existing administrative and military policy. The posts at Bila,
Padang Lawas and intermediary points were to be abandoned. But
the mountain range East from Angkola and Mandailing; and the
Batta districts, including those of Toba and Silindung, were to
remain under Dutch control largely for strategic reasons.
Governor-General Merkus - who was also opposed to the idea of
non-expansion - accepted the proposals of Michiels and submitted
(81) Michiels to the Batavian Government. 3rd October, 1842. in 
Kielstra V. pp. 405 - The whole of the despatch covers
pp.398-440.
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(82)them for approval to the Home government. Merkus also reported
the withdrawal from Indragiri after the conclusion of a treaty-
in which Dutch sovereignty was recognized. But in regard to
Djambi the governor-general expressed his doubts as to the
feasibility of withdrawing the garrison of Muarah Kompe, as such
a measure would probably have an undesirable effect on the situ-
(83)ation in Palembang. The proposals were submitted to the King
on 25th January,1844 and Baud commented that the measures which
had been taken were in accordance with the instructions given
earlier, because they would attain the desired objectives of:
”..an increase in the military forces in Java and the 
adoption in Sumatra of a cautious policy, which produces 
more guarantees for order than the too hasty expansion 
which was a feature of the earlier accepted policy.....”(84)
In a further despatch on Djambi in February, 1844 Merkus stressed
the desirability of keeping a military force in that territory,
because the Sultan, according to a report by the Resident, would
certainly be murdered or driven away, if left without Dutch
support, But in order not to antagonize the British Merkus
suggested that a non-differential tariff should be introduced,
which in any case would not cause a great loss to the government,
(85)as customs revenue amounted to only 3400 guilders yearly. In
(82) Merkus to the Minister for Colonies. 20th March,1543. in 
Kielstra V. pp.445-Ki•
(83) Ibid. PP.450-451.f84) Baud to the King. 25th January, 1844. in Ibid. pp*46l-462. 
(85) Merkus to Baud. 11th February, 1844# in Ibid, p.451 note 1.
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August, 1844 the Home government permitted the East Indian 
authorities:
“••not to evacuate Djambi, as long as the peaceful 
condition of Palembang might require the continuous 
occupation of that territory, but to introduce there, 
without making any fuss about it, a non-differential tariff........ .....................................“(86)
Although Baud, as we have seen, was forced to make concess­
ions to the British; and actually stopped Dutch expansion in 
Eastern Sumatra, he had made it clear that this was only a temp­
orary measure, implying that Holland had the fullest right to 
occupy the East-Coast if it desired to. On the contrary Palmer­
ston insisted that the Dutch had no right at all to interfere in 
the independent Sumatran principalities. But on this fundamental 
issue Baud did not give in; and consequently in order to prevent 
this question from being hammered to a conclusion by Palmerston, 
the Dutch Minister took recourse to the well-tried diplomatic
tactic of protracting as long as possible a reply to the rather
(87)sharp notes of May and June, 1841. In addition Baud purposely 
kept the British ambassador ignorant of the decision of September, 
1841 to withdraw from the East-Coast, because he was convinced 
that if the Dutch would withdraw from Eastern Sumatra the 
complaints from the Straits Settlements on which the British 
protests were based would gradually stop* This in fact happened,
(86 ) Baud to Merkus, 2nd August, 1844. quot, Kielstra V,p.451 
note 1,
(87) See pp. 237-238 and p. 240.
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Baud*s diplomatic manoeuvre was helped along by political 
developments in England, where in September, 1841 Palmerston 
was succeeded by Aberdeen, who needed some time to take up 
again from where Palmerston had left off.
But while Baud tried to keep the withdrawal from the East- 
Coast as a trump card to be played at an opportune moment, 
Disbrowe on his part had been trying to induce the Foreign 
Office — without the knowledge of the Dutch government — to 
replace the treaty of 1824 with a new one, which would be more 
in accordance with British interest. Already in June, 1841 the 
British ambassador had outlined a plan to obtain a better deal 
for British commerce and trade in the Archipelago. In that 
report Disbrowe had commented about the financial difficulties 
of the N.H.M. and the Dutch government as follows:
"•••It is now evident that the system of the late King, 
by which He endeavoured to bolster up the manufacturers of the country, has fallen to the ground. As the 
contracts (i.e. with the N.H.M.) will cease in the year 
1843» there is still time to consider whether any steps can be taken to ensure to the British merchants the 
supply of the Java market.......... ......
The Dutch government which was threatened by bankruptcy would
be inclined, so Disbrowe argued, to give up its attempts to
foster its own textile industry, and instead obtain its cottons
from British industry, provided Britain would offer sufficient
compensation. Therefore England should concede some of its
shipping advantage to Holland, because if it proved too difficult
for Dutch ships to compete in the East-Indian trade, the Dutch
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could well decide to obtain their cottons from Belgium. Another
attraction which could be offered to Holland was to offer admiss—(88)
ion of Java sugar into Britain. While Palmerston was not given
time to act on those suggestions, Disbrowe in October, 1841 drew
the attention of Aberdeen to them. Aberdeen took the matter up
and suggested to Dedel, the Dutch ambassador in London, that it
would be desirable to discard the treaty of 1824 and to conclude
a new agreement in order to put a definite stop to the endless
(89)Anglo-Dutch disputes in the Archipelago.
However, Baud - when informed about Aberdeen’s intentions — 
immediately grasped the tremendous repercussions which such a 
move would have on the Dutch position in the Archipelago. He 
realized that the treaty of 1824 was the foundation upon which 
Dutch territorial rights in the East-Indies rested; while in 
addition, from a commercial point of view, the treaty was dist­
inctly advantageous to Holland, as the many complaints by 
British trading interests showed. Therefore in a submission to 
the King, Baud declared that:
"...In so far as I can ;judge the matter, I consider all 
negotiations about the establishment of a new foundation 
for shipping and trade in the Indies as highly dangerous 
for the Netherlands...(and)..In my opinion our interest 
requires that we restrict ourselves...to informing that 
ambassador that no disputes exist any more.••••••••••.9U(90)
(~§8) Disbrowe~o Aberdeen. 19th October, 1841. quot. Goedemans 
op.cit. p. 81.
(89) Dedel to Van Kattendi.1ke« Foreign Minister, 17th December, 
1841. quot. IbidI pp. 88-89.
(90) Baud to the King. 10th January, 1842. quot. Goedemans op.cit. 
PP.90-93.
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Baud decided that the time had come to play his trump 
card; and consequently on 13th January, 1842 the British Ambass­
ador was informed that already in September, 1841 orders had been 
sent to the Indies for the withdrawal of the Dutch forces from 
the East-Coast of Sumatra. The sole reason for the Dutch occupa­
tion of that territory had been, so the note explained, to 
intercept war supplies to the Padris in Central Sumatra. But as 
this fanatic sect, after a struggle of 25 years duration, had 
finally been subdued, the Dutch government saw no reason for
occupying the East-Coast any longer. Furthermore as the decrees
(91)of 1834 had been suspended, no points of dispute existed any 
(92) 
more.
Although Disbrowe seemed initially rather perplexed by the
Dutch note, which gave concessions which had not been asked for
(93)i.e. the complete evacuation of the East-Coast, Aberdeen was 
soon to point out that the Dutch note sidestepped the most 
important point of dispute i.e. the right to occupy independent 
native states in the Archipelago. The Dutch concessions, so the 
British Minister argued, were no guarantee against any future 
actions by the Dutch in independent Indonesian territories; and
(91) See * pp. 234-235.(92) Van Kattendi.jke to Disbrowe. 13th January, 1842. Guedemans quot 
Ibid. P.93.(93) Aberdeen to Disbrowe. 21st January, 1842. quot. Ibid, 
pp.95-99.
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in any case he could not see what the subject of rebellious 
Indonesians had to do with the question under consideration.
The fact remained that the Dutch treaty with Djambi and the 
occupation of Baros and Singkel were against the treaty of 
1824» Finally* Disbrowe was urged to press upon the Dutch 
government that Britain was willing to start negotiations 
immediately to obtain greater reciprocity in the trade relations 
between the two countries in the Archipelago.
There were three reasons for the eventual refusal by the 
Dutch government to negotiate with Britain about a new settle­
ment in the Archipelago. Firstly the realization, especially 
by Baud, that Holland because of the existing precarious state 
of its economy and finances could not afford to suffer a reduc­
tion in the financial remittances from the colonies. Secondly, 
as we have already noted, Baud feared that a change in the 
treaty of 1824 would severely shake the foundation of Dutch 
territorial rights in the Archipelago. Thirdly, at this time 
a swing in Dutch public opinion towards France became evident, 
especially on the part of the King.
The persistent refusal by Britain to recognize the right 
of the Dutch to occupy independent native states made Baud 
realize that his attempts to satisfy the British government by 
making a de facto concession, while not giving in on principle, 
had actually failed; and as he wrote:
M..I have to abandon the position taken earlier, that 
in regard to the relations of Britain with the Nether­
lands no points of difference exist any more.*..*....”(94)
Baud therefore adopted a new stalling technique# While feigning
a certain amount of interest in the British proposals to
negotiate, he pointed out that the time for such negotiations
was rather unsuitable, as the existing economic situation in
Holland did not permit a reduction in the flow of profits(95)remitted from the colonies for the time being#
But while Baud was opposed to negotiations with England
mainly on economic and political grounds, the King was set
against such a move largely on personal grounds# William II -
a rather impulsive personality - had been alienated from
Britain and the East-European Powers because of the Luxembourg (96)
Question. He therefore was inclined to seek closer co-operation 
with Prance; and the French ambassador in The Hague did every­
thing possible to help along this development, especially 
because Prance, which was disquieted by the formation of the 
German Zollverein, tried to reinforce its position. As a
counter-balance to the Germans the French tried to bring about(97)a customs union between themselves, Belgium and Holland# The
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(94) Baud to van Kattendi.ike. 31st March, 1842. Goedemans, op. 
cit. p.121•(95) Van Kattendi.ike to Disbrowe. 20th April, 1842 quot. Ibid.
pp.121-122#(96) Note: In 1840 the question arose whether Luxembourg - which 
was under the House of Orange - should join the recently 
formed German Zollverein (Customs Union), England together 
with the East-European Powers finally managed to join the 
duchy in a commercial union with Germany, against the will 
of William II, who wanted a union with Belgium#(97) Bois le Comte to Desages. 18th August, 1842. quot. Goedemans 
op.cit. p.125.
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Dutch King was full of enthusiasm for the French plan and sent 
a special envoy to Paris for discussions. From the instructions 
to this envoy it can he seen that William was greatly annoyed 
at the way his father and he himself had been treated by the 
Allies:
‘'...The destruction of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
has changed my position: from being the enemy of 
France I have become the ally of that country......”
The King could understand why France acted as it did during the
Belgian revolution, but he could not understand the position the
Allies had taken. In regard to the Luxembourg question he was
thankful for the help offered by France and:
"••my policy consists of being on good terms with all 
powers, but on more confidential terras with France, 
without becoming a satellite of that planet. In a 
war between France and England I will not hesitate 
to choose the side of France, especially if, as is 
very probable, the United States will participate 
with us..................•••••••••••••••.....•••••”(98)
Although the enthusiasm of the King went too far, according to
the French ambassador, who therefore tried to temper it down
somewhat, it cannot be denied that the strong Francophile
feelings of the King, who after all had the final say in
colonial affairs, contributed to the decision to refuse to
negotiate with Britain.
(98) Bois le Comte to Guizot. 30th April, 1842. ouot. Ibid, 
pp.126-127.
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In the meantime Disbrowe during farther discussions
with the Dutch, had come to the conclusion that it would be
difficult to insist on greater reciprocity in colonial trade
so long as the rather stringent measures in the British
(99)colonies were not removed. Consequently the British refrained
from using the complaints of British merchants, but instead
tried to reach their goal of obtaining better conditions for
English trade and commerce in the Archipelago by means of
exchanging concessions. Java sugar was to be given preferential
treatment on the British home market, while discussions would
be held about a similar treatment of coffee and other colonial
produce. In return the British expected preferential treatment(100)
for their shipping and trade in the Dutch colonies.
When Baud in private discussions with Disbrowe showed 
sufficient interest in the British proposals, a note was sent 
to the Dutch government on 29th August, 1842, which in fact was 
the first official British reply to the Dutch refusal to 
negotiate the previous April, Although in this note Britain 
still insisted on the independence of Siak, it would refrain 
from raising this question any further, because the Dutch had
(99) Disbrowe to Aberdeen, 30th May,1842. quot. Goedemans op.cit. 
p.131. NoteI Disbrowe wrote:”...taking into consideration 
the mode in which the import duties are levied at Calcutta,
I am afraid it would be difficult to insist on the principle 
contained in the treaty of commerce and navigation signed
in 1837 between Great Britain and the Netherlands”(i.e. 
most-favoured nation treatment).
(100) Aberdeen to Disbrowe♦ 19th August, 1842. quot. Ibid.pp.133-I_
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withdrawn from that area* It was, however, regretted that
the Dutch were unwilling to negotiate on commercial questions
and therefore they were themselves responsible if they suffered(101)
any harmful effects by persisting in this attitude.
This note was rather satisfying to Baud, as the earlier 
British insistence on a revision of both trading and territorial 
agreements had been reduced to commercial questions only. In re­
ply Baud suggested that Java produce should be imported into 
Britain on Dutch ships, but as this conflicted with the Acts of 
Navigation, Disbrowe had to refer the matter to the British gov­
ernment, In the meantime Baud promised to look into the matter (102)
of lower duties. However when by the end of December, 1842 no 
further reply to the British proposals had been received Disbrowe 
sent a threatening note to the Dutch government. But it still 
took some time before The Hague replied. The Dutch offered a 
reduction of 5% in the import duties on British textiles in 
the East-Indies, but in return requested that Java sugar should 
be allowed into Britain when carried on Dutch ships and further­
more that British duties on Dutch butter and cheese should be 
(103)reduced. The Foreign Office was opposed to the Dutch proposals
(104)
and especially to the last mentioned request. The negotiations 
ended again in failure, as undoubtedly had been the hope and the 
intention of both the King and Baud,
(101) Disbrowe to Kattendi.jke, 29th August,1842, quot,Goedemans 
op, cit. pp, 135-136 •
(102) Baud to van Kattendi.jke, 4th October,1842, pp, 139-141,quot, 
Goedemans op.cit,
(l°3) ^t^van K&'fc‘fcendi.jkQt 27th December,1842.quot.Tart inp
(104) Kattendi.jke to Disbrowe,24th January,1842,quot,Goedemans 
op.cit, pp.lbk-I&Ö.
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SECTION V.
THE WEST-COAST OF SUMATRA s1843—1848.
After the Anglo-Dutch negotiations of 1842/1843 had 
failed the British Foreign Office continued its policy of 
obstructing Dutch expansionary moves wherever possible. The 
Dutch, as we have seen, had already been stopped in Sumatra 
and now Britain turned its attention to Borneo, the Celebes,4)Bali and some of the other Lesser Sunda Islands.
In fact the British denial of the right of the Dutch to
occupy independent Indonesian states brought about a situation
very similar to the one which had existed in the period 1816-
1824» when the Batavian government in order to prevent Raffles
from establishing a British East Indian empire tried to occupy(2)as large an area of the Archipelago as possible. The treaty of
1824 had been designed to eliminate those territorial disputes
by dividing the Archipelago into a Dutch and British sphere of
influence. However, Palmerston's interpretation of articles 9
(3)and 10 of the 1824 treaty actually nullified the Contracting 
Parties' agreement on a demarcation line, causing the Dutch 
territorial position to become again rather shaky.
(1) Tarling. op.cit. pp.147-152.
(2) See Section I, pp. 15-26.
(3) See Section IV, pp. 237-238.
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In any case that is how Baud saw the situation in 1843.
In a letter to Merkus the Colonial Minister - after having 
referred to the attempts of British officials between 1816 and 
1824 to keep parts of Borneo and Sumatra for Britain and the 
subsequent illegal occupation by the British of Singapore - 
pointed to the recent settlements of individual Englishmen in 
Borneo, Bali and Lombok; and to the fact that owing to British 
pressure Holland was forced to refrain from making establishments 
on the East-Coast of Sumatra. An obvious danger to Dutch terri­
torial rights existed, Baud continued, and therefore he instructed 
Merkus to guard those rights effectively. Especially in those 
islands which were in danger of being occupied by a foreign 
power, Dutch sovereign rights should be made clear. There were 
various means for reaching that objective, according to Baud, 
without causing a great deal of publicity, such as scientific 
explorations; administrative measures, subduing riots; and 
mediating in disputes. On the other hand, he warned, his 
instruction did not mean that the existing policy in regard to 
the Outer—Possessions — i.e. non—expansion and non-interference — 
was set aside. The Minister explained that the Outer-Possessions 
were to be divided into two categories. Firstly those islands 
which were fit for economic exploitation and which the government 
intended to occupy in gradual stages, such as Sumatra and Borneo. 
The second category consisted of those islands where the govern—
ment was only interested in maintaining its sovereign rights, 
leaving exploitation for the distant future; and in those 
areas the administrative structure should be at a minimum and
(4)the official attitude a passive one. The way, however, in
which Baud envisaged that expansion should take place in islands
coming under the first category is clarified in a letter to
Governor-General Rochussen in 1845» Military occupation and
the introduction of a government administration would only occur,
after colonists - who Baud hoped to attract from China and other
parts of Asia - had established trading centres and requested
(5)government protection. Thus, the policy of non-expansion had 
been relaxed to such an extent that expansion i.e. actually 
taking possession, could occur provided it followed economic 
exploitation.
This policy of Baud was dictated by two factors. First, 
Baud did not want to spend part of the financial surplus of Java
Th) Baud to Merkus. 4th November,1843« quot. Coli.in "Politiek beleid..” op.cit. p.31. See also Goedemans op.cit.pp.199-202 
and Somer "Körte Verkläringu op.cit.pp.5^-61.
(5) Baud to Rochussen. 28th October, 1845.quot. Somer op.cit. 
pp.60-61. Note: Rochussen. Jan Jacob; born at Breda 1797; 
died at The Hague in 1871; Secretary of the Chamber of 
Commerce of Amsterdam, 1826-1837; Minister for Finance 
1840-1843; Governor-General of the East-Indies, 1845—1851; Member of the Tweede Kamer (House of Representatives), 
1852—1857; Minister for Colonies, 1858-1861; Member of the 
Tweede Kamer, 1864-1869*
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for establishing Dutch authority on a firm basis in the whole 
of the Archipelago, regardless of the economic feasibility of 
such a move. Only when quick financial returns, which would add 
to the remittances sent home, were to be expected would expan­
sion be considered worthwhile. At this stage, it should be 
noted, imperialistic ideas about the establishment of a Greater 
Netherlands State were still far from the minds of Dutch 
politicians. The colonies were considered as a necessary source 
of income which kept Holland’s economy afloat. Therefore any­
thing which tended to reduce this coveted colonial surplus had 
to be prevented. Furthermore, although Java probably could have 
provided the funds for the effective occupation of the whole of
the Netherlands East Indies, there still remained the problem,(6)
which had already been pointed out by van den Bosch, of man­
power needed for administrative and military purposes.
On the other hand the fear of British penetration into the 
Dutch sphere of influence forced Baud to relax the established 
policy of non-expansion and non-interference in cases where this 
was economically feasible; if not, then Dutch sovereign rights in 
the Archipelago had to be made clear to the outside world by 
such devices as the issuing of Dutch flags to local rulers and 
the erection of posts featuring the Dutch coat of arms.
(6) See Section III, p. 135.
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Meanwhile in the Dutch-controlled parts of Centra Sumatra 
no serious disturbances of peace and order occurred between 1841 
and 1844* But in 1844 a rebellion took place in Pau, near Fadang, 
which was instigated by some discontented indigenous leaders and 
a group of fanatic Muslims from the surau (i.e. Mohammedan school) 
of Lubuq Lintah (near Pau). A detachment of government troops 
which was sent to put down the disturbances was repulsed with 
heavy losses. But soon afterwards the rising was subdued and
ten of the rebels were sent into exile to Banda, Riouw and
(7)Ternate.
More important, however, was the deterioration of the 
situation in the districts bordering the Dutch held territories, 
where refugees and Muslim fanatics had congregated and staged 
repeated invasions into Minangkabau. Government troops early in 
January, 1845 repulsed a band of invaders from the kampung Ajer 
Angat (East of Sid^undjung); and action had also to be taken 
against the III Kotas Sungei Pagu and Sungei Abu, which were
threatening the XIII Kotas and had occupied the kampung Talang(8)Berbunga. Michiels, who already in 1842 had directed the
attention of the Batavian authorities to the difficulties which
(9)
could be expected from the independent districts in the interior,
(7) Kielstra V, op.cit. p.534.
(8) Ibid, pp.534-535«(9) See Michiels* comments on policy decision of 1st September, 
TS41 in his despatch of 3rd October, 1842. ouot. p. 247.
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pointed out that apart from the fact that many anti-government
elements had fled there the inhabitants were forced to become
hostile to the Dutch government because of its policy to divert
as much trade as possible from the East-Coast to Padang. This
interfered with the traditional transit trade between Minang—
kabau and the East—Coast ports, which was carried on by the
people living along the Eastward flowing rivers in the interior.
According to Michiels it was impossible to put an effective stop
to those hostilities unless those territories were effectively
occupied by the Dutch. Furthermore, Michiels - pointing to
Baud’s instructions of 1st September, 1841 which allowed conquest
only when this was necessitated by circumstances - submitted that
the repeated incursions from the Kwantan and Sungei Pagi(10)
districts were a case in point. But a resolution by the 
Batavian government of 4th May, 1845 declared that the latest 
instructions from The Hague dictated a cautious policy; and 
although the Governor’s report was considered important enough 
to be submitted to the Home government, in the meantime;
"...no new districts are to be occupied unless this is 
absolutely necessary for our safety within the borders 
which have been occupied lately................. ••••”(11)
(10) Michiels to Batavia. 16th January, 1845« ouot. Kielstra.V. op.cit. pp.536-540.
(11) Resolution of Batavian Government. 4th May, 1845« quot. 
Kielstra V, pp.540-541«
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Together with Michiels1 report governor-general Van Rijnst
sumitted to Baud that the hostility of the interior districts
could be stopped by abolishing the severe restrictions on the
import and export trade with the East-Coast, which included the
confiscation of goods when smugglers were caught. The core of
the trouble, according to van Rijnst, was that not enough
competition existed in the government territories owing to the
prominence of the N.H.M. and the salt and opium monopolies, which
caused low prices to be paid for local produce and high prices
for foreign imports. The trading conditions in Western Sumatra
should be made more attractive by creating a more competitive
market. This would increase the import and export trade of the
government districts far more than the existing oppressive(12)
measures adopted for stopping East-West trade.
Baud in his reply to the King about those submissions 
reiterated his earlier argument that in no case Sumatra was 
to become a financial burden; and
"••in regard to the argument, that a continuous expansion 
of territory would tend to ensure general peace and cause 
a consolidation of our power, I still remain of the 
opinion that, as great necessity yet exists to keep our 
measures in proportion to our financial means no conquests 
should be made than are strictly required for the quiet 
administration of what has already been occupied. We 
must as it were proceed reluctantly.
(12) Van Ri.1nst.to Baud. 4th May, 1845» ouot. Ibid.pp.541-542.
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A lth o u g h , so  Baud c o n c e d e d , o c c a s io n s  c o u ld  a r i s e  w hich  
n e c e s s i t a t e d  e x p a n s io n  he d id  n o t  a g re e  w i th  M ic h ie ls  t h a t  
th e  p r e s e n t  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w i th  t h e  b o r d e r - d i s t r i c t s  w a r ra n te d  
su c h  a m ove. The d i s s e n s io n  was a p p a r e n t ly  c a u se d  by 
m e a su re s  ta k e n  by th e  governm ent to  g iv e  th e  t r a d e  o f  th e  
S um atran  i n t e r i o r  a  W este rn  d i r e c t i o n ,  d e s p i t e  th e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h i s  t r a d e  was n a t u r a l l y  i n c l i n e d  to w a rd s  th e  E a s t .  The a rg u ­
m ent by M ic h ie ls  t h a t  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w ould s to p  i f  th e  E a s t -  
C o a s t p o r t s  w ere  o c c u p ie d  was n o t  v a l i d  a s  a l l  t h a t  w ould 
h appen  was t h a t  th e  d i s s e n s io n  w ould b e  d i s p la c e d  fro m  th e  
i n t e r i o r  t o  th e  E a s t - C o a s t .  The r e a l  i s s u e  a t  s t a k e  was th e  
f a c t  t h a t  th e  S um atran  p e o p le  d id  n o t  w an t to  be  b u rd en e d  by 
any fo rm  o f  t a x a t i o n  o r  o th e r  ty p e s  o f  governm ent i n t e r f e r e n c e .  
F u rth e rm o re  th e  o c c u p a tio n  o f  th e  E a s t-C o a s t  w ould c a u se  a 
ren e w a l o f  th e  a rg u m en ts  w ith  B r i t a i n ,  w hich d e n ie d  th e  D u tch  
th e  r i g h t  to  l e v y  d i f f e r e n t i a l  t a r i f f s  t h e r e ;  an d :
H. . i n  o r d e r  to  p re v e n t  su c h  an  a rg u m e n t, we w ould have 
to  in t r o d u c e  -  when i n  p o s s e s s io n  o f  th e  E a s t-C o a s t  -  
v e ry  l i b e r a l  t a r i f f s ;  and how w ould t h a t  p o s s e s s io n  
i n  su c h  a c a se  be a d v a n ta g e o u s  from  th e  p o in t  o f  view  
o f  o u r  t r a d e  and in d u s t r y ?  Not a t  a l l . . ...............
B aud, h o w e v e r, was i n c l i n e d  t o  a g re e  w ith  th e  p r o p o s a ls  o f th e
g o v e rn o r—g e n e r a l  to  a b o l i s h  th e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o f  th e  t r a d e  w i th
th e  E a s t - C o a s t ,  p ro v id in g  th e  l o s s  in  governm ent rev e n u e  was
n o t to o  g r e a t .  B ut i f  i t  a p p e a re d  t h a t  su c h  a p o l i c y  would
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r e s u l t  in  a co n s id e ra b le  in c re a se  in  im ports from th e  E a s t-  
C oast o f such commodities a s  s a l t ,  opium and c o tto n s  th en  one 
would have to  choose between two e q u a lly  d is a g re e a b le  
a l t e r n a t iv e s  i . e . :
u. . . t h e  c o n tin u a tio n  o f th e  e x is t in g  system , to g e th e r  
w ith  th e  h o s t i l e  f e e l in g  o f a g re a t  p a r t  o f th e  
ind igenous p o p u la tio n , o r th e  s a c r i f i c in g  o f p a r t  
o f our revenue in  Sumatra and o f  a f a i r l y  co n s id e rab le  
m arket f o r  N eth e rlan d s c o t t o n s . . . . . . ......... ..”
Under the  c irc u m sta n ces , Baud th o u g h t, th e  b e s t  means to  so lv e
th e  problem  would be to  in tro d u c e  a p o l l  t a x ,  which would enab le
th e  government to  reduce th e  t a r i f f  on co ffee  q u ite  c o n s id e ra b ly .
On the o th e r  hand a p o l l  t a x ,  Baud f e a r e d ,  could cause even
(13)
g r e a te r  d is s e n s io n  among th e  p o p u la tio n  th an  a lre a d y  e x is te d .
But th e  M in is te r  l e f t  i t  f o r  the  g o v ern o r-g en era l to  decide —
a f t e r  hav ing  rece iv ed  f u r th e r  in fo rm a tio n  and adv ice  -  on a new
p o lic y  o r to  acq u iesce  in  the  e x i s t in g  s i t u a t io n  w ith  a l l  i t s
(14)
obvious in co n v en ien ces .
I t  to o k , how ever, t i l l  Septem ber, 1846 b e fo re  M ich ie ls  
r e p l ie d  to  a re q u e s t by the  g o v ern o r-g en era l f o r  h i s  f u r th e r  
o p in io n  on the  q u e s tio n  o f E ast-W est tra d e  in  C e n tra l Sum atra.
The governor t r i e d  to  p lay  down the  e a r l i e r  o b je c tio n s  r a is e d  
by th e  g o v ern o r-g en era l to  th e  sev ere  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on tra d e  
w ith  th e  E a s t-C o a s t; and he p o in ted  ou t th a t  those  r e s t r i c t i o n s
(13) Baud to  th e  K ing. 27th  November, 1845* cruot.  K ie l s t r a  V.
P P .543-547.
(14) Baud to  B a ta v ia . 8 th  December, 1845. q u o t.  I b id ,  p .5 4 3 .
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were not causing any more inconvenience to the people concerned 
than the levying of customs did anywhere else. Michiels agreed 
that one solution to the problem of low prices for export 
produce and high prices for imports was to decrease duties; 
but:
•’..the Malay did not pay any land or poll tax; and 
as long as that is the case the treasury could not 
do without the customs revenue.. ......••••
Furthermore it was important to make the West-Coast — where so
much Dutch money and energy had already been spent - a paying
proposition as soon as possible. The amount of customs revenue
received depended obviously on the output of export commodities;
and:
”..Therefore the question is : is this output sufficient?
Is it proportional to the real productive capacity of 
a population of nearly 500,000, who inhabitate the most 
fertile regions of the rich island of Sumatra? I venture 
to say with confidence: no..................... ....... ”
Agriculture, so Michiels argued, was mainly left to the lower
layers of society in Minangkabau, while also a great deal of
work was left to the women. The Minangkabau, however, spent
most of his time in idleness unless he sought to overcome his
boredom by inciting civil strife or war. In addition the Min—
angkabau had little incentive to engage in agriculture, as the
natural fertility of the land provided him — without much
effort on his own account - with enough food for his subsistence.
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Furtherm ore th e  p r o f i t  in c e n tiv e  was g r e a t ly  weakened because
th e  grower o f  expo rt produce rece iv ed  on ly  l i t t l e  r e tu r n  f o r
h is  h ard  work, as most o f th e  p r o f i t  ended up in  th e  pockets
o f middlemen and c o o l ie s ,  who had to  be p a id  a co n s id e ra b le
amount o f  money f o r  t r a n s p o r t in g  the produce to  th e  coast®
T herefo re  the o n ly  way to  encourage the  p ro d u c tio n  o f expo rt
com m odities, accord ing  to  M ic h ie ls , was to  ensure th e  grower
a la r g e r  sh a re  of the p ro fits®  T h is  was p o s s ib le  even w ith
low p r ic e s  r u l in g  the m arket. D esp ite  th e  in s t ru c t io n s  l a i d
down by van den Bosch in  1833 w hich forb ad e in te r fe r e n c e  in
ind igenous a f f a i r s  -  in c lu d in g  a g r i c u l tu r a l  p ro d u c tio n  -
M ich ie ls  argued th a t  in  t h i s  case  i t  was a b s o lu te ly  n ecessa ry
th a t  the  government took  d i r e c t  s te p s  in  an a ttem pt to  r a i s e
th e  o u tp u t o f co ffee  -  th e  most im p o rtan t ex p o rt commodity
produced in  Minangkabau -  because o u tp u t had so f a r  rem ained
U 5 )
f a r  below what i t  should and could have been® In  o rd e r  then
(1 3 )  N ote:Indeed  a s u b s ta n t ia l  f a l l  in  c o ffe e  p ro d u c tio n  had 
o ccu rred  s in c e  1843 as the fo llo w in g  s t a t i s t i c s  show:
E xports o f co ffee from Padang -  piculs®
1819 4 ,0 0 0 1828 29 ,0 0 0 1837 6 0 ,0 0 0  1846
1820 1 7 ,0 0 0 1829 4 0 ,0 0 0 1838 5 6 ,0 0 0  1847
1821 1 4 ,0 0 0 1830 28 ,0 0 0 1839 9 6 ,0 0 0
1822 25 ,000 1831 4 0 ,0 0 0 1840 9 1 ,0 0 0
1823 26 ,0 0 0 1832 6 1 ,0 0 0 1841 94 ,0 0 0
1824 28 ,0 0 0 1833 8 1 ,0 0 0 1842 8 3 ,0 0 0
1825 3 3 ,0 0 0 1834 7 9 ,0 0 0 1843 1 0 0 ,0 0 0
1826 4 8 ,0 0 0 1835 8 2 ,0 0 0 1844 7 5 ,0 0 0
1827 4 0 ,0 0 0 1836 8 7 ,0 0 0 1845 8 3 ,0 0 0
6 7 ,0 0 0
3 8 ,0 0 0
S o u rce : K ie l s t r a  E.B . HDe K o ff ie c u ltu u r  t e r  W est-kust van 
Sum atra” in  In d isch e  G id s, 1 8 8 8 , P a r t  I I ,  p®1486®
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t o  e n c o u ra g e  th e  p r o d u c t io n  o f  c o f f e e  and t o  b a la n c e  g o v e rn ­
m ent e x p e n d i tu r e  w ith  l o c a l  re v e n u e  M ic h ie ls  p ro p o se d  to  
o f f e r  to  in d ig e n o u s  p l a n t e r s  i n  M inangkabau a minimum g u a ra n te e d  
p r i c e  o f  7 g u i l d e r s  p e r  p i c u l .  A lso  th e  g ro w er sh o u ld  n o t  be 
b u rd en e d  by t r a n s p o r t  c o s t s ;  and t h e r e f o r e  th e  g o v e rn o r  p ro p o se d  
to  have  th e  c o f f e e  t r a n s p o r t e d  by c o m p u lso ry  s e r v i c e .  Only 
ab o u t 3 % o f  th e  w o rk in g  p o p u la t io n  w ould be n eed ed  f o r  t h i s  
u n p a id  t r a n s p o r t  s e r v i c e ;  and in  any c a se  th e  g o v e rn o r  c o n s id e re d  
t h i s  p e r s o n a l  ta x  o n ly  a  v e ry  s m a ll  b u rd e n  e s p e c i a l l y  on th e
l a r g e  num ber o f l o a f e r s  who d id  n o t  pay  any o t h e r  t a x e s  and
( 1 6 )
o n ly  w a sted  t h e i r  tim e  g a m b lin g .
B u t th e  r e s i d e n t  o f  M inangkabau , S te in m e tz ,  was opposed  to  
th e  p r o p o s a l s  o f  M ic h ie ls .  The R e s id e n t  a rg u e d  t h a t  i n  a 
c o u n try  w here d e m o c ra tic  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w ere p ro m in e n t and in d iv ­
id u a l  la n d o w n e rsh ip  was v e ry  r e s t r i c t e d ;  and w here  fu r th e rm o re  
th e  f e r t i l i t y  o f  th e  s o i l  d id  n o t  r e q u i r e  a g r e a t  d e a l  o f  
e f f o r t  to  p ro v id e  th e  p o p u la t io n  w i th  i t s  e s s e n t i a l  n e e d s ,  a 
sy s te m  o f  heavy  d u t i e s  was th e  w o rs t  t h a t  c o u ld  be d e v is e d .
H igh  t a r i f f s  d e p re s s e d  th e  p r i c e  o f  e x p o r t  p ro d u ce  c a u s in g  a 
f a l l  i n  p r o d u c t io n ;  and th e y  in c r e a s e d  th e  c o s t  o f  im p o r ts ,
(16)  M ic h ie ls  to  B a ta v ia . 2 3 rd  S e p te m b e r, 1846. in  K i e l s t r a  
"De i t o f f i e c u l t u u r . •** o p . c i t .  p p . 1465-1468•
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causing a fall in consumption of European manufactures. If
the existing system was maintained then it would have to be
followed very soon by compulsory measures, because the people
on their own account had no incentive to grow more coffee. A
compulsory system was fitting in Java where the people were
used to being forced from above, but this was not so in
Sumatra, where the population was accustomed to a great deal
of personal freedom. Steinmetz therefore was of the opinion
that a system of direct taxation - the incidence of which
should be appropriate to the wealth of the individual districts —
would be a far more appropriate revenue earner than customs 
(17) 
duties*
Also General Von Gagern - who had been on an inspection 
tour of West-Sumatra — was inclined to agree with Steinmetz; 
and he submitted that in order to raise production it would be 
better to rely on the self-interest of the people than on force. 
It was highly desirable that duties should be reduced; commun­
ications through the mountain passes improved; and the hated(18)
compulsory services abolished.
But governor—general Rochussen declared himself in agree­
ment with the proposals of Michiels and by resolution of 30th
Tl7) Note of the Resident of Minangkabau. September,1846* in 
Ibid. pp.1468-1471•
(18) Note of General Von Gagern. 25th September, 1846. in Ibid* 
pp. 11+71-1473*
271.
March, 1847 he empowered the governor of Sumatra^ West- 
Coast to offer planters a guaranteed minimum price of six 
guilders per picul of coffee delivered to the government; to 
pay the indigenous heads and officials, who encouraged produc­
tion, 50 cents per picul of coffee produced in their districts; 
and to have the coffee transported to the coast without the 
help of the growers* Furthermore the governor was requested to 
investigate and report on the best means for improving roads
and means of transport; and to see if it would be desirable for
(19)the government to bear part of the cost of coffee transport* 
Subsequently on 20th September, 1847 Michiels issued a 
decree ordering that all coffee produced was to be delivered to 
the government at fixed prices, after which it would be sold at 
Padang by auction. All coffee transported from Minangkabau to 
the coast had to be accompanied by certificates issued by the 
administrative officer in charge of the district from where the 
coffee originated. Any coffee transported without such a cert-
(20)
ificate was to be confiscated.
More detailed instructions were issued by Michiels in 
October, 1847* Coffee, none of which could be bought or sold 
by private persons before delivery to the government, was to 
be delivered by the grower at the nearest government warehouse,
(19) Resolution of the governor-general. 30th March. 1847* quot* 
Kielstra uDe Koffiecultuur...H op*cit. p*l473#
(20) Michiels instructions of 20th September. 1847. in. Ibid* 
pp. 1478-1479#
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after having been cleaned, hulled and dried. Growers would 
be paid immediately on delivery at rates fixed in proportion 
to the quality of their produce. But after a period of six 
months no more 3rd grade coffee would be accepted; and the 
administrative officers and indigenous heads concerned were to 
ensure that only the best quality coffee would be delivered.
To that purpose administrative officers were instructed to 
hold regular inspections, choosing suitable areas for the use 
of large regularly laid out plantations and inducing the 
population to adopt more efficient production methods. In 
regard to the transport problem the governor decided the 
following. The growers were required to deliver their produce 
to government warehouses, which were to be erected at convenient 
points all over the country. Large central stores were to be 
built at Padang.Pandjang, Port de Kock, Port van der Capellen, 
Pajacombo and Solok, while smaller warehouses were to be erected 
at eleven other centres. Those buildings were to be constructed 
by the population at no cost; and the government would only 
supply certain building materials such as iron. The cost of 
transport from those establishments to the coast was to be 
born by the government. Preferably use should be made of horse- 
carts and packhorses, but where this was not feasible coolies 
were to be employed. Furthermore the main tracts leading from 
Minangkabau to the coast would be widened to such an extent that
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th ey  could  ta k e  h o rse  drawn c a r ts *  In  f a c t ,  so M ich ie ls
r e p o r te d ,  work on the  road  from Kaju Tanam to  Padang Pandjang
was a lre a d y  so f a r  advanced th a t  i t  was u sab le  f o r  h o rse -
c a r t  t r a f f i c ;  and a c o n tra c t  had been concluded w ith  W.
Townsend, a Padang m erchan t, f o r  th e  d e l iv e ry  o f government
s a l t  to  Kaju Tanam and th e  c a rry in g  o f c o ffee  from  th e re  to
( 2 1 )
th e  c o a s t .  In  a d d i t io n  to  the p ro v is io n s  made f o r  t r a n s p o r t ,  
ind igenous le a d e r s  and o f f i c i a l s  were o f fe re d  in c e n tiv e  pay­
m ents o f  50 c e n ts  p e r p ic u l o f c o ffe e  produced in  t h e i r  
r e s p e c tiv e  d i s t r i c t s ,  p ro v id in g  th ey  were co n sid ered  as showing
(22)
s u f f i c i e n t  z e a l in  the  prom otion o f c o ffe e  p roduction*
Summarizing, th o se  in s t r u c t io n s  by M ich ie ls  in c lu d e  many 
f e a tu re s  o f th e  c u l tu re  system  in  Java* In  f a c t  th e  Minang- 
kabais, a p a r t  from being  re q u ire d  to  d e l iv e r  a l l  co ffee  to  the  
governm ent, were fo rced  in d i r e c t ly  to  grow more and b e t t e r  
co ffee  by th e  p re ssu re  put on them by t h e i r  own le a d e r s ,  whose 
f in a n c ia l  i n t e r e s t s  were a t  s ta k e .  However, the  new system  -
(23)
as w i l l  be d isc u sse d  in  th e  nex t p a r t  — worked w e ll and 
r e s u l te d  in  a c o n s id e rab le  in c re a s e  in  output*
But w hile M ich ie ls  had managed to  convince h is  s u p e r io rs  
o f the  n e c e s s i ty  o f h is  economic p o lic y  a t  the W est-Coast h is
(21) R eport o f M ich ie ls  to  th e  g o v e rn o r-g e n e ra l* 26th  O ctober, 
184-7. q u o t.  K ie l s t r a  HDe K o f f ie c u l tu u r . . u opf c it.p p * 1 4 7 5 -  
1477.
(22) Reglement op den inkoop en a fv o e r van h e t  k o ff ie p ro d u c t in  
de Padangsche Bovenlanden* g e a r re s te e re d  by b e s lu i t  van den 
Gouverneur t e r  Sum atrans W estkust* dd* 11 O cto b er*1847. in
I b id ,  pp. 1460- 1485•
(23) See l S ec tio n V II , pp
274.
attempts to have the Home government waive its objections to 
the occupation of the East-Coast were far less successful.
In fact both Michiels and governor-general Rochussen were 
opposed - although for somewhat different reasons - to the 
policy of non-expansion in the Outer-Possessions. Michiels* 
concern was more localized as he tried to convince the Home 
government that the occupation of the East-Coast was a pre­
requisite to the proper establishment of peace and order in 
Central Sumatra. But Rochussen pressed The Hague for a 
revision of the policy of non-expansion in general on the 
grounds that Dutch sovereignty could never be properly upheld 
without effective occupation. Actually Rochussen*s requests
had been triggered off by Baud himself, who in December, 1845 —
(24)when upset by the activities of the British in Borneo - had
aksed what could be done:
’’...for the establishment of our territorial and 
political supremacy in the Indian Archipelago and 
the security of our sovereign rights over those 
parts where those rights...can be disputed with us 
by other nations........ ....... ....... ...... •” (25)
(24) Note: On 10th December, 1845 in reply to Dutch protests 
about the appointment of Brooke as British agent in Borneo, 
Aberdeen had pointed out to the Dutch ambassador that this 
did not interfere with the treaty of 1824 because article 
12 of that treaty which prevented the British from making 
establishments or concluding treaties, did not apply to 
Borneo as that island had not been specifically named as 
belonging within the Dutch sphere of influence. See Irwin 
’’Nineteenth Century Borneo” op.cit. pp. 105-106.
(25) Baud to Rochussen. 19th December, 1845. in Coli.in ’’Politiek 
beleid..” op.cit. p.34.
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But when the British government a few days later notified
The Hague about the establishment of a coaling station on
Labuan, an island off the coast of Borneo, Baud tried to
answer the question of protecting sovereign rights himself
by instructing Rochussen to declare the whole of Borneo a
province (gouvernement) of the Netherlands Indies, in order
(26)
to stop any further British penetration into Borneo. Baud 
was apparently mainly interested in presenting the outside 
world with a formal declaration of Dutch sovereignty, but 
Rochussen wanted to go further than that and introduce effect­
ive control, because:
H...possession in name gives little guarantee for 
the future, (but) de facto possession obtained by 
efficient and progressive development will take 
away all pretexts and does not only secure our supremacy but it will also increase our shipping 
and trade................ .............. . M
The time had come, Rochussen continued, to use some of the
financial surplus produced by Java and which so far had all
been remitted to the mother country, for the development of
(27)the Outer—Possessions. However, Rochussen*s request for 
100,000 guilders needed for his plan to establish the provinces 
of West and East Sumatra; the construction of roads in South
(26) Baud to Rochussen« 21st December, 1845. quot. Colijn 
uPolitiek beleid.." op.cit,p.3Ö.
(27) Rochussen to Baud. 18th June, 1846. quot. Ibid. p.40.
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Sumatra; and the setting up of a special commission for the 
Outer-Fossessions, was refused by Baud on the grounds that:
"...most of the Outer-Possessions have always been 
financial burdens. The improvement of their 
prosperity and trade is certainly desirable, but 
by wishing to do too much at once, their deficits 
would keep growing from year to year.............M(28)
Although very anxious to affirm Dutch sovereignty in the
Archipelago, Baud considered it sufficient to do this outwardly,
without establishing direct internal control. The Colonial
Minister still clung to the policy objectives which were laid
down by van den Bosch in 1833; i*e. first to exploit Java and
Sumatra while keeping the rest of the Archipelago loosely under
Dutch control until such time that economic exploitation in
those areas became feasible.
In Sumatra the major objective of controlling the wealth 
of that island had largely been reached; and further expansion 
into the East-Coast was, according to Baud, not a profitable 
proposition because the British would object to the introduc­
tion of differential tariffs. The main objective of Dutch 
policy in Sumatra was the establishment of a trading monopoly, 
which in any case had been reached to a considerable extent 
as the most fertile parts of the island - i.e. the valleys of 
Minangkabau - had been brought under firm Dutch control.
(28) Baud to the King. 1846 quot. Ibid. pp. 43-44*
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Especially after the introduction of Michiels system of 
coffee production this area could he expected to become a 
paying proposition in the near future. In short, van den 
Bosch and Baud and for that matter the majority of Dutchmen 
at the time considered the colonies solely from a business 
point of view, although — as will be discussed in the next 
part - differences of opinion existed as to how this business 
should be run. Money was only to be spent - and even then as 
little as possible - on those islands which promised a quick 
return. The other areas in the Archipelago were to be kept in 
reserve for future exploitation. It should be noted that at 
this time imperialistic motives are far from the minds of the 
Dutch. Political expansion was allowed only for purely economic 
reasons. Such nationalistic notions as the establishment of a 
Greater Netherlands state and the spreading of Dutch culture 
are still far away in the distant future. In fact the policy 
of least possible interference in indigenous affairs points 
decidedly the other way. Interference in internal affairs was 
only permitted if it would increase profitability and even then 
the authorities would think twice about causing social upheavals 
which would disturb peace and order, which in turn would result 
in costly expeditions and increase overheads. During the 
period under discussion the Dutch considered themselves as the 
managers of a gigantic business enterprise, no more and no less.
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H ow ever, th e  D u tch  w ere n o t  a llo w e d  to  m o n o p o lize  th e  t r a d e  
o f  th e  A rc h ip e la g o  f o r  th e m s e lv e s ;  and  i n  1824 th e y  had  been  
f o r c e d  i n t o  a p a r t n e r s h i p  w i th  th e  o t h e r  c o n te n d e r  B r i ta in *
B ut t h i s  p a r t n e r s h i p  had  in  f a c t  b ro k e n  u p  m a in ly  b e c a u se  o f  
th e  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  o f  th e  p a r tn e r s *  The econom ic and m i l i t a r y  
s u p e r i o r i t y  o f  B r i t a i n  te n d e d  to  re d u c e  H o llan d  to  a  s l e e p in g  
p a r t n e r  w ith  an e v e r  d e c r e a s in g  s h a re  o f  th e  p r o f i t s .  The 
D utch  t r i e d  to  p re v e n t  E a s t  I n d ia n  t r a d e  and commerce from  
becom ing a B r i t i s h  m onopoly by in t r o d u c in g  a m onopoly o f  t h e i r  
own* I t  was t h i s  m onopoly a s p e c t  o f  D utch  c o lo n i a l  p o l ic y  -  
n e c e s s i t a t e d  by B r i t i s h  suprem acy  i n  th e  f i r s t  p la c e  -  w hich  
made B r i t a i n  d e c id e  to  c a l l  a h a l t  to  any f u r t h e r  D u tch  
e x p a n s io n  in to  h i t h e r t o  in d e p e n d e n t In d o n e s ia n  t e r r i t o r i e s *
B ut Baud a p p e a rs  to  have  b e en  c o n te n t  w i th  w hat had  b een  
a c h ie v e d  so  f a r  and d id  n o t  w ish  to  ta k e  m ea su re s  w h ich  o n ly  
c o u ld  d e c re a s e  th e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  th e  c o lo n ie s *  H ow ever,
Baud was n o t  p e r m i t t e d  t o  p u rs u e  h i s  p o l i c i e s  f o r  much l o n g e r ,  
b e c a u se  i n  1848 he was r e l i e v e d  o f  h i s  p o s t  when a l i b e r a l  
governm ent to o k  o v e r  i n  The Hague a f t e r  a  b lo o d le s s  r e v o l u t i o n ,  
w hich  was a c o n seq u en ce  o f  v i o l e n t  p o l i t i c a l  u p h e a v a ls  i n  o th e r  
p a r t s  o f  E urope d u r in g  t h a t  y e a r .  The e f f e c t s  o f  1848 on D u tch  
c o lo n ia l  p o l ic y  w ere c o n s id e r a b le ,  b u t  t h e i r  d i s c u s s io n  w i l l  be 
l e f t  f o r  th e  n e x t  s e c t io n *
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SECTION VI.
THE EFFECT OF LIBERALISM AND HUMANITARIAN!SM 
ON THE POLICY OP NON-EXPANSION,
The constitutional revision of 18*48 caused a marked 
change in the relations between the mother—country and the 
colonies. A great deal of the power over the colonies was 
transferred from the King to Parliament. The States-General 
were given the responsibility over colonial finances; and 
they were also requested to prescribe a new Regeeringsreg- 
lement (Fundamental Law) for the colonies. In addition the 
King was required to submit to Parliament annual reports onu)colonial administration and affairs.
This increased parliamentary jurisdiction over colonial 
affairs gave the Liberal faction - which had become increas­
ingly critical of government colonial policy - the opportunity 
to press its demands for a modification of the monopoly system
(1) Note: The Constitution of 1848 provided that:
^Article 59« Supreme power over the colonies and possessions 
of the Realm in other parts of the world is vested in the 
King. Fundamental laws regulating the governments admin­
istration there are to be laid down by law. The monetary 
system is to be regulated by law. Other matters, concerning 
those colonies and possessions, are to be regulated by law, 
as soon as the necessity thereof appears to exist.
Article 60. The King is to give annually to the States 
General a comprehensive report about the administration of 
those colonies and possessions and about the existing state 
of affairs there. The management of and responsibility 
for finances is regulated by law.1 1 
Source: Alberts A MBaud en Thorbecke, 1847-1851»M(Utrechtse 
Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis, het Staatsrecht en de 
Economie van Nederlandsch-Indie.XVIl) Utrecht, Oosthoek,
1939« ouot. p.29#
280.
of van den Bosch. The liberals were just as eager to 
receive the ever growing profits from the colonies, but 
for both economic and humanitarian reasons they wanted a 
change in the culture system. The following quotation from 
a parliamentary speech by van Hoevell gives a clear illus­
tration of the liberal position:
M...The impression is given, that the opposition 
wants to deprive the nation of those millions; 
the impression is given, that our system were: 
no direct benefits from the Indies. This is an 
untruth. We,however, want those benefits by other 
means; we do not want to further the interests of 
the Netherlands at the cost of the Indian popul­
ation, but by means of their prosperity. That 
prosperity comes first and then the benefits.....M(2)
The liberals demanded more scope for private enterprise in 
colonial trade and agriculture, mainly because Dutch entre­
preneurs were desiring to invest surplus capital, which the 
culture and consignment system had enabled them to accumulate 
in the first place. Furthermore there was a strong belief in 
the liberal doctrine that private enterprise - free from 
unnecessary government interference - would not only increase
(2) Speech of van Hoevell in the Tweede Kamer (Second Chamber),
18th July, 1854» in Handelingen der Regeering en der Staten
Generaal betreffende het Reglement op het Beieid der Reg­
eering van Nederlandsch-Indie. Derde Deel. Beraadslagingen.
Utrecht, Kemink, 1857« P.37* Note: Wolter Robert baron van
Hoevell went to the Indies in I836 as a minister of the
Dutch Reformed Church. Van Hoevell was an ardent liberal 
and had a genuine interest in trying to improve the lot of
the indigenous population. In his periodical the "Tijdsch-
rift voor Nederlandsch Indie2 *11 he propounded his ideas, but 
in 1848 after having participated in an anti-government
demonstration in Batavia he lost his position and returned 
to Holland. There he was elected to the Tweede Kamer 
(Second Chamber) where he became the liberal faction’s expert on colonial affairs.
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the profits of the Indies even further, but that it would 
also create the best possible world for everybody, including 
the downtrodden Javanese, who were suffering terribly from the 
excesses of the culture system. In fact the pressure put on 
the indigenous population by both Dutch and Indonesian admin­
istrative personnel in order to raise the production of export 
commodities even at the cost of food production had resulted 
in great calamities in some parts of Java. A famine in Demak 
caused the population to decrease from 336,000 to 120,000
between 18i+8 and 1850, while in Grobogan the population
(3)diminished from 89,000 to 9»000. Initially, however, the
liberal programme did not demand an immediate abolition of 
the culture system, but it pressed for its modification in 
order to grant more scope for private enterprise and to 
secure a more humane treatment of the indigenous population.
In fact most parliamentarians, realizing their unfamiliarity 
with the actual situation in the Indies, were unwilling to press 
for too drastic changes in colonial administration out of fear 
that the flow of profits might diminish.
Therefore in regard to colonial affairs the liberals 
tended to be less progressive, as can be seen from the fact that
(3) Colenbrander H.T* "Koloniale Geschiedenis" Deel III. p.42.
282.
the first Thorbecke cabinet included Pahud - a conservative - 
as Minister for Colonies. Furthermore the new Regee ringsreg** 
lement of 1854 was clearly a compromise between liberal and 
conservative principles. Article 56 of the new regleraent 
stipulated that the existing government cultures would be 
maintained. However, preparations were to be made for an 
arrangement whereby after a period of transition the govern­
ment would withdraw from the economic sector; forced labour 
would be abolished; and private enterprise would be able to 
conclude contracts with the indigenous population. Furthermore 
excessive pressure on indigenous labour was condemned; and 
an investigation into the workings of the culture system was 
ordered. Any measures taken by the Governor-General in
relation to article 56 were to be mentioned in the annual
(4)Colonial Reports to Parliament.
This initial apprehension of the liberals and the unwill­
ingness of the conservatives to abolish government enterprise 
which had proved to be a reliable source of income led to the 
idea of a division of labour between government and private 
enterprise in the exploitation of the Netherlands East Indies. 
The fact that the culture system was concentrated mainly on 
Java directed the attention of private enterprise to the
(4) Colenbrander "Koloniale Geschiedenis" III. op.cit. pp.46-47»
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Outer-Possessions. Already in August, 1848 Rijk, the
successor of Baud, had pointed out that the East-Indian
government - as long as it was required to remit surplus
capital to the Home government - would never have sufficient
funds and manpower at its disposal for the development of
the whole of the Netherlands Indies. Therefore the aid of
(5)private capital and management should be co-opted.
This idea of a division of labour is a salient feature 
of a report by a Commission set up in 1850 to investigate the 
feasibility of handing over to private enterprise the government 
tin mines in Banka. The report stated that the apparent lack 
of interest so far in the exploitation of the vast mineral 
wealth of the Indies was due to the monopolizing of the 
economic sector by the government, which had no sufficient 
means to develop the whole of the Indies on its own account. 
Therefore any future exploitation should be left to private 
enterprise. While the Commission agreed that Java and Madura 
should remain the field for government enterprise9 it definitely 
expected that in the Outer-Possessions the government would 
restrict itself to the fulfilling of its obligations as a 
sovereign ruler in order that:
(5) Ri.1k to the King. 22nd August, 1848. Irwin G. "Nineteenth 
Century Borneo - A study in diplomatic rivalry•" s’Graven- 
hage, Nijhoff, 1955* p.161.
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11 •• exploit at ion could be extended wherever feasible, 
when the whole Nation concerns itself with it; and 
a useful and profitable field can be opened up in 
the Netherlands Indies possessions for so many 
industrialists, who are keen in finding a destination 
for their surplus capital*.•••••••••••••••••••••• ....”(6)
The recommendations of the Commission were adopted by the
Government and the first Netherlands Indies Mining Regulations
were issued by Royal Decree of 24th October, 1850. The
I
Regulations stipulated that mining concessions in the Outer-
Possessions could be granted to Dutch nationals, who had
satisfied the government as to their financial capacity to
develop the mining deposits properly. The granting of each
concession was to be preceded by a survey — paid for by the
government - to establish the value of the deposits and the
amount of capital required for their proper exploitation.
However, the cost of any further protection or encouragement
(7)by the government was to be born by the entrepreneur.
The liberal members of the Commission such as van Hoevell 
were genuine in their belief that the development of the Outer- 
possessions by private enterprise would improve the situation 
of the indigenous population; and they were convinced that 
Holland had a moral duty in trying to improve the lot of the 
indigenous population:
(6) Gerretson C. "Geschiedenis der Koninklijke" Vol.l., Utrecht, 
Oosthoek, 1939* pp. 8-9#
(7) Royal Decree of 24th October. 1850. quot. Gerretson op.cit.
p.9.
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H•••Will the Netherlands fulfil its moral obliga­
tions to lift up the people, who are under its 
sovereignty, from that terrible situation and to 
civilize them as much as possible? If so, then 
land reclamation and agriculture are very effective 
means. The transfer of mining to private enter­
prise could and should be the first step; thereby 
the income and productivity of the people will 
increase and more demand and civilization will be 
created...... ....... .................... •••••••M(8)
However, a far more important motive - at least to the 
conservatives - was the consideration that private entre­
preneurs would be able to ease the task of the government in 
ensuring the effective occupation of the economically valuable 
parts of the Outer-Possessions, This idea of a partnership 
between the government and private enterprise not only to 
exploit the economic resources of the Archipelago but also 
to secure Dutch sovereign rights there, is expressed in a 
departmental note submitted early in 1849t G.L. Baud - no 
relation of the earlier J.C. Baud - who succeeded Rijk to the
Colonial ministry. The submission pointed out that the measures
(9)indicated in 1843 “by J#C. Baud for the protection of Dutch 
rights in the East Indies were not effective on their own 
account. They should be implemented by an effective exploit­
ation of the rich resources of the islands. But this 
exploitation should be left to private entrepreneurs, who 
were to select suitable regions for exploitation, where - with
(8) Report of Commission on Mining. 24th July, 1850. quot.Ibid.
p.10.
(9) See pp. 259-60.
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the help and protection of the government - they would he
able to conclude contracts with the indigenous population(10)
or princes. The Minister was clearly impressed and sub­
mitted the recommendations to the King, adding that Dutch 
adventurers of the type of Raja Brooke should be encouraged; 
and if they had sufficient capital they should be given anui)assurance of all possible government help and protection.
The function, hov/ever, which the conservatives wished to
assign to private enterprise is clear from a report by Pahud
to the King on the occasion of the Mining Commission’s
recommendation that the Banka tin mines should be exploited
by private capital. Pahud was opposed to this because he
pointed out that private enterprise was not needed to take
over successful government businesses, but instead to increase
the points of support of Dutch authority in the rest of the(12)
Archipelago. A conservative member of the Commission put 
another slant on the Banka question by arguing that private 
Dutch funds would not be sufficient to take over such a 
large scale enterprise and that therefore foreign participation, 
probably British, would have to be invited; and:
(1°) Report of Department of Colonies. February, 1849* auot. 
Somer bp.cit. p.So1
(11) G L Baud to the King. 28th February. 1849. quot. Gerretson. 
op.cit. p p.13-14»
(12) Pahud to the King. 30th September, 1850. quot. Ibid, p.15.
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"•••Once the English are tied up in the affairs of 
Banka they will expect to be protected and supported 
by the Netherlands authority; they will, especially 
as English capital is involved, complain at every 
possible occasion about the lack of protection, both 
at sea and land. Also the most unreasonable requests 
would have to be complied with; and if the Government 
would not be able to do so, as it forces might be 
needed in other parts of the Archipelago, then the time has come for England to do on its own account - 
and as it will be termed for the protection of its 
shipping and trade - what we were not able to do.
And that Power will settle in Banka without ever 
giving it back to us........ ........ ............ .”(13)
Another consideration which centred attention on the
development of mining was the growing economic and strategic
importance of iron and coal. Steam was replacing sail - also
in warships - and iron was used on an ever increasing scale in
shipbuilding. The Dutch therefore considered it of great
strategic importance to find workable local deposits of those
essential commodities, as in the case of war with England —
the only possible enemy at the time - the Indies would be cut
off from overseas supplies. In addition the mechanization of
the sugar industry in Java and somewhat later of railways
made a reliable local coal supply even more important. Already
in 1846 the King - on the advice of Baud - had approved a
scheme for the training of mining engineers in England for the
colonial service. The first of those trained experts arrived
(13) Nota van den gewezen waarnemend Resident-Militair 
Commandant van Banka. P. Oosthout, 15th May, 1850. 
quot. Ibid. pp.l5-lS#
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i n  the In d ie s  in  1850; and t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  were re g u la te d
by a Royal d ecree  o f Ju n e , 1852, which i n s t i t u t e d  a government
m ining s e rv ic e  ( in d is c h  M ijnwezen). The main ta s k  of t h i s
s e rv ic e  -  a p a r t  from su rv ey in g  m ining co n cess io n s acco rd ing
to  the  Mining R eg u la tio n s  of 1850 -  was to  c a rry  out a
g e n e ra l e x p lo ra tio n  of m in era l re so u rc e s  in  th e  A rch ip e lag o ,
(14)
e s p e c ia l ly  o f iro n  and coal* Soon a f te rw ard s  a number of 
d e ta i le d  r e p o r ts  on m inera l d e p o s its  in  th e  A rchipelago  were 
p u b lish e d , which could  be used  as  a guide by p ro sp e c tiv e  
in v e s to r s .
Thus th e  Mining R eg u la tio n s  of 1850 were th e  r e s u l t  of 
a com bination of f a c t o r s :  i . e .  th e  p re s su re  o f p r iv a te  e n te r ­
p r is e  f o r  p a r t i c ip a t io n  in  th e  e x p lo i ta t io n  o f the  c o lo n ie s ; 
secondly  the  growing concern  fo r  th e  s e c u r i ty  o f Dutch 
so v e re ig n  r i g h t s  in  th e  A rchipelago  coupled w ith  th e  u n w illin g ­
n ess  o f b o th  l i b e r a l s  and c o n se rv a tiv e s  to  in t e r f e r e  w ith  
p r o f i t a b le  government e n te r p r is e  in  Ja v a , re la y e d  th e  p re s su re  
o f p r iv a te  e n te r p r i s e  to  the  O u te r-P o sse ss io n s ; th i r d ly  th e  
growing im portance -  b o th  econom ically  and s t r a t e g i c a l l y  -  o f 
i ro n  and co a l c re a te d  a g re a t  d e a l o f p u b lic  i n t e r e s t  in  th e  
r e s t  o f th e  A rch ip e lag o .
The immediate e f f e c t ,  how ever, o f the Mining R eg u la tio n s 
on m ining e x p lo i ta t io n  by p r iv a te  e n te r p r is e  was r a th e r  l im ite d ;
(14) Royal Decree o f 3 rd  J u ly .  1852. n o .5 . q u o t.  G e rre tso n .
o p .c i t .  pp.32-33*
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and the only direct outcome was the formation of a private
company in 1852 for the purpose of tin-mining on the island
(15)of Billiton. For the rest private enterprise showed only 
slight interest in the exploitation of the mineral resources 
of the Indies until the end of the century, when oil - which 
was known to exist in great quantities in Java and Sumatra - 
was becoming a commodity of world importance. The reasons 
for this lack of interest by Dutch capitalists in East- 
Indian mining are various. Firstly the recompensation which - 
according to the Regulations of 1850 - had to be given by 
private firms for government services was found difficult to 
assess in practice, e.g. the East-Indian government put its 
costs for the "encouragement and protection" of the private 
venture in Billiton at 20,000 guilders per year. This was a 
large amount of money for a company which oust started off and
which furthermore was hard hit from the beginning by falling(16)tin prices. Secondly the field open for mining exploitation 
was in fact rather limited by the stipulation in the
(15) Note:When van Hoevell returned to Holland in 1849 his 
enthusiastic remarks about the possibilities of Billiton 
as a tin producing centre caused a few Dutch private 
investors — including Prince Henry of Orange - to become 
interested. A private company was formed; and after a 
government survey had established Billiton as a promising 
tin-mining area the company was granted a concession on 
20th April, 1852. After a great deal of initial financial 
trouble the original private company was changed into a 
public company in I860; and become known as the Billiton 
Maatschappij, which was soon to become one of the largest 
private ventures in the Netherlands East Indies. Source: 
Ysselsteyn H A van "De Geschiedenis der Tinwinning op 
Billiton." s'Gravenhage, Nijhoff, 1927* pp.2-19#
(16) Ibid. p.13.
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Regulations that concessions were restricted to government 
territory in the Outer-Possessions, excluding the self- 
governing territories, which made up the greater part of the 
area under Dutch influence.
Both the question of recompensation and the restriction
of mining concessions to government territory in the Outer-
Possessions were repeatedly brought up in Parliament; and in
(17)1857 the Mining Regulations of 1850 were amended accordingly. 
The complaint about recompensation was quickly solved by 
allowing the East-Indian government to charge a fixed fee for 
its services, when granting further concessions* The question 
of granting mining concessions in self-governing territories, 
however, posed a number of difficulties. The rights which 
self-rulers recognizing Dutch supremacy retained included that 
of granting mining concessions to whomever they wanted, 
including foreigners. Firstly therefore in 1856 the government 
decided - in order to prevent undesirable persons from settling 
in the self-governing territories - that from then on contracts 
with self-rulers were to include a provision making the grant­
ing of mining concessions dependant on government approval.
The question of total exclusion of foreigners however, became 
a controversial point. Mijer, the Colonial Minister, tended to
(17) Royal Decree of 10th October. 1857. auot. Gerretson 
op.cit. pp.20-21.
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agree with the recommendation of the Raad van Indie (Council 
of the Indies) that:
"...a more liberal attitude would cancel the interest 
of foreigners to overpower the possessions of a state 
which granted them a substantial degree of protection 
and prosperity.•••••.••••••• ..... . .............• "(18)
But the conservative Raad van State (King*s Council) was
opposed to admission of foreigners on the grounds that such a
move would endanger the safety of the colonies, which already
were:
"•••too amply supplied with foreign soldiers, industrial­
ists and missionaries.•.*•••••• ••••••••• ............ «"(19)
As a compromise the Mining Regulations were amended to the
extent that only those entrepreneurs who were allowed by
general ordinance or special permission to reside in the self-
governing territories could be granted mining concessions.
Another factor which made Dutch private enterprise rather
hesitant to invest capital in mining ventures was the little
success which coal and iron raining had achieved so far, espec-(20)
ially in Borneo, while the early difficulties of the Billiton 
Maatschappij probably had a deteriorating effect on the 
willingness to invest,
(18) In Secret report of the Minister of Colonies, 4th August. 
1357. ouot. Ibid. p.19.
(19) Secret advice of the Raad van State. 15th September, 1857. 
quot. Ibid, p,20.
(20) Irwin "Nineteenth Century Borneo,." op.cit, pp.163-164*
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Furthermore during the sixties the opportunity for 
Dutch private entrepreneurs to invest in agricultural 
enterprise in Java - a far less risky venture than mining 
in the Outer-Possessions - was opened hy the gradual 
elimination of the culture system. The earlier attempt of 
the conservatives to direct the attention away from govern­
ment enterprise in Java had failed owing to the ever increas­
ing impact of liberalism and humanitarianism on Dutch public 
opinion, which resulted in a more intensive attack on the 
culture system. The liberal faction in Parliament had 
increased in strength; and while during the fifties liberal 
criticism of colonial policy had been rather theoretical, the 
presence in Parliament during the sixties of such prominent 
liberals as Fransen van der Putte, who had years of experience 
behind him as a planter in Java, enabled criticism of the 
culture system on practical economic grounds. Both in 
Parliament and in an increasing number of pamphlets the culture 
system was attacked on such issues as inefficient and incapable 
management; the lack of application of scientific techniques 
which resulted in overcropping, leeching of the soil and low 
quality produce. A concurrent development was the increasing 
concern of the Dutch public about the inhumanity of the culture 
system. While before 1848 hardly any information about the 
actual situation of the Indonesian population leaked through
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to Holland, after that a ätream of books and pamphlets 
appeared informing the Dutch public about the often inhumane 
treatment which the Javanese received under the culture 
system* This flood of moral indictment reached its culmina­
tion with the publication in i860 of the "Max Havelaar" by 
Multatulli, in which apart from severe criticism of Dutch 
colonial policy, special attention was paid to the vile
treatment meted out to the Indonesians by their own princes(21)
and leaders*
Consequently the culture system was gradually abolished
during the ’Sixties and private enterprise took over where the
government left off. Fransen van der Putte eliminated the
forced cultivation of pepper in 1864; of tea, cinnamon, indigo,
cochineal and nopal in 1865; and of tobacco in 1866* De Waal
commenced the liquidation of the forced cultivation of sugar(22)
in 1870.
(21) Multatulli pseudonym for Eduard Douwes Dekker, 1820-1887; 
went to the Indies in 1838 where after having served in 
many parts of the Archipelago, including West-Sumatra, he 
was appointed assistant resident of Lebak (Java) in Jan­
uary, 1856. There he became soon involved in a dispute 
with the Resident, whom he accused of too much weakness 
in dealing with the local Javanese aristocracy whichwas pillaging and suppressing the people. Dekker was trans­
ferred to another post, but as he did not mend his ways, 
he was discharged from government service. On his return 
to Holland he published the Max Havelaar and numerous 
other works which were concerned to describe the inhuman­
ity of the Dutch colonial system. Multatulli gained a 
tremendous influence in Holland including Parliament.
Apart from a humanitarian and social improver Dekker had 
the gift of writing and his works are some of the best 
in Dutch literature in regard to language and style.
(22) Meinsma "Verval...op.cit. p.73.
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Although mining - with the exception of Banka and
Billiton — did not experience a great upsurge till the end
of the century, the establishment of a government mining
service was an important step leading to future exploitation.
One example of this are the government surveys in Minangkabau
which in 1868-1869 led to the important discovery of an
estimated 200 millions of usuable coal West of the Ombilin
river. The coal layers were estimated to be three to four
meters deep and their quality was considered to be at least
, % (23)equal to Hartley (Newcastle) coal. This find - although not
immediately exploited - proved to be an important factor in
the economic development of Minangkabau, when between 1887
and 1894 a railway was built from Padang to the Ombilin
fields and extensive harbour improvements were made at Padang
(24)in order to facilitate the export of coal.
However, in this context the mining legislation of the 
fifties is of importance because it illustrates the general 
change of attitude which was taking place in regard to the 
Outer-Possessions.
Another indication of this change in public opinion on 
the value of the Outer-Possessions is given by a report in 
1857 of a Government Commission on white colonization. The
(23) Koloniaal Verslag (Colonial Report), 1870/71. P.162.
(24) Blink H "Opkomst en Ontwikkeling van Sumatra als 
Economisch—Geographisch Gebied11 s’Gravenhage, Mouton, 
1926.
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Commission - of which Rochussen was put in charge - was the
result of a petition to the King by ten private citizens
requesting the government to support a scheme for the
colonization of the Outer-Possessions by white settlers
including convicts. The petitioners stressed the benefits of
colonization including the bringing of civilization and
Christianity to the Indonesians and the disposal of unwanted
persons and criminals in Holland, who when their term of
punishment had been completed, should be allowed:
"..after having been improved in the meantime by
religion and morality....... ...to settle as freeworkmen........... .....................
In addition the prospective colonists expected government 
protection and in return were prepared to pay taxation. 
However, in order to ensure sufficient protection it was pro­
posed that the government should participate financially in
(25)the colonization venture. The obvious inference to be drawn 
from the petition is that private enterprise is willing to 
invest in the Outer Possessions, with the provision however 
that such investment would only take place after or con­
currently with the establishment of peace and order. While 
before 1848 it had been largely outside pressure which on 
occasions made the government take action in the Outer-
(25) Adres van F.H. van Vlissingen en negen anderen. 1857* 
quot. Somer. op.cit. pp.98-100.
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Possessions, now in addition inside pressure tried to force 
the authorities to establish effective control at least in 
the economically valuable parts of the Archipelago.
But the Commission was first of all opposed to the idea 
of developing the Outer-Possessions by convict labour on the 
grounds that such human material was not suitable to acquaint 
the Indonesians with European civilization. Furthermore the 
Commission was opposed to large scale white colonization as 
such. The reasons for this attitude were that costs of trans­
port, settlement and temporary support would be extremely high, 
while in addition the tropics were considered as too unhealthy 
for white settlement* However, the most important reason which 
made the Commission decide against white colonization was the 
fear that large scale white immigration would interfere with 
the basic principle of Dutch colonial administration: i.e. 
indirect rule, which it termed:
u..the foundation of our supremacy over the whole 
of the Indian Archipelago.• .......... .
Large concentrations of white settlers, it was feared, would
result in increased interference with the indigenous social
and political structure, which the government was concerned to
leave untouched as much as possible, for the sake of peace and
order. A case in point of such interference was, so the
Commission argued, the petitioners* request to obtain land in
ownership, which would involve the suppression of the adat,
297.
because Indonesian land ownership was generally on a communal
basis. If therefore the government thought it desirable to
open up land for European planters then the Commission suggested
it should grant long term leases, while ensuring that the land
rights of the Indonesian population would not be interfered (26) 
with.
In fact this suggestion by the Commission became the basic 
principle of the land legislation which was finally adopted in 
1870. Although in 1862 Land Regulations were issued in accord­
ance with the provisions of article 62 of the Regeerings
(27)Reglement of 1854* the area of land made available to private 
enterprise was still very much restricted. The 1862 Regulations 
stipulated that a private entrepreneur could not obtain crown 
land in ownership nor on long term lease, while the sale or 
leasing of land owned by indigenous communities was forbidden.
The only way open to private enterprise was to rent virgin land 
from the government or make contracts with indigenous communities 
to grow export commodities. In order to overcome those obstacles 
Fransen van der Putte in May 1866 submitted a bill to Parliament 
which provided for 99 year leases of crown land; the leasing of
(26) Verslag aan den Koning, uitgebracht door de Staatscommissie, 
ingesteld by s*Koning*s besluit van 16 Juny 1857, no.90, op 
het adres van F.H. van Vlissingen negen anderen, betreffende 
Europesche Kolonisatie in Nederlandsch-Indie. quot. Somer 
op.cit. pp.100-111.
(27) Note: Article 62 forbade the Governor-General to release 
land for any other purposes than factories. However, the 
King - if he thought it desirable - could permit the 
Governor-General to make exceptions.
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la n d  owned by ind igenous com m unities; and th e  ev en tu a l
rep lacem ent o f ind igenous lan d  law s by the  Dutch C iv il  Code.
E s p e c ia l ly  th e  l a s t  p ro v is io n  caused a g re a t  d ea l o f  o p p o s it io n
and f i n a l l y  van d er P u tte  w ithdrew  th e  b i l l  and re s ig n e d . H is 
(28)
su c ce sso r  M ije r , in s t r u c te d  th e  G overnor-G eneral to  p ro c la im  
p u b lic ly  t h a t  th e  government would p ro te c t  th e  r ig h t s  o f the  
ind igenous p o p u la tio n  re g a rd in g  the  ow nership and use o f  la n d ; 
and th a t  land  no t in  th e  p o sse ss io n  o f ind igenous communities 
would be d isp o sed  o f  acco rd in g  to  th e  p ro v is io n s  of th e  1862 
r e g u la t io n s .  In  a d d i t io n  th e  M in is te r  o rd ered  ex ten s iv e  
in v e s t ig a t io n s  in to  th e  a c tu a l  e x te n t o f ind igenous lan d  r i g h t s .  
The c o lo n ia l  lan d  q u e s tio n , however, rem ained the su b je c t o f a 
g re a t  many d eb a te s  in  P a r lia m e n t; and f i n a l l y  in  1870 M in is te r  
de Waal managed to  f in d  a s o lu t io n .  The A g rarisch e  Wet o f  1870 
(Land Law) -  which was a compromise on van d er P u tte * s b i l l  o f 
1866 -  p rov ided  fo r  75 y ea r  long  le a s e s  o f  v i r g in  la n d ; th e  
re n tin g  o f lan d  owned by ind igenous com m unities, w ith  p ro v is io n  
fo r  th e  p ro te c t io n  o f ind igenous r i g h t s ;  and the  p o s s i b i l i t y  
f o r  th e  In d o n esian  -  i f  he d e s ire d  to  -  to  o b ta in  European le g a l  
r ig h t s  on lan d  (A g ra risc h  eigendom r e c h t^ .
(28) N ote: Mi.1er P i e t e r ;  bo rn  in  1812 a t  B a ta v ia ; d o c to r of law 
a t  L eiden in  1832; re tu rn e d  to  th e  In d ie s  in  1833 where 
su b seq u en tly  he f i l l e d  h igh  p o s ts  in  the  ju d ic ia ry ;  r e tu rn ­
ed to  H olland in  1855 where he was ap p o in ted  M in is te r  f o r  
C olon ies (1836-1858); Member o f Tweede Kamer (1860-1866); 
M in is te r  o f C olon ies May 1866; ap po in ted  G overnor-G eneral
o f the  E ast I n d ie s ,  Septem ber, 1866 -January , 1872. Died 1881.
(29) Colenbrander o p . c i t .  p p .49-55«
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The new lan d  l e g i s l a t i o n  was v a l id  f o r  the  whole o f  th e  
In d ie s  and c o n s t i tu te d  an im portan t s te p  in  f a c i l i t a t i n g  the 
grow th o f p r iv a te  c a p i ta l  investm ent in  c o lo n ia l  a g r ic u ltu re *
But w h ile  th e  g rad u a l a b o l i t io n  of th e  c u l tu re  system  and th e  
in tro d u c t io n  o f  lan d  l e g i s l a t i o n  were im portan t f a c to r s  
induc ing  p r iv a te  investm en t in  a g r i c u l tu r e ,  in  reg a rd  to  th e  
O u te r-P o sse ss io n s  an o th er n ecessa ry  c o n d itio n  f o r  su c c e s s fu l 
European e n t e r p r i s e :  i .e *  e f f e c t iv e  government p ro te c t io n  
s t i l l  rem ained to  be f u l f i l l e d *  The Commission on C oloni­
z a t io n  th e re fo re  took  up th e  o p p o rtu n ity  to  d i r e c t  th e  a t te n t io n  
o f th e  government to  th e  in e f f ic ie n c y  o f th e  p o lic y  of non­
in te rv e n t io n  in  the  a re a s  o u ts id e  Ja v a . The Commission — 
a lth o u g h  g e n e ra l ly  opposed to  la rg e  sc a le  w hite  c o lo n iz a t io n  -  
supported  th e  id ea  o f th e  economic development o f the 
O u te r-P o sse ss io n s  by p r iv a te  e n te r p r is e  u s in g  ind igenous 
la b o u r . But i t  p o in te d  out th a t  i f  t h i s  goa l was to  be reached  
the e x is t in g  government p o lic y  in  reg a rd  to  th e  O u ter- 
P o ssess io n s  needed u rg en t r e v is io n .  Government c o n tro l should  
be e s ta b l is h e d  o r r e in fo rc e d  a t  l e a s t  in  th e  more im portan t 
i s la n d s  of th e  A rch ip e lag o ; and th e  government shou ld  g iv e  a 
p u b lic  d e c la r a t io n  th a t  the O u te r-P o ssess io n s  were earm arked 
f o r  development by p r iv a te  e n te r p r is e  and th a t  i t  was co n sid ered
d e s ira b le  t h a t :
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"the enterprising spirit of Netherlander - after 
mature deliberation — should direct its attention 
to the various objects which promise profitable exploitation,. ............ .................. ,,,M
In addition, however, the government should make it clear that
it was willing to protect such enterprises and even prepared to
help financially in the early stages; and the Commission therefore
proposed that an amount of one million guilders should be set
aside for the granting of interest-free loans to smaller
enterprises.
The Commission’s interest in the Outer-Possessions 
was not solely concerned with economic development, but also 
with the rights and duties of the government. It insisted 
that it was:
"..the vocation of the Netherlands government to give 
all the Indian nations safety of goods and person, 
which constitutes the first condition of all social development ...... .................
Even if some of the territories which should be occupied would 
become a financial liability this should not deter the govern­
ment from carrying out its duty:
"•• when it means to exterminate such social evils as 
piracy and its concomittant of slavery.............."
Apart from protecting the people who came under its sovereignty
the government should make "the moral and social development of
the people" one of its main objectives, although this did not
3 0 1 ,
n e c e s s a r i ly  mean th a t  European c i v i l i z a t i o n  should  be fo rc ed  
on th e  In d o n esian s  re g a rd le s s  o f :
" a l l  th e  g re a t  d if fe re n c e s  in  p h y s ic a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l  
c a p a c ity , which e x i s t  between them and the  European, 
and w ith o u t ta k in g  account o f the  h i s t o r i c a l  develop­
ment o f th e  peop le*s c h a r a c te r . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  .* ,* "
The c r e a t io n  of a homogeneous In d o n esian  s o c ie ty  -  which would 
underm ine Dutch supremacy based as i t  was on th e  p r in c ip le  o f  
d iv id e  and r u le  -  was obv iously  f a r  from  the  minds of th e  
Commissioners* The Com m issioners, how ever, were g en u in e ly  
concerned about th e  a t t i t u d e  o f a government th a t  allow ed 
u n iv e rs a l  human r ig h t s  to  be tram p led  upon in  i t s  c o lo n ie s , 
e s p e c ia l ly  in  the  s e lf -g o v e rn in g  t e r r i t o r i e s *  I t  was n o t th a t  
th e  Commissioners su g g ested  th e  in tro d u c t io n  o f democracy and 
p a rlia m en ta ry  government as the  cu re  o f a l l  th e  tro u b le s  of 
ind igenous s o c ie ty  -  as i s  so o f te n  w rongly suggested  to -d ay  — 
bu t they  wanted a b enevo len t and h u m an ita rian  government to  
in te rv e n e  on b e h a lf  o f th e  In d o n esian  people* The only  d i r e c t  
W estern in f lu e n c e  which th e  Commission though t would be bene­
f i c i a l  to  th o se  In d o n esian s who were pagans, such a s  th e  B a tta s  
and th e  Dyaks, was th e  in tro d u c t io n  o f C h r i s t i a n i ty .  The 
accep tance o f C h r is t ia n  p r in c ip le s  would have a c i v i l i z in g
e f f e c t  on ind igenous s o c ie ty  and fu rth e rm o re  i t  would make th e
(30)
in tro d u c t io n  o f Dutch ru le  f a r  e a s ie r*
(30) V erslag  aan den Koning e t c .  o p .c i t*  Soraer. p p .100-111.
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However, the Home government’s attitude to the question
of expansion of control - as suggested by the Commission on
Colonization - was far less enthusiastic. Although in 1855
it had decreed in article 43 of the Instructions to the
Governor-General that interference in the internal affairs of
treaty states was allowed in case of misgovernment and neglect
of the people’s interests and rights, the main objective of the
Dutch government in concluding treaties with self-governing
territories was to secure recognition of Dutch sovereignty and
the prevention of political contacts by those territories with 
(31)other Powers. Loudon, the Minister for Colonies, - having the 
recommendations of the Commission on Colonization in mind - put 
the Home government’s position very strongly when he wrote in 
1861:
”...I consider every extension of our authority in the 
Indian Archipelago as a step nearer to our downfall; 
and this is even more so as we have already now 
overreached our power in this respect.•••••••••••••.• ,,(32)
The expansion of direct Dutch rule was impossible, according to
Louden, because the government did not have sufficient capital,
staff and troops at its disposal. Furthermore Loudon - who was
apparently influenced by British thinking on colonies at that
(31) Instructie voor den Gouverneur-Generaal. Royal Decree of 
5th June. 1855. in Somer op.cit. Bijlage I. p.353*
(32) Loudon to Batavia, 8th June, 1861. quot. Somers op.cit.p.94» 
Note: Loudon James born 1824 at The Hague; doctor of law
at Leiden, 1846; in the same year went to the Indies where 
till 1857 he held important positions in the judiciary; 
Minister for Colonies, March 1861 - February 1862; 
Governor-General, 1871-1875«
303.
time - seemed convinced of the futility of direct colonial 
rule, when he wrote:
"••The existence of those facts (i.e. lack of personnel 
and capital) and the well-known tendency even of 
uncivilized nations towards self-government poses the 
question: is not already the extent of our present 
settlement in the Indies too extensive in proportion to 
the resources of the Netherlands••••.•••.••••.••••••”(33)
However, it should be noted that the real cause preventing the
Dutch government from pursuing a more vigorous policy in the
Outer-Possessions was the continued insistence of the Dutch
parliament on receiving the financial surplusses (batig slot)
from the Indies; and as the Raad van Indie (Council of the Indies)
put it in 1852:
"••As long as the Netherlands-Indies shall be held to its 
obligation of providing a so-called credit-balance (batig 
slot; of a few million guilders for the benefit of the 
mother-country,«....one cannot think about the acceptance 
or execution of any system of expansion in our outer- 
possessions, or the occupation of territories, principal­
ities or posts which involve the use of costly military 
and maritime means.••••••••••••••••• ............ ••••••• "(34)
The "Batig Slot" policy, however, was not openly attacked in
parliament until 1870 when de Waal proposed to use the greater
part of the colonial surplus for the construction of public
works in the Indies* De Waal*s proposal was closely connected
with his land legislation of the same year, which consequently
necessitated the provision of adequate modern transport
(33) Ibid, p.lll.
(34) Coli.in "Politiek beleid,.," op.cit, p, 73.
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facilities. But it took till 1875 before the Dutch parliament 
agreed to the use of surplus funds for the building of railways 
in Java and the construction of a modern harbour near Batavia. 
However, since 1877 the East-Indian budget showed increasing 
deficits, which were partly caused by the heavy cost of the 
war with Achin. The roles are now turned and the Indies have 
to borrow from Holland; and finally legislation is passed in 
1898 separating the Home government’s finances from those of 
the colonies.
But in the meantime, Colonial ministers, who were unable 
to use colonial budget surplusses to finance the establishment 
of effective Dutch power in the whole of the Archipelago, were 
forced to prescribe a strict policy of non-expansion and non­
intervention. In despite of this the East-Indian government 
during the fifties and sixties shows an increasing tendency 
towards annexation and direct intervention in the internal 
affairs of the self-governing territories. The reason for 
this was the growing realization that the punitive expeditions 
which the government was forced to make at an increasing rate 
in order to stop slavery, piracy and misgovernment, were 
ineffectual in establishing government authority. Consequently 
Batavia pointed out on many occasions that the only guarantee 
for peace and orderly government was direct rule and annexation.
(35) Colenbrander op.cit. p.64.
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Although the Home government remained opposed to such a course 
of action, it was - as will be shown in the following sections — 
repeatedly presented with a fait accompli. But it was not until 
1898 that a final solution was found to the dilemna of the 
necessity to expand direct government influence, on the one 
hand, and the fear of causing a complete collapse of Dutch 
power in the Archipelago by spreading limited resources over too 
wide an area on the other hand. This solution was the so- 
called Korte Verklaring (Short Contract) which was a compromise 
between annexation and self-government. In this contract the 
Indonesian prince or community accepted Dutch sovereignty; and 
promised to obey all orders given by the Netherlands Indies 
Government. In fact this meant that the indigenous adminis­
trative structure was incorporated into the Dutch administrative
(36)
system without being replaced by Dutchmen.
In conclusion, the years 1848-1873 form a transition period 
in which the government as entrepreneur is gradually superseded 
by private enterprise, owing to the growing pressure of Dutch 
capitalists and the philosophy of liberalism and humanitarianism. 
The established policy of non-interference and non-expansion is 
ever more attacked both on the grounds that inroads have to be 
made upon the indigenous political and social structure in order
(36) A copy of a Korte Verkläring pro forma is published in 
Sortier op.cit. pp. 362-363.
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to open up land and to ensure effective government protection 
of capital investment, but also on the grounds that the govern­
ment was wrong in condoning misgovernment and the disregard 
of human rights in the territories which came under its 
sovereignty. In addition, the colonial government owing to 
the futility of the measures taken to promote its influence in 
the Outer-Possessions, increasingly advocated annexation as the 
only solution to the problem of establishing peace and order 
in the Archipelago. The Home government, however, remained 
opposed to this course of action and a growing split occurred 
between The Hague and Batavia which resulted in increased de 
facto expansion. Thus expansion in fact occurred not according 
to a well-defined line of policy, but rather dictated by ad hoc 
considerations such as the fear of foreign interference. It is 
only in the beginning of the Twentieth century that the Dutch - 
during van Heutz* term as governor—general - followed a definite 
policy of bringing the whole of the Indies under their effective 
control.
The two ruling forces - i.e. liberalism and humanitarianism 
making for change in this period, are basic to the argument in 
an 1857 report (an appendix to the report of the Commission on 
Colonization) in which it is proposed to abolish the indigenous 
land laws of Minangkabau. This proposal caused — as will be 
shown in the next section - a controversy about the fundamental 
principles of Dutch administrative policy in West-Sumatra.
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SECTION VII,
THE WEST—COAST OP SUMATRA;1850—1873«
The Commission on Colonization of* 1857 had pointed out(l)in general that the adat pusaka in Minangkabau was detrimental
to the material and moral development of the people* Lieutenant-
Colonel Andressen - a member of the Commission - who had been
attached to Michiels* general staff at the West-Coast since
1843 had written a more detailed report on the subject; the
Commission fully agreed with its findings and submitted the(2)report to the King for consideration*
Andressen first of all attacked the adat pusaka on moral 
grounds* The fact that the husband had no control over his own 
children left him without a sufficiently strong incentive to 
work and caused him to become lazy and indolent* Most of the 
work was left to the women who in addition had to take care of 
their children without much help from their husbands or their 
brothers. This state of affairs, according to Andressen, was 
responsible for the widespread use of abortion in order to 
stop childbirth:
(1) Adat Pusaka: Minangkabau her id it ary law which prescribes 
that children inherit from their mother and not from their 
father.
(2) Commission on Colonization to the King* 24th December, 1857. 
quot. Kielstra E.B* ^Sumatra's Westkust sedert 1850M in 
BTLV. 1892* p*288. Further references to this source will 
be indicated by Kielstra VI.
308.
"...Thus, the adat pusaka has consequently placed 
the father on the lowest social level - he only 
needs to follow his animal instincts - and it has 
made the mother into a child murderess.••••••••• .**
Secondly Andressen was opposed to the adat pusaka because it
prevented the sale or lease of land to outsiders. Although he
agreed that respect for indigenous institutions would be the
best guarantee for the steady maintenance of Dutch supremacy
in the Archipelago, this principle should not be stretched too
far; and while it would be irresponsible to:
•.interfere with harmless (indigenous) institutions 
in order to pursue utopias, or to force those tribes 
by leaps and bounds on the road to civilization and 
progress, for which the European nations have needed 
centuries; I would call it equally irresponsible if 
those institutions which undermine moral and material 
interests and obstruct gradual progress are left 
untouched and are respected, when the possibility 
exists to modify (those institutions) without causing damaging shocks................. .............. .«..."
Therefore the government should abolish as soon as possible the
adat pusaka, and replace this institution by a hereditary law
based on succession in direct line; to introduce the institution
of private ownership; to divide the suku land into private and
municipal land; and finally to re " ce the existing suku
government by municipal government.
This radical proposal caused a great deal of criticism,
(3) Nota van Luitenant Kolonel Andressen. 4th November, 1857* in 
Kielstra VI. op.cit. pp.272-208".
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especially from the administrative personnel stationed in 
Minangkabau.
(4)
General De Brauw, governor of the West-Coast of Sumatra, 
attempted in a lengthy report to refute the allegations made 
by Andressen. De Brauw pointed out that it was wrong to 
consider the adat pusaka without reference to the existing 
social structure and the philosophy behind it. The European 
concept of a family - i.e. both parents with children - was 
not known to the Minangkabau; but instead the mother and her 
children was the accepted unit upon which social cohesion was 
based. The origin of the adat pusaka was the desire to leave
inheritances to persons whose blood relationship to the 
deceased left no doubt i.e. the mother. This law fitted in 
well in Minangkabau where polygamy was common; and therefore, 
so the governor pointed out:
”...what loote unnatural to us, does not do so to the 
Malay, who is born and bred under the adat pusaka.
On the contrary if he suddenly and without preparation 
was transferred to a land where his adat pusaka did 
not exist, but instead our hereditary law - which seems 
natural to us - and the family unit of man, wife and 
children, upon which this heriditary law is based, then 
he would certainly find it equally wrong and unnatural.”
(4) Note: De Brauw C A ionkheer: 1809—1062; military college 
at Semarang (1822-1026;: participated as a lieutenant in 
the Java war (1825-1830;; Lieutenant-Colonel in 1846; 
chief of staff in third Bali expedition in 1849; subdued 
Bantam rebellion in 1850; resident governor of the Celebes, 
1855-1857; 1857 Major-general; governor of Westcoast of 
Sumatra, August, 1861-Pebruary, 1862.
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De Brauv also pointed out that the adat-pusaka was a counter 
balance to the influence of orthodox Islamic teachers who 
tried to change those parts of the adat which were in conflict 
with the Muslim law. Therefore the abolition of the adat- 
pusaka would mean playing directly into the hands of those 
fanatical teachers, whose influence the government was
concerned to curb as much as possible. Furthermore the fact 
that those teachers so far had been unsuccessful in abolishing 
the adat-pusaka showed the people’s continued attachment to 
that institution and dispelled the truth of Andressen’s 
allegation that the Minangkabaus generally favoured its aboli­
tion. On the contrary, careful investigations had shown that 
only in Padang - where the people had been in contact with 
Europeans for centuries - were there any signs of opposition 
to the adat-pusaka, but for the rest the people seemed to be 
as attached as ever to this institution; and moreover, De 
Brauw argued;
’’•••not yet a quarter of a century ago the Malays (i.e.. 
the Minangkabaus) were prepared to stake their life and 
goods on the retention of those institutions, and it is 
unthinkable that in the short space of time our admini­
stration has been established they already have become 
so attached to our ideas of heriditary law.....••••••"
In addition the governor attributed the incidence of abortion -
which he claimed Andressen exaggerated, as was shown by the
(5)
of the deve 
the Padris.
ection for a more explicit treatment 
of Islam since the extermination of
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steady rise in population - not to the adat-pusaka, but to
the Mohammedan marriage law which provided for easy and
quick dissolution causing married women to be concerned
about their physical attractiveness in order to remain eligible
for re-marriage. Also the adat-pusaka, according to de Brauw,
was not exclusively responsible for the instability of the
suku government, because everywhere in Indonesia where a
similar type of political structure existed, but no matriarchy,
government was equally unstable and the country just as much
disturbed by civil strife. In any case, so the governor argued,
the existence of the suku government made the interference of
the Dutch government indispensable to the indigenous population;
and therefore the establishment of Dutch influence was made
much easier. The correctness of the administrative system as(6)
introduced by Merkus and Michiels was becoming more evident from 
day to day; good roads were being constructed by the population; 
the production of coffee was increasing; and the transportation 
system was working well. It should be obvious, De Brauw 
argued, that the authority of the government was well established 
considering that the coffee monopoly and other enforced services 
did not cause any obstruction; and therefore:
"...institutions giving such results and which are 
equally profitable to the government and the 
population cannot be regarded too highly...... .
The abolition of the adat-pusaka, which was an institution
(6) See section V. $
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fundamental to the whole of the Minangkabau social structure, 
would cause a revolutionary situation by breaking up the 
existing conditions of peace and prosperity which had been 
established after so much blood and expense. Therefore, De 
Brauw alleged, the proposals of Andressen were unsound and 
should not be implemented. The only point of substance raised 
by Andressen in the governor’s opinion was the fact that the 
adat-pusaka made the sale or lease of land to outsiders pract­
ically impossible. But De Brauw stressed that from the 
Government’s point of view the maintenance of the existing 
peaceful and prosperous conditions in Minangkabau was far more 
important than the interest of private European planters. This 
was especially so, as large tracts of land were still available 
to private enterprise in other parts of the Netherlands East 
Indies, while the absence of private European enterprise in 
Minangkabau would do no h a m  to the treasury, considering that
the revenue of coffee prodiiction proved to be ample recompensa-
(7)tion for government expenditure.
The Batavian government was in complete agreement with De
Brauw4s advice and Andressen*s proposals were put aside. Indeed
there are various indications that by this time the authority of
the Dutch in Minangkabau had become firmly established. Since(8)the uprising at Pau in 1845 there is no record of major anti-
T7) De Brauw to Batavia. 12th November, 1861. in Kielstra VI.
op.cit. pp.289-302.
(8) See Section,V, p. 262. , '>
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government disturbances or risings in Minangkabau* Consequently 
in 1656 the Governor of the West-Coast, General van Swieten, 
was of the opinion that a number of military posts could be 
abandoned and the actual strength of the military forces could be
(9)
diminished* Another indication of the existence of normal 
conditions of peace and order in Minangkabau was the proposal 
in 1862 to separate the functions of military commander from 
the position of governor* It was pointed out to the King that 
the investment of one person with both civil and military power 
at the West-Coast of Sumatra had been necessitated at a time 
when Dutch authority was being established by force of arms*
But as there were no rebellions to be subdued anymore and the 
government's authority had been firmly established, the task of 
civil administration and economic development was becoming too 
burdensome to be carried by the military commander* Also if:
"...that much promising part of the Netherlands overseas 
possessions will be brought to the high stage of devel­
opment and civilization for which it seems to possess 
all the requirements, then civil authority should be 
invested in a person who has a sound knowledge of 
politics and economics, and who is conversant with the 
institutions, customs and laws of the Sumatran popul­
ation...................... ••••••••••••..........•••"(10)
(9) Van Swieten to Batavia. 17th September, 1856* quot. Ibid*
pp*265-266* Note: Van Swieten Jan* 1807-1888; 2nd Lieutenant 
to the Indies ^ 1827-1830); in Holland (1830-1835); returned 
to the Indies in 1835 as Captain; Major (1841); Lieutenant- 
Colonel (1844); Colonel and Governor of West-Coast of 
Sumatra (1849-1850); Major-General (1853); Lieutenant- 
General and Commander-in-Chief (I858-I862); Member Tweede 
Kamer (1864-66); Commander of Achin Expedition (1873-74)*  
(lQ)Minister for Colonies to the King. 2nd September, 1862* quot* 
Ibid. PP.305-306.
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The Hague agreed and in November, 1862 J P van den Bosche 
was appointed civil governor of the West-Coast of Sumatra.
During van den Boschefs term of office a number of important 
administrative measures were taken. One of those measures 
was concerned with salary increases for indigenous officials; 
i.e. the district (laras) heads and kampung heads (penghulu 
kapala), offices created in 1833 by van den Bosch to form an 
intermediary link between the Dutch administration and the 
indigenous suku government. The laras heads - who numbered 
about 60 in Minangkabau - were the most important officials in 
their districts, some of which had a population of more than 
10,000 people. Their function was to execute all orders given 
to them by the Dutch administration and therefore the effective­
ness of governmental policy depended a great deal on those 
officials. The Laras head was reponsible for keeping law and 
order; the supervision of coffee and rice production; and the 
maintenance of roads and bridges. Furthermore all legal matters 
in the districts had to be brought before him; and he could 
decide on those cases in conjunction with the suku heads concerned 
or submit them to the indigenous court - the rapat - which was 
presided over by a Dutch administrative official and of which
(11) Van den Bosche J P R S; a civil administrator who held
posts previously at Palembang and Bezuki (Java); held the 
post of civil governor of the West-Coast of Sumatra from 
1862-1868, when he was appointed to the Raad van Indie 
(Council of the Indies).
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he was himself a member. The Penghulu Kapala was an official 
subordinate to the laras head and acted as his deputy in one 
or sometimes two kampungs. But the penghulu kapala was not a 
member of the rapat# (12)Already in March, I860 Governor Mels had pointed out to 
the Batavian government that a salary of 20 guilders per month 
for laras heads and no remuneration for penghulus kapala at 
all was unreasonable; and it could not be expected that such 
little recognition of their services would promote the effi­
ciency of those officials. The governor wrote:
”...Surely, the prosperity of the people is dependant 
to a great extent on the greater or less diligence of 
those officials, and especially the maintenance and 
expansion of coffee production, which already accounts 
for such valuable revenue, but which will still 
considerably increase in proportion to the greater 
interest taken by the indigenous officials...........”(13)
To see the question of remuneration of indigenous officials
in its proper perspective it is necessary at this stage to
describe the working of the system of coffee production which
(14)was introduced by Michiels in 1847.
(12) Meis A.; (1809-1861); military school at Semarang (1822- 
1825); participated in Java war (1825-1830); Captain (1837); 
Major (1845); Lieutenant-Colonel (1846); participated in 
Bali expedition (1849); Resident of Palembang (1849/50); 
Major-General (1854); Commander of Second Military District 
in Java (1854-1858); Governor of the West-Coast of Sumatra (1858-1861).
(13) Meis to Batavia. 29th March, I860, in Kielstra VI. op.cit* 
PP. 308-316.
(14) See Section, V. ,
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Initially the system of Michiels occasioned a great 
deal of dissension among the Minangkabaus, because officials - 
as instructed - were trying to introduce the same production 
methods as were used in Java. Attempts to induce the population 
to grow their coffee on large well laid out plantations failed 
partly because of official inefficiency but especially because 
of the unwillingness of the Minangkabaus who preferred to grow 
so-called "pagger coffee” (kopi dapur) in small plots around 
the village or on cleared plots in the jungle (kopi rimbu).
To stop dissension governor van Swieten abandoned the idea of 
Javanese production methods; and he encouraged the growing of 
coffee in small plots in order to:
“...make coffee cultivation into an industry which would be popular, because it furthered personal gain, but was 
not based on official pressure or forced services......”(15)
In fact this decision was in accordance with the spirit of the
1854 Regeerings-reglement which required the colonial authorities
to prepare for a state of affairs where agriculture would be(16;pursued without government interference.
Thus, in order to make the cultivation of coffee as 
attractive as possible to the Minangkabaus the governor was 
concerned to avoid coercion as much as possible. In accordance
(15) Agricultural report by van Swieten. 1855. quot. Kielstra 
”De KoffiecultuurM op.cit. pp.1610-1620•
(16) See Section VI, p. 279« <
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with this principle van Swieten in 1855 instructed that 
all coffee delivered should be paid for at the first grade 
price, irrespective of quality* The governor argued that the 
price paid by the government was so low that it was ridiculous:
’‘•••that a product, which had a value of 30 guilders 
was bought for only 7 guilders, later 8,4 guilders 
and during my term of office at the highest for 9.2 
guilders, should be refused solely because it was 
not of superior quality and could not secure the 
highest price, e.g. 35 guilders per picul*.••• (17)
In 1856 van Swieten could report that the earlier difficul­
ties of terrain - which had necessitated the carrying of produce 
from the highlands to the coast by coolies had been largely
overcome. Most of the produce was transported by horsecarts,
(18)
which were owned and run by private enterprise. Although those 
transport establishments generally were well run, those operated 
by indigenous heads and officials were often inefficient. There­
fore indigenous leaders - in order to cover up for their losses - 
resorted to subjecting the population to forced or badly paid 
services such as the feeding of horses; the maintenance of 
stables and the driving of carts. Van Swieten - in order to 
stop this unnecessary pressure on the population, - which it
(17) Van Swieten to the governor-general. 9th April, 1862. quot.
Kielstra "De Koffiecultuur", op.cit. pp.1620-1621.
(16) Van Swietc^s annual report. I856. quot. Ibid, pp.1621-1625«
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attributed to the coffee system as such - decided in July,
1857 to forbid indigenous leaders and officials from partici-
(19)pating in the transport business.
The coffee policy of van Swieten was indeed successful: (20)and during his term of office production increased considerably. 
But the governor attributed this large increase in production 
not to the introduction of the culture system, but rather to the 
policy of economic development; i.e. the building of roads and 
warehouses; and to the policy of making the forced deliveries 
of coffee as little burdensome as possible by preventing 
excesses and allowing the population as much freedom of choice 
as possible in their production methods. In fact van Swieten was 
rather critical of the culture system which he considered as a 
necessary evil; and as a means:
uto awaken a people from the sleep of inaction, and 
to lift up agricultural production from a languishing 
condition injecting some forceful life into it; but 
(this should be) only a temporary measure and not a 
permanent one....... .................... ••.•.....,,(2l)
(19) Ibid. 1857. quot. Ibid. p.l627.
(20) Coffee delivered to the government - piculs.
1848 56,000 1855 127,000 1862 159,000 1869 142,0001849 55,000 1856 129,000 1863 132,000 1870 183,0001850 71,000 1857 191,000 1864 187,000 1871 156,000
1851 82,000 1858 129,000 1865 124,000 1872 91,0001852 122,000 1859 141,000 1866 165,000 1873 109,0001853 119,000 1860 158,000 1867 158,000
1854 131,000 1861 124,000 1868 143,000Source: Ibid. p. 1674.
(21) Report b:/ van Swieten on coffee cultivation in Sumatra.
2 6 th November, l56l. in. Kielstra uKoffiecultuur^ op.cit. 
pp.1629-1637.
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Van Swieten’s successor, General Meis, generally followed
the same policy, Meis, however, changed one of van Swieten’s
measures i.e. the regulation of 1857 ordering all coffee to be
paid for at first grade prices. In response to a complaint by
the N.H.M. about the general quality of coffee the governor(22)instructed that only first grade coffee would be bought. But
this reversal of policy caused important problems. The refusal
of the Dutch authorities to buy any second or third grade coffee
made the Minangkabaus sell this type of coffee to East-Coast
merchants. When it appeared that in Singapore higher prices
were to be obtained for coffee in general first-grade coffee
was also sent there. It was estimated that about 10,000 piculs
of Minangkabau coffee were annually exported to Singapore; and
in order to stop this’leakage” Meis1 successor, de Brauw,
decided in November, 1861 that the government would again buy
all grades of coffee, but that prices paid would be in propor— 
(23)tion to quality.
Van den Bosche who succeeded de Brauw in 1862 continued the 
policy of van Swieten to make coffee cultivation an agreeable 
as possible proposition to the Minangkabaus, Accordingly after 
having convinced himself that in the flat regions of Minangkabau, 
such as Mandailing, Pau and Rau, the soil was more suitable for
(22) Ibid, p.1620, ~
(23) Resolution of De Brauw. 14th November, 1861, quot, Kielstra 
uDe Koffiecultuur” op.cit. p,l643.
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rice growing and that coffee cultivation there - although requir­
ing heavy work - resulted in little gain, van den Bosche decided 
to stop forcing people in those regions to grow coffee. For 
example, in April, 1863 the people of the district of Ulaban 
(near Priaman) were allowed to grow rice instead of coffee, 
because of the unsuitability of the soil. Van den Bosche also 
took up again the question of higher salaries for indigenous 
officials which had already been raised by Meis, but so far had 
remained unsettled.
Meis had pointed out that it was the duty of the government 
to protect the population from extortion by their own leaders. 
Underpayment tended to increase the incidence of malpractice and 
corruption among indigenous officials causing resentment among 
the people against the government. The regulation of 1857 in 
particular, which forbade indigenous leaders from participating 
in the transport business, caused officials and leaders to 
attempt to obtain extra money by illegal means such as extortion. 
Actually, so Meis argued, the heads had been treated unfairly 
in the sense that they initially had practically been forced by 
the government to start off the transport service, but when the 
earlier difficulties had been overcome they had been deprived 
of reaping some of the profits of their work. Dissension was 
the obvious result; and this did have a detrimental effect on 
their willingness to co-operate and their administrative
321.
efficiency. £\irthermore while the income of the people in
general was increasing the salaries of officials should he
increased in proportion in order to enable them to keep up
their status and prestige. The other major reason, which -
as was previously noted - caused Meis to request higher
salaries for indigenous officials was the concern to stop the
growing influence of orthodox religious teachers on the (24)population.
The influence of the Padris had not died out with the fall
of their regime at the end of the thirties; and so-called
’’independent” teachers continuously kept trying to undermine
the position and prestige of the adat-chiefs. In some parts
of Minangkabau elements of Padri governmental organization had
been incorporated into the indigenous structure; e.g. in Lubu
Sikiaping a new institution - the so-called Besar nan IX (The
Big Nine) - had evolved, consisting of both adat and religious 
(25)officials. In addition Meis pointed to an apparent state of 
tension among Indonesian Muslims, which he attributed to the 
attempted partition of the Turkish empire by the Western Great
(24) See note 5. p.310 of this section.
(25} Schrieke B ”Communism cn the West-Coast of Sumatra” in 
Indonesian Sociological studies - selected writings of 
Schrieke. The Hague/Bandung, Van Hoeve, 1955» P*150.
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Powers and the Crimean War. In this instance it should be
noted that Indonesian Muslims also - both the faithful and
teachers alike - showed great reverence to the Sultan of
Turkey, who was considered as the only legal supreme ruler of(26)
the whole world, to whom all other rulers owed allegiance. In 
any case, so Meis argued, it would not take much to spark off 
a general outburst against Dutch authority, especially if 
Muslim teachers could find examples to prove that the govern­
ment was trying to undermine the Faith. Therefore the governor 
was of the opinion that Christian missionary activity should 
be tightly controlled by the government especially at a time when 
new clashes between Christian and Muslim States in Europe were 
probable; and intensified missionary activity:
"..can cause disturbances of more or less importance 
among the inhabitants of our Indian possessions. There 
is no better means - on the West-Coast of Sumatra - to 
overcome those disturbances than to give relief to the 
indigenous heads and to possess their friendship; be­
cause even if they are Mohammedans themselves, they (in 
order to protect) their authority shun theocracy and in 
that respect their interests are the same as ours*••.*u(27)
Also Verkerk—Pistorius - an official who spent a number of
years in Minangkabau - was of the opinion that all large scale
and vehement disturbances were due to the influence of fanatic
orthodox teachers. As an example he quotes a certain tuanku
sjech Berulah, who during the 1860*s - after having lived for
(26) Juynboll TH. W »Handleiding tot de kennis van de Mohamme- 
daansche Wet." Leiden Brill, 1925» P*339*
(27) See note 33 on page 5L5 of this section.
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(28)many years in Mecca - introduced the teachings of Abu Hanifa
in Padang Ganting (Tanah Datar)* Those teachings were steadily
supplanting the - according to Verkerk-Pistorius - more tolerant
(29)Sjafite principles to such an extent that an estimated one
eighth of the population had already accepted them. The fact
that the Hanifite teachers were strongly opposed to the adat
(30)
chiefs caused many disturbances. The reference here to Hanifite
teachings is interesting as this points again to Turkey, which
was not only the centre of this school of interpretation (madzhab)
but also of Panislamism, a movement for the political unification
of all Muslims under the supreme leadership of the Sultan of
Turkey. In fact Panislamism at this time was beginning to cause
great concern to European colonial powers, which - although
wrongly - believed that the Sultan of Turkey was a type of 
(31)Islamic Pope.
Accordingly Meis strongly advocated higher salaries for 
laras heads and penghulus kapala; and in order to bind the 
suku heads closer to the Administration he suggested that the
(28) Note: Abu Hanifa (767). founder of a fikh (madzhab) - i.e. 
school of interpretation of the Qu’ran and Tradition, which 
became prominent in the Turkish empire. Source: Juynboll 
op.cit. pp.20-21.
(29) Note: Muhamad Ibn Idris as—Sjafi’i (767—820); was a teacher 
in Bagdad, for some considerable time and later in Egypt.
His school of interpretation is widely accepted in Indonesia. 
Source: Ibid. pp.19-20.
(30) Verkerk-Pistorius A W P "Studien over de Inlandsche Huis- 
houding in de Padangsche Bovenlanden." Zaltbommelf Noman, 
1871. PP.232-233.
(31) Juynboll op.cit. p. 340.
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percentages paid to them on coffee delivered should he raised. 
Those proposals were approved by the Batavian authorities; and 
finally endorsed by the Home government in March, I863, with 
the exception of the proposed higher incentive payments to the
(32)
suku heads.
The most important aspects of Dutch policy in Minangkabau 
have now been discussed; and in conclusion I will attempt to 
review the rationale of Dutch administrative policy in Minang­
kabau, while at the same time trying to indicate - in general 
terns - the effects which this policy had on the Minangkabau 
social and political structure.
At the beginning of the century Minangkabau was in the 
grip of a fierce revolutionary war, caused by the attempts of 
orthodox Muslim preachers to overthrow the existing social and 
political order, many features of which conflicted directly 
with Islamic teachings. As this war was adversely affecting 
the profitability of the Dutch possessions at the coast, the 
Dutch intervened in the struggle on behalf of the adat (i.e. 
conservative) party; and after a long and bloody war succeeded 
in defeating the revolutionary party and restoring peace and 
order. This Dutch interference, however, meant in the first 
place a retardation of the “natural” social and political 
development of Minangkabau society. Modernistic tendencies
(32) Indisch Staatsblad. 1863. no. 45 (Netherlands Indies" 
Gazette).
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which were trying to change the suku-government and the adat- 
regulated inheritance and property law - institutions which 
made for a static society — were stopped; and constantly 
opposed whenever they re-appeared afterwards. The Dutch in 
fact were constantly trying to keep Minangkabau society static 
by directly supporting the adat-chiefs, who as their own position 
and interest were at stake, were opposed to change. The reasons 
for this attitude by the Dutch can be summed up in the formulas 
divide and rule. Accordingly the Dutch - in order to obtain a 
solid hold on the country - monopolised the task of bringing 
order and regularity in a rather anarchical state of affairs, 
which was the result of the suku system of government with its 
numeroiis independent and often antagonistic political units.
The objective of Dutch policy was to make its administration 
an indispensable centralizing force; and therefore any innate 
centralizing or unification movement had to be opposed, as 
otherwise the raison d’etre of the presence of the Dutch in the 
people’s eyes - i.e. as a stabilizing force - would become non­
existent. Consequently the Dutch — as elsewhere in Indonesia - 
tried to keep the existing social and political structure intact 
by bolstering up the authority and prestige of the traditional 
leaders against any group or movement which challenged their 
position.
Furthermore, in order to facilitate and smooth the contact 
between the Administration and the people the Dutch tried to
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create a new class of leaders - i.e. the laras heads and 
penghulus kapala — who would gradually become a type of 
aristocracy on the lines of the Javanese regents and whose 
function was to act as intermediaries between European 
administrative officials and the indigenous population.
The major assumption underlying Dutch opposition to 
social and political change within indigenous society should 
be sought in the general thinking that was prevalent at the 
time on the function of colonies. At least until 1848 the 
majority of Dutchmen considered colonies solely as business 
enterprises, or rather as a type of public corporation, which 
was run in the first place for the benefit of the owners - i.e. 
the Netherlands - and, more as an afterthought, also for the 
Indonesians. Trade and commerce, so it was argued, could only 
flourish under conditions of peace and order; and anything there­
fore which would disturb such a situation had to be prevented. 
Foreign influences such as Christianity, European education, 
orthodox Islam, and foreign consuls, or anything else which 
might start off social and political repercussions within 
indigenous society were constantly and consciously kept away.
The Dutch government did not believe that it had any business 
to introduce the Indonesians bo European culture and civilization, 
but that it was solely concerned to create the best possible 
conditions for trade and commerce with the smallest possible
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overheads. A very sound principle from a purely business point 
of view. Actually van den Bosch had instructed officials not to 
interfere in indigenous affairs; and to disregard the existence 
of certain indigenous practices such as slavery and inhuman 
treatment which would be objectionable to European susceptibili­
ties; unless action was absolutely necessary for the maintenance 
of peace and order.
But after 1848 a notable change in this aspect of colonial 
policy is discernable. The Regeeringsreglement of 1854 showed 
concern for the protection of the human rights of the indigenous 
population; and required the East Indian government to provide 
for education. It was noted that in Minangkabau such men as 
van Swieten and van den Bosche were convinced that the Adminis­
tration, apart from its task of running a profitable enterprise, 
had the additional duty of protecting the rights and the inter­
ests of the people, even if this was going to cost money. Some
more proof of this is furnished by a regulation of 1864 forbidd-
(33)
ing the import and sale of opium. Following a request from a
number of indigenous leaders for the prohibition of the sale of
opium, van den Bosche — after having carried out a survey on the
use of that drug on the West-Coast - strongly advised its
prohibition, althoiigh this meant an annual loss of more than
(34)
200,000 guilders in licence fees and customs revenue. In this
(33) Indisch Staatsblad. 1864. no. 112.
(34) Van den Bosche to Batavia, 29th October, 1863* quot. 
Kielstra VI. pp.329.
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context also the new regulations of 1864 about the leasing of
pawnshops should be mentioned. Until then, government control
over pawnshops had only existed in Padang, but van den Bosche
argued that it should be extended over the whole of the Vtest-
(35)Coast in order to protect the people from usury. Another
instance of government action to protect the rights of the
indigenous population was land legislation. A report in 1871
about the establishment of various European plantations on
waste lands in Minangkabau caused the government to carry out
an investigation into the land rights of the Minangkabaus.
After this investigation had been completed the government
considered that it had the right to dispose of Minangkabau
wastelands in so far as this land was not claimed under the
terms of the adat which granted land in private ownership to
persons - belonging to the nagari - who kept such land under
(36)
continuous exploitation. A regulation of 1874 therefore 
stipulated that wasteland in Minangkabau would be granted on 
long lease to persons interested, but emphasized that land
(37)could not be bought or alienated from indigenous communities.
However, it should be noted that although the Dutch admin­
istration showed greater concern for the welfare and protection
(35) Van den Bosche to Batavia. 2&th August.1864. miot. Ibid» 
PP.329-330.(36) Joustra ’'Minangkabau..*1 op.cit. pp. 115-116.
(37) Kielstra VI op.cit. pp.647-648.
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of the Minangkabaus, its opposition to indigenous social and 
political change remained a prominent feature of policy. In 
this respect also the economic policy of the Dutch in Minang­
kabau tended to retard natural economic development. Such 
factors as the forced production and delivery of coffee; govern­
ment monopoly of salt; the closing of the East-Coast - the 
other natural outlet for Minangkabau produce -, which cut the 
earlier class of traders and middlemen out of existence, 
resulted in a situation where the Minangkabaus became tied to 
the soil. Thus, Dutch economic policy tended to keep Minang­
kabau a self-sufficient economic unit, which was closed off 
from commercial intercourse with the outside world. This 
isolation, which obviously resulted in economic stagnation, 
lasted for most of the century; and it was only in 1908 after 
the coffee monopoly had been abolished that Minangkabau was 
fully opened up to the outside World.
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SECTION V I I I
THE DUTCH AND THE EAST—COAST OF SUMATRA;
~T B 4 l—1 8 7 5 .
The E a s t-C o a s t  S u l t a n a t e s  o f  D jam b i, I n d r a g i r i  and S ia k  
co m p rised  an  a r e a  w h ich  w as l a r g e l y  c o v e re d  by r a i n  f o r e s t  and 
m arsh es  c u t  th ro u g h  by a num ber o f  w ide n a v ig a b le  r i v e r s ,  w h ich  
o r i g i n a t e d  i n  th e  C e n tr a l  M ounta in  ra n g e  (B u k it  B a r is a n )  and 
f lo w e d  e a s tw a rd s  i n to  th e  M alacca  S t r a i t s .  T h is  p a r t  o f  
S um atra  was s p a r s e ly  p o p u la te d  and had  l i t t l e  n a t u r a l  w e a l th ;  
and a p a r t  from  th e  e a r n in g s  on su ch  f o r e s t  p ro d u ce  a s  cam phor 
and b e n z o in  th e  g r e a t e r  p a r t  o f  th e  n a t i o n a l  incom e was 
p ro v id e d  by th e  rev e n u e  o f  th e  t r a n s i t  t r a d e  b e tw een  M inangkabau 
and th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n ts .  More im p o r ta n t ,  ho w ev er, w ere 
th e  s m a l l e r  s u l t a n a t e s  to  th e  N o rth  o f  S ia k  w h ich  c a r r i e d  on 
an e x te n s iv e  p e p p e r  t r a d e  e s p e c i a l l y  w ith  P u lu  P en an g .
In  1841 th e  D u tch  w ith d re w  from  th e  E a s t - C o a s t ;  a n d , a s  
we h ave  s e e n ,  k e p t  o n ly  one p o s t  i n  t h i s  a r e a  i . e .  a t  M uarah 
Kompeh in  I n d r a g i r i  b e c a u se  t h i s  p o s t  was c o n s id e re d  n e c e s s a ry  
f o r  th e  m a in te n a n c e  o f  p e a c e  and  o r d e r  in  th e  D utch  p o s s e s s io n
CD
o f  Palem bang  to  th e  S o u th . F o r  th e  r e s t  th e  B a ta v ia n  governm ent 
k e p t  s t r i c t l y  fro m  i n te r v e n in g  in  th e  a f f a i r s  o f  th e  E a s t-C o a s t  
s u l t a n a t e s ,  even  th o u g h  on s e v e r a l  o c c a s io n s  i t  h ad  b een
( l )  See S e c t io n  IV , p .  248
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requested by the sultans to intervene on their behalf in 
order to restore order in their territories which were 
continuously torn apart by civil strife. Although they had 
withdrawn in 1841 the Dutch had openly declared that they did 
not give up their ’’right” to occupy those territories in the 
future; and in fact during the fifties the Batavian authorities 
felt obliged to avail themselves of this ’’right” in order to 
curb foreign influence.
During the 1Forties, cases of infiltration into what the
Dutch considered their sphere of influence had resulted in
preventive action in Borneo and some of the Lesser Sunda(2)Islands# But during the fifties foreign adventurers seemed to 
show a marked preference for the sultanates on the East-Coast 
of Sumatra.
In 1852 an American, Captain Gibson of the ’’Flirt”, was
accused of trying to incite the Sultan of Djambi against the
Dutch. Gibson was caught and imprisoned in Weltevreden (Java)#
The Gibson incident, however, directed the attention of the
Home government to the East—Coast of Sumatra; and in 1853 the
Governor-General was instructed:
”#.to conclude as soon as possible contracts with 
the independent princes of the East-Coast of
Sumatra. «•••••...... ••••• ........ ..........••••**
and although the Government felt that, considering article 9
(2) See. Section V, p. 258.
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(3)of the treaty of 1824, hardly anything was to be feared from
the British government, it would in any case:
"••be desirable from a general political point of 
view that measures were taken to prevent the 
establishment of other Powers..••••••••••••••..."(4)
During the following year (1854) the Batavian government
proposed the re-occupation of Indragiri, where it was reported
that the British firm of Almeida and Sons was planning to
develop coal deposits. But the Home government decided to
refrain from action for the time being in order not to give
the wrong impression to England, which at that time was deeply
(5)involved in the Crimean War.
The next trouble spot on the East-Coast of Sumatra was 
Siak where in 1857 a British adventurer called Wilson, who 
had been a clerk in the Singapore firm of Martin Dyce and Co., 
tried to carve out a kingdom for himself. The presence of 
Wilson in Siak was due probably in the first instance to the 
unwillingness of both the Dutch and the Singapore authorities 
to comply with the repeated requests of the Sultan for help to 
restore his authority which was being undermined by his 
brother both in Siak Proper and the dependent smaller sultan­
ates in the North-West. Finally the Sultan concluded an
(3) See Section IV, p. 237. ~(4) Minister of Colonies to the Governors-General. 29th April, 
1853. quot. Klerck E.S. de "De Atjeh Oorlog- Deel I, Het 
onstaan van den oorlog." s*Gravenhage Nijhoff, 1912.P.209«
(5) Minister of Colonies to Governor-General. 8th November,1854« 
quot. Ibid, p.238.
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a g re e m e n t w ith  W ilso n  who u n d e r to o k  to  r e s t o r e  th e  S u l t a n ’ s 
p r e s t i g e  and a u th o r i t y  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  a t r a d e  t r e a t y  and a t h i r d  
o f  th e  re v e n u e  o f  S ia k  and d e p e n d e n c ie s  f o r  W ilso n  h im s e l f .  
S u b s e q u e n t ly ,  a f t e r  W ilso n  w i th  a s m a ll  army o f  B u g in ese  had 
r e s t o r e d  th e  S u l t a n ’ s  p o s i t i o n ,  a d i s p u te  a ro s e  ab o u t th e  a c tu a l  
re m u n e ra t io n  f o r  h i s  s e r v i c e s .  T h is  c a u se d  W ilso n  to  t u r n  
a g a i n s t  th e  S u l ta n ;  and i n  1857 b o th  th e  S u l ta n  and h i s  b r o t h e r  
c a l l e d  f o r  h r “ fro m  th e  D u tch  governm ent t o  f r e e  them  from
th e  a d v e n tu r e r .
I n  r e s p o n s e  to  t h i s  r e q u e s t  f o r  h e lp  th e  R e s id e n t  o f  
Riouw was s e n t  to  S i a k ,  w here he m anaged to  e f f e c t  a r e c o n c i l ­
i a t i o n  be tw een  th e  S u l t a n  and h i s  b r o t h e r .  But W ilso n , who 
e a r l i e r  had  l e f t  f o r  S in g a p o re , r e tu r n e d  a few  m onths l a t e r  
and e r e c t e d  f o r t i f i c a t i o n s  on th e  i s l a n d  o f  B e n g k a l is .  I n  
o r d e r  to  a v o id  a r e p e t i t i o n  o f  W ilso n ’ s  e a r l i e r  e s c a p a d e s  i n  
S ia k  th e  D u tch  -  who w ere s t i l l  u n w i l l in g  to  occupy th e  
s u l t a n a t e s  -  co n c lu d ed  a t r e a t y  o f  f r i e n d s h i p  w i th  th e  S u l ta n  
i n  J u l y ,  1857 ; and s e n t  w a rs h ip s  to  B e n g k a l is ,  w hich  a f t e r  an  
u lt im a tu m  su c ce ed e d  i n  d r iv in g  W ilso n  b ack  to  S in g a p o re , w here 
he  lo d g e d  c o m p la in ts  w ith  th e  a u t h o r i t i e s  a b o u t th e  v i l e  t r e a t ­
m ent r e c e iv e d  by a B r i t i s h  s u b j e c t  a t  t h e  h ands o f  th e  D u tc h .
6 ) K le rc k  E .S  de " A tje h  O o rlo g .T 17
7 ) I b i d ,  p p .2 3 9 -2 4 0 .
o p , c i t .  p p .2 3 8 -2 3 9 .
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However, Mijer, the Dutch Colonial Minister, was of the
opinion that a treaty of friendship was not sufficient and
insisted on more definite measures to put an effective stop(8)to foreign infiltration. Consequently the Governor-General
suggested the occupation of one of the Siak ports, where as
at Djambi a non-differential tariff should be introduced.
Immediate action, however, was postponed because the Dutch
government did not want to create the impression of taking
advantage of the weakened English position owing to the 
(9)Indian Mutiny.
Subsequently on 1st February, 1858 the Dutch concluded
a contract with the Sultan of Siak in which the Sultan
recognized the supremacy of the Netherlands government; and
i.a. agreed not to maintain or take up relations with foreign
powers without the consent of the Dutch, who in turn took Siak
and its dependencies under their protection, promising to
maintain and reinforce the position and prestige of the Sultan(10)
and the nobility.
Soon afterwards, the Dutch took measures to establish a 
firmer hold on Djambi. The earlier contract of 1834 with
(8) Minister for Colonies to Governor-General. 25th July, 1857. 
quot. Ibid. pp.240-241•
(9) Report of the Minister for Colonies to the King. . 30th 
December, 1857. ouot. Klerck E.S. de op.cit. p.24l.
(10) Full text of the 1858 treaty with Siak is printed in 
Bi.ilage (Appendix) IV. of Klerck E.S. de op.cit.
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Djjambi stipulated that after the reigning Sultan had died the 
new Sultan was obliged to notify the Batavian government and 
at the same time was to renew in writing the recognition of 
Dutch sovereignty over Djambi. When in 1855 a new Sultan took 
office the Governor-General was of the opinion that the 
Sultan*s notification did not clearly enough indicate his 
willingness to recognize Dutch supremacy; and therefore he 
suggested that a new treaty of a more explicit kind should be 
concluded. The Sultan was opposed to this. But the Batavian 
authorities decided to go ahead; even more keenly because of 
rumours that the United States - which were probably incited 
by the Gibson affair - were intending to carry out an invest­
igation into Dutch political rights in the Archipelago,
Therefore when the Sultan kept refusing to comply with the 
Dutch request for a new treaty, an expedition was sent to 
Djambi in August, 1858, The Sultan fled, and appealed for 
help from the Sultan of Turkey, The Sultan*s letter was
apparently received in Constantinople, but the Turkish govern-(11)ment assured the Dutch ambassador that no reply had been sent*
When the Sultan of Djambi had fled, his uncle - after having(12)
agreed to a new treaty - was put on the throne by the Dutch.
In addition to Djambi the Dutch were also forced to
(11) Van Zuylen van Nyevelt. Dutch Ambassador in Constantinople, 
to the Minister for External Affairs. 30th September,1858. 
quot. de Klerck op.cit. p. 257,
(12) Ibid. pp.246-247.
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intervene in Reteh, a region immediately to the North of
Djambi which came under the sovereignty of the Sultan of
Riouw-Lingga. Sultan Tungku Mahmud of Riouw-Lingga after
having been deposed by the Dutch in 1857 had fled to Reteh;
and he had succeeded in gaining the support of the head of
that region. Dutch attempts to bring Reteh into line were
in vain; and in October, 1858 a Dutch expedition after heavy
(13)
fighting occupied this territory.
Also in 1858 closer ties were established with Indragiri;
and an agreement was made whereby concessions for agricultural
land or mining would only be granted after the approval of the
(14)
Batavian authorities.
The re-occupation of the East-Coast did not only cause
difficulties with the Straits Settlements - as was to be
expected - but also with Achin.
Article 2 of the contract concluded between Holland and
Siak contained a description of the dependencies of Siak, which
(15)
included the pepper ports of Deli, Langkat, Assahan and Bila.
A dispute arose with Achin, which claimed sovereignty over some 
of those territories. This Dutch-Achinese dispute, although 
one of many which had occurred since the return of the Dutch
(13) Netcher E De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak, 1602-1865* 
s*Gravenhage, 1870. Verhandelingen Bataviaasch Genootschap 
van Künsten en Wetenschappen. Deel XXXV. pp.307-329*
(14) Klerck de E.S. op.cit. p.247.
(15) See p.332 this section.
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to the West-Coast of Sumatra in 1819, had far more drastic 
consequences than the previous ones, because it ended in a 
full-scale war with Achin, which lasted for more than thirty 
years. Therefore for clarity*s sake a diversion on Dutch— 
Achinese relations during the nineteenth century is necessary 
at this point,
A note by Canning and Wynn - the British Plenipotentiaries
to the 1824 treaty - expressed the hope that, although England
would change the restrictive clauses of Raffles’ treaty of 1819(16)
with Achin into an agreement for the friendly reception of 
British shipping, the Dutch government would refrain from 
taking hostile measures against the Sultan of Achin, At the 
same time however the Dutch were requested to protect the 
general interests of Europeans - i,e, trade and shipping - in
(17)Achinese waters. The Dutch Plenipotentiaries agreed with the 
British request and:
”.«they believe that they can ensure that their 
Government will immediately establish relations 
with Achin in such a way that this State - without 
loosing anything of its independence - will offer 
the sailor and merchant that continuous security, 
which it seems can only exist throiigh the moderate 
use of European influence,............ .•**(18)
(l6V See Section I, p. 42,
(17) Nota der Engelsche Plenipotentarissen. George Canning en 
Charles Wynn. 17 Maart, 1824. in Elout’s Bijdragen op.cit. 
pp.228-231.
(18) Rota van den Nederlansche Plenipotentarissen, H. Fagel en 
A.R, Palck. 17 Maart, 1824. in Ibid. pp.231-234.
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How the Dutch negotiators imagined that it would be possible 
to protect European trade and shipping without curtailing the 
independence of Achin, a country known for its fierce pirates 
and anti-European attitude, is hard to explain. But in any 
case the Dutch government until the f60*s neither had the power 
nor, as it appears, the inclination to fulfil the promise made 
in 1824.
De Stuers and Verploegh - who on 17th February, 1825 were 
appointed Commissioners for the take-over of the British 
possessions in Sumatra - were i.a. instructed to notify the 
Sultan of Achin about the treaty of 1824 which brought Sumatra 
within the Dutch sphere of influence. Before, however, conclud­
ing a definite treaty with Achin, the Commissioners were to 
await further instructions after they had reported to the
government about the action taken by the British in regard to
(19)their treaty of 1819 with Achin. But no arrangement was made 
with Achin at this time; and neither did a commission appointed 
by Du Bus de Gisignies in 1827 to take stock of the situation 
in Achin come to anything. In 1828 the Batavian government 
again decided to send a commission to Achin in order to obtain 
better treatment for Dutch shipping which was reported to be 
forced to fly English or American flags in order to protect 
themselves against Achinese pirates. But owing to the lack of
(19) Resolution of the Governor-General. 17th February, 1825« quot. Officieele Bescheiden betreffende het ontstaan van 
den oorlog tegen Atjeh in 1873. Van regeeringswege uit- 
gegeven ter Algemene Landsdrukkerij. Batavia.1881. pp.8-9*
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warships suitable for such a mission the commission was 
postponed and finally forgotten about. Though the Dutch 
during 1829 and 1830 were forced to take action against 
Achinese marauders, who were trying to establish themselves 
in the Dutch territory of Tapanulli on the West-Coast, no 
official contact was made with the Sultan of Achin after
(20)those attacks had been beaten off.
During the thirties, however, Achinese pirates appear to 
have become less discriminating in picking out their prey; and 
in 1831 the American vessel ’’The Friendship11 was plundered 
while at anchor in the Achinese harbour of Kwalla Batu and the 
captain and a number of the crew murdered. Consequently the 
United States government sent the frigate ’’Potomac” which in 
reprisal bombarded Kwalla Batu into rubble. The ’’Potomac” 
incident made The Hague remind Batavia of the promises made 
in 1824; and the Minister for Colonies expressed the hope that;
”..as soon as Netherlands influence shall have been 
properly established in the surroundings of Padang 
and among the Padris-to which purpose Governor- 
General van den Bosch is directing successful 
attempts - measures will be considered to imbue 
the Achinese with somewhat more respect for our 
flag than they appear to have at p r e s e n t . (21)
In the meantime, however, complaints by the West-Coast
authorities about Achinese infiltrations into government
territory and their co-operation with the Padris are continuously
(2°) See Section,II, p. 126,
(21) Officieele Bescheiden op.cit. p.10.
growing. But the Batavian government refrained from taking 
any direct action against the Achinese; and even when the 
Sultan refused to deliver the Dutch government vessel "De 
Dolfijn" which had been captured by its crew carrying 30,000 
guilders in silver and had been located by a Dutch frigate in 
Achin, the Batavian government took a rather lame attitude. 
When the Sultan refused to surrender "De Dolfijn" to the 
Commander of the “Van Spijck", which had found the ship, on 
the grounds that the captain had no written request from the 
Governor-General, an official letter was despatched to Achin 
requesting the return of the Dutch ship. But at the same time 
the Resident of the West-Coast was instructed to act with 
careful judgment in the matter; and
"•«if the said Sultan returns the schooner Dolphijn 
in a usuable state, not too much ought to be pressed 
(for the return) of the rest such as the restitution 
of 30,000 guilders in silver; the (ship*s) guns; and 
the sailors of said schooner, considering it is not 
advisable to take measures which could cause a war 
with the sultan "(22)
Subsequently a commission was sent to Achin to take 
possession of "De Dolfijn" and to report on the military 
strength of the country. But the Sultan tried to stall the 
restitution proceedings as long as possible; and finally 
replied that "De Dolfijn" had been burned at the Pedir coast 
and that the crew had taken the money. The Commission subseq­
uently advised the Batavian government that owing to the
(22) Resolution of the Governor-General, 14th November,1830* 
quot. Ibid, p,12.
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unwillingness of the Sultan to come to terms and the many 
previous difficulties experienced with the Achinese, would:
'••.make it necessary to maintain the honour of the 
Netherlands-Indies Government with force and to compel 
the Sultan with strong although proper means to 
satisfy our fair requests.*........ ........... ..•••"(23)
But Batavia preferred to remain impassive and the "Dolfijn"
affair was dropped.
The main reason for this attitude of the Netherlands 
Indies government in respect of Achin was the consideration 
that the remittance of surplus funds home was more important 
than the upkeep of national honour by means of costly and 
valueless expeditions. Prom the Dutch point of view a war 
with Achin was useless, because it could not result in the 
establishment of a Dutch trading monopoly for the reason that 
the treaty of 1824 forbade Holland to infringe the sovereignty 
of Achin* Van den Bosch felt himself especially hampered by 
the Achin clause in the 1824 treaty; and he repeatedly asked 
the Home government if there was no possibility of coming to a 
new arrangement with England about that territory. He wrote:
"..that island (i.e. Sumatra) can become to us nearly 
as important as Java; only the treaty of London stands 
very much in my way. Would it not be possible to
change it...... .on the grounds that the Achinese
repeatedly invade the Batta lands and other districts 
in our territory in Sumatra, (and) to obtain the right 
to establish ourselves everywhere on the coast of 
Sumatra, where our security and interest requires this."(24)
(23) Report of'w.H.R. van Loon en W.L. Ritter, quoted in Resol­
ution of the Batavian Government, 19th October,1837* quot. 
Officieele Bescheiden op.cit.pp.12-13«
(24) Van den Bosch to Baud. 4th June, 1831. in Briefwisseling 
op.cit. p.97.
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B ut su ch  an  ag reem en t was v e ry  u n l i k e l y  to  come ab o u t d u r in g
(2 5 )
t h e ’T h i r t i e s  and f o r t i e s ,  w hen, a s  we have  s e e n ,  A ng lo -D u tch
r e l a t i o n s  b o th  i n  E urope and th e  c o lo n ie s  w ere r a t h e r  s t r a in e d *
The D utch  t h e r e f o r e  t r i e d  to  be c a r e f u l  i n  t h e i r  d e a l in g s  w ith
A c h in ; and van den B o sc h , a s  can  be ju d g ed  from  h i s  l a t e r
c o rre sp o n d e n c e  w i th  B aud, a p p e a rs  to  h ave  a d ju s te d  h im s e l f  to
th e  id e a  o f  an in d e p e n d e n t A ch in :
’* * • th e  s u b j e c t io n  o f t h e  w ho le  i s l a n d  o f  S u m a tra , 
w ith  th e  e x c e p t io n  o f  A c h in , m ust be a p o l i t i c a l  
o b j e c t iv e  o f  th e  g o v e rn m e n t, w hich  sh o u ld  be 
p u rsu e d  c a lm ly  and w ith o u t  h a s t e . . . * * . ............ . . . . ” ( 26)
The B a ta v ia n  governm ent was c o n ce rn e d  to  p r e v e n t  E n g lis h
c o m p la in ts  a b o u t D u tch  v i o l a t i o n  o f  A ch in ese  s o v e r e ig n  r i g h t s ;
and an  exam ple o f  t h i s  i s  th e  s e n d in g  o f  w a rs h ip s  to  th e  W est-
C o ast i n  1838 to  p r o t e c t  Trumon and to  occupy B aro s and S in g k e l ,
a c t i o n s  w hich  w ere c o n s id e re d  by th e  D u tch  to  be d i r e c t e d
(2 7 )
a g a in s t  A ch in ese  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  n o t th e  A ch in ese  s t a t e .  B ut
d e s p i t e  th e  a t te m p ts  n o t  t o  o f fe n d  B r i t i s h  s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s ,
( 28 )
th e  B r i t i s h  g o v e rn m e n t, a s  was p o in te d  o u t e a r l i e r ,  p r o t e s t e d  
a b o u t th e  D u tch  o c c u p a tio n  o f  B a ro s  and S in g k e l a s  c o n s t i t u t i n g  
a v i o l a t i o n  o f  A ch in ese  s o v e re ig n  r i g h t s .
H ow ever, th e  i n a c t i v i t y  o f  th e  D u tch  c a u se d  E u ro p ean  
s h ip p in g  i n  A ch in ese  w a te r s  to  become v e ry  u n s a f e .  In  1844
( 25) See S e c t io n  iv~
(2 § )  Van den  B osch to  B aud . 1 6 th  F e b ru a ry , 1835* i n  B r i e f w i s s e l -  
in g .  o p . c i t .  p .2 0 £ 7
(2 7 )  See S e c t io n  I I I .
(2 8 )  See S e c t io n  IV .
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two British merchantmen were pillaged, one at Kwalla Batu 
and one at Kwalla Merdu. British warships after having failed 
to obtain satisfaction from the Sultan severely punished those 
ports. In 1851 the French warship, the ‘'Cassini”, made an 
unsuccessful attempt at punishing the port of Diak, where
9
the Neapolitan vessel "Clementina” had been plundered. But 
the Achinese appeared hardly impressed and in 1852 they 
pillaged the British schooner "Coney Castle".
Up to this point the Dutch government had left the punish­
ment of Achinese pirates to the nations concerned but in 1853 
the Dutch begin to show more initiative in regard to Achin.
In fact The Hague had become alarmed about the presence of an 
Achinese, called Sidi Mohammad, in Paris where he was generally 
recognized as the envoy of the Sultan of Achin. In addition 
the Raad van Indie (Council of the Indies) argued that since 
the West—Coast of Sumatra had finally been brought under firm
control, the time had come to consider the possibility of
(29)
concluding a definite treaty with Achin. But the governor 
of the West-Coast of Sumatra, General van Swieten, was of the 
opinion that to approach the Sultan, who appeared to have little 
say over his vassals, would be useless. Therefore instead, 
the governor suggested that it would be far more effective
(29) Resolution of the Governor-General. 8th October, 1853. 
quot. Officieele Bescheiden, op.cit. p.15.
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annually to send warships to the Achinese ports on a showing— 
of-the-flag mission. The Batavian government agreed with van 
Swieten’s proposals; and the governor of the West-Coast was 
empowered to send at the end of each year a large—type warship 
to Achin in order to show the flag; and to intervene, if 
requested, in disputes between European traders and the indig­
enous population. However, for the time being, no friendly 
correspondence was to be opened up with the Sultan, unless 
this prince in contrast to his letter of 1837 concerning the
"Dolfijn" case showed more definite signs of wanting to come
(30)
on more friendly terms with the Dutch government.
Consequently in 1855 the brig "De Haai" was sent to Achin,
But its commander received a rather hostile reception from the
Sultan who was apparently very upset about the fact that this
(31)
officer did not carry a letter from the Governor-General.
However, the Batavian government was of the opinion that the
Sultan after further visits by larger Dutch warships would be
forced to become more friendly, since he could not afford to
start an open war with the Dutch out of fear of a rebellion by
his vassals who were constantly trying to diminish the Sultan’s
(32)
prestige and authority. Subsequently in I856 a larger vessel,
(50) Resolution of the Governor-General. 8th October.1853.ouot. 
Ibid.p.15.
(31) Rapport van kapitein-luitenant Couvier dit Dubekart. 
commander of the "Haai". Uth May. 1855» quot, Ibid. pp.16-18.
(32) Resolution of the Governor-General. 10th October, 1855* 
quot. Ibid. p.18.
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the frigate ,fPrins Hendrik der Nederlanden” was sent; and 
the governor of the West-Coast in contrast to the Batavian 
resolution of 14th April, 1854 issued the captain with a 
letter to the Sultan in order to spare the Dutch mission the 
same hostile treatment as the commander of nDe Haaiu had 
received the previous year. The Sultan was apparently impressed 
hy this second visit; he emphatically declared himself to be 
willing to come to better terms with the Dutch government and 
furthermore requested that a treaty be concluded* Moreover, 
the Sultan expressed similar sentiments in a letter to the 
Governor-General* As a result a draft treaty was drawn up in 
Batavia, the main points of which were: the admission of
subjects of both nations to trade, shipping and residence; the 
prevention of slavery, piracy and beachcombing; the waiving of 
earlier claims on both sides including the question of ,!De 
Dolfijn"; and the recognition by the Sultan of the governor of 
the West-Coast as the representative of the Netherlands Indies 
government empowered to deal with affairs concerning Achin*
(33)An Achinese-Dutch treaty was finally signed on 3rd March, 1857.
However, this treaty soon became a dead letter because 
acts of piracy by Achinese against Dutch ships continued; and 
furthermore the penetration of the Dutch into the East-Coast 
during 1857-58 caused a major clash of interest with Achin,
(33) The treaty is printed in full in note 2 of pp. 19-20 of
Officieele Bescheiden, op.cit.
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w h ic h  c la im e d  p a r t  o f  t h a t  a r e a  a s  coming u n d e r  i t s  s o v e r e ig n ty .
The a n n u a l d e s p a tc h  o f  D utch  w a rs h ip s  was d is c o n t in u e d  in  
1 8 5 6 ,  b u t  in  1861 a man o f  w ar had  t o  be d e sp a tc h e d  i n  o r d e r  to  
r e q u e s t  an  e x p la n a t io n  o f  th e  c a p tu r e  o f  tw o D u tch  v e s s e l s ,  
th e  ’’S a s s a h ” and th e  ’’Jo h a n n a ” , b o th  b e lo n g in g  a t  P ria m a n .
The S u l ta n  e x p la in e d  t h a t  th o s e  s h ip s  h ad  b e en  c a p tu re d  by 
R a d ja  Udah o f  Klumenong in  o r d e r  to  o b ta in  paym ent o f  a 50-  
60 y e a r  o ld  d e b t w hich  was ow ing to  him  by P e to  M ajeh , a 
P r ia m a n  m e rc h a n t. The g o v e rn o r  o f  t h e  W est—C o ast t h e r e f o r e  
was r e q u e s te d  by B a ta v ia  to  c o l l e c t  t h i s  d e b t .  But on i n v e s t ­
i g a t i o n  i t  was fo und  t h a t  t h e  m erc h an t c o n ce rn e d  had  d ie d  some 
tim e  b e f o r e ,  and t h a t  h i s  r e l a t i v e s  d id  n o t acknow ledge th e  
d e b t .  At t h i s  p o in t  th e  B a ta v ia n  governm ent d e c id e d  to  pay 
c o m p e n sa tio n  to  th e  ow ners o f  th e  two v e s s e l s ,  b u t  i n s t r u c t e d  
th e  g o v e rn o r  o f  th e  W est-C o a s t to  em phasize  t o  t h e  S u l ta n :
’’. . t h a t  a f t e r  c o n tin u e d  p o stp o n em en t o f  th e  paym ent 
o f  c o m p e n sa tio n  -  w h ich  was re c o g n iz e d  a s  f a i r  and 
w hich  had a l r e a d y  b een  advanced  to  th e  ow ners o f  th e  
s c h o o n e rs  S a ssa h  and Jo h an n a  -  th e  N e th e r la n d s  
I n d i e s  Governm ent -  how ever much to  i t s  d i s l i k e  — 
w ould have  to  p ro c e e d  t o  o b t a in  s a t i s f a c t i o n  on i t s  
own a c c o u n t ,  w hich  w ould damage th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
w ith  A ch in , w h ich  had  b e en  so much im proved o f  l a t e . . ” (3 4 )
B ut th e  w a rsh ip  ”Bromo” w hich  was s e n t  f a i l e d  to  o b t a in  any
s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  w h ich  a c c o rd in g  to  t h e  G overnor o f  th e  W est-
C o a s t and th e  c a p t a i n  o f th e  ”Bromo” was l a r g e l y  due to  th e
(3 4 )  R e s o lu t io n  o f  t h e  G overnor - G e n e ra l . 2 8 th  J a n u a r y ,  1862 . 
q u o t .  O f f i c i e e l e  B e sc h e id e n  o p . c i t .  p .2 1 .
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poverty and powerlessness of the Sultan.
As has been mentioned before soon after the conclusion 
of the Siak treaty of 1858 difficulties occurred with Achin 
about the actual sovereignty over the smaller East-Coast 
sultanates to the North of Siak Proper. In fact a shift in 
de facto sovereignty had taken place during the course of the 
century when Achin had taken advantage of the growing weakness 
of Siak - caused by continuous internal strife and division - 
to extend its hold over the pepper ports to the North - West of 
Siak Proper. The Sultan of Achin claimed that his sovereign 
rights extended as far south as Batu Bara - i.e. including the 
smaller sultanates of Langkat, Deli, Serdang, and Assahan. But 
the Sultan of Siak called on the Dutch government - in accord­
ance with the stipulations of the 1858 treaty - to help him 
re-establish his authority both in Siak Proper and its 
dependencies. The Batavian government was willing to intervene 
on behalf of the Sultan largely because of its conviction that 
the most effective way to prevent the possible establishment 
of foreign influence in that region was to stop the political 
anarchy which had been prevalent in Siak for most of the 
century. Consequently in March, 1862, Netscher, the Resident 
of Riouw, was ordered to proceed to the Northern dependencies 
in order to:
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"..take personal stock of the existing situation 
there and to withdraw those states from the 
usurped sovereignty of Achin and to guide them 
by friendly means to the acceptance of the 
sovereignty of Siak............ ..............(35)
Netscher, who accordingly made a journey to the East-Coast
sultanates in August, 1862 described the situation there as:
"..most terrible, everywhere (there is) discord (and)... 
great hate against the state of Siak, which because of 
its unlimited anarchy and misgovernment is in such a 
state of decay that it cannot possibly give to (its 
dependencies) the protection which they have a right 
to.......... ........................................
All the dependencies, so Netscher continued, desired to come
under the protection of the Dutch government in order to stop
Achinese encroachments, the only exception in this respect
being Assahan, which did not want to recognize either Dutch
or Siak supremacy. While there was much discord among the
principalities themselves, the report continued, they were all
opposed to Siak, which they considered had left them unprotected
against Achinese aggression. The Resident further reported
that he had taken advantage of this favourable opportunity to
obtain declarations from those principalities in which they
recognized the sovereignty either of the Dutch government or 
(36)
of Siak.
(33) Resolution of the Governor-General. 27th March, 1862* 
quot. Klerck E.S. de opfcit. pp.252-253*
(36) Resolution of the Governor-General. 25th December,1862. 
ouot. Ibid, pp*253-254* See also: Officieele Bescheiden 
op.cit. p.23.
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Probably in response to Netscher's activities the
(37)Sultan declared during the visit of the "Bromo” that Langkat 
and the country as far as Batu Baru belonged to him; and soon 
afterwards the Sultan wrote to the Governor-General requesting 
that discussions should be held to demarcate the Dutch and 
Achinese spheres of interest in the East-Coast region. In 
reply the Governor-General stated that he was very much in 
favour of such an arrangement; and that he had requested the
Resident of Riouw to prepare for negotiations to which the
(38)
Sultan was invited to send his representatives. But this 
letter was only delivered in Achin in September of the following 
year (1863) mainly owing to the dilapidated condition of the 
warship stationed at the West-Coast and the lack of other 
suitable shipping.
It soon became evident, however, that Achin was unwilling 
to cede the East-Coast sultanates - which were de facto under 
its sovereignty - to the Dutch. In February, I863 Deli requested 
the help of the Resident of Riouw against a threatening Achinese 
invasion. But when the Resident appeared at the East-Coast with 
two warships the expected invasion did not occur. However, as 
soon as the Dutch ships had left an official of the Sultan of 
Achin appeared in the principalities in order to levy taxes and
( 37) See page T3567 v”
(38) Governor-General to the Sultan of Achin. 23rd December,
1862. auot. Klerck E.S. de op.cit. pp.256-237«
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generally to enforce the Sultan*s authority. When the rulers 
of Langkat and Deli refused to comply they were threatened with 
force. However the Achinese succeeded in inciting Serdang and 
Assahan against the Dutch government; and in May, 1863 they 
went as far as to bombard Batu Bara where the Dutch flag was 
flying on the ramparts. After these incidents the Resident of 
Riouw pressed the government to take more effective action 
against Achin, which obviously was unwilling to come to terms 
and repeatedly violated the friendship treaty of 1857. Accord­
ing to the Resident:
"...the patience which has been shown shall have to 
come to an end soon, if we want to avoid losing 
everything we have gained, (and avoid) being forced 
to undertake costly and difficult expeditions......"(39)
When in September, I863 the Dutch warship "Bromo” delivered the
letters from the Governor-General to Achin, the Sultan was not
impressed by either the first letter which contained the
Governor-General’s reply to the Sultan’s request about a border
settlement; or by the second one which complained about the
dishonouring of the Dutch flag at Bata Baru. In reply to the
Governor-General the Sultan reiterated his earlier position that
the whole of the East-Coast up to Bata Baru came under his
sovereignty and that in any case the Governor-General had no
right to plant the Dutch flag there without the Sultan’s
(39) Report of Netscher to the Batavian government. I863. quot» 
Officieele Bescheiden op.cit. pp.24-25*
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permission. Furthermore the Sultan promised to bring the
question of the two Dutch ships the "Sassia" and the HJohanna”
which had been captured in I860, to a satisfactory conclusion
(40)
within a few days. Following this the Batavian government
refrained from making the Bata Baru incident a casus belli; and
decided not to press for a quick border settlement* At the same
time, however, it was resolved that Achinese sovereignty over
the East-Coast sultanates would not be recognized and that
those principalities were to be put under Dutch protection.
Furthermore the Resident of Riouw and the Governor of the West-
Coast were instructed to gather as much information about Achin
and dependencies as possible for the use of the general staff
(41)
in case war broke out with that country.
Further incidents occurred in the East-Coast region during 
1864 i.a. the head of Tamiang refused to justify himself before 
Dutch officials about the murder of two Chinese from Pulu Penang 
on the grounds that he was only responsible to the government 
of Achin. In the meantime, however, the anti—Dutch attitude of 
Serdang and Assahan was becoming increasingly stronger; and the 
Resident of Riouw advised the Netherlands Indies government 
that if measures were not taken soon:
(40) quot. Officieele Bescheiden, op.cit. p.25.
(41) Governor-General to the Hague. 24th November, 1863. auQt. 
Ibid. p.25.
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"••It will not take long before our officials at 
the East-Coast of Sumatra will not be safe any­
more. The trouble is caused by the unpunished 
insults to the Netherlands flag, and the undist­
urbed settlement of Achinese on Netherlands 
Indies territory. As Achin remains unpunished,
Assahan and Serdang also think that they can defy 
us................... ..................... ........ "(42)
Subsequently in August, 186fj the Batavian government decided
to send an expedition to bring Assahan and Serdang into line;
to drive away any Achinese who had settled South of the Tamiang
river; and to destroy their fortifications. Rather interestingly
the Batavian government did not consider this action as a
violation of the 1824 treaty, because it was not the intention
carry on hostilities against the state of Achin 
itself, but (only) the repulsion of Achinese 
encroachments on Siak territory, which is subject 
to us.......................... ................... •"(43)
The continuous complications with Achin during the fifties
and sixties made the Dutch government increasingly anxious for
the removal of the obstacle to direct action against that
territory posed by the treaty of 1824«
While van den Bosch, as we have seen, felt particularly
hamstrung by this provision, but was forced to acquiesce owing
to the worsening of Anglo—Dutch relations, since the fifties*
many of the conditions that were responsible for this uneasy
(42) Report of Resident of Riouw. 186>5. ouot. Ibid, p.26.
(43) Koloniaal Verslag (Colonial Report), 1865* pp.12-14.
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state of relations between the two countries had disappeared.
The main cause of friction had been the steady refusal of the
Dutch to admit British shipping and trade to its colonies on
(44)more favourable terms. The increasing pressure of private 
enterprise and the growing impact of liberalism and humanit-
arianism on Dutch public opinion caused the gradual abolition
(45)of the culture system. At the same time the other concomittant 
of liberalism i.e. the principle of free and unrestricted trade, 
was also making headway in the Netherlands, The example of 
England which in 1846 had abolished the Corn Laws and in 1849 
the Navigation Acts, forced the Dutch government to follow suit. 
Consequently in 1850 radical changes were made in the Dutch 
navigation laws, which included such measures as the abolition 
of differential shipping charges; and the granting of Dutch 
shipping papers to foreign built ships. Furthermore in 1862 
partly as a reaction to the Cobden treaty of I860 between 
France and England, the Dutch parliament passed a so-called 
revenue tariff, which provided for duties of 3% on imports of
manufactures; and free entry of raw materials, while all export
(46)
duties were abolished.
But while the new shipping legislation applied to the 
colonies, it took somewhat longer before a more liberal tariff
(44) See Section IV,
(45) See Section V,
(46) For Dutch shipping and tariff legislation See Brugmans 
op.cit, pp,214-219«
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was introduced in the Netherlands Indies, Although as early
as 1850 the Dutch government had submitted a proposal to
Parliament for the abolition of differential duties in the
Indies, surprisingly enough it had been the Tweede Kamer (House
of Representatives), in which the Liberals were strongly
entrenched, which was opposed to such a move. Dutch industry,
so it was argued, was not yet strong enough to compete on an
unprotected colonial market, while furthermore free trade would
cause a decline in the staple market for colonial produce in
Holland. The liberals defended their attitude by pointing out
that during the system of protection before 1848, Dutch industry
had become too onesided. However, when it appeared that despite
(47)the gradual abolition of the Consignment system, most of the 
colonial produce was still marketed in Holland and Dutch 
industry appeared to have secured a strong position in the 
colonial market on its own account, opposition to the intro­
duction of a more liberal tariff gradually weakened. Subsequently 
in I865 the Indian Tariff Law (indische Tarriefwet) was passed 
by Parliament introducing a general import duty of 6$. But 
various goods of Dutch origin were still given a certain amount 
of protection, including woollens and cottons which were to be 
admitted at 10$ when of Dutch origin and 20$ when imported from 
foreign countries. In I869, however, this duty was lowered
(47) See next paragraph
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from 20% to 16%; and in 1872 a new tariff was introduced
which admitted all imports into the Indies at a general(48)
duty of 6%.
Together with the abolition of the culture system and
the introduction of liberal tariffs, the Consignment system —
the other essential part of van den Bosch’s colonial monopoly -
was gradually dismantled. In 1857 the sale of government
produce in Java - which had been discontinued since 1836 — was
renewed and in that year amounted to 6.5% of all government
produce, while by 1870 this proportion had increased to 37% of
(49)the total. Furthermore, particularly the abolition of the
government indigo and spices monopoly in the 60*s and of
sugar in 1873 caused a considerable decline in the N.H.M.
export trade. This company therefore gradually changed from
being a government banker, transporter and sales organization,
into an ordinary private business enterprise. The N.H.M.
adapted itself well to the new circumstances and began to
specialize in the buying and selling of colonial produce and
banking operations which included the provision of funds to
(50)private planters and other enterprises.
This liberalization of the East-Indies trade during the 
fifties and sixties was one of the major causes of an apparent
(48) Meinsma ,,Verval...,‘ op.cit. pp. 149-150.
(49) Gonggri.jp USchets.." op.cit. pp. 114-115.
(50) Brugmans op.cit. pp.242-243.
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"rapprochement” between England and Holland which occurred 
at this time.
While in 1840—41 the threatened occupation by the Dutch 
of* Siak brought Anglo—Dutch relations near to breaking—point, 
the occupation of the same territory in 1858 nearly passed 
unnoticed by the British government or at least seemingly so.
In 1857 Blundell, the governor of the Straits Settlement, 
refused to take action on complaints made by Wilson about the 
treatment he had received from the Dutch in Siak. When 
subsequently the Foreign Office — after direct representations 
by Wilson - was inclined to take up the matter v/ith The Hague, 
the British ambassador in Holland was opposed to such a move, 
because he believed that the Dutch were in a strong position 
and would reply:
”...we make no attack on the independence of the Raja 
of Siak - but we cannot permit the creation on the 
island of Sumatra of a new independent sovereign.••.”(51)
Consequently the Wilson question was not raised; and the main
reason for this appears to have been that Wilson’s proceedings
were considered by the Foreign Office as contravening article 9
of the treaty of 1824, which stipulated that no British settle-
(52)ments were to be made on the island of Sumatra.
(51) Abercrombie to Clarendon, 30th December, 1857* quot» Tarling op.cit. pp.i60-lbl.
(52) Foreign Office to the India Board, 26th March, 1858. quot» 
Ibid, p.161.
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Also when the Dutch occupation in 1858 of Siak became
known to the British the reaction was rather mild; and e.g*
Blundell wrote in May, 1858 to the India Office that although
it had to be seen how much British trade and commerce would be
interfered with, he was inclined:
’’•••to consider such establishments to be very 
beneficial* Siak has long been in a state of 
anarchy and disorganization, and wherever such 
a state of affairs prevails, trade is at an 
end and plunder and piracy unchecked.••••••••.”(53)
Subsequently when the Dutch ambassador in September, 1858
communicated the treaty with Siak, the British government did
not go any further than giving a simple acknowledgement. This
seemingly disinterested attitude by Britain becomes more
intelligible when it is taken into account that the British
government at this time was expecting the introduction of a
more liberal tariff in the Dutch colonies. Only a few months
earlier Rochussen, then Minister of Colonies, had declared to
the British ambassador that a new and more moderate tariff for
the colonies was under consideration; and that in any case in(54)Siak - similarly to Djambi - a non-differential tariff would be(55)introduced. But despite the fact that the Dutch government’s 
attempts to introduce a liberal tariff in the East-Indies was
(53) Foreign Office to the India Board. 26th March, 1858« quot» 
Tarling. op.citV p. l6l.
(54) See Section IV.
(55) Ward. British ambassador in The Hague to Malmesbury. 25th 
June, 1858. quot. Ibid, p.162.
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retarded by the strong opposition in Parliament and in fact 
did not come about - in the fullest sense of the word - till 
the early seventies, the Foreign Office seemed unwilling to 
press the Dutch too hard; and as Lord Wodehouse wrote in I860:
"•••I believe the policy of Mr. Canning*s treaty was 
much the wisest, viz. to leave to the Dutch the 
Eastern Archipelago....The exclusive colonial policy 
of the Dutch is no doubt an evil, but it has been 
much relaxed of late....It seems to me in many respects 
very advantageous that the Dutch should possess this 
Archipelago. If it was not in the hands of the Dutch, 
it would fall under the sway of some other maritime 
power, presumably the French, unless we took it our­
selves. — The French might, if they possessed such an 
eastern empire, be really dangerous to India and 
Australia, but the Dutch are and must remain too weak 
to cause us any alarm............ .......... .."(56)
While the Straits Settlement*s merchants so far had been 
rather quiet about the Dutch occupation of Siak, the visit of 
Netscher in 1862 to the pepper ports and the subsequent estab­
lishment of Dutch control there, caused a flood of complaints 
from Pulu Penang and Singapore to the Home Government about the 
alleged extension of the Dutch trading monopoly to those territ­
ories upon which the prosperity of British traders depended so 
much. Consequently the Foreign Office instructed the ambassador 
in The Hague to remind the Dutch government about the promises 
which it had made earlier about British trade in Siak; and in the 
meantime Aitchison, Under-Secretary in the Foreign Department in
(58) Lord Wodehouse. Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office. 
Memorandum, 18th August, i860, quot. Ibid. p7l6lj-.
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I n d i a ,  a f t e r  h a v in g  r e c e iv e d  r e p o r t s  ab o u t th e  g ro w in g  in f lu e n c e
o f  t h e  D u tch  i n  th e  E a s t-C o a s t  p r i n c i p a l i t i e s ,  a d v is e d  th e
F o re ig n  O f f ic e  t h a t  i t  sh o u ld  i n s i s t  on th e  in d ep e n d en c e  o f
th o s e  s u l t a n a t e s ,  u n l e s s  a new c o n v e n tio n  c o u ld  be c o n c lu d e d
w ith  t h e  D u tch  w h ich  w ould be  more e x p l i c i t  on B r i t i s h  r i g h t s
o f  t r a d e  and commerce i n  th e  A rc h ip e la g o  th a n  th e  t r e a t y  o f  
(57)
1824.
H ow ever, i n  r e p ly  to  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  made by th e  B r i t i s h
a m b a ssa d o r, th e  D u tch  governm ent a rg u e d  t h a t  i t s  a c t i o n s  d id
n o t c o n tra v e n e  any o f  th e  s t i p u l a t i o n s  o f  th e  1824 t r e a t y ;  and
t h a t  in  any c a se  in c r e a s e d  D u tch  in f lu e n c e  i n  th o s e  t e r r i t o r i e s ,
i n s t e a d  o f  b e in g  h a rm fu l ,  w ou ld  be a d v a n ta g e o u s  to  B r i t i s h
t r a d e  b e c a u se  o r d e r  w ould be  e s t a b l i s h e d ;  p i r a c y  and  s l a v e r y
s to p p e d :  w h ile  fu r th e rm o re  i t  was to  be  k e p t  i n  m ind t h a t  th e
(58)
t a r i f f  was on th e  p o in t  o f  b e in g  l i b e r a l i z e d *
B ut more c o m p la in ts  from  th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t le m e n ts  c o n tin u e d  
to  a r r i v e  i n  London; and th e  F o re ig n  O f f ic e  s e n t  a n o th e r  
i n s t r u c t i o n  to  th e  a m b assad o r i n  The Hague to  th e  e f f e c t  t h a t :
" . . . H e r  M a je s ty * s  Governm ent have  c o n s ta n t ly  p r o t e s t e d  
a g a in s t  th e  en c ro ac h m en ts  o f  th e  D utch  on th e  e a s t  
c o a s t  o f  S u m a tra , and th e y  c a n n o t t o l e r a t e  th e  o b s t r ­
u c t i o n s  t o  B r i t i s h  commerce w h ich  may r e s u l t  fro m  su ch  
en cro ach m en ts*  H er M a je s ty ’ s  G overnm ent a re  w i l l i n g  a t  
th e  same tim e  to  a c c e p t  th e  a s s u r a n c e s  g iv e n  by th e  
N e th e r la n d s  Governm ent o f  t h e i r  i n t e n t i o n  to  a d o p t a 
more l i b e r a l  com m erc ia l p o l i c y  i n  th e  E a s te r n  S e a s ,  and 
th e y  w i l l  se e  v /ith  s a t i s f a c t i o n  th e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  an 
im proved sy s te m , b u t th e  N e th e r la n d s  Governm ent may
(57)  V ic e ro y  o f  I n d i a  to  F o re ig n  O f f i c e * 8th J a n u a r y ,  1863.quot« 
T a r l in g *  p . lS T i
(58 )  Dutch F o re ig n  M in is te r  t o  M ilbanks«  B r i t i s h  Am b a ssa d o r , 
15t h J u l y ,  1§63. cjuot. I b i d ,  p . lb ö .
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rest assured that if steps are not shortly 
taken for removing the just cause of complaint 
which had been afforded to British traders in 
the East by the obstacles placed by the Dutch 
authorities in the way of their commercial 
operations, a state of things will arise which 
cannot fail to be most injurious to the good 
relations of the two countries.... ...... (59)
The British government was apparently willing to acquiesce in
the Dutch occupation of the East-Coast of Sumatra, providing
it could assure a better deal for British trade and commerce
there.
But when in 1864 Cremers, the Dutch Foreign Minister,
released the details to the British ambassador of the long
promised new tariff for the Dutch colonies the British were(60)
not content with the concessions made, even though the Dutch
Note contained the promise that in Siak and its dependencies
non-differential tariffs would be introduced. The British
government insisted on the equal treatment of British and
Dutch subjects in regard to the tariff and residence qualific—(61)
ations in the Dutch colonies.
Britain, however, was apparently bent upon finding a 
definite and speedy settlement of its differences with Holland 
in the Malacca Straits; and in August, 1864 Milbanke, the
(59) Russell to Milbanke. 11th September, 1863* quot. Tarling. 
op.cit. 'p.l6&.
(60) For further details of the new tariff See pp*^r$~of this 
section.
(61) Cremers to Milbanke. 23rd September, 1864# quot. Ibid.p.172.
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British ambassador, suggested to van der Putte, then the
Minister for Colonies, that a definite understanding between
the two countries on the interpretation of the 1824 treaty(62)would be highly desirable.
During the next few years further discussions on the 
possibility of a new convention on Sumatra, which would be 
supplementary to the 1824 treaty, were held; and finally in 
July, 1867 the British ambassador presented the Dutch govern­
ment with a draft convention relating to the East-Coast
$territories situated between Djambi and the Achinese border.
The draft stipulated that in the case of Dutch occupation of 
any of those territories, British subjects were to be treated 
on the same basis as Dutch ones, while in addition Holland was 
to refrain from introducing differential origin duties; mono­
polies; differential destination duties; and restrictions on
(63)the coasting trade and the residence of British subjects.
While the Dutch cabinet was generally favourably disposed 
towards the British proposals, it insisted that an agreement 
on the future of Achin should be included in any eventual 
Sumatra settlement. Although at this time the British govern­
ment had no objections in principle as such to a Dutch 
occupation of Achin, it decided to keep the question of Achin
(62) Milbanke to Foreign Office. 16th August, 1865* ouot. Ibid. 
P.173.
(63) Tarling op.cit. p.177.
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as a diplomatic bargaining point for future negotiations; and
accordingly the Foreign Office decided that an assurance should
be given to the Dutch government:
11 that in case of the desired commercial concessions 
being granted, Her Majesty1s Government would be 
disposed to deal liberally with the question of
Achin. ...... •••••••••••••••••..•••••.... • •.. .•.”(64)
After further exchanges of notes and a visit of the governor 
of the Straits Settlements to Batavia a new draft was finally 
agreed upon by both governments. Subsequently on 8th September, 
1870 a new Anglo-Dutch convention on Sumatra was signed in which 
the British government gave Holland a free hand in Sumatra 
including Achin; and the Dutch government in return assured 
British subjects the same treatment and privileges as enjoyed
(65)by Dutch subjects.
From the Dutch point of view the new convention not only
put a definite stop to the endless disputes with Britain, but
it also offered, as van der Putte phrased it, another distinct
advantage in that the earlier British objection to direct
action by the Dutch against the state of Achin was waived:
"...I won’t expand on this, but will only mention a 
few names: Gibson; the presence of the Achinese Sidi 
Mohammad in Paris; the finding of Achinese influence 
behind every complication in Sumatra, either in Nias, 
or as in 1864 at the East-Coast. If also that influ­
ence (i.e. of the Achinese) is remembered in the war 
against the Padris; (and) it is remembered that still 
in 1864 we were forced to take measures to stop
(64) Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 22nd August, 1868.quot.
Ibid. P.178 “
(65) Full text of the convention is in de Klerck op.cit.BiJlage 
VII.pp.457-460.
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slavery in Nias; and (if it is remembered) that the 
punishment of Achinese mi schief makers at the East- 
Coast was hampered by the treaty of 1824, then one 
shall not underestimate the value of the repealing 
of those restrictions, which were so injudiciously 
agreed to in 1824.............................. ..”(66)
Although the consideration that the independence of Achin
had proved to be a hindrance to Dutch plans in Sumatra would
in itself have provided a sufficient reason for the occupation
of that country during the time of van den Bosch, now additional
reasons for such a course of action are advanced* As already
pointed out, since 1846 a growing awareness is discemable in
Dutch government circles, that apart from purely commercial
pursuits the government had a definite duty - on humanitarian
grounds - to create better conditions for its colonial subjects
by protecting them from such evils as slavery, extortion and
anarchy. As the Dutch cabinet pointed out during the debates
on the Sumatra Conventionj
”..The Netherlands at present derive, just as previously - 
perhaps more than previously - much of its relative 
prestige from the rich heritage which has been bequeathed 
to it in the East and the West (i.e. Indies). But, it 
has been correctly pointed out that apart from the advan­
tages which can be gained from overseas possessions, 
serious and costly duties exist, which have made our 
task there not easier.......... ••••••••••••......••••”(67)
(66) Speech by Fransen van der Putte on 7th July. 1871 during 
the Tweede Kamer debate on the Sumatra Convention, in 
Handelingen der Staten Generaal. 1870/71 p.1127.
(67) Memorie van Beantwoording by Gericke. Foreign Minister and 
van Bosse. Minister for Colonies. 22 June, löjlm in Ibid, 
pp.1815-1625•
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An independent A chin, i t  was argued , would make th e  
c a rry in g  o u t o f  th e  Dutch governm ent’ s d u t ie s  very  d i f f i c u l t  
because o f A chin’s  a d d ic tio n  to  s la v e ry  and p iracy*  F u r th e r ­
more th e  co n tin u ed  independence of Achin would, i t  was f e a r e d ,  
r e s u l t  in  re p e a te d  d is tu rb a n c e s  in  th e  Dutch c o n tro l le d  pepper 
p o r ts  over which Achin s t i l l  claim ed so v e re ig n ty . T h is l a s t  
c o n s id e ra tio n  became an even more im p o rtan t m otive f o r  ta k in g  
d i r e c t  a c t io n  a g a in s t  the  A chinese when i t  appeared t h a t  th e  
economic v a lu e  o f th e  E ast-C o ast s u l t a n a te s  was f a r  g r e a te r  
th a n  o r ig in a l ly  had been ex p ec ted .
One r e s u l t  of th e  more e f f e c t iv e  European c o n tro l  on the 
E as t-C o as t s in c e  1858 had been th e  a ttem p ts  by the  Dutch 
a u th o r i t i e s  to  r a i s e  th e  economic v a lu e  o f th a t  a r e a .  A lready  
in  1858 co tto n -g ro w in g  experim en ts had been conducted in  S ia k ; 
and corn  and tobacco seeds had been issu ed  to  some o f th e  
ind igenous le a d e r s .  But more im p o rtan t N e tsch e r, the  R es id en t 
o f  Riouw, who in  1862 had v i s i t e d  the  S iak  dependencies wanted 
to  c o n s o lid a te  Dutch in f lu e n c e  th e re  by a t t r a c t i n g  European 
p la n te r s .  C onsequen tly , la r g e ly  owing to  h is  e f f o r t s  a s o i l  
survey  was c a r r ie d  ou t in  1863 bu t i t s  r e s u l t s  d id  no t c r e a te  
much i n t e r e s t  among European f irm s  in  Ja v a . However, in  th e  
same y ea r an Arab m erchant on a v i s i t  to  Java succeeded in  
in te r e s t in g  a number of f irm s  th e re  in  s e t t i n g  up a t r a d in g  
v en tu re  in  D e li where he re p o r te d  th a t  more th an  30,000 p ic u ls
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of tobacco were to be bought* When the representatives of those 
firms on their arrival in Deli found that the Arab merchant had 
completely misrepresented the true situation, they returned to 
Java, with the exception of one of them, a certain J* Nienhuis, 
who remained behind in order to experiment with tobacco growing* 
In 1864 Nienhuis succeeded in growing 50 packs of tobacco which 
brought 48 cents per pound at the Rotterdam sales. In 1866 the 
harvest of 189 packs brought 149 cents per pound; and in 1868 
the Amsterdam tobacco merchant P.W* Jannsen who had invested 
30,000 guilders in Nienhuis* enterprise earned 67,000 guilders 
profits on his outlay. The success of Deli tobacco spread 
quickly and soon a number of European planters settled there*
In 1870 the Deli Maatschapij, which replaced the earlier enter­
prise of Nienhuis and Janssen and was lar " financed by N.H.M*
capital, was able to pay a dividend of 20%.
While the increased economic importance of the East-Coast 
sultanates provided yet another reason for putting an effective 
stop to any Achinese attempts to interfere with the peaceful 
development of that territory, the already existing complaints 
about Achinese piracy became even more intensified with the 
large increase in the East-Coast trade, of which the Straits
(68) Broersma R Oostkust van Sumatra. Eerste deels De ontwikkel- 
ing van Deli* Batavia, 1919. pp.26-38. See also Blink H. 
Sumatra* s Oostkust in hare opkomst en ontwikkeling als 
economisch gewest. s*Gravenhage, Mouton, 1918*pp*91-94.
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Settlements were the main beneficiaries* It is therefore 
not surprising to see the Straits Settlements* press clamoring 
for effective action against the Achinese:
"••At all events if we do not choose to chastize 
them, and bring them to their senses, it is to 
be hoped that the Dutch may take the matter in 
hand* Such a state of affairs as has been going 
on at Acheen and the neighbourhood for some time 
back, should by no means be allowed to continue, 
unless indeed it be desired that Penang traders 
and others are to be regarded as the legalized 
prey of such a gang of pirates and banditti«•••”(69)
Another reason for the eradication of piracy, which should
be mentioned here was that the Straits of Malacca, as a result
of the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 was fast becoming one
of the major thoroughfares for international shipping»
But Achin presented both England and Holland with yet
another major problem, because it was feared that Achinese
attempts to obtain support from countries such as Prance and
the U.S.A, against the ever increasing influence of the Dutch
in Sumatra could result in the permanent settlement of a third
power in the Malacca Straits region. In fact this consideration
had also played an important role in bringing about the Anglo-
Dutch Convention of 1870 on Sumatra. In this context therefore
it should be noted that at the same time as "laissez-faire11
was becoming an accepted principle of economic behaviour in
(69) Penang Gazette, 15th April, 1870« ouot* Officieele Bes­
cheiden« op.cit. p.28.
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W estern  Europe, a c o u n te ra c tin g  c u r re n t  i s  d is c e r n ib le ,  
e s p e c ia l ly  in  Germany and th e  U n ited  S ta te s .  During th e  
p e r io d  1850-1870 w orld tr a d e  -  in  c o n t r a s t  to  th e  lo n g  down­
ward tre n d  s in c e  the  N apoleonic Wars -  showed a s p e c ta c u la r  
r i s e ,  which was la r g e ly  th e  r e s u l t  o f the  b reak -th ro u g h  o f the 
i n d u s t r i a l  R ev o lu tio n  in  th e  European C on tinen t and in  N orth  
A m erica. While t h i s  la rg e  in c re a s e  in  th e  volume o f  w orld 
tr a d e  made th e  te n s io n  between th e  Dutch and th e  E n g lish  in  
th e  A rchipelago  l e s s  acu te  th a n  i t  had been d u rin g  the se v e re  
tr a d e  d e p re ss io n  o f th e  f o r t i e s ,  on th e  o th e r  hand the  c o n tin ­
uous sp read in g  o f  in d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  in  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  soon 
r e s u l te d  in  a q u es t f o r  raw m a te r ia ls  which ex tended  o u ts id e  
th e  n a t io n a l  b o u n d a rie s . The a t t e n t io n  o f h i th e r to  non­
c o lo n ia l  powers became more and more d ir e c te d  tow ards o b ta in in g  
o v erseas  p o sse ss io n s  in  o rd e r  to  secu re  a cheap and r e g u la r  
supply  o f raw m a te r ia l s .  In  a d d i t io n  to  t h i s  development 
European n a tio n a lism  which had been sm ouldering th roughout th e  
n in e te e n th  cen tu ry  re c e iv e d  a trem endous l i f t  because th e  
qu ick  growth in  n a t io n a l  income and p ro s p e r i ty  was o f te n  a t t r i ­
bu ted  no t so much to  th e  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  p ro cess  b u t r a th e r  
to  th e  in n a te  g en iu s  o f  the  n a t io n  and the race«  C onsequently  
in  a d d i t io n  to  th e  co m p e titio n  f o r  raw m a te r ia l s ,  th e re  appears 
a s tro n g  tendency  f o r  t r y in g  to  outdo th e  r e s t  o f th e  w orld in  
a l l  f i e l d s  o f human e n te r p r i s e ,  in c lu d in g  the  p la n t in g  o f th e
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national flag in hitherto largely unknown territories, even 
though in some cases those areas had neither economic or
strategic value to the European power concerned.
\
What is important in this context is that the beginnings 
of this new spirit of European imperialism i.e. the desire to 
expand the national ethos as widely as possible, are already 
noticeable in the late sixties and the early seventies. The 
quest for colonies by such powers as Prance and the United 
States - and later Germany — provided an additional reason for 
England and Holland to forget their differences and to present 
a solid front against any attempt by other interested countries 
to infiltrate into their established spheres of influence; and 
for example Herman Merivale, the Permanent Under-Secretary of 
the Council of India, was of the opinion that the:
H••acknowledgement of the Dutch supremacy in Sumatra 
(is) a good thing for us, even if we got nothing by 
it. I think it would be a good thing for us to have 
the whole, or all the accessible ports of that 
island, controlled by a European power, which has 
every reason to be on good terms with us, and only 
a few old-fashioned jealousies pulling the other 
way.,..But to get their trade in exchange for this 
acknowledgement would be an excellent b a r g a i n . . 70)
Another quotation from a despatch by Ricketts, the British
consul at Sarawak, possibly illustrates this point even better:
(70) Merivale to Hammond. 10th November, 1865# auot. Tarling 
op.cit. P.174«
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"•••The old policy of working against the Dutch 
out here seems to me foolish - things are now 
entirely in a transition state- the influence 
which we once held together with the Dutch in 
this portion of the East being now divided among 
French, Americans, Dutch and English - it would*•• 
be*♦•♦.politic to be on terms of amity with the 
Hollanders, so as in times of difficulty to 
neutralize the power of the French and Americans*• "(71)
But while the British preferred the Dutch to be in charge
of the whole of the Archipelago, chiefly for strategic reasons,
the Dutch themselves - or at least the Liberals - wanted closer
co-operation with England in order to counteract the threat of
Par>-Gerraanism - a movement for the unification of all Germanic
peoples under the aegis of Prussia. The Dutch Colonial Minister
de Waal, during whose term of office the Sumatra Convention was
signed, very strongly stressed the danger posed by the rise of
Germany to the existence of Holland as a nation; and as an
example of this threat he quotes the following statement from
an 1867 issue of the "Kreuz zeitung" - Bismarck’s paper - to
the effect that the Dutch people:
"•••can only save the remainder of their valuable 
national heritage when closely annexed to Prussia.«"(72)
Summarizing the findings of this Section, it appears that
the thinking of the Dutch government in regard to colonies did
undergo a considerable change since the end of the forties«
(71) Ricketts to Layard. 22nd August« 1865« auot* Ibid* p«175.
(72) De Waal E "Onze Indische Financien" Deel I, p*6.
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The e a r l i e r  p o in t  o f  view th a t  the c o lo n ie s  e x is te d  on ly  f o r  
th e  purpose o f be in g  made s e rv ic e a b le  to  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  
owners g ra d u a lly  changed; and in  a d d i t io n  a growing r e a l i z a ­
t io n  i s  n o tic e a b le  in  Dutch government c i r c l e s  th a t  a p o s i t iv e  
du ty  e x is te d  in  reg a rd  to  th e  In d o n esian s th em selv es; i . e .  to  
p r o te c t  them from  such s o c ia l  e v i l s  as s la v e ry ,  p ira c y  and 
an a rch y . T his in  many cases  n e c e s s i ta te d  in c re a se d  in te r f e r e n c e  
and in te rv e n t io n  in  th e  in te r n a l  a f f a i r s  o f ind igenous s t a t e s  
and com m unities. A part from  h u m an ita rian  c o n s id e ra t io n s , 
in te rv e n t io n  and expansion  o f e f f e c t iv e  Dutch c o n tro l  were made 
n e c e ssa ry  in  o rd e r  to  s to p  any in te r f e re n c e  w ith  th e  f r e e  and 
u n r e s t r i c te d  flow  o f tra d e  and commerce. The e r a d ic a t io n  o f 
p ira c y  i s  a case in  p o in t h e re .  But a t  the  same tim e as th e  
p h ilo so p h y  o f l ib e r a l i s m  and i t s  co n co m ittan t of f r e e  tra d e  
became prom inent in  H olland and r e s u l te d  in  v a s t ly  improved 
Anglo-Dutch r e l a t i o n s ,  an i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of n a tio n a lism  
r e s u l te d  in  th e  o p p o s it io n  to  any o th e r  n a tio n  occupying p a r t  
o f the  A rch ipelago  -  i . e .  the sphere  o f  in f lu e n c e  which now 
was n o t on ly  co n sid ered  as  th e  a re a  dem arcated f o r  Dutch econo­
mic e x p lo i ta t io n  b u t a lso  as th e  f i e l d  to  be developed and 
c iv i l i z e d  under Dutch tu te la g e .  The b e l i e f  th a t  u n r e s t r ic te d  
in te r n a t io n a l  co m p e titio n  in  tra d e  and commerce would c re a te  the  
b e s t  p o s s ib le  w orld f o r  everybody, in c lu d in g  th e  In d o n es ia n s , 
to g e th e r  w ith  th e  c o n v ic tio n  t h a t  i t  was th e  duty and th e
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destiny of the Dutch nation to create a state of affairs 
in Indonesia enabling the safe and unrestricted conduct of 
trade and commerce largely explains why the Dutch decided 
to re-occupy the East-Coast of Sumatra during the fifties 
and why they eventually, in 1873» declared war on Achin.
«•
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CONCLUSION.
Five distinct phases in Dutch expansionary policy in 
Sumatra during the period 1816-1873 can be discerned.
I found that between 1816-1824 - the first phase - the 
main motive of the Dutch to extend their influence in Sumatra 
was to prevent Raffles from accomplishing his plans for the 
establishment of a British colonial empire in the East Indies. 
The Batavian authorities feared that the establishment of a 
British free trade port too close to Java - the Dutch economic 
and political stronghold - would be detrimental to its prosp­
erity; and they therefore tried to surround Java with a 
protective barrier in which Sumatra formed a vital link. 
Although in 1824 Sumatra was recognized to be within the Dutch 
sphere of influence, that island had then lost its original 
importance to Holland, because a British post had been wedged 
into the protective screen around Java at another point: 
Singapore.
Thus, Dutch interest shown in Sumatra during the period 
1816-1824 was primarily of a strategic nature; and it was 
only the port of Padang at the West-Coast of Sumatra, which, 
because of its coffee exports, was considered by Batavia to be 
of some direct economic importance.
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The attempts of the Dutch between 1821 and 1829 to 
establish their control in Minangkabau - the hinterland of 
Padang - constitutes the second phase.
Three conclusions emerged from my investigation of this 
period. Firstly Dutch military intervention in Minangkabau 
was not part of any general plan for the occupation of the 
whole of Sumatra, but was rather an ad hoc measure designed 
to restore peace and order which were a pre-requisite for 
the prosperity of the Dutch ports on the West-Coast,
Secondly, only after the revenue potential of the rich 
valleys of Minangkabau had been realized by the Dutch did they 
decide to keep at least part of the country permanently 
occupied.
Thirdly, it was largely for external reasons - i,e, the 
financial debacle in Java and the rebellion of Diponegara 
(1825-1830) - that the Dutch were prevented from achieving their 
objectives of restoring peace and bringing Minangkabau under 
their effective administrative control.
The Sumatra policy of van den Bosch (1830-1841) forms the 
third phase; and it should first be noticed, I think, that 
van den Bosch - in contrast to the period 1816-1830 - devised 
a plan which included the whole of Sumatra,
Secondly, van den Bosch’s Sumatra policy constituted an 
integral part of his general policy for the whole of the Dutch
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East Indies; and therefore its main determinant was the 
principle of profitability.
The desire for large profits with the smallest possible 
overheads was responsible for van den Bosch’s initial plan 
to seal off the Sumatran coastline and to leave the interior 
of the island untouched.
Similarly this profitability motive explains his later 
decision to occupy Minangkabau when it appeared that the 
Padris were unwilling to come to terms and a great deal of 
Minangkabau coffee was being exported to Singapore,
Again, the regulations designed by van den Bosch for the 
administration of Minangkabau show his pre-occupation with 
business. Occupation of territory for the sake of national 
grandeur was out of the question; and the sole reason for the 
presence of the Dutch in Minangkabau was to make that territory 
a profitable proposition. As the forced introduction of 
European civilization into Minangkabau would cause social and 
political upheavals and would result in increased military and 
administrative expenditure, the cheapest way, according to van 
den Bosch, for the Dutch to reach their objective would be to 
leave the existing indigenous social and political structure 
intact.
However, the execution of van den Bosch’s plan was 
retarded by two developments. Firstly the stubborn resistance
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of the Padris kept the Dutch fully occupied until the end 
of the * Thirties* Secondly when the Padris were finally 
disposed of, an even more formidable obstacle was put in 
the way of the completion of van den Bosch*s objectives; 
i.e# Britain# But this second development brings us to the 
fourth phase in Dutch Sumatra policy (1841-1848)#
During the period 1840-1871 the extent of Dutch expansion 
in Sumatra — which previously had been dependant mainly on 
factors of national and local importance - became largely an 
international issue#
Soon after the conclusion of the treaty of 1824 both 
parties had tried to twist its stipulations to such an extent 
that this agreement became hardly more than a worthless piece 
of paper# The result was that the Dutch territorial position 
in the East Indies became again very shaky as it had been in 
the years 1816-1824; and the extent of Dutch expansion in 
Sumatra became largely dependent on British goodwill, which in 
turn depended mainly on Holland’s willingness to grant concess­
ions to British trade in its colonies#
Until 1848 the Dutch government was unwilling to grant any 
trade concessions in the colonies, not only because it did not 
want to abolish the colonial monopoly system of van den Bosch, 
but also because it needed all the money it could obtain from 
the Indies in order to keep afloat financially#
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The reaction of The Hague to the prohibition by Britain 
of further Dutch expansion on the East-Coast of Sumatra was 
twofold.
Firstly the Dutch in order to prevent a discussion of 
territorial rights tried to take away the cause of dispute 
by evacuating most of the East-Coast area.
Secondly - and here the profitability motive comes to 
the fore again - the Dutch government reasoned that owing to 
Britain’s insistence on non-differential tariffs and the fact 
that the East-Coast itself was known to have only little 
economic value, this territory had lost its original value to 
Holland, i.e. to seal off the transit trade between the rich 
Sumatran interior and the Straits Settlements. This objective, 
The Hague argued, could still be reached by closing off this 
trade at its source in the Dutch controlled districts of the 
interior.
Subsequently in Minangkabau and the other districts of the 
Central West-Coast the Dutch successfully reverted the natur­
ally Eastward flowing trade to their ports on the Western 
seaboard.
Thus, despite British opposition the Dutch managed to 
reach much of their original objective in occupying Sumatra, 
i.e. to control its trade and commerce.
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Consequently, requests by colonial authorities to expand 
Dutch control Eastwards were repeatedly put aside by The Hague 
on the grounds that such a move would not increase profits, 
but instead would only provoke Britain with the possible 
result that Holland might lose everything it had gained so far.
The parliamentary revolution of 1848 in The Hague inaug­
urates the fifth phase in Dutch expansionary policy in 
Sumatra (1848-1873).
Although during this period the Home government kept 
insisting on receiving colonial financial surplusses (batig 
slot) and therefore generally remained opposed to further 
expansion of control, the colonial authorities on various 
occasions took the law into their own hands and presented The 
Hague with a fait accompli.
I found three main motives for renewed Dutch expansion 
on the East-Coast of Sumatra. Firstly the fear of foreign 
infiltration into that area; and secondly a desire both on 
economic and humanitarian grounds to stop the recurring inter­
necine struggles in the East-Coast sultanates and to abolish 
misrule, slavery and piracy. Thirdly, there is an increasing 
awareness discernible among many Dutchmen that apart from 
business, which in any case would flourish better under a more 
liberal system of trade and commerce, it was Holland1s duty and 
destiny to raise the Indonesians themselves to a higher level 
of prosperity and civilization.
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There were two developments which made it possible for 
Holland to expand its control on the East-Coast of Sumatra 
without being opposed by Britain.
Firstly, the growing impact of liberalism and humanitar- 
ianism on Dutch public opinion since 1848 resulted in the 
gradual abolition of the culture and consignment system, a 
process which had practically been completed in 1870. In its 
place a more liberal system of trade was introduced in the 
Dutch colonies. This development removed the main cause for 
British opposition to further Dutch expansion in the Archi­
pelago.
Secondly, during the * Sixties fears of a third power 
settling in the East—Indies, caused Britain and Holland to 
draw closer together.
Thus this growing rapprochement between Holland and 
England resulted in the Sumatra treaty of 1870/71 in which 
the Dutch were given a free hand in Sumatra, including Achin, 
in return for equal treatment of British trade in the Nether­
lands East Indies.
Subsequently, in 1873, the Dutch declaring war on Achin 
embarked on the last stage of bringing the whole of Sumatra 
under their control.
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